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THE CIVIL WAR IN SPAIN

THE CIVIL WAR IN SPAIN

by

FRANK JELLINEK

Author of "The Paris Commune of 1871"

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FOR
ANTONIO, RAFAELA AND MARIA FUSTER
MIGUEL OROZCO
FRANCISCO RONDA
AND
THOSE OF ALTEA

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INTRODUCTION

THE EARLY PART of this book was written between late August and October 1936; the latter part between October 1936 and February 1937. This introduction and Part V Chapter VI, "The War in 1937," may be dated August 1937.

Since the original writing many new facts have come to light. Many—perhaps too many—books on Spain and the Civil War have been written, few of which I have had the opportunity to consult. For an adequate history of the Spanish Civil War, its background, its immediate and remoter causes and results, one may have to wait half a century. For an attempt at understanding what is actually going on at the moment there can be no more delay.

Nearly all other studies have aimed at making their readers *see* the Spanish Civil War: but it was vitally important to provide also the materials which might show what the Civil War was *about*. There should be no excuse for being at the mercy of rhetoric or the picturesque. Such accounts are invaluable as aids to the realisation of the physical conditions of civil war, the implications of this particular civil war: but it was essential to provide a background.

No doubt, "war is hell", and civil war perhaps more hellish even than international war, especially in Spain, where the human conception of brotherhood is stronger than anywhere else in the world. For this reason, I have appended the narrative of "English Penny", one of the finest because one of the least "prettied-up" narratives of actual war conditions. (*See Appendix I.*)

It was, of course, impossible to assess the Spanish Civil War completely when one viewed it from a particular

angle—in this case that of an ordinary, fairly well-informed foreign journalist stationed in Barcelona from long before July 19, 1936. Marx could analyse the Paris Commune in 1871 with the help of few documents save the London press; but he had made a life-time study of French revolutionary politics, the events happened near home and were confined to a matter of ten weeks. The Spanish Civil War spread over a period of more than a year (to the time of writing), involved 26 million persons and a whole international situation at one of its most critical periods. Marx was writing, at fever heat but with nearly a quarter of a century's experience behind him, in a "safe" country: this book was written chiefly in Barcelona, subject to the exigencies of daily journalism, the interruptions of war and the censorship. I must, however, thank the officials of the Catalan Press Commissariat, Manuel Galés, Sais, Costa and Casacuberta, for straining discretion to the limits of safety and for passing the manuscript of this book although they disagreed with many of my conclusions.

Much documentary evidence was lacking or unreliable. I have tried to include only what appeared indubitably genuine. Most of the events described I saw personally. The rest were reported to me by reliable observers. I wish particularly to thank Dr. Ernst Bock for his information on the events in Madrid in July and August 1936. But it was impossible to check all data completely, and doubtless there are decisive factors, the mention of which has been totally omitted.

Some situations have changed radically since the writing of the last chapter. In some cases, latent tendencies have come out into the open, and have been liquidated. Errors have been perpetuated or corrected. Many men have died, some of whom were my friends.

Inadequate though such a study of the Spanish Civil War must be, it appeared essential. The understanding of historical facts may influence action until it has an historical effect. The knowledge of origins, not the schematised

deductions of distant Solomons, must influence these decisions. To support the Spanish Republic "against Fascism" may be a sterile, though honourable, attitude unless there is an understanding of what that Spanish Republic and what Spanish Fascism really are.

There has been, too, much talk of the "betrayed Revolution", especially since the May riots in Barcelona. These riots, implicit in the whole history of Catalonia since 1931, must be understood in the light of their past history. Similarly, the military rebellion of July 19, 1936 must be regarded only as the continuation of a long process, the origins of which stretch far back into Spanish political and economic history. While it is obviously incorrect to isolate the Spanish Civil War from the history of all Europe, it is essential to regard it as a thing Spanish, based upon a long historical process where the most apparently insignificant moves of minor politicians in a backward country at the end of Europe were to have consequences which shook the Foreign Offices of twenty-seven "non-intervening" countries.

Forecast and deduction are still impossible. Civil war reserves surprises, especially in Spain, where everything is unpredictable. Why, for example, the Spanish Republicans should have elected as their first President the man who had resigned from the Premiership because he was opposed to the Republican constitution is only one typical example of the puzzles of Spanish contemporary history. The Civil War provided hundreds more.

Political analysis abroad has been notably partisan, and this was the chief excuse for this book, which is an attempt to give the actual data for forming a judgment, not to give what would, after all, be nothing but one more statement of opinion. This was the more necessary in that the information sent back to various parties in England interested in the Spanish situation tended in some cases to be entirely prejudiced and as inaccurate as it was incomplete. Most of the delegates sent to Spain were unable to speak any Spanish and thus fell into the hands of interpreters who,

usually not themselves Spaniards, handed on information with a strong subjective colouring.

Hence arose a somewhat ridiculous patronising attitude. Persons who had never heard of the Asturias rising in 1934 nor the history of the relations between Spanish Anarchist and Socialist Unions dared to blame the Spanish workers for lack of unity, when they could not even achieve sufficient unity in their own countries to aid members of the Internationals to which they belonged. Barcelona was crowded with well-meaning individuals who had not the remotest idea of what was happening and no qualifications whatsoever either with machine-gun or typewriter. "I've just come to make the Revolution!" one young American—since expelled—naïvely told the Unified Catalan Socialist Party. "Go down the street and talk to the Trotskyists: we're busy," was the reply.

This was not cynicism. There was need for anyone who could do anything concrete to help win the war. A whole new State had been created from nothing, amid the crash of foreign bombs. Efforts were often ridiculous, often criminal, nearly always confused. It took a year to make an army, but when the Spanish People's Army was formed, it was a formidable thing in European calculations: a quarter of a million men disciplined under fire. No other army had been tested since the Great War. The boasted qualities of the Italian infantry were put to the test and failed at Brihuega and Brunete.

Military observers learned more than politicians. The revised opinions of General Staffs have a decisive political influence. In 1936, the Spanish Republic depended upon outside aid. It was not forthcoming, and defeat loomed. "Admired and abandoned by the whole world," Spaniards fought for international democracy against a new-formed Fascist International. In 1937, the Spanish People's Army began to give democracy a lead. The International Brigade had saved international solidarity, at the cost of three-quarters of its members. Now the Spaniards themselves were respectable: driven back on their own powers of

self-discipline and organisation they had become a force which could no longer be neglected. They had achieved what a Spaniard most respects: the dignity of a man. They could take their own way, and it was an impertinence to patronise them.

This did not mean that international solidarity was no longer necessary. It would have been so had the democratic Powers been able to check foreign intervention on behalf of the rebels, or if they had been even willing to supply the Republic with the essential arms. The capacity of even the members of the Labour and Socialist International to be bluffed out of a strong position was only not surprising when the history of its most important section, the British Labour Party and T.U.C. Executive, was examined. Mr. Eden, related to all the political hostesses, could quote the Labour organ, *Daily Herald*, to refute Labour Party objections in the House of Commons.

There was an unpleasant sadism about all this which the Spanish resented. In the summer of 1937, they were strong enough to despise it. Spanish histories of the Peninsular War usually make no mention of the Duke of Wellington. The Spanish histories of the Civil War of 1936 onwards will certainly mention the International Brigade, but the democratic Powers will be lucky if they escape unnoticed.

Certainly, it took a year of warfare to clarify the issues. On the side of the Antifascists there were sixty years of murderous dissensions to overcome. The thing that was surprising was not that nearly a thousand were killed in the street-fighting in Barcelona in May 1937 but that sufficient unity had been achieved for this massacre not to lead to total collapse.

Sheer necessity brought out the unsuspected capacities of the Spanish people: the smiling courage under hunger, bombardment, isolation; the potentialities of self-discipline voluntarily accepted; the constructive powers of the unions; the complete refusal to accept defeat or death as anything of exaggerated importance.

It is important to make the point about the capacity for discipline and organisation, for, admittedly, it was the Communist Party which took the lead in building up the People's Army and this might give rise to the suspicion that any success was due to "Moscow methods" or "Muscovite agitators". The French press was full of stories about *nagaika* whips and men chained by savage Russians to their machine-guns. The stories were always attributed to deserters from the International Brigade and were usually sponsored by Doriot. The truth was perfectly simple: the Spanish Communist Party was a *Spanish* party, just as intolerant of foreign dictation as the bulk of Spaniards have always been. The Duke of Wellington received no particular gratitude, and the heroes of the Peninsular War are, to Spaniards, Palafox, the defender of Saragossa, and El Empecinado, the guerrilla leader. Von Faupel was no particular hero to the Spanish rebels. "Red emissaries", who were in fact the legitimate diplomatic envoys of a friendly Power, were welcomed heartily but never had a leading influence. There were no Russian brigades, and the only Russian General was a White who had been in exile for ten years.

Curiously enough the Russian fantasy was shared by the Extreme Right and the Extreme Left, by Fascists and Trotskyists, who pooled their misinformation. POUM's paper, *La Batalla*, was frequently quoted by such papers as the organ of Tardieu's son-in-law, and by Queipo de Llano in his radio talks.

Queipo de Llano always referred to the "Marxist scum" — *la canalla Marxista*. It was strange that this "scum", which was hardly "Marxist" throughout since it included Catholics, bourgeois democrats and Anarchists, should have at one time almost neglected the war to build schools, form museums, construct tramcars and care for the unemployed and poor in a well-organised public relief system; that one of its major preoccupations was to stamp out the illiteracy and semi-literacy which had been the result of centuries of Church schools. "Red agents" could not

possibly have done this unless there had been a passionate and universal demand for it.

The excuse made by Germany and Italy for intervening on behalf of Franco, and the fear which prevented the British National Government from acting on behalf of a Government with which it maintained diplomatic relations and which was a fellow-member of the League of Nations, were that Spain was being "Bolshevised". In support of this were adduced hundreds of atrocity stories alleging "Asiatic barbarism", most of them dating from well before the Paris Commune. Atrocities were certainly committed by both sides, although observers in rebel territory frequently stated that the loyalists really had not the first idea of a proper terror. There are few atrocity stories in this book, for it is a profitless business swapping horrors. It must be remembered, too, that what might seem atrocities in a country which had its last civil war three centuries ago—when churches were treated much as they were in Spain in 1936: and there has been the Black and Tan episode since—do not seem so atrocious in a southern country with an appalling infantile mortality rate even in peace-time. But the atrocity issue was practically irrelevant.

More important was the accusation that "Spain was going Communist". The exact implications of this were never defined by German and Italian Government spokesmen and rarely without hysteria by the "inspired" press. "Bolshevists," Goebbels was to shout, "are not human beings. In Spain, Moscow is holding a roll-call of its satellites. . . . A mysterious destiny has let them loose on the world to torment the peoples. . . ."

The "Bolshevik contagion" in Spain was quite obviously merely a pretext of the fascist Powers to continue their policy of aggressive blackmail and to distract attention from their internal difficulties. First it was the "menace of Judaism"; then it was "the poison of Bolshevism". The really serious thing, however, was that Italy, which had always been almost openly contemptuous of this

ghost-raising, had been proud of its good relations with the U.S.S.R., had never looked upon Fascism as an "export article" and was quite frankly interested in the Spanish Civil War only for the advantages in the Mediterranean which it could thereby blackmail out of England and France, found it convenient to adopt the slogan and assure the world that it could never countenance the "fact" that "Bolshevism intended to make Spain a platform for revolutionarising Western Europe and a base for its army and navy in Western Europe and the Western Mediterranean".

It was perfectly true, admitted publicly by both Litvinov and Maisky, that the U.S.S.R. had an interest in the Spanish Government's victory. Any triumph for the fascist Powers, once the Spanish Civil War had become a war against foreign invasion, must necessarily endanger world peace. The U.S.S.R. was the only European Power to which peace was the supreme consideration, and any increase of the factors tending towards world war would necessarily meet with its hostility. This European policy, which could only benefit the countries which were interested in keeping the peace, was a very different thing from a desire to set up a Soviet State in the Mediterranean.

Nothing, in fact, could be so deadly to a fascist regime as a peace policy. The U.S.S.R. had understood the brilliant and essentially humanistic—"civilised"—idea of fighting Fascism with peace. Thus, M. Dzelepy, a profound admirer of such Right wing spokesmen as "Pertinax" and Wladimir d'Ormesson, was compelled to note that "Russia in fact had done nothing but be the first to apply the principle of the indivisibility of peace". "This may seem paradoxical," continued M. Dzelepy, "even inadmissible. But it is so, and we must have the courage to recognise it. Whether we like it or no, the Soviet Union must to-day be considered among the Powers which are defending peace."

The Spanish Communist Party was well able to look after itself. It was not Russians who organised the Fifth

Regiment nor was it a Russian who inspired Spaniards with unflinching determination by such slogans as: "It is better to die on our feet than live on our knees." The Communist Party certainly obtained a dominating influence in Spanish politics and an ever-increasing membership and mass of sympathisers. It did so because its slogans were proved correct and because its activity was efficient. It won its position by merit, not by "oriental intrigue".

By the summer of 1937, the time of the victory at Brihuega, increasing numbers of Spaniards were beginning to look to the Communist Party for the lead which they had failed to find elsewhere. It was not the intrigues of the Communist Party which had led to the insufficiency of the historical Liberal, Socialist and Anarchosyndicalist organisations and to the treachery of the POUM, but the course of the historical dialectic. That party would inevitably lead the way which had best understood whither that way led.

Should the Spanish Communist Party become the dominating force in antifascist Spain, this would by no means imply "Sovietisation", until the broad masses of the people demanded some sort of Soviet system. Actually, the Soviet system approximates very closely to the traditional Spanish way of living before it was destroyed by the centralising Monarchy. There are many records of a form of collectivised farming, and the "Old Laws" for which the outspokenly "anti-Red" Basque Catholic Nationalists fought contain a system of nationalised mines.

Those who saw in Communist dominance all the, to them, horrors of the implantation of Soviets had never taken the trouble to read the Resolutions of the VIIth Congress of the Communist International, a document easily available in several languages. Basing itself upon this, the Spanish Communist Party accepted the fact that Spain was working out its bourgeois democratic revolution and liquidating feudalism, just as Cromwell had done in England and Robespierre in France. This was an

essential historical stage, and it may be hoped that the study of Spanish conditions presented in this book will show the data upon which the view was based. These data had apparently not been studied by the foreign advocates of immediate proletarian revolution, although Maurin, whose disappearance did so much to disorganise their brother-party in Spain, had presented a very complete picture, to which I have been much indebted in the earlier part of this book.

Since the VIIth Congress, the Communist Party's view was that the matter of supreme importance was the defence of democracy in the interests of peace against aggressive Fascism. The predominance of the Communist Party in Spain would therefore mean an immense strengthening of democracy in the Popular Front—a very different matter from the “horrors of Bolshevisation”. It would mean an intensification of the Popular Front programme which won the 1936 elections and was at that time widely approved abroad for its moderate and enlightened liberalism.

It has often been said that “the Spaniard is too individualistic ever to be a Communist”. This is about as correct as other such tropes: “the British working man is too conservative ever to be a revolutionary”, “the Russian is too incompetent ever to be a mechanic”, and so on. The historical facts of the British labour movement and of the Russian Five-Year Plans are simply ignored. Circumstances alter character, even if the original generalisation were true. Anarchosyndicalist collectivisation and communal farming in Estremadura and Andalusia, where it was purely instinctive, not organised by any party, showed that Spaniards prefer to work in the group rather than as individuals. Certainly Spaniards have a high sense of the dignity of a man; but only such persons as André Gide could believe that a communist system, based on a desire to remove inequalities of opportunity and condition, necessarily means the denial of the human personality. The truth is that the Spaniards, perhaps

more than any other people, possess the high art of living in a community. Hence the deep influence of anarchist ideals, despite all the inconsistencies of anarchist practice.

The Spanish Communist Party's standpoint was attacked also from the "left", by those who suffered from most of the "infantile maladies of Communism". The Communists were accused of "stifling the Revolution", even of being "counter-revolutionaries". This should have been gratifying to the foreign and Spanish magnates, but since they did not at once embrace the Communist Party, the accusation must have appeared to them untrue. It was untrue.

In the first place, the Spanish Communist Party was not "stifling" a "Revolution", but defining it. The "Revolution" was that of democracy against feudalism and a feudalised capitalism; there were no objective conditions present to justify the straight proletarian seizure of power. To seize power at once would have been the most criminal opportunism, would have alienated wide masses of the Popular Front and have degenerated into mere insurrectionism. It would certainly have lost the war, and even the Anarchists came to realise that "if we do not win the war, we cannot completely fulfil our aims".

In the second place, the Communist Party was fighting as a member of the Antifascist Popular Front. It could not betray its allies. The winning of the war with *all* available antifascist forces was the more necessary when foreign Powers turned a civil war into a war of national independence. The class-content of the struggle was always present, for the rebels were using mercenaries in defence of the privileges of the Church, the financial and industrial magnates and the feudal landowners. Their defeat would necessarily mean the disappearance of these classes. This in itself was revolutionary. It would leave a free field for progress and the steady expansion of proletarian influence, until the broad masses, especially the peasants, were ready for the next historical stage.

The Soviet Union's view was that it was the working-class and antifascist movement in general in each country

which must decide its international policy. It would have been absurd to consider "Bolshevising" Spain, because this could only happen when the Spanish Communist Party had won the support of the majority of Spaniards. Accusations that Bela Kun (as usual) had been sent to start a communist revolution in Spain with two million pesetas could be based only upon a complete ignorance of the way in which revolutions are made and a refusal to study the published decisions of the Communist International's Congresses as well as the frank declarations of the leaders of local Communist Parties and of Stalin himself.

In 1920, Lenin stated: "With the vanguard alone victory is impossible. To throw the vanguard alone into the decisive battle when the whole class, when the broad masses have not yet taken up a position either of direct support of the vanguard, or at least of benevolent neutrality towards it, and one in which they could not support the enemy, would not be merely folly but a crime" (*Left-Wing Communism : an Infantile Disorder*).

This fundamental line dictated the Soviet Union's acceptance of the Franco-British proposal for non-intervention. The U.S.S.R. was attacked by "Leftist" critics perhaps even more strongly than by the pro-Fascists and Fascists. Such parties as the POUM in Spain and the I.L.P. leadership in England were virulent in their attacks upon the U.S.S.R.'s "betrayal of the Spanish workers"; and many Liberals and non-Marxist Labour supporters were puzzled by what was in fact a perfectly consistent policy.

The whole international situation depended upon winning the majority of the people in each country for the fight against Fascism. Had the Soviet Union refused to declare its neutrality when requested to do so by France and Britain, it would have been attacked as a "war-monger" not only by Italy, Germany and the British Conservatives but also by the British Labour leaders. In France, the anti-Soviet Labour campaign would have

split the Popular Front, itself an essential part of the general line-up against Fascism. The vital thing was to win the British and French working-classes in a vast campaign to end neutrality. The wide growth of feeling against non-intervention inside Britain and France enabled the Soviet Union to raise sharply the question of breaches of the agreement. Eventually, therefore, it might be possible for the Spanish Government to buy arms not only from the U.S.S.R., but also from the British and French Governments after they had yielded to pressure from the working-classes in these countries. Working-class and antifascist unity would have been greatly strengthened on a concrete issue ("arms and planes for Spain") and the Spanish Government would be in a much stronger position. The U.S.S.R. would have scored a triumph for its policy of fighting Fascism by enforcing peace.

I have laid particular stress on this point of "Sovietisation", not only here but throughout this book, because it is the key to the whole story. In Spain a new modality of history was being worked out, that of the Popular Front. In Europe, a new diplomacy had come into existence, based upon the simple abandonment of the concepts of international law and the sanctity of treaties. The two tendencies were parallel. In some measure, the Spanish Antifascists were fighting for common decency, the only thing which enables men to live in civilised communities. It appeared that the rise of the Spanish Communist Party might lead to a decent society in Spain, in accordance with the wishes of the majority of Spaniards, and that the condition for this rise, the victory over Spanish reaction, might inflict such a defeat upon the Fascist International that it would once more be possible to enforce the conception of honourable dealing in international affairs.

This is perhaps an abstract view. I have attempted to follow up the intricacies of *Realpolitik* in the body of the book. There were many details which were not available in Spain at the time. Especially, a much fuller investigation of the foreign capitalist interests in Spain is needed.

The inadequacy of the analysis must be excused by the insufficiency of available data.

Throughout, it has been the intention to concentrate on the Spanish aspect of the Civil War. It is possible that a fairly detailed description of events, especially of those between 1934 and 1936, may help in the understanding of the war itself. On the Civil War itself there is now almost a superfluity of material.

I am very much aware of sins of omission, which may have falsified this study's focus. It was unfortunate, but a really thorough description of the war could be done only in tranquillity and after its end, with all the material at hand. This was impossible; but it was essential that some attempt should be made to explain what actually happened and to imply the issues involved.

The usual question asked, in August 1937, is: "When will the war be over?" There are only two possible answers: when Italy and Germany have bankrupted themselves and destroyed their fighting machines by the magnitude of their aid to Franco; or when the Spanish Government has won.

Foreign Powers played the usual game, from neutrality to "humanisation", from "humanisation" to mediation. These proposals were of course merely moves in the far bigger game of world politics. Nothing could be certain in the Spain of August 1937, but it appeared that this proud and death-ignoring people could not, even more than would not, end the struggle until they had won it.

A Basque paper, *Euzko Deya*, published in Paris, argued, in March 1937, that there were perhaps 6 million "Reds", 4 million "Whites" and 16 millions of persons fundamentally neutral, who were sick of the war and sicker of the foreign invasion. The continuance of the war could lead to nothing but the increase of suffering. If the 16 millions united, they could enforce reason upon the warring 10 millions.

This was written before the annihilation of Guernica and by a typical Basque Catholic Nationalist in exile. This sort of fantasy was much encouraged in London.

It was obviously a fallacy, because it would be impossible for the 16 million neutrals (even if the figures were correct) to enforce their will on 10 million trained and armed fighters.

No Spaniard likes war. A dogfight against the police in the streets of a large town, especially Barcelona, is an old custom; but warfare in the open country, with planes killing children behind the lines, was a very different thing. But it was impossible to give in: everyone knew only too well what happened to the rebels' prisoners.

There was one other possibility: that the rebel Spaniards, who, after all, called themselves Nationalists, might turn upon their foreign allies. This appeared the most probable solution. Experience had shown that, after the excesses of the early days, deserters and prisoners were well treated by the Government forces.

A fine country was being ruined. But fine things were emerging from the ruins. There was a new spirit in the Spanish people. Especially was this obvious in the youth movements. It was the Young Socialist-Communist Militias which saved Madrid on July 19 and went out into the Sierra. Most of the Generals elected by acclamation were comparatively young men. Young men held new administrative responsibility. This was so even on the rebel side, and Alejandro Lerroux, the aged Radical ex-Premier, wrote from exile in France protesting to Franco that age was being neglected.

One thing was certain. Even if the rebels should win the war, they could not win the peace. Every success Franco obtained tightened his dependence upon his foreign allies, so that Mussolini could openly claim the capture of Santander as an Italian victory. Every Italian victory would sharpen the dissensions among the capitalist Powers to such a point that eventually war would become inevitable unless the Italians agreed to relinquish the fruits of their victory.

If Franco won, he would have bankrupted himself in the process. He would have almost no native forces to

keep down a people which had become conscious of its rights and had been steeled by months of modern warfare. Neither England nor France could eventually permit a country garrisoned by Italians or Germans to straddle their strategic lines, however much the big financial interests might be in favour of doing a deal with the winner and sharing the loot. Franco's victory would necessarily be fatal to him, to his allies and to world peace.

The Spanish Republic by the summer of 1937 was beginning to be strong enough to fight its own battles and to win, provided that the rebels received no more huge reinforcements from abroad. This should have been the task of the international labour movement and of all democrats who saw in Franco's victory the deadly threat to world peace and the imminence of Fascism in their own countries. Much was done: money, supplies, medical aid were sent, refugees cared for. Many Antifascists went to die in the International Brigade to save Madrid and to vindicate the honour of world democracy. But much was left to do, and although the British T.U.C. Congress finally placed on record its homage to the Brigade and demanded the restoration of the Spanish Government's right to buy arms freely, it dared not move into active opposition to the National Government. Just as throughout the Spanish story the moral was that unity can be achieved only on the basis of a concrete issue, so here was a great chance of uniting the millions of organised workers and progressive persons throughout the world in a crucial struggle for all that most nearly interested them. It was not taken.

Could that unity be obtained on the basis of "aid for Spain", despite the reluctance of national Governments, an immense step forward would be taken by the labour and democratic forces in all countries. An International Popular Front could be built, capable of effectively checking the menace of Fascism and War.

.

Besides the persons and works already mentioned in this Introduction, I have been indebted to books by Jaume Miravittles (and to him personally), Angel Estivill, Ramos Oliveira, Manuel Benavides and others. I must also thank *World Trend Features*, the *Manchester Guardian* and the *News Chronicle*, for much of the latter part of this book was based upon material sent to them. I have also to thank Archie and Nancy Johnstone, Eduard Ragasol, D. R. Darling, M.J., E.F.B., Antonio Fuster and some friends at Puigcerdá for much assistance of various kinds.

FRANK JELLINEK.

August 1937.

PART I

THE PROBLEM OF SPAIN

- I. The Land
- II. The Church
- III. The Army
- IV. Capitalism
- V. The Workers
- VI. The Regions

PART I

THE PROBLEM OF SPAIN

THERE IS AN old Spanish fable which relates that the men of Spain were particularly acceptable to the Blessed Virgin, who promised that she would intercede with the Almighty for whatever they might desire.

They asked for the finest climate in the world, and the Almighty granted the request. They asked for the finest fruits and wheat, and the Almighty agreed. They asked for the finest horses, swords and such other things, and they received them. They asked for the best songs and the noblest dances, and these were given to them. They asked for the most beautiful women and the bravest men, and these too were granted.

Finally, they asked for the best government in the world. The Almighty turned away his head. "Who do they think they are?" he asked the tearful Virgin.

Spain has been cursed by bad government. This is merely a superstructural way of stating that its whole economy has been distorted and frustrated for centuries in the interests of certain dominating classes, whose economic interests were necessarily opposed to all modern progress. A feudal system of land-tenure, the economic, cultural and political tyranny of the Church, an anarchic, parasitic and ill-organised industry, a narrow and reactionary Army caste, kept three-fourths of the Spanish people in misery. By their very backwardness they produced a violent, ill-directed and desperate middle and working-class movement of sheer protest. The Spanish Revolution of 1931-36 had to be fought out in terms of 1789-93.

This very anachronism made the struggle more bitter. Once given direction, the protest acquired organisation and purposeful violence. Opposition brought strength in union. A weak people has strong governments, a strong people weak governments. A State devoured by parasites will eventually fall; so it must be cut down and burned before its fall can spread infection.

Spanish economy in 1930 was "mixed": a combination of feudalism and monopoly-capitalism, with the dominating power, the Church, partaking of both characteristics. The revolution, therefore, would also be "mixed". The feudal landowners, the Army, the Church and monopoly-capitalistic industry had not yet resolved their inner contradictions: their opponents, the nationalistic petty-bourgeois of the autonomous industrial regions and the working class, had also to resolve their contradictions before the conflict could be clarified. The problem of the Spanish Revolution was, therefore, extraordinarily complex.

The reaction automatically provided a solution by giving the struggle a nation-wide and simultaneous extension. Every Spaniard was forced to decide for the one party or the other. The relation between the individual and the economic interests at stake was violently clarified.

On the one side there were the feudal landlords, the industrialists, the bankers, the officer caste, the Church. On the other, the nationalist petty-bourgeoisie, the small peasants, the day-labourers, the workers. Those who attempted to stand between were liquidated or exiled.

The problem of Spain was on the way to solution. It could no longer be adjourned after July 18, 1936. The solution lay in the strength, intelligence and development of the interests involved. The terms in which the solution would be found were determined by those in which it was posed. The decision lay between the Spain which had always failed in its historic mission and the Spain which had not yet been able to understand it. This was the sense of the struggle.

I

THE LAND

SPAIN IS A country of hunger: mainly of sheer physical hunger, but also of hunger for land.

A population of which nearly 70 per cent lives on the land possesses almost none of it. Sixty-five per cent of the population held 6·3 per cent of the land, while 4 per cent of the population held 60 per cent. In 1925, in one-third of the surface of Spain with a population of 1,053,402, there were 874,548 who earned less than one peseta (5*d.*) per day, while 1,096 "earned" over 1,000 (£25).

The holdings extended from vast estates and ranches (*latifundia*) in Castile, Leon, Andalusia and Estremadura to holdings incapable of supporting a single family (*minifundia*) in Galicia. The Duke of Medinaceli owned 79,146 hectares; two and a half million Galician peasants owned 2·9 million.

In 1931, a peasant could count on work for only 180 days a year. In the province of Saragossa, he could earn as much as 1,440 pesetas (£40); in Avila 180 (£5). The average wage throughout the country was about 810 pesetas (£22 10*s.*). The Catholic "fair wage" worked out at about 270 pesetas (£7 10*s.*).

Yet Spain is not a poor country, but merely impoverished. Ten per cent of the land is some of the richest in Europe; 45 per cent is average; 35 per cent under average, but could be improved; only 10 per cent is desert. Spain produces a large proportion of the world's supply of oranges, olive-oil, artichokes, cork, wine, raisins, grapes, rice and a fine quality of potatoes and wheat. This agricultural produce is supplemented by very important supplies of

copper, mercury, lead, iron ore, pyrites, potash and sulphates.

In this land, which the Moors considered the earthly Paradise and treated with the utmost care—the irrigation of the famous Valencian *huerta* is entirely based on the original Moorish system—the cultivated surface totals 22 million hectares, the uncultivated 24 million, and the completely unproductive no more than 3·2 million. In this impoverished land 70 per cent of the peasants are illiterate or semi-illiterate, although the Spanish peasant is far more intelligent than the Russian *moujik* of Tsarist days. The legend of Spanish *mañana* is true perhaps only of the Andalusians, and hunger-laziness is a well-known effect of under-nourishment. Russian inefficiency used to be a platitude, but the U.S.S.R. has successfully carried through the biggest piece of organised planning ever undertaken.

—The causes of the monstrous wastage can be found in the political and economic history of the Spanish ruling classes. Deforestation, the conversion of arable land into steppe and of agricultural soil into grazing-grounds, enclosures, absentee landlordism, the lack of a strong internal market owing to the incredibly low wages paid, the struggle first between agricultural and stockbreeding interests, then between agrarianism and industry, combined to ruin the country.

The *Mesta*, the famous organisation of the Castilian stockbreeders, won its decisive hold over the Spanish Court in the middle of the sixteenth century and held it until the middle of the nineteenth. Everything was sacrificed to the sheep and the bull. The “sheep’s corrosive tooth” deprived whole provinces of vegetation and hence of water. When the Moors were expelled, for reasons which will be explained later, irrigation, their great speciality, was utterly neglected. Almost all the roads in Spain date from the brief interval of the reign of the “Enlightened Monarch”, Charles III (1759–88), some of them modernised by Primo de Rivera.

The three pillars of the agrarian feudal system were always wheat, maize and cattle. In a wheat-producing country production rarely covered demand, and rarely did Spain not import. The price, therefore, remained absurdly high in a country where wages were tragically low.

Primo de Rivera, the Dictator placed in Madrid by the Catalan textile interests who wanted protective tariffs, prohibited wheat, maize and meat imports. The internal price of wheat rose to 46 pesetas per quintal when the world price was 16; maize was 54 pesetas the metric quintal when the world price was 14. In 1932, cattle production was 32 million head, exactly what it had been for a population smaller by 12 million, in 1794. The Second Republic permitted the importation of Argentine meat to force down the price. The agrarians replied by driving out the Republican-Socialist Government on November 19, 1933, and exactly two months later Argentine imports were prohibited. The Argentines replied by prohibiting Spanish imports, chiefly oil and textiles. Olive-oil exports to the Argentine had totalled about 30 million pesetas annually, one-third of which came from Catalonia; the ban on textiles lost Catalan industry some 10 millions. In this brief summary appears clearly the clash of interests, the results of which were always thrust on the peasants and workers. If Catalan industry won, agricultural wages fell; if the agrarians won, unemployment in the factories rose steeply.

The struggle between wheat-cattle and textiles-steel had profound social and political effects. A decrease in agricultural prices and a rise in wages would favour industry by strengthening the internal market. Simultaneously it would strengthen the petty-bourgeois and proletarian movements which grew up within the industrial drive to power and used the victories of the big bourgeoisie to open up for themselves new possibilities for expansion. Thus it was necessary for the feudal agrarians to keep the country as impoverished as possible; and in this they were entirely successful.

With almost entire control of Spanish politics, the agrarians could fight off the threat from industry almost as easily as they had crushed commerce in the sixteenth century. There was thus no political reason for Spanish agriculturalists to make special efforts to develop their properties. Absentee landlordism became a common feature, the land was administered by scoundrelly agents, and representatives of the landowner were placed in all positions of local political influence. Hence arose a figure of considerable importance in Spanish politics, the *cacique*, who exercised some of the same functions as the agent for a Rotten Borough—Azaña, student of English history, made the word popular in a famous speech, the “*burgos podridos*”. The *cacique*, who would be the Mayor, the local comfortable bourgeois, the doctor, the chemist, any one of the members of the village *Casino*, would have absolute power over the peasants at election times, so that the landowner had in effect a modern form of the feudal retainer army. “Caciquism” largely explains the surprising number of votes that the reaction could collect even in the elections of 1936.

Absentee landlordism could be explicable in modern times, especially in the more advanced provinces such as Valencia. The older families would send their son to the capital for modern education. He would perhaps become a hydraulic engineer. He would therefore lose interest in the family property and refuse to give up his profession when his father died. That was reasonable. What was fatally unreasonable was that the family, a unit which, with the Church's help, could exercise an irresistible influence over any but the most resolute of the Spanish upper classes, would absolutely refuse to allow the engineer to sell or even let his property. In most cases, the land simply fell into decay or was administered by an agent bent on lining his own pockets.

In some places, the landowners were guilty of criminal stupidity. In the province of Salamanca there was a hill which had once been communal property. In the course

of time, no one exactly knew how, the local landowner had enclosed it, then abandoned it. The villagers, starving, decided to go out and cultivate the hill again, and spent two years turning that ungrateful soil. The absentee landlord heard of it, and sent the Civil Guard. The villagers were driven out, the landowner took possession again, and two years' work was simply a gift to the latifundist. It is hardly surprising that peasant hunger riots are a prominent feature in Spanish history.

Until the world wheat market collapsed, the Spanish landowner occupied a position which can be paralleled in post-war Europe perhaps only by that of the Hungarian Magnates. Supported by the Church and the Civil Guard, with a private corps of keepers armed with shotguns, with feudal rights over the lives of his tenants and no such obligations as an English squire, for instance, is expected to recognise (repairs, sick-relief, etc.), a Grandee of Spain or his modern successor, the successful financier who had bought out the aristocrat, lived in a world which had little contact with modern life. It must be admitted, however, that the true provincial Spanish aristocracy lived on the whole in extreme sobriety, enlivened, if one may put it so, by a strange mysticism surviving from the days of El Greco or even Saint John of the Cross. The Church naturally took full advantage of this. The real tragedy is that the Spanish countryside was utterly unchanging. There is a fine description of Andalusia as it was in 1936 in "Azorin's" *Los Pueblos*. The book was written in 1906.

Hunger, sun, Civil Guard, trachoma, priests, unemployment, *flamenco* singing (that Moorish famine-wail), flies, illiteracy, infant mortality, excessive natality, beggars, syphilis, and again hunger: this was the panorama of the Spanish countryside in all the wide stretch from Murcia to Corunna, which is known as Black Spain. In the villages, "caciquism", clergy, cheating overseers, unequipped and ramshackle schools, petty snobbery, Civil Guard and hunger. In the manor-houses, confessors, women in perpetual

mourning, mysticism, ignorance, family quarrels, barren pride of race, bad food, early deaths. In the churches, ignorance, greed, rivalries, hatred of the poor, servility. In the Civil Guard barracks, revolvers, Mausers, sub-machine-guns. In the hovels, union-cards of the Socialist Federation of Landworkers or the anarchist organisations. In the *Casinos*, portraits of the President of the Republic. In the manors, Monarchist flags and the Sacred Heart of Jesus.

In the hands of the *caciques*, the old municipal system had fallen into decay and corruption. Yet, in the smaller villages, especially in the east, there was still an unofficial system of local government with an elected Mayor who settled immediate problems. In many places, remains of a communal system survived. In Castile, Aragon and Catalonia it had been common before the enclosures. Cases like that of the Salamanca hill show that common initiative by a whole village is a deeply-rooted instinct. In many places the villages were organised into the One Big Union, not by trades. In Malaga, where anarchist influence had largely yielded to communist, there were several attempts at collective farming during peasant insurrections between 1930 and 1936.

The Republic of 1931 attempted to solve the peasant problem by the Agrarian Reform. Uncultivated land belonging to the latifundia and enclosed common land was to be given to peasant colonists, against very generous compensation to the owners. In the economic field, the Reform was based on three fundamentals: quotas; import of wheat, maize and meat; the Parish Law (*Ley de Terminos Municipales*).

The quotas set up a control over export of agricultural products to prevent the rise of internal prices. The import of wheat, maize and meat was intended to break the price-fixing which benefited only the big producers. The Parish Law forbade the employment of outside labour until all the peasants within the parish had been employed. This prevented undercutting by cheap vagrant or immi-

grant labour, especially by Portuguese workers brought over the frontier into Estremadura for the harvest; and also prevented *caciques* seeing that any labourer suspected of "subversive tendencies" did not obtain employment.

Agricultural wages rose and the cost of living decreased. But little was done to appease the terrible hunger for land. In Estremadura, the *yunteros*, labourers owning a pair of horses but no land to plough, waited hopelessly. "The land to the peasants!" the communist slogan, and "The land to him who works it" of the Anarchists, were terribly real in the starving countryside; and wild hunger revolts, strikes and lock-outs exhausted both the peasants and the land. There could be only one remedy: the way pointed by the Communists backed by full power at the centre. Sheer hunger, despair and perhaps the strong infusion of Moorish blood in the south gave to these peasant revolts an extraordinary savagery and tenacity, matched only by the savagery of the repression. The peasantry were a potentially insurrectionary class; given direction and co-operation by the organised workers in the town, they could become revolutionary.

In Catalonia, there was another potentially revolutionary peasant class, the *rabassaires*, organised into a strong union by Luis Calvet, and closely connected with Francisco Maciá, the Catalan Liberator, and his successor, Luis Companys.

The *rabassa morta* was a peculiar and ancient system of semi-feudal land-tenure. A man who wished to work a piece of land would go to the owner and ask for it. The owner would give it to him on terms which varied in different provinces, the most usual being the payment of a lump sum down and the promise of half, a third or a quarter of the produce, according to the soil. If he could, the *rabassaire* paid the deposit; if, as usually was the case, he could not, he at once fell into the clutches of the banks by raising a loan, and therefore never really owned his land at all. Only after five or six years would the soil be able to produce vines, and those of inferior quality for at

least another five years, so that the *rabassaire* could hardly meet his interest-payments for ten years, thus increasing his debt.

Even when the soil began to yield, the *rabassaire* had to pay not only a large part of his produce but also "customary gifts", chickens at Christmas, first fruits, etc. He could hold his land only so long as he kept it in cultivation "according to the good use and custom of a good cultivator".

At the end of the nineteenth century the phylloxera ruined nearly four-fifths of the Catalan vines. The owners declared that the *rabassaire* had allowed the land to go out of cultivation. The Courts finally decided that the life of a vine should be considered as twenty-five years; but before the sentence was given, many *rabassaires* had been ejected and all had increased their indebtedness.

Thus, the phylloxera, striking Catalonia at about the same time as the defeat in the Cuban War ruined the Catalan textile industry, was an historic factor of the first magnitude. The *rabassaires* began to organise under Francisco Layret at the same time as Cambó began his Separatist agitation, which passed into the hands of the rich Francisco Maciá in the early 1920's, Companys acting as a link between the two movements.

The phylloxera had subjected the *rabassaires* to increasing proletarianisation, and they became in fact almost as miserable as the Andalusian day-labourers. They had land, but they were cursed with all the disadvantages of small-holding: taxation, the fear of a harvest too bad or too abundant, the failure of agricultural prices, the problem of credit. Their desires were such as a petty-bourgeois revolution might be expected to fulfil: tax-relief, abolition of mortgages and usury, easy credit, canals, roads, schools, cheap manufactured goods and fertilisers, regulation of agricultural prices. It was for this reason that they strongly supported Maciá, and, after his death in 1933, Companys, leaders of the middle-class Left (*Esquerra*) in Barcelona, and, indeed, constituted their

main force. The interests of the *rabassaires* moved on an exact level with those of the Catalan urban petty-bourgeoisie and inclined towards those of the working-class in proportion as the urban middle-class was impotent to save itself from the agrarian counter-attack from Castile and Leon.

Thus there were two sectors hostile to the agrarian monopoly, Catalonia and Black Spain. Their respective interests coincided only up to a point, in the same way as did those of the professional-commercial middle-class and the workers. Should feudal agrarianism and big industrialism conclude an aggressive alliance, their respective opponents would also come together in defence against the common enemy and make the democratic-socialist revolution. With the passing of the Agrarian Reform and its Catalan equivalent, the Law of Agrarian Contracts (*Ley de Contratos de Cultivo*) by the Republic, although the execution might be timorous and ineffective, the domination of the real Spanish ruling class had been challenged for the first time for more than three centuries. The way to revolution lay through the wheat-fields, the maize-plantations, the cattle-ranches and the vineyards.

II

THE CHURCH

ON JULY 20, 1936, almost every church, monastery and convent in Barcelona, except the Cathedral, burned. All over the country, wherever the rebels were defeated, churches burned. Where the whole building was not destroyed, the images were taken out and burned, and the church was afterwards turned into a market, school or hospital.

In the "Tragic Week" of 1909, over seventy churches and religious buildings were burned in Barcelona. On May 12, 1931, forty-three churches and convents were burned in Malaga. On February 20, 1936, many churches were burned in Alicante and Madrid.

In Mieres, Asturias, in October 1934 the socialist miners raised a huge placard: "Long live the Red Christ, he is one of us!" At a small village in Andalusia, the women went in pilgrimage to the local image, "the Christ of the Boot", after the February 1936 elections, to give thanks for the victory of the anti-clericals. During the Holy Week festival at Seville in 1936, Communists in full uniform of blue shirt and red scarf paraded a famous Virgin, shouting: "We are Communists. Our knives for anyone who touches Her!" On the Aragon front they sing, parodying an old song of the Napoleonic Wars: "The Virgin of the Pillar does not want to be fascist; she wants to be captain of the communist column!"

The Holy Office of the Spanish Inquisition burned about half a million "heretics", men who, like their descendants who burned the churches, desired to found a juster, more vigorous and more enlightened society.

The question of the church-burnings of July 1936 will be raised again in its place. But the facts given above show that it was *not only* because the rebels turned many religious buildings into fortresses that the people burned the churches. It was *not only* the result of justified fury or tactical necessity, as it was in the case of Oviedo Cathedral in 1934. The needs of civil war no more *entirely* explain this phenomenon than pure sadism *entirely* explains the *autos-de-fé* of the Inquisition or the necessities of war explain Cromwell's men stabling their horses in Ely Cathedral. In 1909, 1931 and February 1936 there was no question of tactical necessity. The causes go deeper and provide an even more comprehensible explanation. The burnings, although regretted by all responsible central organisations, from the bourgeois Government to the Communist and Anarchist Committees, was not *entirely* the work of hooligans and *agents-provocateurs*. Such elements may have carried out the actual work, but the Spanish people's conscience was acquiescent, if not positively approving.

In Europe, church-burning is an almost exclusively Spanish phenomenon. The French and Russian Revolutions expelled the clergy, the Paris Commune liquidated some of them; the churches were turned into revolutionary clubs, hospitals, billets, but were not destroyed. Only in England and, to some extent, in Germany, was iconoclasm more than sporadic. But, despite the fires of Smithfield and Oxford, the Catholic Church in England, although closely allied with Spain, was never one-hundredth so cruel as the instrument of Torquemada.

It would be exaggerated to lay too much stress on the *autos-de-fé* themselves as responsible for the Spanish hatred of the Church, just as it would be exaggerated to explain the international antifascist movement solely by repulsion from the horrors of castor-oil and concentration-camps. These are superstructural merely, and the causes of this hatred go right down into the economic basis.

Luther's protest against the Catholic Church was the protest of the rising commercial bourgeoisie against

feudalism, the demand for free expansion for the middle-class, the open replacement of indulgences, already a form of commercial credit, by the letter of exchange issued by the producers, not the mere holders, of wealth.

A few months after the appearance of Luther's Ninety-five Theses, declared heretical by Pope Leo X in the Bull of June 15, 1520, the fifth Inquisitor of Spain forbade the entry of Lutheran books. Charles V punished by death anyone found in possession of works listed in the Louvain Index of 1539. The first *auto-de-fé*, "Act of Faith", was carried out at Valladolid on May 28, 1559.

Aided by the policy of the House of Austria, which forbade the majority of half-way capable Spaniards to work and thus effectively prevented the rise of a powerful bourgeoisie to challenge its absolutism, the Church grew rich. Spain was to be pure, proud and poor, the country chosen by God, whose gaze should never penetrate through the fantastic splendours of churches decorated by El Greco to the starving masses so far below. Spain, gorged with the gold of the Indies, remained the rock-like opponent of the economic revolution begun by England and Holland; starving, suicidal and fantastic, Spain prayed while Europe worked.

The Church and the monastic Orders soon became the economic masters of the country. The Church bought in, for preference, the mortmains and properties at prices so high that no one could compete with it. Thus they obtained the best properties in the Kingdom. They acquired communal lands from those who worked under mortmain, and thus reduced the villagers to mere day-labourers.

The Church's privileged position and wealth allowed it to hire out land at very low rent, so that it became easier to be a Church-tenant than an independent owner. Thus the Church had become by the middle of the nineteenth century the biggest landowner in Spain. Of a population of seven millions, 147,000 lived in religious institutions.

By far the richest congregation was that of the Jesuits. They were a militant order and had done some remarkably fine educational work in Peru. But, by the middle of the nineteenth century, their initiative had been swamped by their wealth, although, with their subtle and elastic dialectic, they had been able to adapt themselves to modern conditions. Their missionary skill had been transformed into commercial acumen, and of all Spanish capitalists, with the possible exception of Don Juan March Ordinas, they were the most cunning, enterprising and ruthless.

Every regime which favoured the rising commercial class saw in them its worst rival and expelled them: they always returned as soon as the traditional Spain of the Inquisition and authoritarian centralisation regained the upper hand. Charles III, an "Enlightened Despot", drove them out in 1767. They crept back, three at a time, between 1768 and 1790. Ferdinand VII, supported, like the equally reactionary Louis XVIII in France, by the bayonets of the Holy Alliance, officially recognised their return in 1815 as a guarantee against the "satanic" Revolution. The Cadiz Cortes, the revolt of the democratic bourgeoisie, expelled them again in 1820. After its collapse in 1823, the Jesuits returned. In 1836, the liberal leader, Mendizabal, urgently needing money for the Carlist War, confiscated their property and expelled them. They returned with the reaction in 1857. The First Spanish Republic expelled them again in 1868, but they returned after the royalist triumph in 1876 and remained until the Second Republic drove them out once more in 1931. Lerroux let them creep back in 1933. They were expelled again by Azaña in 1936. In 170 years, the Jesuits existed in Spain legally for eighty-eight, were in exile for eighty-two.

Expulsion, however, meant little to the Jesuits. They were always careful to hold their property through disguised limited companies and individual agents. Until 1936, the power of the Jesuits in Spain never looked like being in danger.

In the middle of the eighteenth century, the world organisation of the Jesuits amounted to 2,000 members. In 1917, there were 20,645. In 1932, 22,000. Spain was always their stronghold.

The comparison between the Jesuits and Juan March stands when it is realised that even within the Church the Jesuits are in somewhat bad odour, in the same way as the duller capitalists fear March almost as much as they fear the Revolution. The Church is jealous of the Jesuits' social and economic influence. Rome has always feared the Spanish Jesuits. When Canalejas proposed anti-Jesuit measures in 1911—they never arrived even at discussion in the Cortes—the Holy See did not disapprove. The Jesuits fought back by reviving the old controversy whether the Church Council or the Pope controlled the Church. When ecclesiastical jurists decided in favour of the Council, the Jesuits cleverly reversed their policy, lobbied in favour of the Vatican and put it under a perpetual obligation. Ratti would do no more than give the friend of both Lerroux and Gil Robles, Pita Romero, a *modus vivendi* when he was Ambassador to the Vatican in 1933, despite the efforts of the Papal Legate, Monsignor Tedeschini; but this was smoothed by the granting of the red cap to Dr. Gomà, Archbishop of Toledo, in 1935.

The Jesuits' legal position in Spain was curious. By the Concordat of 1851, only three religious orders, chosen by the Pope, were to function in Spain. The Pope named two, and the others remained until he decided upon the third. The decision was never made. The Jesuits remained in an ambiguous position, embarrassing alike to Spanish Governments and to the Holy See.

The Jesuits were not alone in battenning on Spain. According to statistics published by the Spanish Geographic Institute in 1930—the last year in which the clergy were listed there—there were then 4,924 religious communities in Spain, 1,026 male and 3,898 female. There were 20,485 monks and 60,880 nuns. There were 17,157 buildings dedicated to religious purposes, and 31,345 priests.

There were, then, 112,710 persons directly active in the Church and not outside it. Another statistic gives 168,762, including seminarists and sacristans. In Madrid there were 308 religious institutions, 377 in Barcelona. In Lerida there was one such institution for every 387 persons and one person engaged there for every thirty-three inhabitants. Not that Lerida was a particularly godly town.

The Jesuits exercised a domination over this huge mass of clerics. Even after the 1931 Republic, religious schools were not forbidden, but religious teaching in State schools was banned. No one need send his children to a religious school if there were a State school available—a big “if”.

The Jesuits gained control of both private and religious schools. The expensive private schools they acquired by playing on the snobbery of the Spanish upper classes. The Church schools they controlled by a form of blacklegging. The ordinary salary of a Jesuit teacher was about 1,500 pesetas a year, plus his revenue from masses, about one-third of the wages of a Spanish skilled worker. State teachers got about double. The Jesuits, privately supported by their ample funds, could save the local bishop's money by undercutting the cost of other clerical teachers, and thus gain control of the Church schools.

This control of the schools was extremely important in a country which was about 70 per cent illiterate but longed for education. Workers and peasants had long been taught by propagandists basing themselves on Elie Reclus, Kropotkin and Ferrer that knowledge is power. Workers who could just read made the most fantastic sacrifices to buy Elisée Reclus' big and bad *History of Mankind* and a pistol. With both they could conquer the world; but one was useless without the other. Church education was worse than useless.

Most of the religious Orders gained their wealth in the time of the Austrian Kings and preserved it; the emeralds of the Virgin of the Pillar in Saragossa were possibly the finest in the world. The other Orders could remain the

biggest landowners in Spain, with their interests allied to those of the *Grandeos* of the Castiles and Leon, the ranchers of Andalusia and Estremadura. The Jesuits, ever in danger of expulsion and ever confident of return, laid up for themselves a more lasting and a more mobile treasure.

They discovered the advantage of hiding their property under the name of a person outside the Order or the country. The device dates almost from the beginnings of the limited liability company, called, much more accurately, in Spanish "the anonymous society". In 1879, three English Brothers were entrusted with the nominal ownership of almost the whole of the Spanish Order's property. A letter written by the Superior of the El Salvador monastery in Aragon in 1890 reveals the system: "Since the Spanish Government may intervene in the social sphere, unless we are cautious the trick may become so obvious that liberal rapacity may not hold back before the scruples of alienating the rights of a third person." The Father Superior need not have been afraid; third person rights were sacrosanct until the Church-supported *putsch* of July 1936.

The Jesuits rarely appeared as owners of their property. They were always ready to eat their Passover bread and flee, having spoiled the Egyptians. At one time recently, their affairs were run by Father Ron. A few years later, Father Ron's notary, Ruiz Senén, suddenly appeared as President of nine companies, Vice-president of six and Director of twenty-nine. His director's fees amounted to some £50,000 a year, rather more than those of the biggest financier and industrialist in Spain, Don Estanislao de Urquijo y Ussea.

Although it is difficult to decide where Ruiz Senén's own interests ended and the Jesuits' began, it is certain that both worked—and won—closely together. They controlled banks, power, electricity, transport, railways, hotels, mines, radio, press agencies, newspapers, telephones (in conjunction with Alfonso XIII's intimate

friend, Colonel Sosthenes Behn, of Western Electric). In 1932, when the Jesuit Society had no legal existence in Spain, it was reckoned that its income for that year was no less than £900,000.

Jesuit influence was strong among the small bankrupt farmers, a very important class in provinces such as Catalonia and Valencia. The Catholic National Agrarian Federation was second in importance only to the State Agrarian Bank, serving over two million small farmers who could not exist without credit and could obtain it on easy terms in return for support of Church interests. The Federation owned seventy periodicals and five daily papers spread all over the country.

Jesuit money controlled important sources of indirect propaganda such as the Fabra news-agency, which also received some funds from Germany. It controlled the "Union Radio" Madrid broadcasting station, which brought in some £4,000 per month in publicity alone. The Jesuits had a large interest in the cinema through Herrera Orias' big film company, CIFESA, dedicated to inculcating "patriotic and religious ideals". Herrera Orias' brother, Angel Herrera, was dictator of *El Debate*, the second biggest daily paper in Spain, which exercised as big an influence on uninformed foreign opinion as the Spanish *Times*.

Although the Society of Jesus was possibly the biggest unit in Spanish capitalism, its activities have been somewhat exaggerated by the popular imagination, in the same way as the Masonic Eye and the Hand of Moscow. During the 1934 rising, for instance, it was widely believed that the Jesuits had either kidnapped President Alcalá-Zamora or laid a spell upon him. No one could explain why.

Jesuit influence spread widely among all classes of society. Naturally its appeal was strongest to those whose interests coincided with its own. Through the aristocratic Estanislaos, Luises and Caballeros del Pilar organisations the Society controlled the upper classes. It had connections with the

highest ranks in the Army. Recently-discovered documents show its close relations with Generals Goded and Fanjul.

Jesuit policy and Spanish Church policy in general was defensive rather than aggressive. It was never interested in the conquest of supreme power as in Austria and Portugal. It always, however, placed all its resources of funds and propaganda behind any party which would preserve its privileges, although it has always preferred a "gradualist" party, such as Robles' Popular Action, to violent organisations such as the Carlists. When after the February 1936 elections in Valencia, a dissident Right section of aggressive young men, organised into the *Tercio de Cruzadas de España*, banded together to "save Mother Church", the Church would provide neither funds nor even instructions.

In times of crisis, naturally, the Church took the offensive. Whenever its interests coincided with those of the big bourgeoisie in Catalonia, for instance, it lent definite aid. Thus, during Martinez Anido's anti-worker campaign in 1921, the Free Syndicates of gunmen were based upon the Catholic Unions and the Carlist *requetes*. When Church interests were menaced in 1932, Church money as well as that of the big landowners raised Gil Robles from a rather aggressive back-bencher to the position of spokesman and nominal *Jefe* of the Confederation of Spanish Independent Right Parties, the Ceda.

The workers therefore had ample grounds to hate the Church. The Inquisition, the control of education, the economic power and the Free Unions were sufficient causes. Added to these there were psychological complaints. It offended Spanish notions of human dignity that a priest should put on clean vestments for a rich man's funeral, wear his dirty one for a poor man's. It offended Spaniards' high valuation of human existence that women should be shut away from the world and condemned to a life of sterility. Some of the conditions which came to light when the Barcelona Antifascists opened the convents appeared

quite incredible in the year 1936, and it is certain that the Barcelona convents were not nearly so medieval as those in Catholic Leon and Castile. It was always against the monasteries and convents far more than against the churches that popular fury was directed. Even Anarchists stated in July 1936 that it was quite possible that the Catholic religion would be again tolerated, but that on no conditions could the monks and friars, the "creeping Jesuses", return to antifascist Spain. "The Church would be very fine if only it could be without priests."

In recent years, the Church had become far more dangerous politically, since it had at last adapted its policy to modern conditions in the same way as the Jesuits had turned from land-tenure to finance. The new policy was based upon Leo XIII's famous Encyclical, "Rerum Novarum", of May 15, 1891, brought up to date by Pius XI's "Quadragesimo Anno" of 1931. Catholic Christian-Socialism, the most insidious form of Fascism, had been officially founded.

"Rerum Novarum" was based on two socio-theological theses: (1) the abolition of private property would harm the worker because it would represent the abolition of his own property; (2) private property is adjusted to the exigencies of nature. Inequalities are necessary and so is union. Inequality, because suffering in itself is a remedy; union, because only so can suffering be minimised.

The duties of the worker are: to work, not to damage the employer's interests, never to have recourse to violence.

The duties of the employer are: not to consider the worker a slave, encourage thrift, pay the "fair wage". Leo XIII defined the "fair wage" as the wage sufficient for a frugal worker of decent habits. This is, as Miravittles points out, a revolutionary break with both the Liberal theory of supply and demand and the Marxist theory of plus-value.

Pius XI realised that this doctrine might appear somewhat too patriarchal, especially as Spanish landowners interpreted the "fair wage" as anything between 75

centimos ($4\frac{1}{2}d.$) and 1 peseta 50 ($9d.$) for a day “*de sol a sol*”, from sunrise to sunset. Hence “*Quadragesimo Anno*”.

This Encyclical is more practical. It recommends the necessity of “humanising” labour legislation and founding workers’ co-operatives and savings-banks. It makes a fundamental distinction between the “right” to property and its “use”. Private property, as St. Thomas Aquinas stated, was created by God, but it has certain “social duties”. The “family wage” and social insurance are the methods by which employers [are to fulfil these duties.

A typical example of the demagoguery made possible by “*Quadragesimo Anno*” is the following appeal from the Catholic “Labour” paper, *Trabajo*: “It is untrue that you hate Capital, friend worker. No. You want it for your own, just as we all do. At most, you hate Capital that does not fulfil its social obligations. That is, you do not hate Capital but the Capitalist who does not fulfil his obligations towards you. To a certain extent you are right. We say ‘to a certain extent’ because hatred is no good for any honourable purpose. You cannot defend yourselves by hatred. You will simply answer injustice by injustice. Reason is nowadays sufficiently powerful for us to defend ourselves, improve our situation and understand and love one another.

“Capital is composed of three elements: one destined for consumption, one to cover economic needs, one to produce new wealth. From this it may be deduced that the worker has no right to trouble himself about the first two, since he is not the administrator or guardian of other people’s needs. He can only be concerned with the capital destined to production.

“Capital originates: juridically, by possession of what belongs to no one else, by donation or inheritance; economically, by labour, thrift, credit, industry. Marx says that Capital is an usurpation of what belongs to others. This is untrue, because man has a right to property.

Even the Socialists do not deny this right, for in a collective society a man has a right to his wages, and so to his savings.

“Capital’s social function: there can be no useful labour without capital. A spade is needed for digging. The spade contributes to labour as capital, for raw materials are needed to make the spade.

“To sum up, friend worker, Capital is not an abuse, only those that abuse it. Against these abuses there should act a legal rate of interest for loans, legal regulation of labour contracts, State-protection of the worker, non-political unions to deal with any other abuses.

“You agree? Then in future, friend worker, don’t say you hate Capital!”

Trabajo had a circulation almost entirely composed of copies distributed gratis.

Thus it was easy for Catholic Christian Socialism to base itself on the eternal emotional platitudes which have not yet lost their attraction for uneducated masses: Religion, Family, Patriotism, Property, Discipline. It gave Gil Robles an easy platform. None of these concepts needed the exact concrete definition they could not bear, and they could appeal to a heterogeneous mass which stretched all the way from the feudal aristocrat and Army officer to the unorganised worker and the starving day-labourer. The real Fascism in Spain was never young Primo de Rivera’s pistol-dramatism but the insidious Catholic propaganda for the brotherhood of master and man. When the clergy were forced out into the open to defend this Fascism with guns, the Spanish masses realised the danger and burned the churches.

III

THE ARMY

SINCE THE NAPOLEONIC Wars, the Spaniards have shown themselves to be probably the best guerrilla fighters in the world; but Spanish troops, once the terror of Europe, have not been able to act successfully save in sieges, street-fights and raids. The only two external wars undertaken since the end of the eighteenth century, the Cuban expedition of 1898 and the Moroccan wars of 1909 to 1926, were lamentable failures. There have been few sieges in history more heroic than those of Saragossa and Gerona in the Peninsular War, there have been few better "irregular" leaders than those of that and the Carlist Wars. There have been few expeditions more shocking than that of General Silvestre to Morocco or disasters more complete than that of Annual.

This contradiction is explained by the role of the Army in Spain. A successful war requires a moral background. The troops of Palafox, even of the brutal Carlists Cabrera, Zumalacarregui and the Priest Santa Cruz, were fighting for an idea, like the revolutionary armies of Hoche and Marceau, the partisans of Budienny, Frunce and Chapaieff. Carnot and Cromwell could build armies and "organise defeat" because their men were defending an idea. "If you see the King in the enemy's ranks," said Cromwell, "shoot him as you would shoot anyone else. If your conscience hinders you from doing so, I counsel you not to enlist in my army."

"My sweetheart no longer loves me," sang the recruits as they embarked for Morocco, "because I have fallen soldier. But one day I will come back to her with my demobilisation papers in my hand."

The Army in Spain was simply the permanent Officers' Corps imposed upon a conscript soldiery unwilling to serve. The officers were drawn from the old landowning aristocratic families, where the ordinary career for sons was the property, the Army and the Church. Officers who came in from outside this select circle had little chance of promotion. From 1840 onwards there was bitter war within the Corps between the old order and the upstart *chusqueros* who had actually merited promotion. Espartero and O'Donnell, leaders of the democratic revolution of 1843, and Prim, leader of the revolution of 1868, were *chusqueros*. But after the fall of the First Republic in 1873, the older circles grew enormously stronger and feudalism was assured of support.

This solid reactionary mass was always at the command of a general who, even if intelligent himself, could appeal to elements of the caste-spirit. The Army was non-political—that is to say, it did not question its eternal verities—but it could always serve a policy which was careful to appeal to its specific prejudices.

After the Cuban Expedition, the Army, with obviously no further likelihood of external war except colonial conquest, turned inward on itself, co-opted, as it were, its peers, and became, like the Church, a State within the Spanish State, with the King as General of the Sword and Cross. The Virgin of the Pillar in Saragossa was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish Army in 1898. The fantastic result was that the Army contained no less than 850 Generals, including 319 "Honorary Generals"! Active and reserve officers averaged about one to every six men.

The Officers' Corps identified its interests with those of the feudal landowners and the biggest feudal landowner, the Church. It maintained its own criteria and its own standard of conduct. It was not aggressive, like the similar caste in Prussia, nor stupid, as in England, nor even dissipated, as in Tsarist Russia. It was simply apart.

This decorative but dangerous force had always reserved to itself the right to "pronounce" upon the political situation. The Spanish politicians and the masses they were supposed to control, the civilians in general, should be called to order from time to time by a loud and brutal word of command. The General stated his opinion, cracked his whip and the recruit jumped smartly to attention.

The Generals of the *pronunciamientos*, however, Espartero, O'Donnell, Prim, Pavia, Primo de Rivera, were quite unaware that the opinions they pronounced were not their own, that they were in fact nothing but armed ventriloquists' dummies. Rarely have these Generals stated a purely military opinion. Espartero and Prim, like Primo de Rivera, were nothing but agents of the Catalan big bourgeoisie alarmed by the tariff policy imposed by the Castilian and Andalusian landowners upon Madrid. The *pronunciamientos* of General Villacampa against Maria Cristina in 1886, the revolts in Madrid and Saragossa in September 1888, had a political content which their originators had not intended.

However isolated, however non-political the military caste supposed itself to be, its interests necessarily coincided with those of the feudal landowners and the Church. Thus, although it might from time to time become the tool of the big bourgeoisie, it was sooner or later forced to betray its backers. Both Espartero and Prim, the "Catalan Hero", were sent to Madrid by Barcelona and returned to Barcelona to bombard it.

The officer caste, therefore, had prejudices but no policy. It was extremely susceptible to flattery and could be moved in any direction which did not conflict with its few basic platitudes: Honour, Patriotism, Order, God. It never attempted to rule the country—all the Generals who supported Primo de Rivera swore that they would resign "as soon as their mission was fulfilled"—but it was always ready to act as a transition to any regime which would represent the interests of the class from

which it was drawn. Its very lack of a political sense of its own made an exceedingly dangerous element in the State. Its contempt of politics and politicians made it a political force.

At the same time, the inner politics of the officer caste often broke out with almost the violence of the struggles between Chinese bandit generalissimos. The caste was capable of realising a threat and organising a defence. In 1917, the year in which the protest against the Monarchy reached its maximum intensity in a coalition which stretched all the way from the big-business Catalan League to the Socialists and Anarchists, the Generals formed their famous Defensive *Juntas* to preserve the old cadres intact. The *Juntas* rapidly assumed the position of the power behind the Throne, were able to expel the Civil Governor of Barcelona, and came out into the streets of Madrid to fight Millan Astray's partisans when that picturesque eccentric, commander of the Foreign Legion, challenged their power. For a moment it looked as if there would be a sort of War of the Barons, with the civilians mown down by the stray bullets. There were attempted *pronunciamientos* at Saragossa and Ciudad Real. The artillery conspired and had to be dissolved. Primo de Rivera's *coup d'état* was not an isolated incident, but simply the culmination of a reactionary movement which succeeded once Catalan big business had given it intelligent direction and purpose.

The language of Primo's *pronunciamiento* was, however, military in the extreme. "This movement is a man's movement. Anyone who does not feel masculinity in its completest sense had better wait in a corner. . . . We have not got to justify our attitude: the facts justify it. Priests murdered, ex-Governors, agents of the authorities assassinated; currency depreciated, a tariff policy suspect by its tendency and the more so because the man who is directing it openly demonstrates his barefaced immorality."

The reference to the tariff policy and the attack on its director, Santiago Alba, "the depraved and cynical minister", as the masculine General called him, shows

clearly the economic background to the manifesto. Alba had infuriated Catalan big business by the proposal to tax industry in 1916. Cambó, its leader, had been a bitter opponent of Alba since then. Two weeks after the *coup d'état* he accused Alba of being in league with Juan March. So that Primo de Rivera's early suspicions of March's morality were due not so much to military puritanism as to Alba's tariff policy and Cambó's vengefulness.

Hence Robles was not being so absurd as at first appeared when, at the elections of 1936, he loudly demanded a strong Army which would make Spain a formidable military power. Naturally, something of this appeal was drawn from experience of fascist Germany and Italy, but it was even more a gesture of flattery towards the military caste, especially towards those elements who, under Azaña's threat to "republicanise" the Army, had suddenly been faced with politics and were ready to "pronounce" upon the situation. In effect, Robles' appeal meant the promise to reverse Azaña's military reforms as an inducement to the officer class to support him in the overthrow of all those elements in the Republican Constitution which threatened the interests of feudalism and the Church.

Azaña's first big measure as Minister of War was to attempt the "republicanisation" of the Army. He was well aware that the officer caste was hostile to the Republic but he was afraid to take the obvious revolutionary course, to dissolve it and reconstruct cadres fitted for command at least as much by proved political loyalty as by technical competence. All that Azaña did was to cut the number of officers by half.

Even this purely administrative reform was stultified by Azaña's timidity. The dismissed officers were permitted to form a reserve, retaining their titles, uniforms, arms and pay. One consequence of this was that when the Spanish Military Union (U.M.E.) was formed with definitely fascist tendencies, there was not only close communication between civilians and officers on service, but it was also easy for retired officers to mingle in uniform

with a regular parade and involve the supposedly Republican Army by their provocative behaviour. This happened notably during the disturbances in Madrid in April 1936.

Another effect was that the Army was brought into contact with civilian politics through the agency of the retired officers. It had understood the threat to its privileges, and the Republic was now proceeding to attack, although with no great vigour, the interests of the big landowners and the clergy by the Agrarian Reform and the disestablishment of the monastic orders. The menace was clear, the remedy suggested by the politicians of the feudal and clerical blocks, Calvo Sotelo and Gil Robles. Calvo Sotelo had been Primo de Rivera's Finance Minister and had presented Juan March with his oil monopoly in return for March's support of Primo's paper, the *Correspondencia Militar*. Robles was to defend March against the Cortes' Commission of Responsibilities in June 1932. Political intelligence, Church support and money were all there for the taking.

There were two alternatives for a new *pronunciamiento*, which, faced this time with the biggest revolutionary threat yet offered to the combined interests of feudalism, Church and Army, would be raised to the proportions of at least a *putsch*. As early as April 1935, Joaquin Maurin was able to forecast the possibility of either a Robles-Franco or a Calvo Sotelo-Goded dictatorship. Franco, the youngest, most energetic and most intelligent of the officer corps, could be attracted by flattery of the Army's discipline, its power to restore Order and expel the "Red canaille". Goded, older, duller, was closely linked with the Jesuits. The alternative combinations signified simply a variation of emphasis.

Some of the more notable members of the officer caste were not necessarily monarchist; or at any rate far less monarchist than the similar castes in Imperial Russia, Germany and Austria. It is true that as an institution to be respected the throne of Alfonso XIII was hardly so glorious as that of a Franz Josef, a Wilhelm or a Nicholas.

It was currently believed that Freemasonry had gained a large number of adepts among the younger officers as it had among the Republicans of the Ateneo. This form of bourgeois Anarchism was supposed to have influenced the upper ranks as historical Anarchism had influenced the non-commissioned officers and the Navy. This may be merely an allegation put about to discredit the "perjured" officers of 1930, to explain their alliance with such notable Freemasons as Martinez Barrio and Alejandro Lerroux, converts from Anarchism. Certainly Goded, Cabanellas, Sanjurjo and Batet were accused of being Freemasons, although they were not infrequently seen at Mass.

Francisco Franco y Bahamonde was a different case. His brother, Ramon Franco, the famous airman, had been a firebrand in 1930 and 1931, flying over the Royal Palace with the threat to bombard the Bourbon, and raising masonic-anarchist Seville. Francisco Franco, the youngest and most brilliant General in the Spanish Army, the organiser, with the fantastic condottiere Millan Astray, of the Spanish Foreign Legion—created in Millan Astray's image rather than Franco's—was a Catholic but a Monarchist only because the Monarchy employed his talents. Like most Spanish officers, he considered himself more intelligent than his employers; and, since the War Ministry, except during Azaña's period, was often entrusted to some *enchufista* with particular claims upon the Premier of the moment, there is little doubt that Franco was right. The scandals revealed by General Picasso's Committee of Enquiry into the Annual disaster showed that the King and ambitious Generals like Silvestre could violate every canon of military sense, sacrifice the younger officers and bring disgrace upon the Army just as effectively as any "Red Republicans".

The officers, then, were neither royalist nor republican. Franco could plead with perfect truth in 1936 that he was not rising against *the* Republic but against *this* Republic. That he was simply acting as the tool for reactionary

forces and foreign Governments, like all the Generals of all the *pronunciamientos* before him, need not invalidate his sincerity. Calvo Sotelo's "Corporative Spain" would have been nominally a Republic still, in precisely the same way as Salazar's Portugal, Dollfuss' Austria and even Hitler's Germany. The quarrel was precisely *what kind* of Republic in 1936, just as it had been *what kind* of Monarchy in 1930. When Goded plotted against Primo de Rivera, when Queipo de Llano married the daughter of the republican leader, Alcalá-Zamora, when Ramon Franco threatened Alfonso XIII and Berenguer with armed rising, they were not really concerned with the form of regime. When Galán and Garcia Hernandez rose at Jaca and when Sanjurjo placed the Civil Guard at the service of the Revolutionary Provisional Government of Alcalá-Zamora and Azaña, they were breaking their oath of allegiance just as much and just as little as Franco when he rose against Azaña and Sanjurjo when he broke his promise never to return to Spain.

No oath and no loyalty could be binding upon a Spanish officer because he recognised no power superior to him which could administer it. The only concern of this caste was the maintenance of a regime in which the Army's "honour" would be respected. Thus the Generals, lacking political sense because they lacked political interest, were only too ready to support those who, in De Tocqueville's words, "mistake the whim of a Tyrant for the love of Order". Since the Warrior King is a figure which has disappeared from the modern world with the defeat of the Negus of backward Ethiopia, the officers would be ready to follow the recent equivalent, the dictatorial "Leader", the "*Jefe*". Gil Robles speculated upon this in his election propaganda, but lacked either the courage or the cunning to carry it through, and was hooted in Burgos and threatened with assassination by irate officers in Portugal. Lacking a civilian "Leader", the officer caste created its "Generalissimo", Francisco Franco y Bahamonde.

The officer corps, separated by caste distinction from the mass of the Spanish people, was quite incapable of understanding the change which had come over the Army's rank-and-file. Under the Dictatorship the conscript recruits had come from a class which had exhausted itself temporarily in the ferocious struggles of 1917-23. The revolutionary spirit was latent and the troops had little mutinous spirit. It was impossible for Primo de Rivera to raise any particular enthusiasm for militarism by the easy victory which the French won for him in Morocco.

The Republic had revived the militancy of the working and peasant class from which the recruits were drawn. While the regiments of Estremenian and Andalusian peasants remained fairly docile, the drafts from Catalonia and the industrial towns were thoroughly republican.

Thus discipline, never a strong point in the Spanish Army, hardly existed. There was a profound difference between the rank-and-file and its officers. There was no more support for the feudal class in the Army than there was in the country. The rebel officers in July 1936 were forced to supply the deficiency with Moors and the mercenaries of Millan Astray's Foreign Legion. It was impossible to hold the democratic Spanish masses by Prussian discipline. Their discipline had always been that of the guerrilla fighter for an idea, "self-discipline" or "the organisation of indiscipline". Discipline as such had none of the appeal to the Spaniards that it had to the Germans and Italians when dramatised by Hitler and Mussolini. Spaniards have a strong sense of ridicule, and a fascist dictator could not brandish the *Versaillesdiktat*. Despite the Moroccan Wars, the word "ex-soldier" had none of the sentimental associations that it can assume in the harangues of Colonel de la Rocque. The military dictatorship of Primo de Rivera made the whole conception profoundly unpopular, whereas in Germany and Italy it had not yet been tried.

Thus the chances of a successful militarist-fascist dictatorship in Spain were not great, because there could be no

hope of popular support. And in any dictatorship based upon the complete annihilation of a whole class, internal contradictions will be presented in all their crudity. The experiment would be excessively dangerous.

THE CIVIL GUARD

There was another armed support of the regime, a body with an *esprit de corps* but no particular caste-consciousness: the Civil Guard.

This corps, brutally picturesque in its characteristic *bicornio*, a curious rounded cocked-hat, its long black cloak and its general appearance of having survived from the savage period of the Carlist Wars, was originally formed as a rural police. Living in barracks in each village, well-mounted, it formed a liaison between the remoter parts of the country.

Recruited from ex-noncommissioned officers, strongly disciplined, magnificent riders, first-class shots, the corps lived in almost monastic isolation. The only contact it had with the masses was when it shot them down.

The Civil Guard was under the orders of the Ministry of the Interior. Its business was to crush disorder by any means, wherever it came from. It was an efficient, unscrupulous, dependable instrument.

The Republic did not alter the position of the Civil Guard. In fact, it increased its numbers. Its past history seemed to guarantee that it was really non-political, that it would serve the Republic as it had served the Monarchy, punctiliously carrying out its commanders' orders. When Sanjurjo rose on August 10, 1932, the majority of the Civil Guard did in fact remain loyal to the Republic.

Such a disciplined body had to suffer for its commanders' sins. It carried out literally the Minister of the Interior's orders at Casas Viejas: "shoot them in the guts." It carried out literally its commander, Doval's, orders in Asturias and, in order to make no noise, hacked twenty-seven captured miners to small pieces with axes one night at Carbayin. The Guards were trained killers with iron

nerves. Sometimes they did exceed orders, as in the man-hunt at Yeste, where they chased and killed nineteen peasants one Spring afternoon.

The clamour against these atrocities, especially the Asturias repression, accused the whole corps. It was threatened with dissolution. The Rights who had given the orders for the Asturias repression ostentatiously took up the defence of the "armed institutions of the State".

The inner politics of the Civil Guard showed no such cleavage between the officers and men as there was in the Army, since promotion from the ranks was the rule. Only the higher officers were in actual contact with the Spanish Military Union.

It was just this closer contact between the officers and the ranks which meant danger as well as security. If the officers became infected with sedition, it was easy for them to pass it on to their men. A whole brigade had to be dissolved in Madrid in April 1936.

Obviously, after the long history of struggles between the Civil Guard and the workers and peasants, and especially after the Asturias repression, even Guards loyal to the bourgeois Republic would be somewhat apprehensive of their reception by the Government's proletarian allies. Socialist ideas had influenced some of the younger officers, promoted since the Republic; fascist sympathies were felt by the older men who were hostile to a regime which could permit its press to question the Corps' right to carry out orders in the way that best suited it. As soon as the struggle was planted in all seriousness, this division was bound to manifest itself.

IV

CAPITALISM

SPANISH CAPITALISM WAS never able to develop a sufficiently solid basis to resist any serious crises. Industry is concentrated almost entirely in Catalonia and the Basque country, with copper and mercury mines, chiefly foreign-owned, in Andalusia and coal in Asturias. It is no accident that the biggest industrial and financial activity is found in the autonomous regions.

This was not always so. In the sixteenth century, when the discovery of the New World and its riches had shifted the centre of activity from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic and had enormously increased the circulation of money, Spain, with its immense political power, was in an excellent position to use all the benefits of the new commercial era.

There was a chain of rich and populous cities, Seville, Granada, Valencia, Toledo, Cordoba, all with over 50,000 inhabitants, very large centres when the total population of Castile was six millions. Valladolid, Madrid, Barcelona, Segovia, Salamanca, Baeza and Ronda were also considerable towns. Agriculture, fertilised by Moorish irrigation, flourished in Valencia and the south. Stock-breeding was prosperous in Castile and Leon.

Thus there was every probability that Spain, with its control over the American gold-hoards, would be the first country in Europe to turn from feudalism to a bourgeois organisation of society, to make the Economic Revolution. Yet England and Holland exploited the new situation at the expense of Spain, not so much because of superior strength or foresight as because the Spanish

ruling class deliberately ruined itself. Whereas England forbade the creation of industries in the colonies—and thereby lost North America—Spain demanded that they become self-supporting, and was interested only in gold. The Spanish ruling class forbade trading with America, while the 300 per cent dividends of the Indies Companies “became one of the basic funds of modern capitalism”.

The discovery and control of the Americas, which should have enormously increased Spanish prosperity and organised the nation on the basis of great mercantile and industrial cities supplying the colonists with manufactured goods from the raw materials sent back to Spain in Spanish shipping, did in fact ruin the country. A mere Castilian predilection for being poor, proud and pure cannot entirely explain this monstrous paradox, although the stupidity and short-sightedness of absolute rulers had considerable weight. The enlightenment of Isabella the Catholic is a myth: she pawned her jewels not to help Christopher Columbus but to pay the expenses of the siege of Baeza. Obsessed by their ten-years campaign against Moorish Granada, the Catholic Kings paid no attention to the New World. Only the Aragonese and Catalan merchants glimpsed its possibilities.

The Catholic Monarchs, intent on driving out what constituted an economic as much as a racial opposition, smashed the Granada Moors and in the same year,—the same year, too, that Columbus discovered America,—expelled the Jews. Not for nothing were Ferdinand and Isabella Catholic Monarchs. The Church had seen clearly in the commercial talents of the Jews and the agricultural skill of the Moors competition against its absolute power. In 1330, it had directed a pogrom which slew 10,000, and 5,000 more in 1391. On January 6 the Holy Office burned the first Jews, and in the first year of the Inquisition 2,000 were burnt in the See of Cadiz alone. This was a slow process of extermination, however, and on March 31, 1492, all the remaining Jews, about half a million, were driven from the country.

The expulsion of the Jews should have favoured the Christian merchants. But the Monarchy simultaneously forbade the Catalans, Aragonese and Valencians to trade with the Indies.

Charles I, the Emperor Charles V as he is better known, was distracted from consideration of the American colonies by his vast European possessions. No Monarch had reigned over territory so wide, so wealthy and so important; megalomania was not far off, and Charles conceived that he might rule the whole world temporally as the Pope ruled it spiritually. With his native Flanders, the Low Countries, Artois and Franche-Comté, with the whole of the Holy Roman Empire and the Americas, with Milan and Naples, Aragon and Castile were but a province. Spain was to be the Court, and there was no room there for the *oficio vil* of industry or commerce.

Even in modern times, the gold of the Americas continued to encourage Spanish parasitism. The famous "*giros de America*", the moneys sent back to their families by emigrants in the Hispanic Republics, actually exceeded the whole Spanish national expenditure. In 1920, when the budget amounted to 878 millions, the "*giros*" were over 1,000 million pesetas. By 1931, however, they had fallen to 346 millions and to 158 millions in 1932. With currency export prohibitions and increasing crisis in South America, this source of unearned wealth practically dried up. Spanish economy had at last to fend for itself.

Charles had every reason to defend the *status quo*. The Church had every reason to support and influence the Emperor. The great enemy was the Reformation, the expression of the rising power of the bourgeoisie. Heresy was synonymous with economic competition.

Charles entered Spain as a foreign invader, with a train of Flemish favourites to whom he gave all the chief posts in the administration. The Spanish nobility were outraged, and the Castilian cities, the "*Comunidades*", were given the opportunity to protest. The first armed insur-

rection of the European bourgeoisie against the retrograde forces of feudalism was the Revolt of the "*Comuneros*" which broke out at Avila under Juan Padilla.

The insurrection was expressed in national terms: hatred of the Flemish intruders. This gained the alliance of a large part of the nobility, but Charles, by conceding a certain number of posts to them, succeeded in isolating the "*Comuneros*", and Padilla, Bravo and Maldonado, their leaders, were hanged at Villalar del Rey in 1522.

Simultaneously, in Valencia and Majorca there broke out the revolt of the "Brotherhoods", the protest of the merchants' guilds against the increasing ruin inflicted upon them by feudal dues. The "*Comuneros*" revolt was political; the Brotherhoods' had a distinct element of social revolution, an attempt to organise a society where all men should be brothers and there would be free opportunity for trade, expansion and expression.

Both revolts were isolated and utterly crushed after a savage civil war. But they had warned the Monarchy. In order to maintain itself in Spain, it must destroy the rising mercantile class however it expressed itself. Heretics were burnt in thousands by the Inquisition and all the best talent in the country sought refuge from famine in emigration. Within a generation, the flourishing cities of Castile, Andalusia and Catalonia were almost deserted.

This policy was suicide for the Monarchy itself. On his accession in 1598, only a century after the discovery of America, Philip III was 100,000,000 ducats in debt, and all the Crown lands were mortgaged. To complete the ruin, he expelled the million remaining Moors and prohibited the export of manufactured goods even to the American colonies. European wars reduced the population already decimated by emigration and famine, and Spain remained as lonely, splendid and bare as Philip II's Escorial.

Dominated since 1552 by the stockbreeders organised in the *Mesta*, populated by starving peasants and a class

of *señoritos* who had made a convention of their ancestors' inability to work, overrun by clerical and aristocratic parasites, Spain became literally eccentric. In 1803, the producing population amounted to 6,650,000 persons, the unproductive to 3,617,000, including 1,440,000 nobility and 203,298 clergy. Even in 1914, the productive population was only 39·1 per cent, whereas the European average was between 42·7 and 51·5 per cent. Those engaged in commerce and transport in Spain amounted to 4·2 per cent, as against 7·4 in Italy and 23 per cent in Great Britain.

These unfavourable conditions were perhaps reinforced by racial characteristics, the Moorish blood which is still strong in Spain. On the other hand, it is curious that the two most representative figures of Spanish capitalism, the Catalan Francisco de Assisi Cambó and the Majorcan Juan March Ordinas, are commonly supposed to be of Semitic origin.

Only in Catalonia did modern capitalism not lag years behind the rest of Europe. Here the Arkwright jenny was introduced as early as 1785, the first big machine-works were opened between 1832 and 1845, and the Universal Exposition of 1888 introduced electrification on a large scale. Basque heavy industry dates from the early Nineties.

The transition to monopoly-capitalism was rapid, since, except in Catalonia, there was no system organised by long gestation to oppose it. A period of steady industrial expansion such as took place in England, France and Germany during the nineteenth century was prevented in Spain by the furious resistance of the feudal interests enrolled under the banner of Don Carlos. The Carlist Wars (1833-39 and 1870-76), the domination of the agrarian interests and the Church against which even the *pronunciamientos* of liberal Generals could make no permanent headway, the loss of the last colonies all contributed to make the rise of an orderly, well-organised capitalism impossible.

In Bilbao, the process of capital concentration was particularly rapid. Ibarra and Co.'s foundry, "Nuestra Señora del Carmen" was opened in 1854—one of the few that date from before the end of the Second Carlist War. In 1888, it was transformed into a limited company under the name of "Altos Hornos y Fabrica de Hierro y Acero de Bilbao" (Bilbao Foundries and Steel and Iron Factory). In 1902, "Altos Hornos de Bilbao" merged with "La Vizcaya" and "La Iberia" to make the "Altos Hornos de Vizcaya" with a capital of 207 million pesetas. Later, "Altos Hornos" formed a cartel on a 60 per cent—40 per cent basis with Sota y Llano's huge "Siderurgica del Mediterraneo", itself the overgrown product of the 16-million-peseta "Euskalduna".

Nearly all the important industry in Spain was trusted: shipping, railways, paper, oil. It is no exaggeration to say that all of it owes its survival to the Treasury, either by direct subvention or by tariffs; to such an extent that after the elections of February 1936 a number of proprietors actually asked the State to take over their concerns.

In Spain, as in France, there were the "Two Hundred Families", except that in Spain the number was more probably only about seventy. One of the heaviest burdens on Spanish industry was the absurd sums paid in directors' fees and the limited number of persons who accumulated them. Twenty persons were directors of 329 concerns, receiving an annual income of 11,515,000 pesetas (about £320,000). Ruiz Senén, the Jesuits' man of affairs, was director of forty-three companies, with an income of 1,500,000 pesetas. The family of Urquijo, the leaders of the Basque financial oligarchy, shares ninety-seven directors' seats with an income of 3,395,000 pesetas. The Great South of Spain Railway Company, an English-owned concern, which exploited 168 kilometres of narrow-gauge line, had to support a director, a chief engineer, a treasurer, a resident engineer and a secretary, all paid in sterling; their salaries amounted to £4,690 per year.

It received in Spanish State-aid no less than 6,084,685 pesetas.

Monopolist, anarchic and top-heavy, Spanish industry and finance were bound to suffer from the same contradictions as Spanish economy in general. Incapable of standing on its own feet, the big bourgeoisie was compelled to spend its efforts in a furious assault upon the State which, dominated by the agrarians, was itself compelled to struggle against its own supporters. By their constant demands for subsidies and tariffs they must inevitably strain the resources of the Treasury to breaking-point, creating a situation where the only salvation for the big bourgeoisie would be total identification with the State, State-capitalism or Fascism.

Neutrality during the Great War enabled Spain to repatriate its foreign debt and buy out important foreign holdings. Key industries, however, remained in foreign hands, and very often Spanish directors' names simply covered foreign holders whenever this practice was found more in consonance with the Spanish laws.

Spain contains far the richest mineral deposits of the "colonisable" countries in Europe. Most of these minerals are of prime importance for armaments. There is iron near Oviedo, near Vigo and in the Basque provinces, the best copper in Europe in Rio Tinto. At Almadén is the biggest supply of mercury in the world, and not far away Peñarroya produces high-grade lead. Scattered over Spain and Spanish Morocco are very important deposits of coal, tin, tungsten, silver, molybdenum, salt, potash, phosphates, pyrites, graphite, zinc, lead and manganese.

The Spanish Monarchy, like the Tsarist regime in Russia, was slow to develop these riches and preferred to hand over their exploitation to foreign companies in return for fat commissions for lack of interference. The most important Spanish mines and the industries depending upon them were owned by non-Spaniards.

The international connexions in Spanish industry are highly complex, for each nominee firm often turns out to

be a holding-company for some enterprise of different nationality. Thus the Rothschild family was interested in the Almadén mines and also in the Unión Española de Explosivos. The directing board of this 60-million-peseta company included representatives of the de Wendel family, who again controlled the Peñarroya lead mines, with its 309 million peseta capital. On Peñarroya's governing Board were found representatives of the Banque Mirbaud, which financed it, the Compagnie des Forges de Homécourt (de Wendel), an Italian aristocrat, Count Enrico San Martin di Valperga, two Spanish aristocrats, the Marqués de Villamayor and Count Romanones, whose personal interests linked again with nearly all Spanish industry, finance and landed property, especially with the Riff mines, and a powerful German industrialist connected with Krupp, Dr. Aufschlager.

German and British interests linked in European Pyrites which is jointly owned by Rio Tinto and the Frankfurt Metallgesellschaft. The Rothschilds also had an interest in Rio Tinto, which made of the province of Huelva practically a British colony, owning all the railways and most of the land, placed strategically between British-controlled Portugal and Seville. In Seville, the lighting, water and electrical transport were British-owned.

Foreign control was particularly powerful in the branches of Spanish industry most closely connected with the needs of war. Telephones, after a particularly scandalous piece of Court intrigue in which Alfonso himself took a hand, were entirely controlled by the American I.T.T. Foreign capital controlled water, electricity, power and transport in the most important cities, Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao and Seville.

A large part of Spanish armaments were controlled by Vickers through the Constructora Naval. Vickers did not actually own the firm, but the amount of money it was owed constituted practically a mortgage. When the State gave this company a monopoly of warship construction in 1908, a clause in the contract ran: "In cases where the

Government thinks fit, the plans and projects of the works must be signed by firms which have carried out with acknowledged success similar work for some navy of the first class." Zaharoff had a sentimental interest in Spain, for he married the Duchess of Villafranca, a Bourbon, after a romantic courtship. Romance, however, never seemed to the late Sir Basil any reason for not cashing in on felicity, and Mr. Yapp told the Armaments Investigation Committee in London recently that Zaharoff was Vickers' accredited agent in Spain.

An interesting example of foreign dominance was that of the so-called Canadiense group in Catalonia, against which the C.N.T. ran a famous strike. It controlled about 80 per cent of Catalan hydro-electric power upon which the great textile factories depend. The firm was registered in Toronto as Barcelona Power, Light and Traction and its Spanish end was named Riegos y Fuerzas del Ebro. The Canadiense, however, was controlled by the Belgian Solfin, connected with the Banque de Paris et Pays-Bas and the Comité des Forges. Unofficially, Canadiense kept a representative in the Cortes to lobby against the cheaper co-operative electrical plants at Sabadell. This representative was a member of the Catalan League, led by Francisco de Assisi Cambó, the biggest Catalan financier, whose own electrical company, CHADE, was closely connected, it will be shown, with British interests in the Argentine in the Primitiva Gas Company of Buenos Aires. This Catalan-British alliance had obvious local political results besides its effects on the international scale: "Sabadell," says Muirhead's guide-book to Spain, "is an important centre of the regionalist and labour movements." The local staff of Riegos y Fuerzas were regarded with great respect by British consular officials in Barcelona.

There was thus a sufficient foreign interest to make the international capitalist interlock a matter for negotiation at the expense of any Spanish government which might appear strong enough to take a stand of its own. Obviously,

a Rightist government, representing classes whose interests were already linked with those of international capital, might appear the most attractive. Spanish capitalism itself had utterly failed to profit from war neutrality and had remained dependent upon foreign "advice" if it wished to survive within the country. It had believed that the boom would last for ever and had grossly overcapitalised itself. Spanish industry became the playground of monstrous white elephants and the slums of the industrial cities were populated by an ever-growing horde of starving and mutinous unemployed.

The wildest error, committed by the Catalan bourgeoisie, was the investment of nearly all its war-profits in German marks!

The Bank of Spain demonstrated the curious mingling of the old and the new in Spanish capitalism. Its board contained four Counts, one Viscount, three Marquises and a Duke; the other directors are all bankers. But two of the Marquises, Aledo and Amurrio, are also bankers, their family names being Ignacio Herrera and Luis de Urquijo. The point here is brought out by an anecdote told by Ramos Oliveira. The present Marqués de Urquijo was lobbying the King for the title of Grandee. The King consulted the Duke of Tamames. The Duke was furious that "a fellow who keeps a shop to sell money" should aspire to the dignity he had inherited from his ancestors; and Don Estanislao Urquijo could not get his title until the Duke was dead.

Within the Bank of Spain, therefore, there was the conflict between feudalism and capitalism. It is a type of the whole system, evolved haphazard, at the mercy of chance, without solid foundations, with interests opposed to those of the class which insisted on keeping the power long after it had outlived its function, and yet unable to make its revolution for fear of being compelled to hand it to a petty-bourgeoisie in its turn incapable of resisting the pressure of the organised workers and hungry peasants.

This contradiction found its expression in two men, Cambó and March.

Cambó, economic dictator of Catalonia, and thus of the best-organised and most aggressive section of Spanish capitalism, was probably more responsible for the mutations of Spanish politics for the last forty years than any other single person. Singularly intelligent, a good speaker, a trained lobbyist, Francisco de Assisi Cambó weaved his way in and out of a hundred tactical alliances extending from the Monarchists to the Socialists. Cambó represented the highest point which the Spanish bourgeois revolution could achieve. It was completely unscrupulous about leaving its temporary allies in the lurch as soon as it had gained its immediate object, and was capable of turning against them as soon as it had made its pact with power. In another chapter will be explained the close connexion of Cambó's Catalan Separatism with the economic movement of the textile industry. Incapable of making the revolution for the whole Spanish bourgeoisie, Cambó invented this very efficient method of putting pressure on Madrid and simultaneously diverting the revolutionary forces in Catalonia. But separatism turned against its inventor by providing the middle-class with a form of concrete expression for its somewhat hazy revolutionary impulses. Catalanism, which had authentic roots in language, culture and history, became a political weapon directed both against Madrid and against the Catalan big bourgeoisie.

Cambó himself was well protected from the immediate personal disadvantages of this change. The arch-Catalanist became probably the biggest exporter of capital in Spain. The *Compañía Hispano-Americana de Electricidad*, known to the financial world as CHADE, was Cambó's personal creation. With a capital of over 470 millions, it was registered as a Spanish limited company, but in moments of crisis the bulk of its resources resided in Buenos Aires. In 1930, its declared profits were about 105 million *gold* pesetas. Thus Cambó, who should logically

keep this fantastic sum in Catalonia if he were really prepared to raise the bourgeois opposition to Castilian agrarianism to its maximum intensity, preferred to weaken its politico-economic resources. CHADE was a concrete demonstration of how the Catalan big bourgeoisie failed to defend its real interests and those of Catalonia.

If Cambó be accused by his enemies of treacheries, economic defeats and political errors, these were nothing more than the inevitable treacheries, defeats and errors of a class in a false position. In Cambó the contradictions of this class found their most intelligent expression.

The almost unchartable wilds of Spanish capitalism could offer a new Indies to any man who had the cunning, brutality and force to explore them. This man was Don Juan March Ordinas, "Last of the Mediterranean Corsairs", one of the most astonishing characters produced by modern capitalism.

The really big financial and industrial figures, the Morgans, Rockefellers, de Wendels, Zaharoffs, have to observe certain rules, show a decent respect for the conventions, walk the Chanceries, belong to a respectable political party. Juan March, working a field just large enough to enable him to win sufficient to finance a large-scale civil war, simply did not recognise conventions. Completely cynical, completely unscrupulous and completely egotistic, he was the modern pirate, who does not break the law but simply ignores it.

March was the son of a small-time tobacco smuggler in Majorca. He entered his father's business, and soon, with the help of a few strong-armed friends, succeeded in organising the whole traffic of the island with himself at the head. There was nothing extraordinary in this, and March might well have remained a mere Sabiani to the end of his days.

But March, although completely uneducated, realised that there were big possibilities in smuggling. He organised a fleet, began to invade the mainland. The War rapidly increased his capital. He supplied German submarines

with oil, freighted boats with supplies for the Allies and then sold the route to the Germans. This was profitable, because he either got paid high prices for his cargoes in the French ports or collected a fair sum for the information as well as the insurance. By the end of the War, March was rich.

With his new capital, he vastly extended his tobacco-smuggling. The Moroccan War was a great help, and March easily broke his competitors in Algiers. Occasionally, he reverted to the tough manners of his youth, but it has never been proved that he was responsible for the shooting of two of his chief rivals on the Grau road near Valencia. He founded a church in Palma and presented the workers with a *Casa del Pueblo*, a political centre. He always hedged his bets. He was becoming a public figure, so he founded in Madrid the violently-monarchist paper, *Informaciones*, and the violently-republican *La Libertad*. By 1923 he had made about 30 million pesetas from contraband tobacco. He was unchallenged political, economic and social dictator of the Balearics, and eager Radical politicians provided him with all the girls his insatiable appetite demanded. Nothing was hard for him: "*dinars o diners*," he used to say in the Majorcan dialect, "*diners or dollars*".

Primo de Rivera, who in his bluff Andalusian way hated all politicians and capitalists and even went so far as to think March immoral, wanted to arrest him. March escaped to France disguised as a priest. He bided his time, and directed the smuggling more intensely. He conceived the brilliant idea of sending his boats out from Gibraltar under the British flag.

He heard—March's intelligence service was so good that he once received a large offer from a certain Foreign Office to buy it *en masse*—that Primo de Rivera's personal paper, the *Correspondencia Militar* was in difficulties. He saw the Dictator and made him a firm friend in half-an-hour.

After the victory at Alhucemas, the Dictator wanted to

give the Queen a souvenir. He talked it over with March, suggested a rope of pearls. March pointed out that she certainly had more pearls than she could use, and suggested that anyway the present would look better coming from *him*. He knew that the Queen was much interested in charitable works, so he offered her a hospital in Palma for poor consumptives. It was to cost six millions, but March had ways and means of getting it done for half. It was never finished, for there was no need to go on with it after it had served his purpose.

His purpose was quite simple: the Spanish tobacco monopoly. He had decided that smuggling involved too much capital outlay. Why break the law if you can make it?

Primo was not anxious to give March the monopoly. March's reply was simply to flood Spain with such quantities of good cheap tobacco that the State could no longer compete. The Queen had been influenced in March's favour, and, soon after, he got the monopoly.

This was something quite new in the history of piracy. That a single law-breaker could beat not only a State but a Dictatorship to its knees and impose his own terms, that smuggling had become an organised business so big that it could force State recognition, this was something novel even in a period which produced Kreuger and the Tschervonetz forgeries.

It was calculated that March's smuggling had cost the State thirty to forty million pesetas.

The tobacco monopoly was granted in the summer of 1927. March, looking for fresh worlds to conquer, decided to try the same policy with oil. Oil was much in the air just then, but it is said that what put the idea into March's head was a jape of his early days. When he was only a poor smuggler, he was very envious of the wealthy villas in residential Palma, and as soon as he grew rich, he built what he called a Chemical Factory as near the villas as possible. He never made any chemicals, but used it to poison the rich men's air. Chemicals seem to have suggested oil.

For the first time March walked straight into international politics and on its bosses' own level.

The Spanish market was shared by Deterding's Shell, Rockefeller's Standard Oil and the Soviet Russian Nafta which had ceded sole sale in Spain, Portugal and Northern Africa to a company called Petroleos Porto Pi, director and owner of which happened, curiously enough, to be Juan March. The arrangement worked well enough, until Shell appointed as its agent in the Balearics a person named Salas.

Salas, a rival local boss, had long been fighting March for control of the Balearics. Their ferocious undercutting resulted in the transformation of Majorca into the tourists' paradise.

Salas' appointment appeared to March as a definite challenge. He immediately declared war on Shell, with whom the milliards of Standard Oil soon allied against the intruder.

Shell, fighting Nafta, raised its favourite "Red menace" scare through the papers of half Europe, but March had the Queen's ear, the local organisation, the friendship of the Dictator and a small army of lads handy with the knife or gun.

In a few months, March had fought the twelve milliards of Shell and Standard to a standstill by playing a trump card: the idea of a State petrol monopoly, the Campsa (*Compañia Arendataria del Monopolio de Petroleos Sociedad Anonima*), involving the compulsory cession of all Shell and Standard interests in Spain.

As soon as the new agreement was signed, March, knowing that Deterding and Rockefeller were obliged by their position to honour their signatures, turned round and attacked the monopoly fiercely. His friend, Calvo Sotelo, Minister of Finance, told the Cortes that "Spain had never yet had an oil policy".

The "Official Gazette" announced the formation of the monopoly in June 1927 to come into operation on January 1, 1928, whether Juan March liked it or no.

The State, after expropriating the Shell and Standard distributive machinery against somewhat exaggerated compensation, was left with March's Nafta oil from the U.S.S.R. The Russians, needing valuta to buy tractors, did not take much interest.

Deterding, thoroughly alarmed at this Bolshevik penetration into Spain, came to see the Dictator personally. Primo, to whom one civilian was much like another, kept him waiting in an ante-room for three hours and flatly refused every one of his proposals.

The Campsa now had everything in its hands—except the oil. March refused to transfer his Nafta contract. The Spanish State entered into direct negotiations with Nafta, which cancelled March's contract on condition that the Spanish State should take sole responsibility if March should bring suit.

Everything was now ready, and March had been defeated. January 1 was approaching. Campsa waited for the oil, freighted in Dutch boats. But there was no news of the oil. January 1 came, and still no oil.

At last the Dictator's patience was exhausted. Half the Spanish Navy scoured the Mediterranean. They found the boats at last, quite snug in Algiers. What had happened was that the Dutch boats had approached the Spanish coast, then, acting on sealed orders, turned south for Algiers, where they were met by no less a person than Juan March. It took diplomatic pressure on a large scale to recover the oil.

March was not only interested in tobacco and oil. He built up a wide but not intricate network of interests on the basis of his earliest profession. March's secret was that he never branched out, merely intensified. His smuggling fleet of thirty-six boats became the Transmediterranean shipping company with complete control of all the Balearic-mainland routes and several liners. He owned the Banco March in Palma, chiefly a deposit, not a credit, bank. He was widely interested in armaments like any other modern financier, but chiefly in the shipping of them.

His old Majorcan shipping organisation transported the Moors and Foreign Legion from Morocco to Cadiz and Algeciras. This done, the organisation turned to its old work and distributed the Italian arms sent to Majorca among the rebels on the mainland. Even the financing of a rebellion was only an extension of his old organising of strong-arm gangs to smash his smuggler competitors.

Juan March at the age of eighty was what he had always been: the Majorcan smuggler, still with the limp cigarette hanging from his narrow lips, his tie awry and often his shirt out in the Majorcan fashion. He still adored women and melons. He could still "smell money".

Rapacious, unsentimental, cold, he was the antithesis of Cambó, but the two complement each other. It would probably be false to suppose that March's financing of the July rebellion was due to any loyalty or apprehension; any more than Basil Zaharoff's financing of the Greco-Turkish war was due solely to patriotism. March's interests obviously lay in alliance with the Right and he had none of Cambó's fear of agrarian competition. He could hate ferociously, and he was quite capable of using a whole rebellion to smash a Republic which imprisoned him, cancelled his monopolies and expropriated much of his property; but it was certain that he would only do so if he could see in it profit to himself. It is said that he financed Franco in return for the monopoly of army supplies.

"The Republic," said Jaime Carner, Minister of Finance, "must smash Juan March or March will smash the Republic." "March is an extraordinary case," he mused, "he is neither friend nor enemy of the Republic; he was neither friend nor enemy of the Dictatorship; he was neither friend nor enemy even of the Monarchy. March is neither friend nor enemy of anyone."

In March and Cambó Spanish capitalism found, not representatives, for both were too intelligent, but a kind of

sublimation. They were representative only in the sense that only the particular conditions of Spanish capitalism in this particular period could have produced them. They constituted a bigger threat to the Republic than all the Sanjurjos, Robles and Francos because they were part of the substance of which it was made.

V

THE WORKERS

ROSA LUXEMBURG HAS stated the two obstacles in the way of the advance of the workers' movement: "abandonment of its mass characteristics and forgetfulness of its final objective; sectarianism and collapse into bourgeois reformism; anarchism and opportunism."

Owing to the slow and unequal development of Spanish capitalism, the Spanish workers' movement was a long time in finding its way. It had to fit itself to the objective conditions in which it grew up: anarchic, parasitic and ill-distributed capitalism and a feudal landowning system, breeder of sheer hunger revolts among the peasants and labourers. It had to overcome not only its own immaturities but also the violent offensive of the owning class against it.

Hence, while the working-class in the last twenty-five years was well-organised and extremely aggressive, it lacked direction and purpose. It was profoundly divided into two equal sections. Neither of these sections, the Socialist General Workers' Union (U.G.T.) nor the Anarchosyndicalist National Labour Federation (C.N.T.) was really revolutionary.

Anarchosyndicalism was the final form of a long evolution which culminated in 1932. As the name implies, it is an amalgamation of Anarchism and Syndicalism. Both are based on the thesis of Marx's Inaugural Address to the International Working-Men's Association (First International): "The emancipation of the workers can be won only by the workers themselves, and the economic emancipation of the working class is therefore the great end to which every political movement ought to be subordinated."

The earliest working-class movement in Spain arose among the Catalan textile-workers in the 1840's, with a Utopian tendency similar to that of the workers in Paris and Lyons. Proudhon's influence came in, and co-operatives were formed, leading to unions in the early Fifties. The unions were prohibited in 1854, and the first general strike in Spain was declared in protest. In Catalonia, 40,000 workers were affected.

Spanish capitalism was still extremely backward even in Catalonia, and the Spanish section of the International followed Bakunin on his expulsion at the Hague Congress in 1872. Bakunin's ideas had been brought to Spain by his friend Fanelli four years previously, and the first Spanish workers' congress was addressed by Farga Pellicer in Barcelona on July 19, 1870. The Congress represented 30,000 workers who adhered to the International.

Farga Pellicer stated the anarchist line which has hardly been modified in Spain for sixty-five years. "Capitalism," he said, "is the great tyrant over mankind to-day. Therefore mankind is faced with only one struggle of true social significance: the struggle of poverty against capital. But the State is the guardian of social privilege, and the Church blesses it and calls it the expression of God's will. Therefore we must break the domination of Capital, State and Church, and upon their ruins build Anarchy, the free federation of free workers' groups."

The Congress passed a resolution of great historical importance: "All the struggles of the peoples towards better conditions which have been based on the maintenance of the State have always been crushed by the State. Authority and privilege are the pillars of the present social injustice. Therefore our task is to overthrow them and to build a new order of equality and freedom. Any collaboration of the workers with the bourgeoisie really means a consolidation of the present system and the crippling of the revolutionary socialist action of the working class. Therefore this Congress advises all organisations in the International to repudiate all attempts at

collaboration with the State in the hopes of social reform, and recommends them to turn their whole energies to a federalist organisation of the producers who alone can assure the success of the Social Revolution. This federal organisation is the true expression of the interests of Labour and must be built up without reference to Governments."

This line was confirmed at the underground Congress in 1871 and at the Cordoba Congress in 1873, representing 300,000 workers from 263 sections.

In 1871, Marx's son-in-law, Paul Lafargue (called Pablo Fargas in Spain) had succeeded in founding the beginnings of the Spanish Socialist Party in Madrid, but this remained a tiny fraction until Pablo Iglesias revived it in the Eighties. The General Workers' Union was formed in Madrid in 1888.

While the Socialists dominated Madrid, the Anarchists grew strong in Catalonia, Valencia, Aragon, Galicia and Andalusia. They adopted many of the federalist ideas of Pi Margall, first President of the First Republic, finding in them at once a similarity with their own conception of the "free federation of free workers' groups" and an opposition not only to centralisation as such but also to centralisation as the basis of the Spanish State-apparatus.

It is not strange, therefore, that, while centralising Madrid suited the strongly centralising character Marx had given to the socialist movement, federalising Catalonia (Pi Margall was a Catalan) should have been fertile ground for Anarchism.

There was, however, a contradiction here. Barcelona was the centre of immigration for the poorest workers from the starving South, already trained in peasant revolt, repressed by the feudal landlords' terrorist "Black Hand" gangs and desperate with misery. It was among these immigrant Murcians, Estremenians and Andalusians rather than among the Catalans that Anarchism found its main strength.

In Catalonia, industry was more highly developed than anywhere else in Spain, and in textiles, shipping and

transport there was scope for the emergence of an organised proletariat. Yet Anarchism is the expression essentially of a backward proletarian movement, and in Asturias and the Basque country, the other two industrial areas in Spain, the workers were predominantly Socialist.

The national problem in Catalonia might also coincide with anarchist federalism, but there was a similar national problem in the Basque country.

These features, therefore, did not wholly explain the anarchist predominance in Catalonia.

The real reason lay in the acute form of the class-struggle in Catalonia, and the socialist failure to provide any revolutionary lead. Grounded in Madrid, a bureaucratic town with very little industry, Socialism was necessarily reformist. It had little to offer as a substitute for Bakunin's "neither God nor master" and Kropotkin's "conquest of bread".

✓ The class struggle existed in all its crudity in Barcelona. In other places, the employers offered a certain margin of tolerance, a certain show of "social reform", "sympathy for the oppressed" and Peabody Institutes for the "indigent but labouring poor". In Catalonia, industrialists openly showed their hatred of the workers and every slight improvement in conditions had to be won at the point of the revolver.

✓ The only method was "direct action", either by the pistol of the Anarchist or by the strike of the Syndicalist. During the heroic age of international Anarchism, Spain had been terrorised as thoroughly as France, Italy or Chicago. In the later days of the Great War, however, there appeared a completely different kind of terrorism, more reminiscent of the old "Black Hand" days in Andalusia.

The initiative did not come from the Anarchosyndicalists but from the employers, who naturally attempted to pass on the responsibility to the workers. The terrible days in Barcelona "when they shot each other in the streets" began in 1917 and lasted until 1923. The first victim was

the arms-manufacturer Barret. The murder was traced to the president of the Metal-workers' Union, Eduardo Ferrer; but it appeared senseless, since Barret had no dispute with his men.

When investigations were carried further, it was found that Barret's "crime" had been to supply the Allies with munitions. Eduardo Ferrer, who was later liquidated as a police-spy, had been bought by the famous Baron Koenig (who was neither Baron nor Koenig), the head of the German espionage service. Koenig used a gang led by Bravo Portillo, an ex-police commissioner who still kept up relations with Headquarters.

After the big strike of 1917, when the Spanish proletariat came near to making the revolution in alliance with broad sections of the bourgeoisie, the Barcelona Anarcho-syndicalists carried on the action. Intense throughout 1918, it culminated in a two-weeks' general strike in March 1919 and a lock-out in November. The employers' counter-attack began. There were shootings, bombings and strikes all that year.

The Anarchosyndicalists had formed the National Labour Federation (*Confederación Nacional de Trabajo, C.N.T.*) in 1911, organising some 600,000 workers and peasants with a programme based upon the autonomous, non-political workers using all the methods of organised direct action to achieve a socialistic society after the workers had taken over industry and run it themselves. All workers not in the U.G.T. were to join the C.N.T., with the stipulation that once the C.N.T. was formed it would establish contact between the two Federations to unite the Spanish working class in a single organisation.

In 1917, both organisations had worked together, but the reformist U.G.T. refused to abandon its connexion with the political Socialist Party and the two Federations had drifted apart again. Only in a truly revolutionary situation, when collaboration with the bourgeoisie was a matter of a tactical offensive alliance, could they come together.

After the Madrid Congress in 1919, the C.N.T. began to organise the *Sindicato Unico*, the One Big Industrial Union. Hence there was perpetual friction with the U.G.T., but even more with the employers, who organised "yellow" unions, the Free Syndicates, based upon the few small Catholic unions supported by gunmen led by such persons as Ramón Salas and by the armed Catholic militias, the ✓ - Carlist *requetes*. The police organised gangs who first shot both the Yellows and the men of the Confederation, then concentrated on the workers' leaders.

The Catalan employers appealed to Madrid in the name of "order", and Madrid sent Martínez Anido and Arlegui to rule Barcelona by police terror. Not only did their men shoot workers' leaders or torture them in the prison-castle of Montjuich but they allowed the employers' gunmen a free hand. Francisco Layret, a popular liberal lawyer, one of the most intelligent of the Barcelona Republicans, was murdered probably by the Carlist *requetes*.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Anarchosyndicalists could maintain their hold on Catalonia when the Socialists had nothing to offer in exchange. The C.N.T. was always the representative of the impatient and desperate starving masses, was always ready to put itself at their head in order to prevent them from being headed off into socialist reformism.

Anarchosyndicalism, however, was itself a mode of reformism. Its hostility to the State, for which it found in its own experience ample reason when Martínez Anido was revealed as the collaborator of Bravo Portillo, forbade it to consider the problem of the seizure of power, the only ultimate problem for the revolutionary working class. Anarchosyndicalism set itself problems that it could not solve, if it were still to retain its specific character. Anarchism might set the problem but it could never be Anarchism that solved it. "Without a revolutionary theory no revolutionary movement is possible," said Lenin. ✓ Anarchosyndicalism has no theory, merely "wish-

thinking". Hence, it is extraordinarily difficult to understand.

The aim of Anarchism is Libertarian Communism, a Communism very different from that proposed by Marx. The Libertarian Communist society is conceived as a federation of autonomous units exchanging products on the basis of need, not equivalence. There would be no central authority but a central debating council. Each community would rule itself by the pressure of mutual trust and public opinion. Every individual would have the maximum personal freedom guided by "community-consciousness". Money would be replaced at first by "production-certificates" showing how many units each worker had produced each day. "To each according to his work" would be replaced by "to each according to his needs" because a socially-minded worker would naturally give his best and no reasonable man can ask more.

Syndicalism, strongly influenced around 1917 by the ideas of Sorel, aimed at worker-control and then worker-ownership of industry through the unions: collectivisation. This would eventually eliminate capitalism, and Socialism would arrive almost automatically. The struggle would come first, when the workers began to collectivise industry, and this would be fought out by "direct action": strikes, sabotage, terror.

Thus the Marxist process: liquidation of the bourgeoisie proletarian dictatorship, Socialism by the abolition of classes, is paralleled by the Anarchosyndicalist process: direct action, collectivisation, Libertarian Communism by elimination of capitalism. It is noteworthy that nearly all the leading syndicalist theoreticians, Sorel, Leone, Lagardelle, Labriola, were trained as Marxists. Marxist deviation could lead to Fascism (Mussolini was trained by Labriola) as easily as to Reformism or Syndicalism.

Reformism, indeed, may be said to breed Anarchosyndicalism and vice versa. The C.N.T. could flourish where the class struggle was severest simply because the

U.G.T. could not give a revolutionary lead. The U.G.T. could not give that lead because C.N.T. violence compromised its position and threatened a bourgeois and State counter-attack in Madrid. Therefore, the more determined the C.N.T. grew in Barcelona, the more solid grew the U.G.T. in Madrid. Lenin has said that Anarchism is often a kind of expiation by the workers' movement for its opportunist sins.

It is essential to understand Spanish Anarchosyndicalism if modern Spanish history is to be intelligible. Spanish Socialism differed little from German and Austrian Social-Democracy, but Anarchosyndicalism is a phenomenon specifically Spanish.

In Spain, the individual is of great importance: not the "leader" but the individual man. Simply because capitalism is undeveloped or unequally developed, individual eccentricity has scope. It is untrue to say that a Spaniard as Spaniard is an individualist—an old platitude. The development of the economic basis is continually modifying the truth of these tropes. But it is true that, under the circumstances in Spain, the Anarchosyndicalists could place immense stress on the individual and did act as individuals. This factor cannot be neglected. The queer mixture of cloudy Utopianism and practical achievement, of the longing for a fuller life, which led sections of the movement into vegetarianism, nudism and free love, and the complete neglect of death as a social concept, which led them indiscriminately into cold-blooded murder and hot-hearted annihilation, is in itself a political factor of the first magnitude.

"The phenomenon of Anarchosyndicalism," writes Ramón J. Sender in his novel, *Seven Red Sundays*, "is the result of excessive vitality in individuals and masses, of the generosity and over-emphasis which characterises over-vital men and societies. Look at the huge disproportion between what the revolutionary Spanish masses have given during the course of their long struggle and what they have gained, the disproportion between their force

and the effectiveness with which they use it. . . . If I am asked: 'Do you think that Anarchosyndicalism is a fundamental fact in Spanish politics?' I reply that it is, and no one can ever neglect it. . . . My formula is, however, non-political. People over-full of humanity dream of Liberty, of the Good, or Justice, giving them an emotional and individualistic content. So burdened, a man can aspire to the respect and loyalty of his relatives and friends, but whenever he tries to face society as a whole, he will be annihilated in heroic but sterile revolt. No man can approach his fellows offering the maximum and expecting the maximum in return. Societies are formed, not by accumulation of individual virtues, but by checking defects by a system which limits each individual's area of expansion. Obviously, this system varies in feudalism, capitalism and communism. The Anarchosyndicalists may make their own, but until they have created it, they will go on aspiring to a strange society where all men will be Saint Francis of Assisi of disinterestedness, Spartacuses of audacity, Newtons and Hegels of talent."

The C.N.T. is non-political and anti-political. Since it is a pure labour organisation, it is open to any worker whatever his political opinions, in the same way as workers of all opinions can be members of the British Trades-Unions. No member affiliated to a political party may, however, occupy a post on the committees. There is no inner-party bureaucracy, and most Committee members do their ordinary work during the day. Those whose functions will not let them do this receive the pay of an ordinary skilled worker. There is such an even morbid fear of creating a professional labour boss or "intellectual" caste that the editor of the C.N.T.'s organ, *Solidaridad Obrera*, may not hold his job for more than three years. No strike pay is given, but any member of the organisation may demand "solidarity" from any other, and it is never refused.

After 1917, the Spanish working-class realised that its strength lay in unity. The Barcelona Congress of the

Catalan Regional Federation of the C.N.T. in June 1918 resolved that the independent Saragossa Federation should act as intermediary between Barcelona and Madrid for a permanent agreement between the C.N.T. and the U.G.T. Representatives of the C.N.T. and the U.G.T. attended the conferences in Moscow leading to the formation of the Third International. So enthusiastic were the C.N.T. delegates, especially as they saw in the Third International a chance of revolutionising the Second, that, in 1919, delegations succeeded in passing resolutions in favour of adherence to the Third International, complete unity of the Spanish working class and even the dictatorship of the proletariat, the very mention of which had hitherto been anathema. Yet resolutions were also passed stating that Libertarian Communism was the Federation's ultimate aim.

The conservative Anarchists in the C.N.T. counter-attacked furiously. Much of the confused shooting of 1920-23 was due to the liquidation of elements which favoured collaboration with the Spanish Socialists or with Moscow. In 1927 was constituted the Iberian Anarchist Federation, the redoubtable FAI (pronounced "*fie*") to prevent deviations in the C.N.T. and to restore the original Anarchist line.

The FAI was illegal from its foundation until July 1936, so that little is known of its structure or numbers. It publishes no statistics, it has no congresses, no party bosses. By no means all members of the C.N.T. are members of the FAI. It is as much of an honour for a C.N.T. member to be co-opted into the FAI as for a Russian worker to be accepted as a member of the Communist Party. The qualifications are an undeviating belief in the doctrines of Anarchism, useful and reliable service to the organisation, above all, capacity for "direct action". The FAI, entrusted with what may be called without intention of insult the C.N.T.'s dirty work, is recruited from among both the most skilled and intelligent workers at one end and from the Murcians and Almerians who are engaged

in the coolie work in the great cities at the other. Naturally, *lumpenproletariat* elements inevitably creep in, but are sooner or later liquidated. The FAI certainly contains killers, but not many mere gunmen. In five years, between its foundation in 1927 and its capture of the leading influence in the C.N.T. in 1932, the FAI achieved such a reputation that many Spaniards believe that it dates right back to the heroic age of Anarchism in the Eighties and Nineties. In fact, it does to some extent continue the tradition of Paolino Pallas and Mateo Morral and the tradition of the One Big Union, but is in reality something quite modern.

The Anarchosyndicalists, placed in opposition to Socialist reformism, were continually forced into collaboration with the bourgeoisie. This appears paradoxical, when the pistols of the FAI were deliberately loaded to prevent it; but it is the tragic truth. In time of peace, the Socialists collaborated, even going so far as to accept ministerial posts in Primo de Rivera's shadow cabinets. In time of war, the Anarchosyndicalists found themselves ranged beside a part of the bourgeoisie against the Socialists. Before 1931, or one might even say before 1934 or even 1936, the class struggle in Spain was waged either by industry against feudalism, or by part of the bourgeoisie against another part, or by sections of the petty-bourgeoisie against the big bourgeoisie. In every case, the warring factions used the proletariat as their allies.

In 1909, Spain might have had its Russian 1905. A general crisis affecting the whole regime; the repercussions of the Russian Revolution; the rise of the Catalan separatist movement supported by *all* sections in Catalonia, the deciding factor in Spanish politics; the Moroccan War unpopular with *all* sections except the Court and the Army; a leader, demagogue though he might be, Alejandro Lerroux. But that leader and the section of the petty-bourgeoisie he commanded, the radical "young barbarians" and the *lumpenproletariat* of Barcelona's Paralelo, were permitted to betray their allies with impunity because

the working class was not united and was still seeking its direction. The revolt was isolated in Catalonia.

In 1917, the revolutionary situation was again extraordinarily favourable. The Monarchy, definitely finished as a form of representative government for the ruling class, was only just strong enough to survive for another fourteen years by calling in a military dictatorship. In 1917, the industrialists were ready to overthrow the Monarchy and its agrarian allies. The big-bourgeois Cambó called a meeting of the Members of Parliament in Barcelona, since the Cortes and the constitutional guarantees had been suspended, in exactly the same way as Companys, the Catalan petty-bourgeois, offered a truly Republican Government asylum in Barcelona in October 1934. In 1919, as in 1934, the situation was the proletariat's if it could exploit it for its own class interests.

Largo Caballero, the leader of the U.G.T., came to Barcelona to discuss joint action with the C.N.T., just as Azaña "happened" to be in Barcelona in 1934. In Catalonia the movement extended all the way from Cambó's Catalan League through Maciá's Autonomists and Marcelino Domingo's Republicans to Caballero's Socialists and the Anarchosyndicalists. In December 1916 the C.N.T. and U.G.T. had carried out a joint protest strike. In 1917, with the influence of the first War-slump and the growing Russian Revolution, the unity of the revolutionary classes was even closer. But this very unity depended upon the crash of industry and wages, and was therefore confined to Catalonia. The proletarian movement was unable to draw the correct conclusion that it, not the parasite petty-bourgeois, must make the revolution. Consequently, the League, frightened by the possibility of working-class unity which would convert the attack upon the agrarian interests into the attack upon the whole system, had the chance of betraying its allies, and accepted ministries.

Enraged by this betrayal, the C.N.T. carried on the struggle which it would have been incorrect to avoid,

but thereby brought upon Catalonia Martinez Anido and Primo de Rivera, and so alarmed the Socialists that Largo Caballero, trained to estimate the "right moment" for revolution, entered one of the Dictatorship's Cabinets in order to preserve the Socialist movement intact for the final thrust. Like every other party in the Second International, the Spanish Socialist Party chose the extremely perilous way of collaboration.

Before the revolution of April 14, 1931, all sectors of the Spanish working-class movement were profoundly reformist. They could only be "ventriloquists" for the hungry and impatient masses (C.N.T.) or gradualists dependent upon the undeveloped petty-bourgeois movement (Socialist Party and U.G.T.). The Spanish masses showed an amazing insurrectionary instinct, a revolutionary intuition and a heroic combativeness, but they lacked direction.

Yet their leaders were men of talent and intelligence. The C.N.T. and the FAI produced such leading militants as Ascaso, Peiró, García Oliver, Seguí (murdered all too early). The Socialist Party produced two figures of historic importance: Largo Caballero and Indalecio Prieto.

Indalecio Prieto might have been simply another Henderson or MacDonald. Self-made, with a powerful patron in the liberal Bilbao industrialist, Horacio Echevarrieta, Prieto had been a pedlar and a shorthand-writer, never a manual worker like Caballero. His antecedents were therefore lower-middle-class, and his policy was based on his antecedents. A Socialist but not a Marxist, a follower of Guesde and Lafargue rather than Kautsky, Prieto's course seemed destined to lead to the premiership of a bourgeois National Government.

Stout, sly, an exceptionally able business-man, Prieto was the antithesis of the resolute, intuitive organiser, Caballero. He had a wider grasp of international affairs than anyone else in the Socialist Party except perhaps its chief Marxist theoretician, Luis Araquistain. Set upon

bourgeois collaboration, he mastered all the arts of the bourgeoisie.

Nevertheless, there was in Prieto an intellectual honesty and brutality which also characterised Largo Caballero and Manuel Azaña; a quality which decisively distinguished him from the Hendersons, MacDonalds, Vivianis and Briands. He was representative, never of the proletarian, always of the petty-bourgeois revolution. Prieto and Azaña were its two poles, as Robespierre and Danton or Ireton and Oldcastle were the poles of their revolutions. It was for this reason that Prieto could dominate the Parliamentary Socialist Party for years but hardly gain a footing in the U.G.T. The purely labour interests of a trades-union federation demanded either the conservatism of a Besteiro or the revolutionarism of a Largo Caballero, just as the British T.U.C. could accept only the conservatism of a Citrine or the revolutionarism of a Tom Mann.

The Communist Party before 1931 hardly existed. In Catalonia, it carried on a fierce battle with the Workers' and Peasants' Block (B.O.C.) headed by Joaquin Maurin.

The B.O.C. could take root in Catalonia for precisely the same reasons as the C.N.T., and, in fact, was largely composed of individuals who had outgrown FAI Anarchism and yet disliked official Communism. It was an admirable example of all the infantile maladies of Communism, particularly in its exaggerated optimism about the possibilities of revolution. B.O.C. policy was simply another mode of FAI "wish-thinking" and this was the reason for the hold it had over considerable masses in Catalonia.

Both socialist and anarchosyndicalist proletarian civilisation were more advanced than their revolutionary understanding. Despite persecution, the Anarchists had succeeded in founding numerous Libertarian Ateneos, which acted simultaneously as propagandist and organisational centres. The influence of Francisco Ferrer, shot on a ridiculous charge of "moral responsibility" for the insurrection of 1909, was strong. His "Free Schools", based

upon rationalistic principles and a good deal of scientific mysticism drawn from Proudhon, Tolstoy and Reclus, did a little to break the monopoly of the clerical schools where reading and writing were taught with the sole aim of making the child understand the Church catechism.

The Socialists had their *Casas del Pueblo*, as in France, Germany and Belgium, which served a similar function. They were extremely well organised in Asturias, but it is a measure of the perils run by the socialist collaborationist policy that the first *Casa del Pueblo* in Barcelona was founded by Alejandro Lerroux and that in Palma de Majorca by no less a person than Juan March.

In 1909 and 1917, the Spanish working-class movement had for a moment been united. The bourgeoisie had been strong enough to defeat this union because it had managed to direct it. But these two great movements had shaken the old structure of the Monarchy to its foundations, and the fall of the Dictatorship in 1930, characterised by the military rising of Galán and García Hernandez at Jaca and a wave of strikes, placed once more before the Spanish working-class the possibility of making the revolution. Even in 1931, there was no possibility of passing straight to the proletarian dictatorship; but there was the opportunity of immensely abbreviating the transitional stage by setting up a bourgeois democracy in which there was "opened a fair field to the working class for the struggle for its own interests, and, in any case, would bring matters to a crisis by which the nation would be fairly and irresistibly launched on the revolutionary career". (Engels.)

VI

THE REGIONS

I. CATALONIA

DESPITE THE ELECTORAL assertions of Gil Robles, despite the "Fiesta de la Raza", Spain is not and has never been more than a conglomeration of peoples. There are at least four different peoples living in the territory between the Pyrenees and the Portuguese frontier: the Castilians, who, with the Estremadurans, Andalusians, Leoneses and Montañeses constitute the Spaniards proper; the Galicians, who are more akin to the Portuguese; the Basques, who come from no one knows where and speak a non-European language; and the big block on the north-east Mediterranean coast, the Valencians and Catalans, who speak the old *lingua franca* which is understood all the way from Alicante to Nice, the language of Gallia Narbonensis.

There is, therefore, in Spanish history, tradition, culture, economy and linguistics, the element of federalism. The Catholic Monarchs imposed a rigid centralism from Leon and Madrid. This centralism was never accepted by the provinces, although open revolt was necessarily only sporadic.

The position of the most important regionalisms, Catalan and Basque, was just the reverse of the relations between Ireland and England. Catalonia aspired to the same autonomy as Ireland; but while England is the rich industrial country, Ireland the impoverished agricultural, Spain is the impoverished agrarian tyrant while Catalonia is the rich industrial rebel. In Catalonia agriculture is

worth about 1,250 million pesetas, industry about 3,500 millions: in Spain agricultural production about 12,000 million pesetas industrial about 4,000 millions. Thus Catalonia accounts for about 10 per cent of all-Spain agricultural production but for 87.5 per cent of industrial. Nearly all the rest is concentrated in the steel and shipping yards of Basque Bilbao, in the mines of Rio Tinto and Peñarroya and the Asturias coal-pits.

In Catalonia the national problem has at various times become a revolutionary thesis because Catalonia represents the concentration of the bourgeois industrial class, the maximum development of the revolutionary proletariat and the planting of the eternal rivalry between feudal agrarian and bourgeois industrial interests.

The Catalans gained special rights, the *usatges*, equivalent to the Basque and Aragonese *fueros*, some eight centuries ago. They evolved more rapidly than "Black Spain". Catalonia was the first commercial maritime power in modern Europe. Columbus was probably a Catalan. It had the first bank, the Taula de Canvi, founded in 1401. The Rialto was founded 186 years later, the Bank of England only in 1694, after the English Revolution. A man was hanged in Barcelona for passing a bad cheque a hundred years before the foundation of the Bank of England.

Don Gaspar de Guzman, Count of Olivares and Duke of San Lucar, told Philip IV in 1640: "The first thing the Monarchy must do is to destroy Catalonia." Claris proclaimed the Catalan Republic and recognised the French Monarchy as suzerain. Philip V finally destroyed Catalan independence in 1714, hanging the autonomist leader, Rafael Casanovas. Henceforward there could be no truce between mercantile Catalonia and agrarian Castile. Charles III calmed passions temporarily by decreeing an exaggerated system of protection for Catalan textiles. The textile mills became mechanised, and 65 per cent of the $2\frac{1}{2}$ million spindles in Spain were concentrated in Catalonia. But the Kings of Castile again

returned to their agrarian allegiance, and Catalonia was suppressed.

The Catalans, modern, progressive, industrial, industrious, politically advanced, were thus opposed to backward, impoverished, agrarian, feudal Spain. Textiles were faced with wheat and cattle.

National movements are usually exploited by the big bourgeoisie to force from the Central Government concessions of a political (and economic) character. Afterwards, in proportion as the movement is popularised and developed, the petty-bourgeoisie takes it over from the big bourgeoisie. This situation does not last long. Either the national movement becomes a basis for Fascism, by which it loses its progressive, liberating sense, or the workers' movement makes it its own, which provides a very important weapon for the cause of revolution, neutralising a part of the nationalist petty-bourgeoisie and drawing to it another important section. The Catalan nationalist movement has passed through all three stages.

The interests of Catalonia and the interests of Castile could never be more than temporarily allied even when they were represented by the agrarian and industrial oligarchies. Both might coincide from time to time in hostility to a threat to the whole class—"to restore order"—but no sooner had order been restored than the struggle inevitably broke out again. This contradiction was manifested in every political form, from the open revolts of the Reapers, of Rafael Casanovas, the *pronunciamientos* of Prim and Espartero, and Cambó's Assembly of Parliamentarians, to the negotiations of the same Cambó with Gil Robles, Portela Valladares and Juan March.

The Catalan problem was therefore always present. The Catalan bourgeoisie, baffled by the Austrian Kings' refusal to permit trade with the Americas, perpetually asserted its historic and economic right to develop in accordance with its own characteristics. The policies of the Central Government were ruinous to Catalonia, therefore

centralisation was the enemy. Federalism always found its chief exponents among the Catalans.

Cambó has stated that "from 1898 to 1923 the Catalan problem was the constant pre-occupation of every Government".

1898 was the year in which Spain lost the last of its American colonies: Cuba, Porto Rico, the Philippines. In 1897, Catalan textile exports to the colonies amounted to 11 million kilograms; in 1899 they amounted to four millions. The foreign market was lost and Catalan policy was no longer exclusively directed to obtaining fantastic tariff protection from Madrid by every means from the lobby to the *pronunciamiento*.

Catalan nationalism reacted strongly. The ruin of the textile industry inevitably and invariably brought repercussions among the petty-bourgeoisie, barred from compensation in large-scale finance. The agitation reached and transformed the superstructure, and there arose in the Nineties a wide Catalanist cultural movement, with a revival of Catalan music, architecture, "Floral Games", poetry, racial mysticism.

Although "politics are simply concentrated economics", the nationalist revival in Catalonia cannot be exclusively traced to a drop of seven million kilograms of textile exports. It coincided with the "Merrie England" movement, post-Wagnerianism, Gothicism, the petty-bourgeois reaction against the world-crisis of 1896 and the rise of monopoly-capitalism. But in Catalonia the nationalist revival had defiant characteristics peculiar to itself.

The Catalan big bourgeoisie, however, could not be a revolutionary element. It might, in 1917 especially, have dismissed the Monarchy as the French big bourgeoisie had dismissed Napoleon III in 1870, not by its own action but by delegating the task to the petty-bourgeoisie. But in Catalonia it was too late. The petty-bourgeoisie, the Maciá Republican Autonomists and later the *Esquerra* (Catalan Left), was so indeterminate that it could do little more than gesture. Cambó was intelligent enough

to realise that Maciá's vagueness must necessarily give scope to the far more vigorous proletarian movement, organised by the Anarchosyndicalists ready to extend Catalan autonomism to Peninsular federalism. The formula "the Catalan State within the Federal Republic" could only be a brief transitional stage even if it could ever come into being.

Faced with all the crudity of the Federal Republic as such, the Catalan League necessarily recalled its class-interests, made a pact with centralisation and a mental reservation that it would direct the Central Government from the lobbies, and hired Primo de Rivera to "restore order". Cambó had accepted the Ministry of Finance in 1921: his trusted lieutenant, vice-president of CHADE, Ventosa y Calvell, accepted it in 1929. Regionalism had become a danger, and the League could make a pact with the organisation of the big Catalan landowners, the Institute of San Isidro. Thence it was a short and logical step to electoral alliance with Gil Robles from Salamanca in the elections of November 1933.

Catalanism therefore passed into the hands of the petty-bourgeoisie, to Maciá and the Esquerra, after a wild flurry of opportunist federalism under the leadership of Lerroux and the Anarchists in the Tragic Week of 1909. It was left to Maciá to proclaim the Catalan Republic in April 1931, hastily checked by the flying visit of petty-bourgeois delegated from Madrid. It was left to Luis Companys to proclaim the Catalan State within the Federal Republic on October 6, 1934, after the Esquerra had arrested the chief anarchist militants on October 5. The Catalan State within the Federal Republic—the Federal Republic which had been proclaimed nowhere else—lasted just six hours.

The Constitutional Monarchy had given the four provinces of Catalonia—Barcelona, Lerida, Gerona and Tarragona—limited local self-administration in the *Mancomunidad*. The Primo de Rivera Dictatorship abolished this, and Catalonia was ruled by a Civil Governor, in the same way as the other Spanish provinces. The Statute gained

by Maciá in 1931 created the *Generalidad*, composed of a President and Councillors. Catalonia was granted its own Parliament. It was allowed the administration of its police, taxes and flag, the famous red-and-yellow "four bars". There remained, however, a Madrid garrison with a Military Command, the IVth Division, and there remained the Civil Guard. Thus there could still be a struggle between those who were satisfied with Autonomous Catalonia—the Esquerra—and those who wanted fuller autonomy amounting to separatism—the youth movement of the Esquerra, known as *Estat Catalá*, the Catalan State.

The "Catalan State" implied the dictatorship of the Catalan petty-bourgeoisie, and was therefore bound to be hostile to the workers' movement, especially when it was organised in an anarchosyndicalist, federalist body like the C.N.T. Dencás, *Estat Catalá*'s leader, was as vicious against the Anarchists as Martínez Anido and Arlegui had ever been. *Estat Catalá* was an extremely dangerous conception, especially for a man like Dencás, a young, intelligent and ambitious doctor, and for his collaborator, Miguel Badia, exuberant, optimistic, a gay conspirator who had been imprisoned during his most impressionable years, from seventeen to twenty-three, and had become chief of the *Generalidad*'s police at the age of twenty-six. There would be more than a temptation, practically a dialectic necessity, for Dencás and Badia to divert the nationalist movement to a kind of sincere National-Fascism in order to achieve and maintain their position in face of the Anarchists' unconquerable hostility to the word and thing, "State".

There could, therefore, be three possibilities for the Catalan nationalist movement. The League might succeed in making an effective pact with fascising Madrid and maintain its position by exploiting simultaneously its influence in the Central Government and the hostility between the semi-fascist Catalan petty-bourgeoisie and the proletarian movement subjected to anarchist predominance. The typically republican-democrat Esquerra

might keep its monopoly of Catalan nationalism with the aid of reformist Socialism neutralising the C.N.T. Or the workers might make the movement their own, giving it a wider scope—the Catalan Socialist Republic—and barring the way to National-Fascism.

The League could not represent any revolutionary nationalist development, and only a forward direction could preserve the movement. Inevitably, alliance with Madrid, however subtly conceived—and subtlety was always the keynote of Cambó's policy—must have led to fascist centralisation, as it did in Germany. The big bourgeoisie had been driven to the defensive in 1923 and a counter-attack in the midst of economic crisis was unthinkable.

The ascendancy of the petty-bourgeois democratic Esquerra in Catalonia must have been as transitional as the domination of the Azañist Left in Madrid. The petty-bourgeoisie, although it can be the initial motive force in a social movement based upon the nationalism of oppressed minorities, can never succeed without the workers' support and can never satisfy anybody, even itself. It was forced, in 1931, to go beyond the demand for the mere restoration of the limited autonomy of the "*Mancomunidad*". The Generalidad, concrete expression of this advance, could not stay still and survive. It was necessarily forced to the insurrection of October 6, 1934, and, in its desire to monopolise Catalanism, was fatally destined to failure. It could not remain itself and also arm the workers, the great majority of whom were organised by the Anarchosyndicalists. Arming or refusing to arm the workers: both ways lay suicide.

The only thing which could preserve the petty-bourgeois monopoly would have been a leader, another Maciá. But neither Companys, representative of the Esquerra's dilemma, nor Dencás, representative of all the dangers implicit in maintaining the monopoly against the workers, were of Maciá's calibre.

The remaining choice was that of the workers—the Catalan Socialist Republic. In Catalonia, the Socialist

Republic would necessarily be an extension of the democratic nationalist Republic with a strong federalist tendency. But the working-class movement, being both national and international, could not ultimately halt at questions of autonomism or separatism. For there would be no hope for the Catalan proletariat until the whole Spanish proletariat made common cause with it, positing the liberties of Catalonia as only one of a whole series of immediate demands in its advance towards the liquidation of feudalism and anarchic capitalism in the social and democratic Revolution.

II. THE BASQUE COUNTRY

Catalonia set the nationalist problem in its most acute terms. It existed also in Galicia, Valencia, the Basque Country and, in a different form, in Spanish Morocco.

The Basque Country, with its heavy industry concentrated round Bilbao, was not quite in the same position as Catalonia.

The Catalans are Spaniards, although they have their own language and institutions; they are at least of the same race. No one knows who the Basques are or whence they came. Their language, Euskera, is almost certainly not European. There are about 600,000 Basques, 470,000 of whom live on Spanish soil. Their four provinces—Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya, Alava, Navarra—conserve their old titles when all other Spanish provinces are called by the names of their capitals.

The Basques are a very old people. Even before Spain was a nation, their ships sailed as far as Spitzbergen in search of *bacalao*, dried and salted cod. They preserved their Rights, their *fueros*, continuously until they were deprived of them in 1839 and 1874 after their defeat in the Carlist Wars.

The Basques are Catholics, almost mystically so in certain parts of Alava and in Navarra, where there is a mixed population of Basques and Aragonese. Navarra

was independent of Spain until 1512, chiefly under French suzerainty. Backward, remote and poor, it was the great home of Carlism.

The Basques aspired to an autonomy similar to that of Catalonia. The chief demands were: complete separation of Basque and Spanish finances, except for payment of national taxes; control of police by the native *forales*, *miñones*, *miqueletes*, not by the Civil Guard; a Basque University; right of local Deputations to control the tenure of property; local justice exercised by mayors and local magistrates; Basque schools, bilingualism; a parliament elected by universal suffrage and proportional representation, with a responsible Cabinet and a Supreme Court; no Basque to undergo military service outside the Basque country.

According to Article 11 of the Spanish Constitution any of the nationalities may obtain its Statute of limited autonomy if it is demanded by a majority of its people in a plebiscite. The Basque plebiscite was held in 1932. The only sections which voted against the Statute were the Carlists of Alava, who favoured a corporative, centralised Spain, and parts of Navarra, which wanted an even wider autonomy immediately and a separate Concordat with Rome.

Basque nationalism was racially strong enough to have persisted without economic stimulus. It is impossible to put any definite date to the beginning of the Basque nationalist revival save the political abolition of their *fueros* in 1874. Few big steel enterprises existed before this date. The big modern foundries date from between 1878 (Echevarría) and 1900 (Euskalduna).

While the Basque landowning class clung to a Catholicism even fiercer than that of Leon and Castile and brought out their tenants for the cause of God and Don Carlos, Bilbao big business, even before the boom in the Nineties, was not interested. It was not even particularly interested in Basque independence since Basque industry cannot hope for the relative autarchy of the Catalan because

there is no big market within Spain for the products of heavy industry. Bilbao fiercely opposed the Carlists of Navarra, and was represented by a republican millionaire, Horacio Echevarrieta, in the Cortes before there was a Republican Party at all. His father, Don Cosme, also a millionaire, had been condemned to death by the Carlists. In Bilbao the Socialist Indalecio Prieto, one-time protégé of Horacio Echevarrieta, is more important than the leaders of the Basque Nationalist Party. Basque industry has never hesitated to lobby Madrid, much as it has despised Spaniards in general. This was the more necessary since, according to a calculation made by Prieto in the Cortes in 1932, Basque heavy industry has been developed to a point where it could supply all Spain's requirements seven times over.

Typical is the career of Sir Ramón de la Sota y Llano, Marqués in his own right. Disliking Spaniards and especially Alfonso XIII, he refused to use his title. Reputed the Grand Old Man of Basque Nationalism, he was not a member of the Nationalist Party. He was always a great admirer of England, furnished his house in the English style, often visited English yachting circles in the former Vanderbilt-owned *Warrior*. Strongly pro-English during the War while most of Spain was pro-German, especially after the entry of the United States—his close friend, Sabino Arana, leader of the Basque cultural revival, had wired congratulations to Theodore Roosevelt when he granted Cuban independence—Ramón de la Sota y Llano, by his “undaunted faith in that country's cause and his many splendid donations to the British Red Cross”, was able to exchange his Spanish marquisate for a British knighthood.

The Sota y Aznar shipping company, founded with a capital of 50 million pesetas in the Nineties, possessed thirty-four ships by 1914. Sir Ramón also owned three iron-ore mines with a capital of over 55 million pesetas. Besides the knighthood, Ramón de la Sota y Llano gained such large profits that “the Board decided not to publish

its balance-sheet". When it was finally published, during the depth of the shipping crisis in 1935, the nett profit was over three million pesetas.

With his colossal war profits, Sir Ramón did not imitate the Catalan bourgeoisie and buy German marks. Instead, he embarked upon an even more hazardous enterprise, the huge steel and shipping yards of the Compañía Siderurgica del Mediterraneo at Sagunto, near Valencia, with a capital of 135 million pesetas.

The idea of conquering the Mediterranean as well as the Atlantic was daring. The idea was that the Siderurgica would make enough money in its early years to pay off the costs of its construction and keep running until the State or the Mediterranean powers could offer new contracts. In 1935, 800 hands were laid off at Sagunto with little prospect of returning.

Horacio Echevarrieta made a similar mistake. He acquired huge shipyards at Cadiz on the strength of a promise by the Monarchy to give them enough contracts to keep them running. The chief product was submarines. Echevarrieta finally went bankrupt, the yards were taken over by the workers in April 1936 and the firm was forced out of its luxurious offices next door to *El Liberal*, the paper owned by Echevarrieta's ex-protégé, Indalecio Prieto.

The State, regarded by the Catalan big bourgeoisie as a tyrant whom they could occasionally influence, became to the Basque ironmasters a sort of milch-cow. Ramos Oliveira quotes the case of the saving of the Siderurgica by violent lobbying of the Radical Government in 1933. The Government gave Siderurgica an order for 25,000 tons of rails, worth 10 million pesetas. But the Western Railway Company, in effect a State-company, already had on hand 7,200 tons of rails which it could not afford to lay for lack of credit for complementary material. In 1929, Siderurgica had made 59,006 tons of rails, in 1932 production sank to 6,502 tons. In December 1934 there were 20,000 wholly unemployed industrial workers in the province of Vizcaya, 17,000 partly stopped.

Thus, the Basque national question was posed in terms somewhat different from that of Catalonia. Although big industrial interests coincided in the demand, and indeed necessity, for a fantastically high tariff protection, the Basque capitalists always tended to turn away from Spain towards England and France, which held large interests in Basque mines. In addition, Basque financing extended over the whole country, so that direct political action was never so essential as it was for Catalan industry.

Basque nationalism, a genuine cultural movement under Sabino Arana, just as Catalan nationalism was genuinely cultural under Puig y Cadafalch, cannot be accused of being entirely the result of trade and tariff interests, as Cambó's regionalism was in Catalonia. Big industry, with rare exceptions such as Sir Ramón Sota y Llano, was hostile to nationalism. The Nationalists reproached the Urquijos for holding such important interests and funds outside the "country", that is, in Madrid and Catalonia.

Basque big industry and finance, more flexible and alert than the Catalan, tended to a tactical alliance with Prieto's Socialists to counterbalance the influence of the Nationalists. This was the easier in that exploitation was never so fierce in the Basque Country as it was in Catalonia. There was no huge and hungry immigrant population from the savage South, although Galicians and Castilians came to profit by the comparatively high wages in the mines and foundries. Bilbao never experienced a Martínez Anido. Anarchism could never gain a foothold save among the fishers and builders, organised nationally in the C.N.T.

The whole structure of the Basque Country determined both the strength and the ideology of the Basque Nationalist Party, with its slogan of "God and the Old Laws". Into the wide plains and latifundia of Navarre, severed historically for centuries from the Three Provinces of Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya and Alava, Nationalism could not penetrate. It could not control the flat plateau of southern Alava.

But everywhere where the mountains divided the population into small semi-self-supporting communities based upon the one-family farm, the *caserio*, Nationalism could triumph.

By economic organisation, by the relatively high standard of living, and by character, the Basques were formed for an essentially petty-bourgeois ideology, profoundly reformist when it came into contact with Marxism. The Nationalist Party could organise these characteristics in their own syndical body, the *Solidaridad Vasca*, with its motto of "labour, Christianity, Basque Nationalism". The *Solidaridad* could not only gain a vastly larger number of members than the U.G.T. but even lend to the socialist union something of its own reformism. Nationalism, not Anarchism, was the nemesis for reformism in the Basque Country.

Certainly the Basques suffered more than the Catalans from the abolition of their national liberties. Autonomy was as common a topic of conversation as smuggling. (It would be a curious study to investigate exactly the role that smuggling as a habit even more than a commerce has played in the Basque and Catalan struggles for independence.) Equally certain was that Nationalism was for a petty-bourgeois party an excellent method of diverting attention from the class-struggle. This is not to impugn its sincerity: the same persons could be as sincere in desiring national liberty as in deprecating doctrines which imperilled their interests.

The Nationalists' social programme was "enlightened", based upon that of the Scandinavian democracies: the one-family farm owning its land, co-operatives, profit-sharing, the family wage, workmen's compensation, social insurance, pensions, etc. A programme which aimed at the installation of a petty-bourgeoisie, active, energetic and comfortable; a programme, equally, which had nothing whatever to do with the fundamental structure of political economy.

The model was British rather than French. The rentier, the peasant with gold in the stocking, were not Basque

characters. Speculation was always a Basque passion; and few Basques ever invested in the funds. Money always circulated freely and payment by note of hand was a common system.

Although "God and the Old Laws" was the Nationalists' motto, most Basques were a little vague about what the Old Laws—the *derecho foral*—were. The chief point was that these Old Laws, these *fueros*, embodied the Basque system of self-rule. Some of them had modern application, such as a system of nationalised mining. Others were obviously obsolete. The Old Laws were in reality nothing more than a symbol.

"God" was more programmatic. The Catholic Church in the Basque Country was profoundly nationalist, whether by conviction or by interest. The Bishop resided at Vitoria in Alava, so that the heart of the Basque Country, Bilbao, was only a Vicariate. This tended to remove the clergy from immediate politics and the odium attached thereto.

It is rather a matter for the ethnologist or the psychologist than for the historian to decide whether Basque Catholicism is predominantly Basque or Catholic, whether an Ignatius Loyola's subtle, uncompromising and missionary sense was not more Basque than Roman. The Church and the Nationalist Party were inextricably intertwined in the Basque Country, and the Basque Church in the Three Provinces tended to oppose the nobility and plutocracy, whereas in Navarre and in Spain it supported them when it did not actually control them. All the stranger that the founder of the Jesuit Order should have been a Basque.

The Basques themselves regarded the Church in Spain as sunk in the general corruption of that degenerate and oppressive country. A Vatican whose brightest ornament at one time was a Merry del Val did not receive much higher consideration. The Basques refused to accept the perfectly outrageous submission to the Holy See suggested by the Navarrese in the project for a Concordat drawn up in March 1936.

The Basque nationalist question had little to do with the Spanish question in general. It was more akin to that of the Poles in 1919. The Basques had always turned their backs on Spain and looked to England, which they still, pathetically, regarded as a great seafaring democracy with a federal Empire. More recently, they had looked to the federal constitution of the Union of Soviet Russian Republics as a model of national structure, much as they disapproved of the Soviet regime.

There was almost no point of contact between Basque and Catalan autonomy. There was, however, a sympathy, practically demonstrated in the summer of 1934 by frequent mutual encouragements. Fundamentally, the Basque Nationalist Party and the *Esquerra* were based upon the same thing: the avoidance of the class-struggle. But the *Esquerra* lacked the social programme of the Basques and the means to carry it out had they had one. Catalan Nationalism's political origins were too deeply marked with the disgrace of Cambó's opportunist regionalism and its exploitation by Lerroux. Catalan Nationalism, in its attempt to avoid Anarchism became anarchic; Basque Nationalism was always orderly. This was the natural result of the differences between Basque and Catalan capitalism. Basque capitalism had a spirit of adventure always coupled with excellent organisation; Catalan capitalism lost itself in "combinations" which usually failed because they were chaotic.

Although both Catalan and Basque industry were ridiculously over-protected, they used different methods to obtain tariffs. The Catalans attempted a "combination" by which they could virtually capture Madrid and dictate a tariff policy to the whole of Spain. The Basques tended to boycott the administration and obtain their tariffs as the price of their collaboration. The politics of the ironmasters were the reverse of the politics of the textile manufacturers. The needs of the key-industries in the would-be autonomous provinces dictated both their internal and their external relations. But both key-industries

were essentially opposed to the interests of the agrarians of Castile.

While the agrarians controlled the country from Madrid, or even when a centralising party structurally and ideologically conditioned by Madrid held the power, there could be no solution for Catalonia and the Basque Country save autonomy. Hence the weakness of the Socialist Party in the Basque Country and the strength of the Anarchists in Catalonia. Hence the strength of the Basque Nationalist Party and the weakness of the Esquerra. Hence the complexity of Spanish relations with the British Empire, from which the Basques needed Welsh coal and the Catalans Indian cotton, while the Castilians had to compete on the world-market with Canadian wheat and Australian meat. Regionalism could not fail to have a decisive influence upon the international position of a country, the soil of which, if not the Government, possessed the majority of the world's supply of copper and mercury.

Thus the regional problem had important repercussions upon the social, federal and international politics of all Spain.

III. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Even in an autonomy conceived so little in terms of the class-struggle as the Basque movement, there were profoundly revolutionary implications; much more so in the Catalan. The Federal Republic implied the complete break-up of the centralised Monarchy forcibly imposed by Charles I and Philip II, a return to the historic structure of Spain.

That such a return was not simple reaction is proved by two obvious facts: that even after four centuries of centralisation the desire for federalism was very much alive; and that some sort of federalism, probably on the model of the Federation of Soviet Russian Republics, is demanded by the economic and geographic structure of Spain. The federalist element was present in the programmes of all Spanish democratic and proletarian parties and even in

that of the Legitimist Monarchists. Azaña's idea of a Spanish Republic "one and indivisible" was based, like so many other neo-Jacobin petty-bourgeois ideas, on a misunderstanding of the verbalisms of the French Revolution. The Convention's agrarian settlement involved wide autonomy for each *commune*, and the interference of the Commissioners was accidental rather than fundamental. It was the Napoleonic "settlement" which was the definite return to administrative rigidity and converted the Commissioner into the Prefect.

Thus the task of a democratic republican revolution basing itself upon "all the workers" in opposition to a centralised system based upon the interests of feudalism and the Church was to erect a system diametrically opposed to the old regime. The municipal elections of April 12, not a vote in the Cortes, brought in the Republic. The municipalities had spoken more clearly than the electors for the Legislative Assembly not only could but would have done.

There was a vast majority in the Constituent Cortes in favour of the Federal Democratic Republic in name and being. The only groups which opposed it were the extreme Right, the Azañists and the Socialists. The Right, because they rightly saw in federalism the smashing of the old system; the Azañists because they misread the French Revolution, their chief study during their exile in France; and the Socialists, at that moment almost entirely reformist, because their interests lay in alliance with Azaña and because centralisation within the party seemed the best way of wielding it as an offensive weapon. Outside the Cortes, the Anarchosyndicalists were profoundly federalist.

The question was debated on August 28, 1931. The Radical majority declared itself federalist. The Republic was on the point of being voted Federal when Alcalá-Zamora proposed that the vote should not be taken, but that the question should be referred back to the Constitutional Commission.

Article 1 of the Spanish Constitution, perhaps the most "chemically pure" of all democratic constitutions, read: "Spain is a democratic Republic of workers of every class organised in a regime of Freedom and Justice. The powers of all its organs emanate from the people. The Republic constitutes an integral State, compatible with the autonomy of the Municipality and Regions."

Article 9 declares that all the Municipalities shall be autonomous "in matters of their competence". Article 11 provides that provinces with common historical, cultural and economic characteristics may petition for a Statute to form a "politico-administrative nucleus within the Spanish State", but Article 13 expressly forbids the Federation of autonomous regions.

By removing the question of federalism from the basic article 1 to the complementary articles 8 to 22, the excellent and well-meaning lawyers who drafted the Constitution were simply postponing a struggle which might have been avoided. They did not solve the complementary question: "The Republic for all citizens or the Republic for Republicans?"

Thus it was possible for a party which had never explicitly declared itself Republican to seize the Republic, abolish the autonomous Municipalities, repeal the Catalan Statute and suspend the constitutional guarantees. The "integral" Republic became, in full accord with the Constitution, the centralised Republic, a Monarchy without a Monarch. Alcalá-Zamora, by his intervention on August 28, 1931, succeeded in sabotaging at the outset a Republic which he had renounced as soon as he saw that it might seriously endanger the Church. By making federalism conditional instead of fundamental, the Republic stultified its logical development and made it inevitable that it could survive only by entire transformation. The Republic of Azaña was really condemned to suicide only four months after it came into being.

PART II

THE FAILURE OF A REVOLUTION

I. The Republic of all the Workers

II. The Black Two Years

III. October

IV. After Asturias

I

THE REPUBLIC OF ALL THE WORKERS

“SPANIARDS! FROM THE profoundest depths of the Spanish people arises a clamour demanding justice, an impetus which drives us to win it. The people has placed its hopes in the Republic. They are in the streets. We have tried the way of legality and it has been closed to us. . . .

“The men of the past and the present have begun a crusade against the men of the future to divert the action of popular justice which is furiously demanding historical responsibilities. . . . Force has been substituted for right, arbitrary action for law, licence for discipline. . . . We have sunk to the level of our present ignominy down the slope of such degradation. The country has no other way to save itself but that of revolution.

“We are not impassioned by the rising violence, the drama of a revolution; but the people’s misery, the country’s anxieties move us deeply. Revolution will always be a crime or madness where justice and right prevail; but it is right and just when tyranny dominates. . . .

“We are determined to overthrow the fortress in which is embattled the personal power of the Monarchy, and establish the Republic on the basis of the national sovereignty represented by a Constituent Assembly.

“Meanwhile, we, fully conscious of our mission and our responsibility, assume the functions of the Public Power with the character of a Provisional Government.”

The manifesto was issued clandestinely to all Spain in December 1930. It was signed by Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, Alejandro Lerroux, Miguel Maura, Santiago Casares

Quiroga, Marcelino Domingo, Alvaro de Albornoz, Nicolau d'Olwer, Fernando de los Rios, Manuel Azaña, Diego Martinez Barrio, Indalecio Prieto and Francisco Largo Caballero.

Primo de Rivera, the ex-Dictator, was dead in Paris. General Berenguer and Admiral Aznar had in vain attempted to prop up the Monarchy. Alfonso XIII, the last King of Spain—there is only room for one more tomb in the Royal Vault at the Escorial—had been chosen as the scapegoat for a system which had been rotting for three hundred years. Galan and García Hernandez had risen at Jaca, the Air Force at the Cuatro Vientos field at Madrid.

The municipal elections of Sunday, April 12, showed that the whole country was solid for the Republic. There could be no further doubt. On the Monday the King's Ministers resigned, made some plans to repress the popular outburst. But it was soon realised that nothing could be done. The Army and the Civil Guard were as republican as the people.

On Tuesday, April 14, Eibar, the big arms factory near Bilbao, proclaimed the Republic, followed closely by Barcelona and Saragossa.

The King anxiously consulted his Ministers. At Miguel Maura's house, the Provisional Government met to send Alcalá-Zamora to tell the King that he must abdicate "before sunset".

News came in from the provinces that they had followed Barcelona and Saragossa. General Sanjurjo, commander of the Civil Guard, put his corps unconditionally at the service of the Republic.

At half-past seven that evening, Maura and the Provisional Government advanced towards the Ministry of the Interior, determined to take it by force if need be. The crowd packed in the Puerta del Sol, opposite the Ministry, cheered them frantically. The forces guarding it saluted. The Government entered, and the hoisting of the republican flag was greeted by the *Marseillaise*.

The new Government called up Sanjurjo and entrusted him with order throughout Spain and the safety of Don Alfonso Borbón and his family, who were to leave next day. Sanjurjo had already phoned all his subordinates to allow the people to hold whatever celebrations they wished, only defending property and persons.

In Barcelona, Luis Companys, Maciá's lieutenant, had proclaimed the Catalan Republic to fourteen interested passers, and Nicolau d'Olwer, Fernando de los Rios and Marcelino Domingo, typical representatives of the petty-bourgeois Republic, had to fly thither to tell the impatient singers of *Els Segadors* that they must wait for their autonomy.

"We have gained the Republic," Manuel Azaña, Minister of War, told the Madrid Ateneo three days later. "Now we will make the Revolution."

Manuel Azaña is undoubtedly the greatest single figure produced by the Spanish Revolution of 1931. The Revolution produced him, he did not impose himself upon the Revolution.

Almost unknown until 1930, Manuel Azaña was merely the best type of the Ateneo intellectual: sceptical, clear-sighted, educated, profoundly Castillian. Suddenly, fermenting Madrid became aware that Azaña had made of the Ateneo, a debating club rather like the Oxford Union, a Jacobin club.

His was not the faith that moves mountains but the word that moves masses. The Castillian polish of his sentences was the polish of a Toledo blade. Personally almost unknown, he could yet project his concepts far beyond the Ateneo's frowsty Victorian smoking-rooms and give a movement direction simply by obviously understanding it.

A Lamartine rather than a Kerensky, who showed by his acceptance of the Presidency in 1936 that, despite personal triumphs achieved by no other man in Spain not a King, he could realise, as Lamartine never did, the meaning of "*Assez de lyre!*"

"I have never believed in politicians, technicians nor intellectuals," Azaña told Jean Cassou during the Civil War; "I have always put my sole faith in the people, the man in the street, the man in the fields." His belief, then, has always lain outside his sphere of action.

In Madrid, the Republic's first two years, the years of the Provisional Government and the Constituent Cortes, passed in the shadow of Manuel Azaña. The tragic mistake of the Spanish Socialist Party in collaborating in bourgeois ministries was not the result so much of an imitation of the Weimar Republic and the Vienna Municipality as of the peculiar ground on which Azaña had situated the issues. A profound admirer of Cromwell and George Washington, he desired to set up a reasonable, progressive democracy which would certainly wish to expropriate the Church and the big landowners, would represent the progressive interests of the petty-bourgeoisie, but would not unduly disturb the even tenor of civilised existence. Azaña showed a brutal intellectual consistency not incompatible with political honour. He expected his adversaries to show the same, to reduce their opposition to no more than the challenge to a duel. He entirely neglected to take into account that the vast mass of the population was hungry, illiterate and desperate. He did, however, have sufficient intellectual honesty to recognise that profound fact once experience brought it to his notice; and, having once recognised it, to act with the same intellectual brutality which distinguished all his actions. When he did so, he ceased to be the mere representative of the Revolution of 1931.

Azaña's thesis posited the existence in Spain of a strong, pushing and ambitious bourgeoisie. But, except in the autonomous regions, there was no such class in Spain. It might have been created among the peasants, but the Republic, with the best will in the world, never even half-way solved the agrarian problem. There were no less than ten schemes for agrarian reform under discussion, and the one adopted, that of Marcelino Domingo, was so

little radical that the Lerroux-Robles reactionary government did not even have to return confiscated land.

Around Azaña, or rather beneath him, were grouped the representative figures of the petty-bourgeoisie, those whose lives had been made impossible by the Dictatorship and had spent much of that period in exile in Paris.

There was Alvaro de Albornoz, son of a poor Asturian family, who were just able to educate him to a point where he could become the favourite pupil of Claris, the famous law professor at Oviedo. Married, very much against his parents-in-laws' will, to an Asturian aristocrat, he became a fairly well-to-do lawyer and a recognised authority on constitutional law. In the hectic year 1930, it was Alvaro de Albornoz who was to be liaison-officer with Galán and Garcia Hernandez when they rose at Jaca. Albornoz failed, was imprisoned. Intelligent and curiously incorruptible, a poet of distinction, his word always carried weight within the small circle of the Azañist politicians.

There were Jiménez de Asua, also a lawyer, whose Socialism sprang from an intellectual sense of justice, and Nicolau d'Olwer, cultured, charming, an authority on medieval churches, engaged in translating Plato into Catalan.

Slim, hard, elegant Casares Quiroga came from Galicia where boss-politics ruled. His organisation, the Galician Autonomist Party, the ORGA, was formidable. A Jacobin of the Saint-Just type, completely devoted to order, the "upright and pure Republic", with the pale, cold eyes, the passion for music, the tuberculosis, the dialectical ability and the wealth, the devotion to work and the wit of his kind. If Azaña's revolution was to need a Tcheka, Casares Quiroga was the man most fitted to direct it. It is the measure of that revolution that it never formed its Tcheka; but Casares Quiroga did his best at the Ministry of the Interior. The Monarchists and the Anarchists both suffered.

The ideology for these types was provided by the "Generation of '98". It is one of the merits of the Republic of

1931 that it at least managed to place this generation in forced opposition to its consequences.

The young intellectuals of the 'Nineties, Unamuno, "Azorin", Ortega y Gasset, Joaquin Costa, were profoundly shaken by the last failure of the Spanish Empire, the Cuban defeat, just as the French intellectuals were filled with despair by their Republic's defeat by Prussia and the horrors of the Commune. Taine's "lubricious gorilla" was paralleled by Unamuno's "tragic sense of life", a dialectic frustrated by intellectual cowardice.

These despairing thinkers had turned to the problem of what was wrong with Spain. There was in this the same subjective impatience as is found in James Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist* and, more vaguely for its increased intensity, in *Ulysses*. Joaquin Costa, the bravest of them, had seen something of the truth when he declared that the only hope was "to triple-lock the Cid's tomb". Ortega y Gasset wished to "Parisianise" Spanish intellectualism. "Azorin" joined the Anarchists, the only obvious party of protest, and ended by being photographed at a picnic with Juan March and Jean Malvy.

This ideology, in reality the protest of the baffled petty-bourgeois, was full of dangers. Unamuno's own tragedy was that, by a form of intellectual cowardice, unable to analyse, he inevitably fell into the easy trap of Fascism, the subjective disbelief in any renovating force and the consequent retrogression to a myth. Costa had been braver, but he had been unheard and had retired to a lonely rock to die.

The way to the Republic of 1931 lay through an extremity of such dangers, even for the politicians. Jacobinism, at least a progressive force even if its basis was a legend, could adapt itself and progress. Casares Quiroga could become a rifleman in the Antifascist Militias of the Guadarrama; Azaña, refusing to be a "civil-war Premier", could yet preserve all the dignity of democracy against reaction, Alvaro de Albornoz and Jiménez de Asua following him. But for others the way lay through

Anarchism, extremely perilous for those who are not Anarchists. The compromise with an intensely sincere, if absolutely impossible, "Idea" had necessarily to lead to the utmost corruption of demagoguery.

One man survived: Diego Martinez Barrio, "Discreet Diego". A Sevillian intellectual of the Nineties, a young clerk in the hot and dusty notary's office, he felt that he was at a dead end. In the evenings he spoke to the Sevillian workers, starving in the tobacco-factory which Bizet had so conveniently romanticised in *Carmen*. "Slaves!" he would cry, "A free man is speaking to you!" He was a good speaker, and the Sevillian Anarchists took him up. He became a teacher in one of Francisco Ferrer's Rationalist Schools at two pesetas a day, the Anarchists believing that a schoolmaster should get no more than a day-labourer. When the Anarchists bombed Alfonso XIII's coronation and Barcelona struck, Andalusia rose. The Civil Guard arrived, and Discreet Diego left the Anarchists to become a Freemason. He joined the Lerrouxist Radicals, almost all *déclassé* petty-bourgeois who had found no consolation in Anarchism because that movement of desperate protest was simply a movement of protest leading nowhere. Premier after Azaña's fall, his police massacred his old Andalusian colleagues, and President Alcalá-Zamora coined the phrase: "A man of blood, mud and tears."

He broke away from the Radicals, deposit of the petty-bourgeois who had failed to be Anarchists because direct action appeared to them not revolutionarily unsound but socially unsafe, and, scared by experience, placed himself to the Right of Azaña. Others remained in Alejandro Lerroux's Radical Party.

The Spanish Radical Party was the depository of all that could not be assimilated even by the Anarchists, a sort of *Lumpenbürgerlichkeit*. Andalusians and Galicians for the most part, from the country where political success depended on a form of rival *caciquismo*, a system of boss-politics rivalling that of the feudal landowners, they had

been trained to oppose demagoguery to force, and thus to become *agents-provocateurs* for the reaction. Political gangsterism of all sorts, from journalism to gunmanship, was their element, and, trained by opposition to the feudal interests in exactly the same way as if they had gone to school with them, they regarded the State as a way of making their personal fortune precisely as their opponents regarded it as a method of solving their larger economic difficulties. The dirty business of buying a municipal councillorship with the starving peasants' votes was exactly the same as buying exemption from bankruptcy by a subsidy or tariff paid by the same peasants' taxes.

The most prominent representative of these "petty-bourgeois driven wild" was Alejandro Lerroux. A superb orator, capable of dramatising himself convincingly, persuaded of a mission which went beyond, though it included, his personal political and material success, he led the Radical Party with intense subtlety for thirty years.

The men he gathered round him were of varied character. One of them, Salazar Alonso, became tired, lost faith in the masses when they at last discovered his empty demagoguery, and, like Unamuno, quite sincerely turned to Fascism as the logical continuation of his career. For these the scandals of the Barcelona municipality were exactly on a par with the political immorality of bringing out the masses in 1909 to die for a mere speculation. Lerroux, who had founded the first socialist Casa del Pueblo in Barcelona in 1900, signed the death-sentences of hundreds of Asturian Socialists in 1934. Salazar Alonso, who led the Barcelona revolt in 1909, was the Minister of the Interior who admitted to provoking the Asturias revolt in order to repress it.

Miguel Maura disapproved of Monarchy because he disapproved of Kings. Alfonso XIII, diseased, corrupt, frivolous and inefficient, was no gentleman. Better a Republic, provided that the old life were not too much disturbed. Alfonso retorted by conferring nobility on the

family. The Conde de Gamazo became director of twenty-eight companies.

A conservative Republican, but a Republican, Maura "stood at an honourable distance from the Monarchy". Azaña's Republic could appreciate the attitude, and Miguel Maura assumed a position comparable to that of Lloyd George or Senator Borah in their old age.

Alcalá-Zamora was precisely the reverse. The Andalusian lawyer, Catholic, rigid and rancorous, twice Minister of the Monarchy, looked back to the good old days. Primo de Rivera, incapable of choosing men to serve him, at least had a certain instinct whom to dismiss. Alcalá-Zamora had been removed. Hence his rancorous Republicanism. By no means devoid of political sense but impelled by personal ambition and the promptings of his confessor, Alcalá-Zamora opposed the disestablishment of the Church, the one really revolutionary measure of the 1931 Republic. The hypnotised Republic rewarded him by making him its President to watch over the Constitution after he had publicly opposed one of its crucial articles.

In Catalonia, Francisco Maciá the Liberator, the man with the eyes Eckener had flown his Zeppelin hundreds of miles only to see, had declared the Catalan Republic. As a gesture, it was revolutionary: but the persuasions of Madrid forced him to wait for the declaration of the Federal Spanish Republic. The Catalan State, *Estat Catalá*, the curiously antiquated dream of Paris salons contemporaneous with Woodrow Wilson, remained a question of internal Catalan politics, a centre round which certain forces could collect. "Independent Catalonia" became simply "the independent petty-bourgeoisie". In 1931 Maciá told his young friend Jaume Miravittles that "separatism would be the death of Catalonia".

Catalonia might have carried the revolution further than Madrid; but Maciá's "revolution" coincided precisely with that of Azaña. Only it had a romanticism born of the frenzied devotion that Maciá himself could inspire, symbolised by the silver star triangled into the red-and-

yellow "four bars" of the Catalan flag like something from the Americas. Maciá was attempting to be a Bolivar in a year when the pound went off gold and U.S. Steel reached an all-time low.

Yet Jaume Miravittles, Secretary of the Catalan Antifascist Militias Committee, could say in July 1936: "I am a Young Catalan Nationalist. I believe in the historic mission of my country. In the twentieth century the anarchosyndicalist workers are guaranteeing this historical inheritance."

Estat Catalá, Maciá's inheritor, was built on active hostility to the Anarchosyndicalists. Under Dencás and Badia, it represented one side of what Estivill calls the "Janus-face" of the Esquerra. The other, the Esquerra proper, headed by Luis Companys, tried to continue Maciá's paternal Socialism and cut straight across class and syndical distinctions by a common appeal to Catalan Nationalism. Such a policy could only aggravate internal contradictions and increase the necessity for a "Janus-face".

Catalan independence, therefore, became a defence against the revolution while its emergence was favoured by it. It took up, in the next stage, the position held in 1902-23 by Cambó's Catalan League. Nationalism, autonomism, separatism were simply three degrees of class defence.

The Socialists, faced with a bourgeois-democratic revolution, had a difficult problem to solve. The Revolution of 1931 had raised questions which had faced other countries in 1789, or at any rate in 1917-23. Mexico and China had made their decision twenty years before.

For a reformist Socialist Party, there could be only one decision: collaboration. The Constitution was to be drafted and the fundamental laws of the Republic decided. Caballero calculated that the biggest party in the Cortes could mould these laws in such a way that Socialism would come almost automatically as the force of circumstances pressed the bourgeois-socialist Government towards the

Left. It was the year of the British National Government. Hitler had not yet appeared as a serious menace in Germany. In Austria the Social-Democrats were still making Vienna the most civilised city in the modern world. The Spanish Socialists could not see that these were mere survivals and that they were too hollow to endure all the consequences of the world crisis of 1930. Italian Fascism seemed an eccentricity, the Polish and Hungarian varieties merely the result of the War.

The Socialists and the Catalan Nationalists had to supply the petty-bourgeois base for the Republic of Azaña. Unless the Republic were to be imperilled, a real class policy could not be carried through immediately. Nor need it be. The Socialists could maintain their petty-bourgeois disguise until the time came when they could reveal themselves and pull the whole Republic over with them to a moderate class formation.

The Right wing of the Party, Besteiro, Saborit and Trifon Gomez, were for going into opposition once the Republic had been consolidated. In opposition, the Socialists would in fact have been simply strengthening the bourgeoisie, because benevolent criticism would simply have emasculated the workers' movement in precisely the same way as His Majesty's Opposition emasculated the British labour movement between 1925 and 1929. Gil Robles might have been impossible, but so would the failure of Gil Robles if, despite everything, he had arrived. Spain would have experienced a much more insidious form of Labour-fascism with Besteiro preaching and enforcing corporativism, the logical result of reformist collaboration. October 1934 would have been impossible.

The calculation appeared to have been correct. Obviously the Anarchists could not accept it. There was a revolution made by the bourgeois with the aid of the workers. The Socialists, as ever, appeared to be black-legging, betraying the workers' fundamental interests, which were, to the Anarchists, never a matter of revolutionary strategy but quite simply of bread and liberty.

The FAI at once attempted to put itself at the head of the Revolution. The big Madrid telephone-strike was the first battle. The workers' demands were apparently simple: a rise in wages and the abolition of the huge directors' fees without a corresponding rise in call-charges. Maura, Minister of the Interior, forbade the company to negotiate with the strikers and Prieto promised compensation for damage done by some extraordinarily ingenious and murderous sabotage. The strike developed into open insurrection on September 4. Artillery was used against the C.N.T. headquarters in Seville. In Barcelona there were sixteen dead. Altogether, 108 persons were killed, and the insurrection had led precisely nowhere except to a favouring of the Socialists' governmental calculations. The C.N.T. was temporarily smashed.

Maura, the "man of the 108 corpses", resigned, with Alcalá-Zamora, disgusted by the anticlerical provisions proposed for the Constitution. Two months later, when Alcalá-Zamora became President, Martinez Barrio and Lerroux also resigned. Thus the extreme Right and the moderate Right of the bourgeois Republic had been successively eliminated, and complete socialist power appeared to be approaching. Azaña was Premier and Minister of War, Casares Quiroga Minister of the Interior. The combination lasted until June 1933, the period of the Constituent Cortes.

The U.G.T., with Largo Caballero as first Minister of Labour, became a kind of official trades-union organization. The labour-code resembled those of the Scandinavian countries, giving the workers in the U.G.T. a privileged position within the capitalist State. This necessarily meant conflict with the organised workers not in the U.G.T. The Republic of All the Workers became the Republic of Some of the Workers.

Maciá, with his idea of uniting all Catalans into one national party *within* which the various divergent factions could work out their own problems, had offered the Barcelona public services to the C.N.T. He believed that he had

attracted the Anarchosyndicalists' federalism and hatred of the Monarchy, and the articles in *Solidaridad Obrera* by its editor, Juan Peiró, one of the leaders of the One Big Union, confirmed him. Angel Pestaña refused the Ministry of Labour in the Catalan Government; but the C.N.T. had agreed to give the Republic at least a period of trial.

Peiró and Pestaña, the Syndicalist section of the C.N.T., were thus in reality initiating a reformist policy by their tacit collaboration with the Esquerra. But the Esquerra were actually in the same position as the Madrid Socialists, that is to say, to the Left of Azaña. They were a petty-bourgeois party disguised as Socialists while the Madrid Socialists were a proletarian party disguised as petty-bourgeois. Hence the attitude of the Syndicalists was precisely the same as that of the Socialists, so that, in Catalonia, there was every chance of the C.N.T. becoming in effect a governmental trades-union directed against the Socialists and Communists, the Communist Left and the Workers' and Peasants' Block. Just as the Republics of All the Workers had become the Republic of Some of the Workers, so there was a chance that the Catalonia of All the Catalans might become the Catalonia of Some of the Catalans.

The Anarchists reacted immediately. The FAI was not yet numerically very strong, but its prestige made up for its lack of numbers. At the Congress of June 1931 it could obtain only four votes against sixty-four. In August, it gained sixty-five against thirty-three.

The struggle between the FAI and the Syndicalists led by Peiró and Pestaña, later to be called "The Thirty", was translated into terms of the struggle against the Socialists and the bourgeoisie. The FAI knew only one way of enforcing its will: "direct action". Hence the unusual violence of the September 4 insurrection, rising to the big outbreak of January 1932. Castilblanco, Arnedo and Figols were reduced by Azaña's artillery and Casares Quiroga sent 120 FAI militants in hulks to fever-stricken

Villa Cisneros. FAI leadership had been fatal to the C.N.T.

The Monarchists had retreated for the moment, had become *cavernícolas*, troglodytes. They confined themselves to obstruction of the Republic's legislation, satirical plays, press attacks, the search for future allies among the Republican Right, mainly the Lerroux Radicals, and to sermons, confessionals and other such propaganda.

The Republic had, however, passed through some very critical first days thanks to Juan March. It is never certain whether March is working purely in his own interests or on behalf of a movement. The fact remains that he had the Republic at his mercy for forty-eight hours.

The Porto Pi oil case had been taken before the French Courts just before the fall of the Monarchy. March had demanded 200 million French francs compensation for the cancellation of his monopoly in favour of the State-monopoly "Campsa". He won the case, but was awarded only 50 millions. He had appealed, and the award had been reduced to 35 millions.

The peseta, for years tottering, crashed with the Monarchy. It had barely recovered when the Republic came to power. March immediately demanded payment in Paris, and the Republic, under suspicion that it might, like the U.S.S.R., repudiate debts, could not afford to neglect the decision of a French court.

- The problem was how to transfer so large a sum to Paris without smashing the exchange. March finally agreed to take payment through a Spanish bank. Twenty-four hours before the expiry of the time-limit for delivery, he suddenly refused the arrangement. For two days, the Spanish Republic was at the mercy of one man.

The Minister of Finance, Jaime Carner, proposed to compensate the Treasury by taxing Porto Pi property in Spain some 15 million pesetas (the equivalent of the 35 million francs). This would simply be balanced against the sum already paid, and Juan March and the Spanish Republic would be square. Before the proposal could be passed

the Constituent Cortes were dissolved, and the Lerroux Governments were naturally careful to refrain from mentioning the case.

The Right's counter-attack always came from three sides: propagandist-obstructionary, financial, insurrectionary.

The Republic, although it was incapable of making the revolution, began the attack on the old order; but placed between the Anarchists and the Monarchists, it was completely unable to carry it through.

All the interests of the reaction were shaken, although not broken. The Church, the Army, the feudal landowners, the big capitalists, the anti-regionalists all were imperilled. The Constituent Cortes made a real effort to make Spain a modern country. But the Republicans thought in terms of the early 1920's; and Madrid aesthetes believed that the Andalusian-Catalan-Parisian Picasso was the last word in culture. The Catalans Miró and Salvador Dali attempted to "Parisify" Spain just as Ortega y Gasset had tried thirty years before. Politicians thought in terms of Stresemann and Briand—proudly they had advanced beyond Clemenceau and Lloyd George—when Hitler and Mussolini were about to revise three generations' concepts of diplomacy.

The offensive against the Church was thoroughly planned and feebly executed. Article 26 of the Constitution stated that the State, the regions and the municipalities would not maintain, favour or economically assist churches and religious institutions. Religious orders which statutorily imposed any vow of obedience to an authority other than the State were dissolved and their property nationalised and put to beneficial or educational uses. The Church was disestablished, the Jesuits expelled; and tolerated religious orders were forbidden to possess more property than they needed for their livelihood, they might not engage in industry, commerce and teaching. Divorce and civil marriage were legalised, cemeteries secularised, and women, hitherto the obedient creatures of their confessors, given the vote and equal rights with men.

The feudal landowners had their power diminished by the importation of meat, wheat and maize whenever the internal price was artificially inflated; by the Parish Law, which forbade the importation of cheap labour from other villages; and by the Agrarian Reform which began to divide up portions of the latifundia among the peasants.

The capitalists had to submit to labour legislation which guaranteed contracted wages, created Mixed Juries for arbitration of labour questions, and by a radical lowering of tariffs.

The authoritarian centralists had to see Catalonia given a Statute of Autonomy which permitted it a fairly wide freedom.

The legislation of the Constituent Cortes, then, was based upon Liberty, Equality and, above all, Fraternity.

Azaña, as Minister of War, began to reform the Army, which was largely disaffected to the Republic. Instead of making a radical purification, however, he simply requested all those who could not find it in their conscience to serve the Republic to leave with all military honours. They were given very generous pensions; they were allowed to keep their arms, uniforms and titles; and it was sincerely trusted that they would now retire quietly into private life.

The Cortes set up a Responsibilities Commission, and before it, on June 14, 1932, appeared Juan March, defended by a young Salamanca Law Professor, José Maria Gil Robles Quñones. Prieto led the attack. Despite Robles' impassioned defence and despite the disappearance of some rather important documents, the great smuggler was found guilty, and was imprisoned luxuriously at Alcalá de Henares, the resort of Spanish retired officers. He escaped fifteen months later.

The interests of the Old Regime had attacked the Republic financially by the Porto Pi case, obstructively in the Cortes, by propaganda in all the churches and clerical schools. Now they swung into open insurrection,

choosing General Sanjurjo, commander of the Civil Guard, whose adhesion had been the decisive factor on April 14, 1931. On August 10, 1932, he rose at Seville. There were a few hours of tension, the general strike was declared, a few shots were exchanged, and all seemed over.

The insurrection had been as rash and partial as any Anarchist outbreak. Even its aims had been the same: to overthrow the Socialists. Its failure was due to the fact that the whole of the feudalists and capitalists were not yet ready to stake all on a last throw. They had many "pacific" weapons still in hand: Alcalá-Zamora, Lerroux, Gil Robles and, regarded objectively, the FAI.

The Socialists missed another chance of driving the Revolution forward. The universal reaction against the attempted *coup d'état* extended all the way from the unprepared big bourgeoisie to the Anarchists. As in 1909, 1917-19 and 1931, the objective conditions were extraordinarily favourable. Instead, two million persons were permitted to sign a petition for the commutation of the death-sentence passed against the mutineer. The "bloodless" Republic forgot the 108 corpses of September 4, the corpses of Arnedo and Castilblanco, and refused to soil its hands with its enemies' blood. Sanjurjo was, after all, an officer and a gentleman.

The offensive simply took the form of a speed-up in the laws passed against the old interests. The Republic formed its own political armed police, the blue-clad *Guardias de Asalto* (Shock Police), to keep check on the Civil Guard. It did not dare to go deeper to the roots of the evil, and entirely reorganise the dubiously-loyal corps. They were always given the benefit of the doubt.

The consequence was that, in the partial municipal elections of April 1933, the Monarchists could still preserve their hold over the "rotten boroughs". The Agrarian Reform could not shake the power of the *caciques* who, alarmed by the results of Sanjurjo's failure, redoubled their pressure.

Sanjurjo's rising had a tremendous importance on two sides. The bourgeoisie had realised all the dangers of failure implied in playing with insurrection, and changed their whole policy. No longer did they think it possible to recover their position by simply opposing the Republic: henceforward they realised that they must aim at seizing the power, to "suicide" the Republic afterwards by "constitutional" means. Only if that failed would it be necessary to repeat Sanjurjo's gesture; but this time seriously, without playing at insurrection.

On the other side, the masses were becoming increasingly radicalised. The tendency was beginning to show even within the Socialist Party, and the Communist Party's slogan of the united front from below was gaining more and more adherents. But the impatience of the masses naturally became more vocal within the C.N.T., and the FAI resolutely placed itself at its head. Within the C.N.T., the Syndicalists of the One Big Union, Peiró, Pestaña and others, increasingly dissented from the FAI's "direct action" policy. The "Thirty" broke away from the C.N.T. to form a semi-political syndicalist group something like the old British Independent Labour Party, though without its tinge of Kautskist Marxism. According to Manuel Buenacasa, they were accused by the FAI of "confusionism, sentimentalism, lack of revolutionary sentiments and contacts with typically reformist political elements, chiefly with Maciá and the Catalan Lefts". In this campaign, curiously enough, the FAI's chief weapon was a book by Jaume Miravittles, then a member of the Marxist Workers' and Peasants' Block.

Thus there was the beginnings of a situation in Catalonia. The FAI possessed the dominating influence in the C.N.T. and had captured its two most important fighting weapons, its paper *Solidaridad Obrera* and the control of the One Big Union. They were, therefore, in much the same position as the Caballero wing of the Socialist Party in 1935. To a certain extent, they were penetrated by the influence of the Workers' and Peasants' Block, faced with

an objective alliance between the Catalan Left, the Catalan Socialists, the Catalan Communist Party and the "Thirty" Syndicalists. Therefore the Catalan Left began its long campaign against the FAI for the virtual control of the C.N.T.

The FAI's policy, however, produced results just the reverse of what it intended. *Solidaridad Obrera* carried on a violent abstentionist campaign at the Catalan elections in November; with the result that the Esquerra completely defeated the Catalan League and strengthened its political hold over Catalonia. The voting, in a region where the average is only 40 per cent participation of the electorate, rose to about 55 per cent, only 10 per cent less than that for the decisive elections of 1931.

After the elections, *Solidaridad Obrera* wrote: "The revolutionary period has begun. After these elections the C.N.T. cannot avoid revolution. The proletariat's demonstration of its aversion to politics has been too obvious."

Engels had remarked of the anarchist policy during the Republic of 1873 that "the Bakuninists have given in Spain an inimitable example of the way how *not* to make a revolution". There was no doubt that the FAI was, subjectively, a genuinely revolutionary party: but its revolutionarism never progressed beyond pure Blanquism. The FAI's impression appeared to be that all they had to do was to declare Libertarian Communism wherever they could, defend it with bombs, force the Government to declare the state of war and thus create a political crisis which would draw into the insurrection other sections of the working class. The contradiction here was that since the aim of revolution is the seizure of power, the action must be political. Sanjurjo aimed at the seizure of power and might possibly have succeeded in capturing Madrid. But he would have then been in precisely the same position as Kapp in Berlin in March 1920. He would have been isolated, because he had not yet behind him a large section of the ruling class whose interest lay in the immediate

seizure of power. Primo de Rivera, on the contrary, was able to maintain his position because he was acting as agent for a very important section of the ruling class—the Catalan capitalists—chiefly against another section—the agrarians represented by Santiago Alba. There was all the difference in the world between this situation and Sanjurjo's insurrection against the republican-socialist combination or the FAI's attempt to fight the whole of Spain single-handed.

The "revolution" announced by *Solidaridad Obrera* was sheer tragedy. All winter, the FAI made bombs. Deposits were found in Vigo, Seville, Barcelona, Valencia and Buenos Aires. Social agitation increased daily between the middle of November and the end of December.

On January 8, men with black hats drawn over their eyes began shooting at the barracks in Barcelona. The word went out into the fields of Catalonia, Valencia and Estremadura that Libertarian Communism had been set up in many places. In the Catalan towns, the workers declared the general strike in sympathy with their comrades fighting in Barcelona. But there it was all over in three hours, with ten dead and seventeen wounded.

Far in the south, old "Seisdedos", "Six-fingers", declared Libertarian Communism at Casas Viejas and held out for hours against the governmental forces who had been ordered to take no prisoners. Then the great revolution was over. The C.N.T. repudiated all responsibility for Casas Viejas. Undoubtedly, old "Seisdedos" had been acting on his own noble instincts. But the moral responsibility was not small.

The FAI had given the Right a powerful weapon. Azaña and Casares Quiroga could be attacked on two fronts: the C.N.T., its centres closed, its militants jailed, was now implacably hostile to the Government; the Socialists shared the odium of a Government which had shot down workers, and the socialist leadership was regarded by its working-class followers with at least suspicion for collaborating with a repressive Government. The Socialists

might object to the FAI, but "Seisdedos" was a fellow-worker.

The Right had two alternative agents through whom to exploit the situation: Alcalá-Zamora and Alejandro Lerroux. Alcalá-Zamora had won the Presidency from the Republican-Socialist combination by his opposition to Article 26 of the Constitution directed against the Church. To make him President seemed the best way of getting rid of the man who had been delegated to order Alfonso de Borbón to abdicate before sunset. It was supposed that the Spanish President would be merely decorative, never a Roosevelt, and far less a Millerand.

The monarchist victory in the partial municipal elections in April gave Alcalá-Zamora his opportunity. The Constituent Cortes must be destroyed before it could carry through even a simulacrum of revolution. After Casas Viejas, the Socialists were being increasingly forced into a more radical position by the pressure of the masses. The interests represented by Alcalá-Zamora, chiefly the Church, were proportionately threatened.

The struggle was waged between the Azaña Government, supported by the Constituent Cortes, and the President. Once it was planted, it could be resolved only in one of two ways: by the transformation of the Cortes into a Convention and the dismissal of the President, as the French Parliament had dismissed Millerand in 1924, or by the dissolution of the Cortes.

All that summer the Azaña Government hesitated. After the first crisis provoked by the President in June, some sort of decision had to be made, and Azaña could not make it. The step of impeaching the President was too dangerous, for it might appear to be the impeachment of the Republic itself. Alcalá-Zamora, therefore, was allowed to take the initiative.

It became increasingly obvious that the end of the Constituent Cortes was approaching. The Right press continued an agitation which began to arouse echoes in the masses. Not that the masses moved, subjectively, towards

the defence of the Church and Order, but they moved away from the Republican-Socialist Government and towards the Anarchists who could always polarise mere negative protest. Thus, objectively, the growing militancy of the FAI favoured the Right. At the same time, it was quite impossible that the FAI should neglect to lead this deep mass movement, for that would have been to abandon what it conceived to be its revolutionary mission. The Spanish working class was divided, but whether the Anarchists, part-authors of Casas Viejas, or the Socialists, part-authors of the repression, were the sectarians it was difficult to decide.

Five days after Casas Viejas, Lerroux had declared: "The revolutionary movement may be repeated, and to avert it, a change of policy is needed to restore calm and tranquillise the intense agitation of the masses." *Solidaridad Obrera* reprinted this statement and commented: "So long as the Socialist dictatorship rules Spain there can be no peace."

Intuitively, Azaña and Casares Quiroga saw how the reactionary and the anarchist lines coincided. They then made the fatal error of directly attacking the C.N.T. by two laws which the police well understood how to interpret: the Vagrancy Law and the Law of Public Order.

The Vagrancy Law created a novel category of criminal: the "socially-dangerous element". While it was perfectly true that it was extremely difficult to class an Anarchist who held up a cashier for the benefit of the Cause, the Vagrancy Law decided that there could be no such extenuating circumstances. The police, too, might arrest and imprison any "agitator" as being a person of no fixed address. The Law of Public Order strengthened the authorities' hold over the lives and liberties of Spanish citizens, and there could no longer be any doubt that the petty-bourgeoisie was manœuvring into its historical position of leaning upon the "parties of order" in fear of its proletarian allies.

The attacks upon Azaña increased in virulence. Casas Viejas was resurrected and exploited with the utmost violence. Chief among the attackers were the Radical papers, especially *Informaciones*; and *Informaciones* was the property of Juan March.

On September 12, Alcalá-Zamora at last felt himself strong enough to dismiss Azaña, or rather, to offer him continuance on terms he could not possibly accept. The Right-wing Socialists also refused; and Lerroux was given his chance. The Cortes threw out the Lerroux Cabinet as soon as it presented itself. A new combination, with a radical majority and with Martinez Barrio as Premier, opened the electoral period on October 10.

The Right had a simple programme: the "restoration of order". It had an admirable electoral machine: the clergy, the "*caciques*", the aristocratic ladies. The granting of the vote to women had been a fatal mistake, for they constituted 55 per cent of the electorate and were almost entirely in the hands of their confessors and benevolent ladies of the manor. The C.N.T. had been more than ever encouraged in its hostility to politics, and, although it would certainly not vote for the Right, the abstention of its 700,000 members, besides their wives, families and friends, would deprive the Republicans and Socialists of important support.

The latifundia, the dividends, above all the rosaries were in danger. To their aid rallied all the *cavernicolas*, all those backward elements who could salve their consciences by voting for the Republic but a Republic that was going to be different.

The Left had been entirely unable to agree on a joint programme. The conditions of the pre-electoral period had made propaganda well-nigh impossible. Every factor was against them. It was perfectly obvious that the Civil Governors appointed by the Radical Government had been chosen simply for their ability in fixing elections, the time-honoured *pucherazo*. Even some sections of the Socialist Party were for abstention rather than certain defeat.

The Right had been able to construct a large unified party based upon the defence of the Church. The Federation of Autonomous Spanish Right Parties (*Confederación Española de Derechas Autonomas*, the *Ceda*) gathered all the various local Right parties which were not openly Monarchist or Radical. Jiménez Fernández, organiser of the Federation, refused to state whether these parties were or were not Republican. Actually, they were purely opportunist, like similar parties in Austria, Hungary and Greece. Not Monarchism but the capture of the Republic was the immediate question. Neither was Fascism an issue. Spain was an extraordinarily unfertile soil for that. Both Hitler and Mussolini could appeal to the "front fighters" and both had had grievances based upon the shabby treatment their countries had received from the great Powers. Spain could not decently recall Morocco and in international politics it had no grievance because it had no direct participation.

What the Ceda could appeal to was what it called the persecution of true religion. Behind this martyrology it could enroll not only those who shared the Church's interests but also all the serfs of the feudal landowners to whom the village fiesta represented all that was stable in life. Based on the agrarians and the Church, the Ceda could appeal to the stockbreeders and the capitalists. Juan March's Radicals and Goicoechea's Monarchists could make a holy alliance with the Ceda.

Jimenez Fernandez found his man in Gil Robles, the Salamanca lawyer who had defended Juan March so well in the Cortes. Cunning, robust, an excellent orator and dialectician, comparatively young, a Catholic whose fervour did not exclude calculation, Robles was the ideal leader for a Catholic pre-fascist combination. Lacking the brutality of a Mussolini and the "somnambulant" self-confidence of a Hitler, Robles yet possessed the willingness, apparent sincerity and intelligence of a Dollfuss. A strong characteristic, which might be equally an advantage or a danger, was his vanity.

With these forces and this leader, the Ceda's victory was certain. To make it absolutely sure, Azaña's last act had been to pass a "chemically pure" but completely disadvantageous electoral law which made it possible for the majority list in any place to obtain a quite disproportionate number of seats. At the elections of November 19, 1933, the Ceda won 110 seats. With proportional representation, the Socialists would have won 130.

The first result of the petty-bourgeois' failure to make the Revolution had come. The Republic was in the hands of its enemies; and it was merely a tactical question whether they would smash it at once or "suicide" it. Nothing stood in the way of reaction to far worse than the conditions under the Monarchy save the Spanish working class. And the working class was still deeply divided.

The Black Two Years began.

II

THE BLACK TWO YEARS

THE PETTY-BOURGEOISIE of Azaña and Maciá had been unable to make their revolution. They had supposed that because no blood was shed on April 14 itself, theirs was a revolution quite remarkable; that Spain had been chosen by some benign providence to show history that all revolutions hitherto had been wrong. Simple chronology had deceived them: the bloodshed was merely postponed; January 1932 and January 1933, the church-burnings in Malaga were all an integral part of the Revolution of April 14, not mere incidents. December 1933 and October 1934 were still to be part of the same process, within its framework, even though Asturias was to show the way out. Azaña's own "revolution", which he had promised the Madrid Ateneo, was simply an intellectual concept.

In exactly the same way, the French Revolution of September 4, 1870, had been a bloodless revolution, and Napoleon III had vanished with as little ostentation as had Alfonso XIII. But the risings of October 31 and January 22 were still part of the process, and the Commune paralleled Asturias.

It has been said that Fascism is not so much the last protest of the petty-bourgeoisie still linked to the big bourgeoisie and afraid of proletarianisation as the revenge taken by history upon the failure to make the revolution. In November 1933 the petty-bourgeoisie had failed, but it was not yet entirely annihilated as an independent class. In Catalonia especially, it still preserved its ambiguous position, and the reaction was not yet prepared to take

the direct offensive. Thus, the victory of the Right could not lead directly to Fascism but only carefully prepare the way. Not until the petty-bourgeoisie had made its final surrender, had disappeared or been politically absorbed either by the reactionary or the revolutionary class, could the struggle be clarified and the revolution made. The electoral victory of the Right was merely a challenge. In no way was it the defeat of a revolution, simply because there had, as yet, been no revolution. The counter-revolution was given its opportunity simply because its opponents had fallen into the error of supposing that the Republic of April 14 had achieved more than transitional importance.

Sections of the Socialist Party, still bound to the policy of collaboration with the petty-bourgeoisie, made a similar error and threw away the possibilities of carrying through the revolution when they had even more reason to make it than had the Republicans. The socialist masses were strongly opposed to the reformist line taken by the leaders of the political party and the U.G.T., but their voice was heard actively only in the Congresses of the Madrid Group of the Socialist Party.

The socialist election policy had been decided and carried through by Besteiro, President of the U.G.T., and Trifón Gomez, President of the Madrid Group, both of the extreme Right of the socialist movement. They so far misunderstood the correct policy of a workers' party in elections that they had decided to withdraw from the second ballot, and Prieto had to hurry down from Bilbao to dissuade them. Caballero asked what was the point of going to the polls one Sunday and to the revolution the next?

This purely rhetorical question was certainly not intended as a declaration. The Right, however, took it as such, proclaimed to all and sundry that the Socialists refused to accept the will of the people as shown—with the stimulus of a considerable amount of compulsion and corruption—at the polls. The campaign acted provocatively on the masses and upon the reflection of their

impulses, the C.N.T. Misled by the Right, the C.N.T. determined to put itself at the head of the announced revolution, especially as its honour was already engaged by the declaration that it would do all in its power to bar the way to reaction. It did not stop to analyse the position, it did not prepare the movement at all, but confided in the spontaneous revolutionary force of the masses. Its militants pulled their revolvers from under their mattresses, unearthed their bombs and swung into a new insurrection on December 9.

It might have been a situation which the Socialist Left could have exploited. The Martinez Barrio Government could not possibly stand against an insurrectionary upheaval on a really large scale. But the Socialists had no even decent fighting forces, there had been little time to prepare propaganda in the barracks, arms were scanty, and the reformist leadership was still at the head of the movement, ready to sabotage it.

The Anarchosyndicalists remained isolated, chiefly in Aragon. There was severe fighting in several places. The Barcelona Transport Union struck. The Barcelona-Seville express was wrecked. The insurrection, like those of January 1932 and January 1933, simply added more names to the C.N.T.'s martyrology. The Government fell, as it was bound to do; and on December 17, Alejandro Lerroux formed the first of his six Cabinets with eight Radicals, three Independent Republicans, one Agrarian and one member of Melquíades Alvarez' party representing northern big business. Martinez Barrio became Minister of the Interior three weeks later.

The reaction had now obtained, partly by the fault of the C.N.T., a most admirable instrument. Don Ale, in his old age, had suffered the change that comes to all demagogues. He loved the Civil Guard with exactly the same affection that he had showered on his "young barbarians" of 1909. The complete type, well described by Marx in his *Eighteenth Brumaire*, of the middle-class renegade driven to a position exactly the reverse of that

which he had exploited in his youth—"the red cap of liberty appeared again as the red trousers of the Reaction's troops".

A Lerroux Government was ideally situated to assist Gil Robles' triple stage to power: support, collaborate, supplant; and then on to the revision of the Constitution and the Christian Corporative State. There could be no man so easy to overturn, for his past was rich with political scandals only too easy to revive, and the Right need wait for no accident such as Casas Viejas. Should it be inconvenient to overturn him, there were few men even in Spanish politics so ready to negotiate in order to save their position.

The attack on the workers and peasants, determined by a reluctance to abandon the old privileges of Church and feudalism, and intensified by the pressing needs of the world economic crisis, was carried on with the maximum intensity. As early as November 24 the agrarians announced their programme: concordat with Rome, repeal of the Agrarian Reform and the social laws, restitution of Church property, and revision of the Constitution. In a few months, the attack took concrete form in the refusal to re-employ workers dismissed for political reasons in 1930 and 1931, when the Socialists had aided the Republican Revolutionary Committee—of which Lerroux was a prominent member—by a series of big strikes. Employers refused to recognise the minimum wages agreed by the Mixed Juries. The attack on the workers was seconded by the attack on the peasants: the Law of Parishes was repealed and the big landowners were allowed to import cheap labour to replace peasants known to belong to Left parties. The last popular representative institutions, the Town-councils and Mayors, were dismissed on futile or political pretexts and replaced by Government Commissioners under the orders of the Ministry of the Interior.

The petty-bourgeois defence had been driven back into the places where its economic basis was strongest and where

the protest could take on a form not directly economic and political. The chief centres of opposition throughout the year were Catalonia and the Basque Country, where Nationalism could act as a rallying-cry against the reaction and its authoritarian centralisation.

Francisco Maciá had died on Christmas Day, and his funeral had been an imposing demonstration. His successor was Luis Companys, the organiser of the Union of *Rabassaires*. Cordial, emotional, clever, but far less of a figure than Maciá, who could reconcile in himself the most astounding paradoxes, Companys had been set to be the exact representative of his class. Willing to fight but not aggressive, prepared to surrender but not cowardly, energetic and subtle in attaining limited objectives, more elastic than his Councillors in the alliances he was ready to enter, he represented all that was best in his class and almost all its weaknesses, its inability to hold to a resolution and its latent fear of the class-conscious workers.

The Communist Party and the Left wing of the Socialist Party were well aware of the danger that threatened them. The Ceda were the largest party in the Cortes, although Alcalá-Zamora did not dare offer them power. The President realised well enough that he could continue to exercise his hidden dictatorship through Lerroux, corrupt, unstable and bound by old ties. In Gil Robles he would find a man of his own stature, and one who would not hesitate for a moment to challenge the Presidential position or engineer a *coup d'état* to impose his own leadership if he found it necessary.

Despite this threat and the collapse of German Social-Democracy a year before, the internal struggles of the Socialist Party were as fierce as ever. The defeat of the Austrian Socialists in February came as an even greater shock than the collapse of the German party. At that time it appeared that the German proletarian movement had merely gone underground, it was still possible almost to forget the event in the dispute about the responsibility, and Hitler had, after all, obtained half the votes in

Germany. But the brutality of the Austrian repression, the treachery of Dollfuss, the heroic failure of the socialist militias, and especially the Catholic aspect of Austro-facism brought home the disaster far more nearly. Especially the Youth Movement, trained from its earliest years in Marxism and naturally far more flexible in its ideas than the adult party, began to take the lesson to heart. Koloman Wallisch became almost a national hero to the Spanish Socialist Youth.

In Catalonia, the B.O.C. was a small minority, but its truculent but plausibly reasoned revolutionarism appealed to certain bourgeois elements in the Esquerra seeking some more radical solution of their political and economic problems, and it also coincided with certain aspects of anarchosyndicalist thought, itself based essentially on the ideology of the "petty-bourgeois driven wild".

The big demand made by the B.O.C. was that for Workers' Alliances. In the early days of this policy, there was a long and complicated struggle about the difference between the official communist slogan of the United Front and the Left communist slogan of the Workers' Alliance, and again between Workers' Alliances and *a* Workers' Alliance.

These were not mere verbalisms. The decision rested partly on an analysis of the general situation, partly on local possibilities.

It is true that at that time the Spanish Communist Party was remarkably unimaginative and rigid, and that its motive for refusing to have anything to do with the Workers' Alliances could be very easily attributed to general disapproval of the B.O.C.'s deviations. It is equally true that the B.O.C.'s inability to make an analysis of the Spanish situation without being affected by a great deal of subjective prejudice seemed to stultify the idea of the Alliance. The revolutionary union of the Spanish proletariat was not a very original idea; and the big fault implicit in the Workers' Alliance, as was correctly pointed out by the Communist Party, was that it did not

take into consideration the objects for which this union was to be formed, its methods and its modalities. The events in Asturias in 1934 and even more in all Spain in July 1936 showed that this unity could be achieved only in the actual struggle and that the conditions of the struggle would determine its form, not vice-versa. The Workers' Alliance posited a form of Soviet before the conditions for its creation existed. Because Soviets had been formed in Russia under certain conditions, it by no means meant that they could be formed in Spain under totally different circumstances.

In Madrid, the protest broke out almost immediately in a big building strike in favour of the 44-hour week. The U.G.T. and the C.N.T. worked together. Simultaneously, the Printers' Union called a strike in solidarity with the striking compositors of the monarchist paper, *A.B.C.* The building employers threatened a lock-out.

The Workers' Alliance in Barcelona called for a general strike in sympathy with the strikers in Madrid. Already, Catalonia was taking up its paradoxical but historic attitude as defender of Spanish liberties. The strike was called by the Workers' Alliance, composed of the U.G.T., the Left communist unions and the "Thirty" expelled from the C.N.T. by the FAI. For the first time, a general strike had been called in Barcelona without the C.N.T.'s consent. The C.N.T. opposed it, and, for a moment, found itself in alliance with the Esquerra.

The Esquerra's point of view was that it was highly praiseworthy to call a strike against Lerroux but high treason to call it against Companys. Any weakening of the Generalidad's position would give reactionary Madrid a weapon.

The Socialist Party from Madrid tended to neglect Catalonia, having failed to analyse correctly the Esquerra's attitude to the workers' movement. It believed that the Esquerra's quarrel with Madrid was in itself creating a revolutionary situation which could be exploited by the whole movement at the appropriate time. The Generalidad

had control of the police, and it was therefore not considered necessary to arm the Workers' Alliance in Catalonia. Prieto offered Catalonia the support of the Socialist Party in a speech at the Party Congress on June 25. "If," he said to the Government, "you are driven by the hatreds of your anti-republican supporters to fight Catalonia, Catalonia will not be alone, for beside her will be the whole Spanish proletariat."

The Madrid Government had been pushed further towards its eventual end: Fascism. The peasants were up in Andalusia and Estremadura. In Badajoz there had been serious incidents. The police firmly believed that the Madrid building strike was the signal for revolution. The police always believed that about any strike: it was such an excellent excuse for breaking it. Martinez Barrio, Minister of the Interior, strongly influenced by Azaña who in turn listened to Prieto, was unwilling to take the step that many of the Right-wing Radicals urged; repress the strike and hand the power to the Ceda, which had never openly declared itself Republican. This was more than Martinez Barrio was prepared to accept. He resigned. There was talk of a dissolution of the Cortes. Salazar Alonso became Minister of the Interior. The last representative of 1931 had left the Government and the first ally of the Ceda had entered in a key-position. Robles' three stages to power had begun.

The result soon appeared. On April 3, the reactionary majority brought before the Cortes a proposal to restore the death-penalty. Hitherto, they had been able to slaughter their opponents only by declaring the state of war and using the courts-martial, or by shooting them in the back.

On the same day a law was passed restoring to the clergy the property expropriated by the Azaña Government. This amounted to 16 million pesetas, while the confiscated lands, holdings and buildings later returned to the Jesuits amounted to no less than 168 millions.

The reaction went further. Three weeks later, a proposal to amnesty the rebels of August 10 was placed before the

Cortes. The Government was deeply divided, chiefly by fear. The President opposed it with all his powers and some that he did not constitutionally possess. As usual, a fantastic "plot" was "discovered" by the police. Robles well knew that it was always possible to frighten Alcalá-Zamora into concessions.

Salazar Alonso was told, and pretended to believe, that Shock Police were to kidnap the President. It was made an open secret. The sceptical Azaña was informed. The political prisoners, Robles' *Acción Popular* and "those who pretended to sympathise with the strikers", according to the Minister of the Interior, had combined in a great plot against the Republic.

The Ceda was seriously alarmed, for the workers had shown their strength. *Acción Popular* attempted to hold a mass meeting at the Escorial. The Madrid workers came out in a solid general protest strike. There were no trains. The roads were blocked. Of the two hundred thousand whose attendance had been forecast not more than ten thousand arrived at the Escorial. In Barcelona, 20,000 strikers demonstrated all round the city for six hours.

The President was duly intimidated, not before Robles had toyed with the idea of assaulting the power by force. The Escorial failure had shown him the impossibility of the plan. Lerroux was too closely bound to the President, not so much by personal affection as by common danger. Lerroux must go; and go he did. An obscure Valencian lawyer, Ricardo Samper, became Premier; a simple marionette worked by Gil Robles.

The workers replied to the Escorial on May 1. The celebration had never before mobilised so many workers. Two hundred thousand demonstrated in Madrid. In Barcelona, a quarter of a million attended an antifascist demonstration, workers and *Esquerra* united against the threat from Madrid.

In Saragossa, the general strike called by the C.N.T. at the end of March still went on. It lasted thirty-seven days. When the strikers' children had been welcomed by

a huge crowd outside the C.N.T. headquarters in Barcelona, the Esquerra's police charged with a violence rarely seen in that city of violence.

The struggle in Catalonia and the struggle between Catalonia and the Central Government were becoming increasingly acute. Royo Vilanova, of the Ceda, denounced the "Catalan separatists who wished to destroy national integrity". But the Catalans were not separatists at all; or, so far as they were, separatism was forced upon them from Madrid. In face of a Government which represented interests entirely fatal to their own, it was a matter of life or death to remain as far as possible outside its jurisdiction. The Catalan Left autonomists were not a mere political party whose civic duty in what was still nominally a democracy lay in obedience to the will of the majority. Catalonia was a section of the country with interests entirely irreconcilable with those of an agrarian Government which hampered industry so far as it could, deliberately, provocatively, and paid 209 million pesetas to the wheat magnates.

The internal situation of Catalonia was complex. The Esquerra saw itself menaced both by agrarian Madrid and by the instinctive reply of the Catalan masses canalised in the C.N.T. Its position was extremely precarious, since it was obliged to fight on two fronts. It sought its strength in the Catalan smallholders, the *Rabassaires*, with whom Companys himself had been closely connected. On April 21, the Catalan Parliament had approved the Law of Agrarian Contracts.

Inside Catalonia, the Right opposition was concentrated in Cambó's big business Catalan League and in the Institute of San Isidro, organ of the big Catalan landowners and the Church. The Institute had the closest relations with Cirera Volta, leader of the small Ceda minority in Catalonia, who later declared: "We are ready to shed our blood for our ideals and you will find that every drop of that blood is Catalan, not one drop Jewish"—a palpable hit at Cambó. In April 1934, however, the League, the

Institute and the Ceda had a close tactical alliance. The threat from the workers in a continuous wave of strikes had once more placed Cambó in a position where an efficient police-escort must have seemed even more desirable than the maintenance of his Catalanism.

It was just this lack of police-escort that Cambó feared. The Generalidad police was still in the hands of the Esquerra, controlled by its two most energetic young men, Dencás and Badia, leaders of Estat Catalá.

Dencás, the "brains" of the combination, had declared war to the death against the FAI. Badia had already cleaned up the Chinese Quarter, driving out a peculiar mixture of vice, crime, political gangsterism and FAI adherents who were perfectly willing to hold up a bank for the good of the cause. Badia had made no distinctions.

For Dencás, Catalan separatism was a real passion. He did not analyse his motives. Public order must be preserved to the greater glory of Catalonia. But the attack on the fomenters of public disorder would inevitably invite reprisals.

Cambó's fears were deeper and subtler. He realised well enough that Companys on the one side and Dencás on the other seriously threatened the domination of the Catalan big bourgeoisie. Whether they attacked directly or whether their failure to attack passed the initiative to the workers, the danger was the same. On May 4, Cambó appealed to the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees against the Law of Agrarian Contracts. On June 8, the Tribunal, on which sat all the most prominent reactionaries, including Juan March, recently amnestied, declared that the execution of this Law lay outside the Generalidad's competence.

The Generalidad refused to accept the ruling. The annulment of the chief point in its January electoral programme would deprive it of its main support, drive the smallholders straight over to the workers or, almost as bad, into apathetic neutrality.

The situation was apparently ripening towards Revolution. Caballero, who had led the movement in 1917, was

preparing the ground. There was no doubt that the revolution, properly organised, was the only chance of avoiding Fascism.

The Right desired the revolution in order to crush it, to "bleed democracy for a generation", as Thiers had said of the repression of the Paris Commune after Bismarck had shown him the way: "provoke an insurrection while you still have the power to smash it." "Let it break out," said Gil Robles, "before it falls on us all, before it stifles us."

Caballero's shock force was the Socialist Youth, with which was closely allied the Communist Youth movement. Youth cells were built up in every factory, district, street. Provincial, regional and national committees were formed. An Intelligence Service was organised. A Revolutionary Committee was set up, with Largo Caballero at its head. So secret was the Committee that its existence could not be proved when Caballero was tried for "moral responsibility" for the October revolution. He had not left his house the whole time.

Prieto had set out a minimum programme in a speech at the Pardiñas Theatre in Madrid in March. He declared that the Socialists' aims were: "Control of the administration by popular commissioners; effective equality inside the barracks, every soldier carrying the marshal's baton in his knapsack; the university open to the people, under the guardianship of the State; the gold hoarded in the Bank of Spain to be restored to circulation; socialisation of the land after it had passed into the power of the State."

This was a cunning programme. Without positing any of the final aims of the Revolution it appealed to all sections of the Spanish people menaced by Robles' Fascism: the civil service, army, students, small shopkeepers, peasants. Largo Caballero could look after the organised workers.

Thus the Socialist Party had made overtures to all those classes defrauded by the failure of the April Revolution, and Prieto's offer to Catalonia closed the front. The possibilities for revolution were becoming extraordinarily favourable.

The masses gathered round the Socialist Party, and the U.G.T., strongly influenced by the Socialist Youth, increasingly came over to the Caballero orientation. The meetings of the Madrid Group became stormier. Finally, the extreme reformists were forced to resign, and the "Bolshevizing" triumvirate, Caballero, Luis Araquistain and Alvarez del Vayo, began to make their influence paramount. Immediately, the Madrid Group demanded that the U.G.T. define its position. After a struggle, the Secretariat won its point, and Caballero gained the virtual direction of the Union.

The Catalan Nationalists were swinging into the last defence of petty-bourgeois democracy in the quarrel about the Law of Agrarian Contracts. The Basques were agitating for their traditional free Municipalities, and at Tolosa, on July 15, declared their aims and their sympathy with Catalan aspirations. A month later, a secret meeting of Basque mayors reiterated these decisions.

Student riots increased until Salazar Alonso decreed that no person under sixteen might join a political party, no person under twenty-three do so without his parents' consent.

The Army was honeycombed with propaganda restricted to simple antifascist slogans. Prieto's speech had had the best effect. The position of the aristocratic officer caste was badly shaken. Salazar Alonso did not hesitate to overlook the fact that many officers were being deeply influenced by Fascism and had taken up an openly seditious attitude against the Republic. In the Civil Guard and Shock Police the two tendencies were accentuated. While officers and non-commissioned officers of the Shock Police acted as instructors of the Youth Militias, the XIVth Division of the Civil Guard, commander Colonel Pereda, trained the fascist leagues, with the full knowledge of the Minister of the Interior. Another August 10, vastly encouraged by the amnesty, was definitely being prepared, slowly, methodically, to break when Robles had passed through the stage of "collaboration" to that of "supplant". There

was already talk of depriving the Catalan Generalidad of its control of the police, by force if necessary. General Batet, the commander of the IVth Division stationed in Barcelona, seemed too Republican, and Samper was thinking of replacing him by General Franco. Overtures had already been made to Viardou, commander of the Shock Police attached to the State Delegation in Barcelona, but he, a strong Socialist, had refused to consider serving under Franco.

The peasants' misery was becoming more terrible daily. Pitilessly, the landowners were breaking down the Agrarian Reform. The Government restored its lands to the Church. Nobles who preferred hard cash to uneconomic property received 577 million pesetas compensation. Cheap vagrant labour replaced that of the peasants who had been able to gain a fair wage by the abolition of this competition after the passing of the Parish Law. In Badajoz and Cuenca manor-houses blazed.

The Socialist Federation of Landworkers decided on a great peasant strike. The reformist leaders were forced out, and a new group adhering to the Left wing of the Socialist Party replaced them, under the leadership of Ricardo Zabalza.

In whole wide regions not a sickle moved. In Cáceres, Estremadura, the peasants invaded the town and sat on the steps of the Town-hall for five days, awaiting they knew not what.

But the movement remained isolated. The Socialists' biggest effort was not coupled with strikes by the industrial workers. A valuable reserve of force was wasted, and the "treason of fatigue" prevented the peasants from coming to the help of the workers in October. Asturias, Catalonia, and Andalusia together must have brought in Aragon, Valencia, Alicante and Estremadura. Such a block in such circumstances must have been invincible.

The Government, driven by Gil Robles behind the scenes, counter-attacked violently. The reintroduction of the death-sentence was confirmed. The Vagrancy Laws

were unscrupulously used against all socialist militants found among the striking peasants, including prominent deputies. The Civil Guard rode incessantly.

The Right press became increasingly violent. Against the Catalans and Basques there began a campaign of frantic nationalism, which was in reality a signal for the offensive against the working class.

The Ceda, assured of Samper's impotence, began its offensive in the autumn. Samper had almost served his purpose, the Radical Party had been completely disintegrated, Martinez Barrio had formed a new party, Republican Union, closely allied, through Alvaro de Albornoz, with Azaña's Left Republicans and Sanchez Román's more conservative National Republican Party. The moment for collaboration had almost arrived. The President had been thoroughly intimidated. The Government's armed forces had been properly infected with hatred of the workers.

Cambó had begun to see his error. Robles, with the whole power of the agrarians, the Church and probably the Government behind him, was too strong to accept equal terms, since that would have meant sacrificing part of his backers' interests to Catalan industry. He calculated that he no longer needed the League's support in Catalonia, since the Generalidad had placed itself in a position where it could be directly attacked by force from outside. The Institute of San Isidro had published a manifesto condemning the League's economic policy. A trade-war with France loomed. The Ceda welcomed the Institute's approval, and the agrarians formed a solid, nation-wide block.

On September 8, the Catalan landowners went in a body to Madrid to hold a demonstration of sympathy with the Ceda. At once, the Madrid U.G.T. called a general protest strike. There was fighting: six dead and fourteen wounded. The Madrid working-class had again shown its solidarity with Catalonia.

On the same day, Gil Robles attempted to hold a mass meeting at Covadonga, the original Christian stronghold

in Asturias whence began the reconquest of Spain from the Moors. The Asturias workers struck, sabotaged the railways, blocked the roads. Only about seven thousand Acción Popular supporters succeeded in hearing Robles make an almost straight fascist speech.

In Barcelona, the Workers' Alliance proposed the general strike against the action of the Institute of San Isidro. The Esquerra opposed it. Catalonia was not Spain, and Companys was not Samper. The general strike would merely hinder Companys in his task of maintaining the dignity of Catalonia against Madrid.

Instead, the Esquerra suggested a mass demonstration on the day of the traditional celebration of the Catalan Martyrs of 1714. The demonstration was to take place in the centre of the city, the Plaza Cataluña. A huge crowd gathered. The Alliance was fifteen thousand strong. For the first time, the C.N.T. joined the demonstration.

The Esquerra was not in the Plaza Cataluña, but outside the Estat Catalá headquarters a quarter of a mile away. There were perhaps two thousand men collected there.

The two demonstrations crossed, the Alliance supporters singing the "*International*", the Esquerra the "*Segadors*". The Alliance procession crowded in front of the Generalidad, shouting for Free Catalonia and the Catalan Socialist Republic. Companys, disconcerted, warned the loud masses against *agents-provocateurs*. The shouts for Free Catalonia and the Catalan Socialist Republic would give Madrid an easy excuse to attempt to annul the Statute. Catalonia would then be a mere rebellious province, not a region whose protest against fascist centralism had the dignity of at least coming from an equal power.

The situation became tenser all over the country. At San Esteban de Pravia in Asturias, coastguards captured a cargo of arms run from the boat *La Turquesa*. All the Asturias Socialist deputies were involved, and Indalecio Prieto seemed to be very closely connected. In fact, Prieto had been responsible for the shipment and the *Turquesa*

belonged to his old friend and protector, Horacio Echevarrieta, the big Bilbao and Cadiz shipping magnate.

The Government declared the state of alarm. The Madrid Casa del Pueblo was closed. Arms-caches were discovered in several places. All public meetings were banned. The ceremony of the reburial of the bodies of Galán and Garcia Hernandez, the officers who had brought the Republic by their revolt at Jaca in 1930, was forbidden. President Alcalá-Zamora, in a speech at Valladolid, hinted at the need to revise the Constitution.

Wild rumours of a communist revolt or a fascist *putsch* spread all over the country. Insurrection from one side or the other appeared on the point of breaking out. The Fascists were arming. The Socialists were arming. The loyalty of the Army was more than dubious. The situation was completely confused.

For the proletarian revolution the factors were deceptively propitious. The Left wing of the Socialist Party had gained all the most important posts, and the U.G.T. was in their hands. The radicalisation of the masses, the middle class and the students was increasing daily. The peasants were rebellious. The Army was partly favourable to socialist propaganda, partly neutral. Even among the officer caste, fascist propaganda had not yet made great headway. Catalonia and the Basque country, last defences of the petty-bourgeoisie, were in open revolt against the Madrid Government and merely awaiting the provocation to rise.

The revolution's armament was not inferior to that with which such a movement may expect to be provided. All the Casas del Pueblo had been mortgaged. There were big deposits in various parts of the country. Part of the *Turquesa* cargo had been saved. It was believed that the Catalan police's arms were at the service of the revolution and their number was vastly exaggerated. There was every possibility that the Army, or at any rate the private soldiers, would join the insurrection once contact had been established and that they would open the barracks and arsenals.

The revolutionary proletariat was well on the way to

union. The Workers' Alliances had spread from Catalonia. In Catalonia itself, the Alliance comprised almost all the workers not in the C.N.T. and could also count on some support from sections of the C.N.T. not directly under the influence of the FAI, and on at least tolerance from Dencás, chiefly as counter-weight to the Anarchists.

In Asturias, the C.N.T. itself had proposed the Workers' Alliance in the early summer and the Asturian Socialist Federation was authorised by the National Committee to form the Alliance.

The Alliances, however, had very little contact. Formed by different parties in different places according to local conditions, still debating the question of the Workers' Alliance, the single big centre, they lacked all cohesion. The C.N.T. in Asturias demanded arms from the socialist section of the Alliance, which refused because it saw no reason to hand over its stores to an organisation over which it had no control. The Catalan Alliance never received arms at all.

Despite Largo Caballero's disapproval, very serious errors had been committed. The workers' strength had been exhausted in strikes which had done little but confuse the issue, and especially deepen the division between the U.G.T. and the C.N.T., instead of raising the revolutionary impulse of the masses. The peasant strike had been an error on the grand scale, although it had prevented the FAI from bringing worse disaster in the form of a new Casas Viejas. The situation in Catalonia had not been understood at all. The arms, despite Caballero's precise instructions to distribute them, had been kept in caches where they were either discovered by the police (Casa del Pueblo in Madrid) or were immobilised because of transport difficulties (the *Turquesa* munitions).

The deeper causes were exposed in the illegal Socialist Youth paper, *Octubre*: (1) lack of cohesion in the total action of the proletariat; (2) too little preparatory work inside the barracks and lack of revolutionary military

organisation there; (3) treachery of reformist elements who in many cases abandoned their posts; and (4) lack of the single command of the insurrection. Once the famous telegram about the sick mother had been sent out, there was little for the Revolutionary Committee in Madrid to do. It is even possible that Largo Caballero was rather bored when he stayed at home for five days: he could neither leave his post nor control his revolution.

The moment for the outbreak was perfectly clear: when the Ceda at last openly came to power. There was no doubt that this event would be recognised by large sections even of the petty-bourgeoisie (Azaña, Martínez Barrio, Companys) as the intolerable threat to what remained of their hopes of salving 1931. But here again was danger: it meant putting reliance upon a class which was on the defensive. In Catalonia, where this dilemma appeared in its clearest form, the Esquerra had definitely turned against the section of the working class which most nearly represented its desperate aspect—the C.N.T.—and was afraid to place arms in the hands of what it had suddenly imagined as its bitterest rival, the Workers' Alliance. The Esquerra-C.N.T. struggle definitely made impossible any chance of proletarian union just where it was most necessary in order to carry through another historical stage of the revolution. Simply because Dencás gave it to be understood that the Alliance was his ally but refused to make use of it, the union of the Catalan proletariat became impossible.

The same was true in other places, but was not emphasised so strongly. Madrid, for instance, had no ostentatious October 6, although all the bourgeois republican leaders, Maura, Sánchez Román, Martínez Barrio, Azaña, issued public manifestos as soon as they learned that Lerroux had offered the Ceda collaboration in his Cabinet and solemnly declared that they "broke off all solidarity with the organs of the Republic which had been completely falsified by the fact that it had been handed over to its enemies."

No fixed objectives had been decided for the revolution. No concrete slogans had gained the people. "All power to the people, the land to the peasants," etc., had not been fused with the revolutionary instinct of the masses. There was no revolutionary party which they had come to regard as their advance-guard. Maurin's idea that the Workers' Alliances could be a Spanish form of Soviets was completely false, since they were merely tactical groupings of previously-existent political parties, varying from place to place and subject to all sorts of outside influences. The Petrograd Soviets of 1917 had had the advantage of the 1905 "dress-rehearsal". 1934 was itself a "dress-rehearsal" for 1936. The Antifascist Militias Committees of July 1936 were a completely different thing, for they had grown up out of the immediate necessities of the situation. But they would not have taken that particular and necessary form had not the Workers' Alliances existed two years before.

In these circumstances, the 1934 revolution, so carefully planned, amounted to no more than a "preventive *putsch*". This is not to underestimate its value, not only to the Spanish working class but to the whole international proletarian movement. Asturias was a Koloman Wallisch and Catalonia an Otto Bauer warning. Marx said of the Paris Commune, "Versailles had placed the Parisians before this alternative: to accept the challenge or to surrender without fighting. The demoralisation of the working class, in the second case, would have been a far greater disaster than the loss of any number of leaders." "Defeated armies," said Engels, "are good schools."

For the success of a revolution, the ruling class must have found itself in a blind alley. Its way out would be Fascism. But the Spanish ruling class was very different from the German or the Austrian. It was still feudo-clerical. It had not engendered a large middle class driven wild by the prospect of proletarianisation. Fascism lay before it; but not yet. Robles himself was sufficiently intelligent to see that there was yet another stage before

Fascism would become the ruling class's last alternative. At present, the agrarian and capitalist class was itself driving towards a "preventive *putsch*", seeking to provoke the revolution while it could still smash it in the plausible name of order. Any insurrection could upset Samper or Lerroux, just as the FAI could upset Martinez Barrio. But to upset Lerroux was not necessarily to bar the way to Gil Robles; and even to upset Robles was not necessarily to bar the way to Juan March, the Jesuits and General Franco. The thing had to be attempted, for a failure to do so would have been an unpardonable evasion of responsibility, more unpardonable than Companys' surrender or Dencás' failure. But the situation, however promising it might appear to the schoolmen of the Workers' and Peasants' Block, was not really revolutionary; or rather, it was one of those situations against which Lenin warned his party, a revolutionary situation which does not *necessarily* mean revolution, but which cannot be declined without battle. It is impossible to say about October 1934 that "they should not have taken up arms".

In Asturias, the situation was correctly estimated. Here there was no suggestion of a desperate revolt such as the FAI had led in Aragon and Andalusia. The Asturian miners had long been a model of socialist organisation. Their Casas del Pueblo, their workers' schools, their proletarian civilisation had long been as famous as those of Austria, Germany and Belgium. By nature they were centrists. Their leader, Gonzalez Peña, was Prieto's right-hand man. Their Workers' Alliance was the most solid and efficient in Spain. They had come to the deliberate conclusion that the entry of the Ceda into the Government would constitute a threat which could not be ignored. They had been long trained in the protest strike accompanied by efficient sabotage. To them the October rising was the logical continuation of the strike against Robles' Covadonga meeting in September.

The obvious moment for the outbreak would be the entry of the Ceda into the Cabinet. Robles himself knew

that, and knew, too, that the beginning of October would be a time when the revolutionary movement would be on the downgrade. The bourgeoisie, by his subtle tactics, was actually moving towards the offensive. He had supported the first Lerroux Cabinets, had then weakened them by forcing Martinez Barrio out, had suggested Samper and had then discredited him by attacking his failure to cope with the strikes and social disturbance, and had thereby created an atmosphere propitious to the demand for a "strong" Government. This was his policy all through: sabotage of his own creations until his backers were led to believe that only an extremity of violence could save them from the fatal effects of their Government's weakness.

Between September 11 and October 1 the situation grew increasingly tense. There could be little doubt that the President would offer ministries to the enemies of the Republic. The Left parties worked intensively towards a united front against the threat. Alvaro de Albornoz, possibly the most intelligent of the Republican Liberals, succeeded in uniting Azaña's Republican Left, Martinez Barrio's Republican Union and Sanchez Román's National Republican Party in common opposition to the Ceda's entry. The example of the Von Papen-Hindenburg-Hitler manœuvre in Germany two years before had shown what dangers lay before a passive attitude by the middle classes.

In face of the imminent threat, the Communist Party, which had spent the autumn criticising the undoubted defects of the Workers' Alliances, joined, on October 1. Three days later, the Socialist Militias fused with the Communist Workers' and Peasants' Antifascist Militias (M.A.O.C.). In Madrid and Asturias, where the Socialists had the majority, the Workers' Alliances had now grouped the broad mass of the organised workers. In Catalonia, the Workers' Alliance united only the Marxist and Opposition Syndicalist groups and the relations between the Alliance, the Esquerra Government and the C.N.T.-FAI were still extraordinarily confused. Azaña chose this

moment to take his summer holidays on the Catalan coast.

The Samper Government appeared before the Cortes on October 1 and was duly defeated. On the 2nd, the President failed to resist Robles' bluff, and on the evening of the 4th, Lerroux announced the formation of a cabinet in which Ceda members held three key posts: Aizpun, Justice, Anguera de Sojo, Public Works, and Jiménez Fernández, Agriculture. The workers and peasants were in the hands of their enemies and an enemy presided over the firing-squad.

III

OCTOBER

I. BARCELONA, OCTOBER 6

THE NEWS OF the fall of the Samper Government had immediate repercussions in Barcelona. It was obvious to everyone that the result could only be the accession of the Ceda. When the list of new ministers arrived, the appointment of Anguera de Sojo fulfilled Catalonia's worst fears. His bitter hatred of the workers was equalled only by his aggressive detestation of Catalonia.

The Workers' Alliance realised that it must assert itself if the coming struggle between the Esquerra and Madrid was to allow free play for the proletarian forces and place Companys in a position of dependence upon them. On the 2nd, it published a strong manifesto against the Madrid Government, called for a big antifascist demonstration in the evening. Dencás' police broke up the demonstration and captured its banners.

With the revolutionary crisis, the struggle within the Esquerra had become particularly acute. Companys was almost at open war with Dencás and Badia. All the contradictions within a petty-bourgeois party rallied around two opposing slogans (Catalonia, Republic) were intensified by the fact that both tendencies were faced by a common enemy: the fascising anti-Catalan Madrid Government, represented in Barcelona by the commander of the IVth Military Division, General Batet, with artillery and 5,000 men.

Against Batet, Dencás had 3,000 armed Shock Police and 7,000 *escamots*, the Esquerra militia, trained chiefly

as special constables in the struggle against the FAI. The Generalidad had a few *Mozos de la Escuadra*, its private defence force, uniformed in the dress of Nelson's sailors, armed with carbines and commanded by the roistering, audacious Perez Farras. The Workers' Alliance had ten thousand men in rough militia organisation, with one Mauser, one Winchester and perhaps 500 pistols. The FAI . . . the FAI?

Estimates of Dencás reserves or arms vary according to whether the writer's argument is that he had arms and refused to give them to the workers or that his whole pretence of strength was hollow from the start. A possible estimate of his total strength, including the armament of the Shock Police and *escamots* might be perhaps 6,000 aged, useless Remingtons, 1,000 Mausers, 4,000 Winchesters and some 17,000 pistols and revolvers. But there was very little ammunition.

On the 4th, the Alliance invited the C.N.T. to join. It was now obvious that Dencás was equally hostile to both organisations. The C.N.T. refused, but reserved the right to join in any struggle waged solely on behalf of proletarian interests. This was vague but not hopeless.

That evening, the Alliance held another demonstration against the Madrid Fascist Government, despite Dencás' refusal to authorise it. The police vainly tried all evening to break it up. Many of the rank-and-file refused to beat up men shouting "Long live Catalonia!"

Dencás, furious, demanded strict measures. Coll i Llach, the chief of police, took the most obvious course, sent some of his men round to the famous anarchist meeting-place, the "Tranquilidad" café, and arrested forty-two militants. Another hundred or so FAI leaders were arrested during the night. The natural result was that the FAI were furious with the Generalidad and even more with the Alliance which supported it. The old accusation, "Marxist blacklegs", was revived with added force. The FAI appeared to betray the revolt of October 6, but they certainly had every provocation to do so. They betrayed

it only in so far as their whole historical character compelled them to do so.

On the evening of the 4th, the Madrid radio announced the formation of a Cabinet with three Ceda ministers. Immediately, the Alliance called the general strike. The Independent Centre of Commercial and Industrial Employees (C.A.D.C.I.), a Catalanist Union not in the Alliance, joined the strike. The C.N.T. unions, despite the efforts of the FAI, came out too.

The police continued to arrest FAI leaders. Companys, over the radio, begged for calm, "hoped and trusted that the Government of Catalonia would not be compelled to impose its authority".

The FAI tried to open its centres by force, and scattered shooting began. Dencás then broke Companys' monopoly of the radio with a furious diatribe against "extremists".

While the Alliance demonstrated on the Ramblas, its leaders interviewed the Generalidad. They demanded arms. The next day would be decisive. The Generalidad hesitated, temporised. Dencás assured them that he had everything well in hand. The troops? Batet? Batet had assured Dencás that his men would fire on the *escamots* only if they approached the barracks.

The next day, the 6th, was decisive. The Alliance Committee commandeered cars to spread their instructions to the provinces. Dencás occupied the strategic points of the city, stopped the cars, tried to stop the requisitions. But news poured in by phone and car that the whole of Catalonia had risen—for the Alliance. One or two small villages, not quite realising the situation, declared for Libertarian Communism.

The Alliance assaulted the Chamber of Commerce and installed its headquarters there. Curiously, this building was to be the C.N.T.'s headquarters in July, 1936.

At six that evening, ten thousand workers crowded the Ramblas demanding arms. Dencás had again forbidden the demonstration, but there was now a definite

duality of powers—the armed *escamots* of Dencás' Estat Catala and the unarmed workers of the Alliance. The demonstrators cheered the police, who fraternised. The excitement rose. At eight o'clock, Companys, after a furious discussion with Dencás, surrendered the only position which might have saved him, union with the armed Alliance. He was forced into definite rebellion against Madrid before the front had been formed in Catalonia. His surrender to Dencás was simply the first stage in his surrender to Batet.

"All the authentically republican forces of Spain and the advanced social sectors, without distinction or exception, have risen in arms against the fascist attack. Catalonia, liberal, democratic and republican, cannot stand aside from the protest which is triumphing throughout the whole country. . . . At this solemn hour, in the name of the people and the Parliament, the Government over which I preside assumes all the organs of power in Catalonia, proclaims the Catalan State within the Spanish Federal Republic and invites the leaders of the protest against Fascism to set up in Catalonia the Provisional Government of the Republic. . . . Catalans! The hour is grave and glorious. The spirit of President Maciá, restorer of the Generalidad, is with us."

Companys rang up Batet and gave him an hour to decide what he would do. Batet replied by declaring the state of war. Two hours later, the League municipal councillors declared that "faithful to their life-long ideals, they stood beside the Government of the Generalidad". It was small wonder that the crowd in the square between the Generalidad and the City Hall were loudly shouting their disapproval. The Republican Provisional Government could only mean Azaña, sitting in the Hotel Colon. Azaña, the mere repetition of April 14, the failure of whose "revolution" had inevitably brought Lerroux and Gil Robles. The Catalan Republic had been proclaimed in the provinces. The Catalan Republic was a guarantee

of progress. The Catalan State within the Federal Republic was something very near Fascism.

The speech, composed on the morning of the 5th, made about every error that Companys, between the devils of Dencás, the Alliance and the FAI and the deep sea of Madrid, could possibly make. "All the authentically Republican forces and the advanced social sectors": what did that mean? Whom did it include? Indeed, the ghost of Maciá was standing beside Companys on the famous balcony whence the Liberator had once before declared the Catalan Republic.

"Have risen in arms"; Asturias was up, and the general strike was fairly solid in Madrid and other places. But it was worse than madness to declare war before Batet's attitude had been sounded. To permit him to declare the state of war before the rising had triumphed in Madrid was simply to play straight into the hands of Gil Robles. The barracks had not even been surrounded. Dencás had assured the Generalidad that everything was prepared, and indeed he had put on a splendid uniform all covered with pistols.

Finally, the protesting crowd could hardly have been wrong if Companys' Catalan State responded to the League's "life-long ideals", hitherto demonstrated by Cambó's conduct in 1917, in 1923 and in the appeal against the Generalidad's competence in the Law of Agrarian Contracts.

Companys had surrendered to Dencás. From now on, through the night of October 6-7, Dencás took the responsibility. The state of war had been declared, but Batet dared not risk more than 500 men on the streets. Dencás had ten thousand, and beside them there were the ten thousand of the Alliance demanding arms.

Dencás knew not the slightest thing about street-fighting, the great speciality of the Barcelona workers. The fighting of July 19, 1936, showed that, armed, these workers can face and utterly rout forces ten times as strong as Batet's.

The inevitable happened. The firing began. Dencás' men had passively allowed the military to take up all the strategic positions they desired. The Alliance and the CADCI fought with what arms they had. Some of their best leaders were killed: Jaume Compte, Viardou. The troops besieged the Generalidad, placed a small gun and began blowing away the corner of the building. The echoes in the Plaza de la Republica are loud, but there was no real need for panic.

Meanwhile, Dencás, at last realising his tactical errors, was calling all Catalonia to arms when, had he wished, an army stood on the Barcelona streets, only waiting for arms. "Catalans!" he cried over the radio, "To arms! Men of Liberal spirit! Republicans and Socialists of Spain! Rise for Liberty!" And then, all night on the radio, Companys' proclamation every two hours, dance-music, Dencás' call to arms, more dance-music, falsely optimistic news and more dance-music.

The *Rabassaires* gathered to march to Barcelona to aid their man, Companys. As they approached the city, they were turned back by the Civil Guard. It was too late. Companys had surrendered. Dencás had sent no forces to relieve the Generalidad. He had not even placed snipers on the roofs. Nothing.

The workers at last got arms from the police. The Alliance took up the struggle. But it was hopeless. Sporadic shooting went on all day, but it was too late to organise a regular battle.

The men of the FAI, willing to fight now that the Generalidad had vanished, came out and collected the arms abandoned by the police and the *escamots*. These arms were the basis of the spontaneous militia of July 1936.

On the Monday, October 7, the C.N.T. went back to work. The orders to return were broadcast from Batet's headquarters.

In Madrid, the strike still held, but the insurrection had failed. There had not been enough arms. The Army

had not risen. By the 9th, when the strike was called off in Barcelona, it had declined badly in Madrid and over all the rest of the country. The "treachery of fatigue" and the lack of concrete slogans and objectives: the movement of October remained simply a protest, at best a dress-rehearsal. Only in Asturias did the struggle have more than a defensive significance. . . .

II. RED ASTURIAS

In Asturias, the proletariat was both class-conscious and united. With the entry of the Communists on October 4, the Workers' Alliance extended solidly from Gijon, the anarchist town on the coast, over the whole great socialist mining basin. Workers of all parties and opinions fought shoulder to shoulder. This was a fact of enormous significance.

Catalonia was the end of a whole stage in Spanish history. The petty-bourgeoisie had made its final surrender: not to a general, but to its own weaknesses. Azaña only a year later could be acclaimed by a quarter of a million Spaniards at Comillas, Companys could hear a "Long live Catalonia!" uninterrupted over the whole plain of New Castile and be greeted by half a million Catalans in Barcelona. But they were not the same Azaña and not the same Companys. Just as both of them were entirely representative of all their class's contradictions, so they were representative of the resolution of these contradictions, temporarily, in the Popular Front. They were no longer men but symbols.

Asturias began a completely new stage. While in Catalonia struggled the last defence of the transition order, in Asturias there was born, in blood and dynamite, two quite new conceptions: the Union of Proletarian Brothers (U.H.P.!) and the Revolutionary Committees organisation.

The communist organ, *Rundschau*, in its issue of December 20, 1934, analysed the lesson of Asturias thus: "The

first generalised struggle of the Spanish proletariat was defeated, but the broad masses of the Spanish proletariat have been imbued by the course of this struggle with an idea which they have long lacked: the idea that the objective in this struggle can be solely the struggle for power, and that this power can come only through Soviets. This idea became a big material as well as moral force . . . Asturias signified a huge historic triumph for the *committee as concept*."

If, immediately after the repulse of the rebels in July 1936, there sprang up the Antifascist Militias Committees, this was the direct result of what was made in Asturias in October 1934.

The Asturias basin was directed by local Committees formed by members of the Workers' Alliance, under the general direction of the Regional Committee in Oviedo, whose chief members were Belarmino Tomas and Gonzalez Peña, Socialists, and José Maria Martinez, of the Gijon C.N.T. The First Committee gave way to a second when General Lopez Ochoa was already in Oviedo, on October 12. This Second Committee lasted only sufficient time to imprint a more radical stamp on the struggle, a beginning of war Communism. The Third Committee, composed of four Socialists and two Communists, "organised the defeat". The C.N.T. did not participate in the Third Committee for various local reasons, but its men continued the struggle until Belarmino Tomas signed the capitulation on October 19.

The Local Committees varied widely from place to place, according as the Socialists, Communists or Anarchists formed the majority of the Workers' Alliances. In Mieres, for example, the Committee was communistic. In Grado, there was a form of Anarchist Libertarian Communism. The general line of the Regional committee, however, took precedence over local peculiarities in the particular matters which concerned the whole of Asturias.

The proclamations issued by the Mieres and Grado Committees are interesting as showing the diverse modes

of thought which could be united in the common struggle. This diversity within unity was perhaps the most important feature of the Asturias revolt and found its final effect in the Pact between the U.G.T., the combined Socialist and Communist Parties, the C.N.T. and the FAI signed in Barcelona on October 22, 1936.

A comparison between the two famous proclamations of Grado and Mieres shows that there is a fundamental coincidence between Libertarian and War Communism. The instructions are almost precisely similar, and, as was discovered in 1936, the *practical* difference between the two is more a matter of verbalisms than substance. But for these verbalisms almost as many good men had died as for the difference between the *homoousia* and *homoiousia* of God in the early days of the Church.

The most important points of the Grado and Mieres proclamations may be compared thus:

GRADO: "We are creating a new society. And, as in the world of biology, its birth is accompanied by physical agonies and moral suffering. . . . It must be so. Death produces life. . . . Let it not surprise you then, toilers, that the world we are forging is costing blood, suffering and tears."

MIERES: "The Revolutionary Committee, interpreter of the people's will and guardian of the interests of the revolution, is determined to take all the measures necessary to direct the course of the movement."

GRADO: "This gigantic labour needs the collaboration of all. The young men are fighting in the streets with an enthusiasm and valour worthy of the cause they are defending. . . . And since we are all needed, we ask the personal co-operation of those who are not fighting rifle in hand for all secondary operations that may be necessary."

MIERES: "We order all those who are able to go to the front to proceed at once to the recruiting offices installed here."

GRADO: "In view of the difficulties we have to face in the provision of supplies, families must co-operate as far

as they are able. . . . Each home must consume only what is indispensable, sacrificing its stomach."

MIERES: "All stocks of food and clothing are confiscated."

GRADO: "Soldiers of the ideal, up with your rifles! There are still enemies left. Thousands of class brothers are still fighting. Our triumph must not let us forget that our will and strength are needed by other toilers who are struggling against greater difficulties."

MIERES: "Members of all parties must present themselves immediately, with their party-cards, to form the workers' militia which will guarantee order and the progress of the revolution."

There were two aspects of the "Commune" created by the Regional Committee: the direction of the war and the organisation of the rearguard. Both arose and took their form from the struggle.

From Mieres there came the beginnings of a Red Army to march on Oviedo. All fit men between eighteen and forty were mobilized. Cars had been requisitioned and telephone-lines laid between every sector of the front, so that it was possible to transfer men rapidly to the points where they were needed. After the capture of the arms-factories and arsenals, there were plenty of arms, although a bad lack of munitions. Throughout the war, dynamite was the chief weapon. It was the first time that its utility to a revolutionary force had been demonstrated on a large scale. It was invaluable for attacking police-posts and even large buildings from close range.

Hospitals were organised. Doctors gave their services voluntarily. A corps of nurses was formed. All milk was requisitioned for the wounded, the civilian population being supplied afterwards.

Supplies were assured by Supplies Committees. All stocks were confiscated against vouchers signed by these Committees. District Committees assessed the needs of each family and supplied food against vouchers. Public dining-rooms were organised. Liquors were forbidden.

Labour Committees saw that the mines were kept running. The pump-men worked a seven-hour day. Volunteers, however, also worked there day and night. Water and electricity was provided by special Committees.

In the great shops at Trubia, Turón and La Felguera, shifts of voluntary workers produced armaments. In the Felguera shops the C.N.T. turned out an armoured-car every eight hours.

Policing was carried out by the armed militias. Red Guards prevented looting, shooting any person caught in the act, investigated persons hostile to the revolution and protected stores. Revolutionary justice was in the hands of these Red Militias, but, despite the atrocity stories freely circulated later, they were responsible for extremely few executions. The anti-revolutionary behaviour of the *lumpenproletariat* is inevitable in any major disturbance.

On the whole, money was not used, both Libertarian and War Communism necessitating vouchers and ration-cards. The Asturias "Commune", however, did not make the mistake of the Paris Commune. The deposits in the banks, especially the Bank of Spain in Oviedo, were confiscated by the Committees, and, if they had to blow open the strong rooms it was because the owners had unfortunately forgotten to leave their keys behind.

In *Capital* Marx had noted that "violence is an economic category". Old Beslay, the Paris Commune's first Delegate in the Bank of France, excused the Communards' omission to take it over by the plea that this "would have shocked the middle class and the world". To a certain extent, Beslay was justified by two local considerations: that the Commune did not need the money and that, from the mere numerical point of view, it was necessary not to "shock" the middle class in a Paris where only a minority of the Commune's fighting-force were, strictly speaking, proletarian. The Asturias "Commune" did not need the money immediately, but it was entirely proletarian, class-conscious for years. Far more

importantly, the Asturias miners had assimilated Engels' lesson: "The Bank in the Commune's hands would have been worth a thousand hostages." In Asturias, they saw that a true revolution attacks, not a political situation, but an economic system, and that it is essential to hit it in its most vulnerable point.

The Asturias "Commune", then, should not really be called "Commune". What happened in Asturias brought the Spanish revolution to a transition stage in the process where, as Lenin reiterated, "the Commune is the first stage, Soviet Power the second". The Asturias miners acted upon one of the most important modifications in Marxist theory, announced by Marx himself in the 1872 edition of the *Communist Manifesto*: "The Commune has demonstrated that the working-class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made State machinery and wield it for its own purposes. Exactly the opposite is the case. . . . The working-class must *break up, shatter*, the ready-made State machinery and not confine itself merely to taking possession of it."

The Asturians in two weeks (October 5-19) did not have the same opportunities as the Communards had in ten. They were fighting on an extended front, not in occupation of a world capital. Even with these disadvantages, they fell into no reformist errors. Their organisation was literally a model.

There is not space here to follow that heroic and instructive war. It is necessary only to emphasise the three hugely important results of the Asturias rising: (1) the Union of Proletarian Brothers, that is to say the abolition of all divergences between every section of the working class; (2) the immediate offensive of this Union, making it doubly valuable; (3) the "shattering" of the "ready-made State machinery" by this Union (Committee-rule, Red Army, confiscation of the Bank of Spain, vouchers, primitive collectivisation).

The Asturias revolt remained isolated. The Government was able to concentrate all its forces. General Lopez Ochoa,

Colonel Yague, General Balmes, General Bosch were able to bring a whole army against the miners. Even then, they held in the mountain passes for a week, until their ammunition gave out.

With the Generals came the Foreign Legion and the Moors. It had been from Asturias that Pelayo had begun the Reconquest twelve centuries before. The Moors took their revenge.

The repression of the Paris Commune was bloodier, on a vaster scale. No repression was ever crueller than that of Asturias.

Not for centuries had torture been so terribly inflicted. Never had such wanton sadism been displayed. Even if the stories of "Red atrocities" had been all true, the reprisals would have been beyond all proportion. But it was not merely alleged atrocities that the troops of Order, the mercenaries and Moors, were avenging. "It was the backwash of their terror," said Flaubert of the repression in 1848. "They were revenging themselves upon the papers, clubs, demonstrations, doctrines, upon all that had infuriated them. Despite their victory, equality won the day: the equality of brute bestiality, a single level of bloody violence."

Inoffensive journalists like Luis de Sirval were brutally murdered by mercenaries. Twenty-seven persons were hacked to death at night at Carbayin. Doval's Civil Guard seemed to wish to outshine the Moors and Foreign Legion, and possibly succeeded.

Alejandro Lerroux, a Thiers without Thiers' intelligence, had broadcast: "Martial law will be applied without weakness and without cruelty, but energetically."

"The Government's duty is to maintain the Constitution," Don Ale told the Cortes after he had handed the power to those who had never voted the Constitution, "because we are not playing at public liberties."

"You have restored to many of us," replied young José Antonio Primo de Rivera, leader of the Fascist Falange Española, "our faith in Spain."

"I am sure," Lerroux had broadcast, "that the whole soul of the whole country will rise and place itself beside the Government to restore the political and moral unity which makes all Spaniards a free people of glorious tradition and glorious future. . . . A civic exaltation accompanies us. With it and under the dominion of the Law, we shall continue the glorious history of Spain." With the Law, the Moors, the Foreign Legion and the restored faith of the Falange Española. . . .

IV

AFTER ASTURIAS

THE PRISONS WERE filled with 30,000 fighters of Asturias and Catalonia. The Lerroux Government had made a clean sweep. Even those who could still stand between capitalism and its destruction were arrested: Azaña, Companys and his Councillors. Prieto was officially in exile, though he was not infrequently seen in Bilbao. Dencás, too, was in France, fleeing through a sewer. Caballero had been arrested on October 14, but they were still vainly looking for proofs. When they tried Sirval's murderer, six months later, they practically acquitted him.

It was one thing to smash a premature insurrection, another to solidify the reaction. Lerroux was willing enough, but the Asturias revolt and above all its repression had exhausted the capitalist offensive. It had carried it over to its own ground: violence. The Parliament had become a useless weapon, especially after the Socialists retired from it. On January 1, the President himself, defender of the Constitution, invited the Cortes to study its reform. Next day, January 2, the Catalan Statute was abolished.

Gradually, Gil Robles approached the seizure of power. Crisis after crisis shook the Government. Lerroux and the President, hating each other, still stood. A dissolution, constitutionally, would mean that the Cortes would have the right to impeach the President for dissolving unjustifiably. It was obvious that Robles was willing to use Lerroux and the Radicals, and they had no objection to being used. To disappearing for ever, yes.

The Minister of Education, gradually sabotaged the Republic's measures to free the schools from clerical influence. One of the more typical Radicals went to Rome to negotiate a Concordat, and only the exaggerated concessions demanded by the Spanish Church prevented its acceptance. The Vatican had always feared the Spanish Jesuits, and feared them the more now that currency export restrictions and the crash of investments had decimated its income while Mussolini's dictatorship had restricted its freedom to a solid gold telephone and a magnificent railway that went nowhere. Ratti went so far as to say that the Spanish Church could recover its soul only by temporal persecution. Under Lerroux, it appeared that the Spanish Church's soul would be hopelessly lost.

At the end of March, the political question was planted acutely over the question of the commutation of seventeen death-sentences, including those of two deputies, Teodomiro Menendez and Ramón Gonzalez Peña. Both Lerroux and the President inclined to mercy, the Ceda ministers were implacable.

It was not that Lerroux was particularly mercifully-inclined. The real question was whether the time was yet ripe for the fascist dictatorship. Robles demanded the power. The President exercised prerogatives he did not possess. In common defence, he and Lerroux stood firm against Gil Robles. The Catalan League was still powerful, lobbying hard against the decree of January 19 forbidding importation of Argentine meat, which Buenos Aires had met by the banning of Spanish textiles. The League had a free hand in Catalonia now that both Companys and the leaders of the Workers' Alliance were in jail. Robles retired to gather his forces for a second—and final—attack; and Lerroux formed his fifth Cabinet entirely of Radicals and "technicians" like General Masquelet at the War Office. Portela Valladares was Minister of the Interior, cynical, opportunist, on the margin.

Robles had achieved one of the cunningest strokes of his parliamentary career. It was quite impossible that Lerroux could stand alone. His extremely perilous situation was admirably fitted for creating a new atmosphere of violence. Robles made a great show of electoral preparation. Rumours of a coming *coup d'état* were carefully fostered. It was even suggested that the workers were ready to avenge Asturias. "Present and onward!" shouted the young Fascists of the JAP (Popular Action Youth). The President was badly scared.

Lerroux did not last a month. He dared not even bring his Cabinet before the Cortes. With the gap left by the Socialist withdrawal, the Ceda was unchallenged dictator there. The "Thirty-day Ministry" vanished, and the Ceda returned in force with five Ministers. A Ceda-sympathising Radical also entered, besides Chapaprieta, representative of high finance, and Royo Vilanova, Catalonia's bitterest opponent. Robles took the Ministry of War.

Robles was too intelligent to demand the Premiership. There, he would have been too far out in the open. It might always happen that there might be a governmental crisis—all the Ministers were not yet under his control—but he would not now be affected. Above all, from the Ministry of War he could organise the final assault on power in a way in which he could maintain it. He had never put more faith in a Parliamentary majority alone than Hitler had. From the Ministry of War he could remove loyal republican officers, promote his sympathisers and undo what was left of Azaña's military reforms. After the amnesty Sanjurjo was not back but his men were. Robles did not organise a *coup d'état*: he was, again, too clever for that. He merely placed reactionary officers in a position where they would find the utmost facilities for making a *pronunciamiento* and saw to it that it was impressed upon them that Spain could not be "saved" unless they did make one. On the pretext of military manœuvres, he constructed cement trenches in the Sierra dominating Madrid.

The international situation was highly favourable to Spanish Fascism if it possessed the least political sense. The Minister of State was then Rocha, whose measure was revealed by a debate one day in the Cortes with the cynical old Count Romanones. Romanones asked him what Spain was doing about the *status quo* in the Mediterranean. "It is all arranged in the proper dossier," replied Rocha. "It's not a dossier I want," snapped the irate Count. "It's a Minister."

The Franco-Russian Pact had just been signed. In France, the Left had triumphed in the municipal elections. The short-lived Stresa Front was forming. Professor Jèze was enquiring into the Wal-Wal incidents. Those in close touch with Rome already knew of the Abyssinian campaign planned for the autumn and knew too that Mussolini's ultimate aims were not in Africa but in the Mediterranean.

The offensive against Britain, master of the League of Nations, was preparing. Unless Montagu Norman, the City and the steel-magnates represented by Lord Londonderry were prepared to share the world with Hitler and Thyssen and force out a France where the arms industry—and perhaps even more—might well be nationalised by a Left Government allied to the Soviet Union, Britain's power should be broken in the Mediterranean and in Portugal. Not directly: but the Balearics and Ceuta would neutralise Gibraltar just as a rebellious Egypt or Palestine would neutralise Cyprus and the Piraeus, recently acquired by a most unfair and anachronistic stroke of Admiralty-inspired royal match-making. In Portugal, where Oliveira Salazar's British-protected dictatorship had been increasingly shaky since the revolt of the Mendez Norton camarilla, German predominance could be easily implanted with a view to "gratitude" in the form of African colonies. Pirow, clinging to South Africa, would not be at all unwilling, with Tanganyika on his mind. The very detectives who provided most of the mass-audience at Stresa had been able to make this simple calculation: Junkers

over London or Capronis over Spain. Even Baldwin, whose lips were not yet sealed and ears still capable of hearing anything which was not being currently discussed in the street, could understand it. It was not probable that the Spanish Radicals, seeking fat commissions, or Gil Robles, seeking power, could overlook the chances. The world's intelligence services crowded in the cafés of Barcelona and Madrid and honest brokers displayed the activity almost of arms commission agents. Hence the famous "dossier".

The Intelligence Services were just about as intelligent as they were accustomed to be. They regarded Spanish politics, the manifestation of the deepest problems of a European country, as nothing more than the reflection of the struggles and shifts of gang-warfare or tribal quarrels. Under the Radicals, Spanish foreign policy achieved a low level such as it had not reached for a century. In Barcelona, the Chinese Quarter was once more crowded by tourists and dope smugglers. Spain knew again the good old days of prostitution, hunger, jails, fantastic tortures, *pistolerismo* and confessionals. "The glorious history of Spain," as the Emperor of the Paralelo had dubbed it, was being restored—with a vengeance. Literally.

The foreign political situation was still on the margin. Definite arrangements could not be made until the Abyssinian aggression had become fact. The cession of Balearic "spheres of influence" was still in the region of "wish-thinking". First, Spain must be made unsafe for democracy.

Unsafe it was becoming for democracy's greatest enemies, the agrarians. The wheat problem was acute. As ever, the big landowners turned to milk the State. If they could not sell their wheat at a reasonable profit, the taxpayer should buy it, but of course not consume it. For the taxpayer to become an economically sound consumer, wages would have to be raised. But then the textile industry could not pay the taxes, perhaps not even continue working. Already unemployment had reached

fantastic levels. The official statistics did their utmost to hide the truth for fear of alarming public opinion; but even they had to admit a minimum of 79,000 part-stopped and 178,000 totally unemployed industrial workers, 154,000 part-stopped, 168,000 wholly unemployed peasants, a total of 579,000 unemployed. But it was known that agricultural unemployment was in fact far higher, that there were nearly a million unemployed altogether, an increase of nearly 400,000.

Wages had been brutally cut since October and since the repeal of the Parish Laws. In whole wide regions, a peasant could earn no more than 2 pesetas 50. Even in the province of Alicante, one of the richest in Europe, the peasant responsible for a world-famous orange-plantation was receiving 4 pesetas, upon which he had to support himself, his wife and three children.

The State therefore carried the burden. The fine wheat of Castile and Leon from one of the finest harvests for years, went into State granaries, where it rotted. The wheat magnates were paid 209 million pesetas, and, as a consequence, subsidies to bankrupt shipping and railway rose to 250 million. The price of bread rose too. Given sufficient time, Spanish feudalism might have achieved its purpose by "gradualism": Moors, Foreign Legion, Civil Guard would have been unnecessary after sheer starvation had done its work. Even a Spaniard cannot live more than six days without food, and the owners had already made the peasants pay for their water in many places, for their contract stipulated only "three pesetas a day and food". The food was what is called *gazpacho*, a succulent dish in Madrid. In the province of Salamanca (deputy: Gil Robles), *gazpacho* was hot water, five drops of crude olive oil and a crust of bread.

In the province of Alicante, there are many orange-plantations where the fruit drops after a wind from the Sierra and lies rotting. No peasant would think of picking one up. He would be punished, not by the owner but by the village. A man is not a thief. When they have the right

to take as many artichokes as they need—no man would take more—from a hired field, they plucked only the leaves to eat with their plain-boiled rice from Sueca. The animals, too, could eat a few leaves. Artichokes that year were worth 1s. 6d. per *arroba* of 12½ pounds in the local market. In Madrid, they cost 3d. each, in London 9d.

The agrarian masters of Spain, then, were at last brought face to face with a problem which could not be solved by force. Roosevelt had been attempting to solve it all the previous year, and the Supreme Court had just decided the illegality of the hub of the N.R.A. Lerroux and his Minister of Agriculture, Velayos, could not be expected to rival Roosevelt and his Brain Trust. Robles at the Ministry of War was already preparing the only radical solution: the complete annihilation of the small consumer.

It was now simply a matter of gaining the power. Castor-oil and machine-guns could not be the final solution. Gil Robles, advised by Herrera, the Jesuit agent, and Juan March, the most powerful single financial figure, opted for the Hitler way: the sabotage of Parliament, a plebiscite, and, if that should fail, naked force. Thirty thousand of the workers' best militants were in jail, five thousand more were dead in Asturias. The way seemed open: 1934 had been fought out in the still factories, in street demonstrations, in Catalonia, in Asturias; 1935 was to be fought in the Parliament and the Presidential Palace. Could Robles know that "defeat is the best school"? He was one of the few Spanish politicians who had never been in prison: the Salamanca Law Professor was uneducated. He would never be able to compete with the Thirty Thousand.

The State was forced to defend itself in the only possible way. Chapaprieta, fighting heavy opposition in the Cortes, brought in a Law of Restrictions, cutting civil service pay and fusing several ministries. The Cortes managed to fight off the application of this law until the end of September.

At the same time, Chapaprieta put through a massive conversion, cutting in half the income of the middle class.

Chapaprieta was excellently placed to carry out the orders of high finance. He had been legal adviser to a group of banks controlled by the Urquijo family, especially the Banco de Credito Industrial and the Banco de Vizcaya. His Under-Secretary, Payá, according to the deputy Perez Madrigal, was interested in the Hidroelectrica Española.

Payá was closely connected with the negotiations between Juan March and the State oil monopoly, Campsa. Campsa by now had become a big force in Spanish politics, for it had vast ramifications in transport, agriculture (through the allied alcohol monopoly) and banking. Like the Church and Juan March, Campsa had become a small State within the State.

On its formation, it had needed 90 million pesetas working capital. This had been obtained not, as might have been expected in the case of a State enterprise, from the Bank of Spain, but from a private group. The Campsa actually held more money in these banks than they paid out in current accounts; yet, while the loan was granted at 6 per cent, the banks allowed the Campsa only 2 per cent.

The reason was that the Governing Body of Campsa was composed of representatives of the banking group, who were also contractors for transport and distribution. A single director controlled the transportation of fourteen provinces. Thanks to this double role, the banks made nearly eight million pesetas profit in 1934.

Herein lay the origin of the bitter struggle between Juan March and Chapaprieta which was to have such important consequences. March transferred his support to Robles, and this transfer was one of the main causes of the collapse of the Radical Government and the outbreak of the Civil War.

The Radicals were desperate for some sort of financial support, lacking that of Juan March and threatened with

the open hostility of the big wheat interests. Lerroux handed over the administration of the colonies to Moreno Calvo, an old adherent of his. Captain Nombela, a zealous civil servant, reported irregularities. Moreno Calvo dismissed him. Nombela immediately informed Gil Robles, but Robles preferred not to act immediately.

That August, Robles met Goicoechea in Bilbao and began negotiations for an alliance between the Ceda and the Monarchists. Two envoys went to see the Duke of Toledo at Fontainebleau; but Alfonso replied that the alliance must be made in Spain. Goicoechea insisted that the whole of Acción Popular should pass straight over to the Monarchists. This was too radical for Gil Robles at that moment. A certain coldness arose between the two leaders.

That August there took place in Moscow the Seventh Congress of the Communist International; and the history of Spain took a new turn. The Congress proposed to the Executive Committee a far more elastic policy than it had followed hitherto, a deeper study of the concrete conditions and peculiarities of each country, wider liberty for national parties and education of local leaders so that "basing themselves on the decisions of the Congresses of the Communist International and the Plenums of its Executive Committee, they should be able to find rapidly and independently the correct solutions of the political and tactical problems of the communist movement."

Far more importantly, the tactic of the "united front at the base" was changed, in view of recent events, to the tactic of the "Popular Antifascist Front on the basis of the united proletarian front."

The Jesuits' paper, *El Debate*, realised the danger at once: "Communism," it wrote on August 4, "now seems to us infinitely more dangerous when it disguises itself with the mask of governmental collaboration and offers this collaboration for something more than mere revolt."

The Workers' Alliances in Asturias had shown the way. In October proposals of alliance were already favourably received by the Caballero wing of the Socialist Party. The C.N.T. Congress in January had already launched the idea of a revolutionary alliance with the U.G.T.

Lenin had written fifteen years before: "It is possible to win the victory over a more powerful enemy if every force is used, by utilising *obligatorily* with care, subtlety and prudence the least discrepancies between your enemies, the smallest clash of interests between the bourgeois in different countries, between the different groups or different categories within each country; equally, the least possibility of obtaining allies must be exploited, even though they be temporary, vacillating, unsure, conditional. He who does not understand this does not understand a word of Marxism, nor of contemporary scientific Socialism, 'civilised' Socialism *in general*."

But "there are never situations without some way out. The bourgeoisie appears like a pirate who has lost his head. It makes mistake after mistake, aggravating the situation and precipitating its own ruin. . . . But to try to 'demonstrate' beforehand that this situation has 'absolutely' no way out would be pure pedantry. In such cases the real 'demonstration' can only be made in practice."

In September, the Law of Restrictions was applied. The Ministries were reduced. Poor Velayos, struggling with the wheat problem, became Minister of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, probably the biggest task ever imposed on one man. He did not last long. A new crisis arose.

Officially, the pretext was the retransfer of some branches of the Public Works administration to the Catalan Generalidad. In fact, the cause was quite different. A certain foreigner had sent a prominent Minister a large envelope.

The Radical Minister of the Interior, Salazar Alonso, had already in the summer become involved with this

foreigner, who was interested in a new form of roulette, the "Straperlo", which he wished to set up at San Sebastian or Formentor, in Majorca. Roulette was forbidden by Spanish law, so that a certain amount of "fixing" had been necessary. Most of the "old gang" of the Historic Radical Party were involved, as they had all been involved in the Barcelona municipal scandals twenty years before, and exploited the wretched foreigner right and left. Accustomed to think of Spaniards as high-minded and money-despising *hijosdalgo*, he met his match.

Now he wanted his money back, and the Ministers of Spain had not wished to send it. In a few hours, every politician, journalist and café-gossip in Madrid guessed what was in that envelope, and names began to fly.

Every effort was made to hide the letter. The problem of keeping Gil Robles out of supreme power was almost insoluble. Acción Popular was shouting for their Leader to take over from the corrupt and inefficient politicians. The civil servants were protesting against the restrictions. There was only one way out: Chapaprieta became Premier, Lerroux Minister for Foreign Affairs, Robles stayed on at the War Office, while Velayos and Royo Vilanova retired.

That envelope could not be hidden. Robles knew, Prieto knew, Azaña knew. Robles gave Lerroux a dinner at the Ritz when he resigned the Premiership. "I do not know," he said, "what the political future reserves for us: what I do know is that an undying affection unites us. Don Alejandro, it is easy to fall into errors; perhaps history will reveal sins; but those are pardoned who have loved much. Spain admires and venerates Don Alejandro Lerroux because he has loved Spain much."

But Spain did not appear to realise its burden of affection for Don Ale. A great clamour was rising. In every town, in every village, the Popular Front, not yet that in name but there in fact, was forming committees, holding meetings. Around Azaña the Incorruptible gathered an immense

enthusiasm. His policy might have been ruinous, his "revolution" of 1931 mere intellectualism; but he was a man. On October 20, four hundred thousand Spaniards came on foot, by bus, by train, on *burros*, on horses to Comillas, just outside Madrid, to hear Azaña make one of the great speeches of his life. It was not a very sound speech; it was obvious that he still believed that the Republic of 1931 could be restored with certain modifications. But he attacked the whole rotten system of the Radical-Ceda Government, denounced the outrages of the Black Two Years in that peculiar personal style of ironic analysis which had made him one of the great orators of modern Europe. It was not the speech nor even Azaña that was important: it was the fact of the colossal antifascist protest. Seven men had walked all the way from Asturias to attend. Another very significant thing was noticed: the iron discipline of the crowd. With its own stewards and organisation, the Popular Front controlled the meeting and prevented the slightest incident.

The announcement of the Comillas concentration and even more the hint that Azaña was going to mention the Straperlo letter had caused tremendous confusion in the Government. Robles saw that Azaña might implicate him. He had to be forestalled.

Chapaprieta published an ambiguous note: "persons occupying responsible positions have committed irregularities." There was nothing for it. Lerroux resigned.

Wild rumours of a *coup d'état* flew round Madrid. The workers' militias, reconstituted since October, manned the strategic points. Comillas was the stunning reply. If there were any thoughts of a *coup d'état* at that moment, the concentration of four hundred thousand antifascists in Madrid effectively prevented it.

Chapaprieta was still Premier. But the situation was impossible. The big bourgeoisie were finding that their representatives in the Cabinet were mere idiots. Every speech made by a Ceda leader in the Cortes was in effect an attack upon the Government. Often it was impossible

to gather a "quorum" for a debate. The Cortes building became deserted. People looked the other way when they passed it. The Cabinet, the whole Parliamentary system stank. The Investigation Commission into the Straperlo scandal produced a report so damning that even those Cortes had to blackball Sigfrido Blasco-Ibañez. Salazar Alonso scraped through by three white balls. Lerroux received only sixty black balls owing to the fact that he had loved Spain so much.

Robles' plan was succeeding admirably. He had supported and collaborated with the Radicals; he had now allowed them to dissolve. An attempt to resurrect a "pure" wing under Alba was frustrated neatly by involving his son in a perfectly ridiculous affair with Paramount Films. Marlene Dietrich was alleged by Gil Robles to have insulted the Spanish Army's honour in *The Devil is a Woman*. Robles was always extremely careful about this military honour, although it was hardly the Minister of War's place to interfere in the Department of State's affairs. Lerroux came out of retirement to announce that no one else should be head of the Historic Party so long as he lived.

This was a bad mistake on Robles' part. Azaña had brought the Straperlo scandal out into the open before it was ripe. Captain Nombela had finished the effect by denouncing Moreno Calvo, and this time it seemed that Gil Robles had known about it for months. All over the country the cry rose: "Out with the thieves!" and could not be stilled.

March was again raising the question of the Porto Pi payments. In Catalonia, Cambó was trying to save the big textile interests, nearly ruined by lack of foreign exchange. Faced by a big revival of the Esquerra, the League tried to blackmail Robles' alliance, gain its support in a "counter-revolutionary front" in return for economic advantages at the agrarians' expense.

Another crisis could not fail to provoke the elections for which the Rights were by no means ready. On the

other hand, if they left it too long, the Left would form the solid Popular Front. The Radicals had not the least chance of forming a Ministry which would not be defeated at once in the Cortes. On the other hand, Alcalá-Zamora dared not give the power to Robles.

Robles' policy of "putting Premiers on the spot" had been too successful. He had weakened the Radicals by eliminating all their biggest men. Cambó would undoubtedly succeed in vetoing any other candidates.

The crisis, the eighth that year, began early in December. It resolved itself in a frantic search for someone who should be neither Robles, Chapaprieta nor Alba. Lerroux, grateful for the Ritz dinner and terrified by the shadow of Asturias, suggested Gil Robles. Alcalá-Zamora tried Alba, who was promptly torpedoed by Cambó. Maura was called, but could make no progress. Nor could Martínez de Velasco, leader of the Agrarian Party. Chapaprieta too failed.

The President revived his old idea of a Government of National Concentration. But there was no one to concentrate. It would have meant, too, including Azaña, and even if Azaña could have been brought to accept—which was impossible—the President could not bear the thought of associating with the man who had actually been arrested in October.

There is never "absolutely" no way out. After five days of confusion, the President managed to collect an "extra-parliamentary" Government based upon a purely hypothetical Centre Party. The Premier was Manuel Portela Valladares, the elderly, savage, long-handed Galician with all the subtlety that has made the province the most famous boss-politics area in Spain. The Ceda was out.

Robles had over-reached himself. His policy had been just one degree too subtle. He had carried through his first two stages in a masterly way. His third had been mistimed. He was broken for the moment, almost hysterical. But there is never "absolutely" no way out. He wept as

he took leave of his devoted staff at the Ministry of War. "Never mind," he cried. "I shall come back. This is not a threat, but a promise."

PART III

THE POPULAR FRONT

I. Preparing the Elections

II. The Elections

III. Counterattack

I

PREPARING THE ELECTIONS

PORTELA WAS FACED with a hopeless task. He had to create a party which had no backing in the country and hardly any save personal ties in the Cortes, and to face the strong suspicion that he was merely the President's creature.

The Left had not yet taken up a decisive position, but issues were growing clearer. There were, however, still serious dissensions.

Prieto had forced out Caballero from the leadership of the Socialist parliamentary party. But Caballero still held his position as Secretary of the U.G.T. and had the Youth movement, now strongly influenced by the Communists, squarely behind him. Negotiations were well on the way towards the fusion of the U.G.T. and the communist unions of the C.G.T.U. (*Confederación General de Trabajadores Unitarios*), which entered the C.N.T. in places where this was stronger than the U.G.T.

The attitude of the C.N.T. was also quite uncertain. Cordial exchanges appeared in *Solidaridad Obrera* and *El Socialista*, suggesting alliance against the menace of Fascism, clericalism and reaction. The C.N.T. proposed that the question should be discussed, not in the press, but by the responsible organisms of the U.G.T. and the C.N.T. with a view to a Revolutionary Alliance. The slogan: "Amnesty!" concerned the Anarchists as much as the Socialists and Communists, and the C.N.T. saw "no special reason" why it should abstain from voting Left, since there was certainly no hope of its militants being released by the Right. It did not actually recommend

support of the Popular Front, but for the first time did not order abstention.

Christmas came uneasy and agitated. The Left made its condition for not boycotting the elections that Portela should restore the Municipalities elected in 1931 and illegally removed in 1934, forbid Provincial Governors to influence the elections, and permit liberty of press and association. This was pure suicide for the Centre, which could only hope for success by hard fixing of elections, the classic *pucherazo*; but officially he had to consent.

Matters came to a head on December 30. Portela suddenly awoke to the fact that his Minister of Finance, Chapaprieta, was spending little time in his office at the Ministry of Finance but plenty talking to agents of the Ceda.

The Cabinet meeting on December 30 was stormy; in fact, as one Minister reported, only the disposition of the furniture prevented the Cabinet from coming to blows. Portela, Chapaprieta and De Pablo Blanco, the "pure" Radicals' dark horse for the Premiership, raged at each other. There were resignations. Alcalá-Zamora, terrified still of letting Azaña hold the elections, patched up the crisis in eight hours.

Robles' attacks upon Portela and the President increased in fury. He opened his election campaign with fierce denunciation of the 1931 Republic, planting squarely the issue: Revolution or Counter-revolution? The Monarchists began a violent campaign to impeach Zamora and Portela for violating the Constitution, although they themselves had refused to vote it. They declared that the postponement of the elections and the budget and Portela's bid to form the Centre Party were unconstitutional. There was really little hope of passing the impeachment through even the Cortes' Standing Committee, much less of forcing Portela to summon the Cortes; but it created the desired atmosphere of violence and uncertainty. There was just a chance of scaring the tough Galician, and the

Rights were readier for elections than were the Left, still engaged in elaborating the Popular Front programme. Portela, asked whether the President's decree for dissolution in his pocket were dated or undated, replied that he had forgotten to look.

In the midst of these intrigues, the country became increasingly disturbed. Robbery with violence increased. "Social crime," that peculiarly Spanish definition of violent acts committed for high-minded purposes, abounded; and the jails, already crammed with the 30,000 political prisoners of October, could hardly hold more. Students rioted in Barcelona and Seville, and the Universities were closed.

On January 8, Portela Valladares at last produced the Presidential decree dissolving the Cortes and summoning elections on February 16. The country entered the electoral period, and, according to the Constitution, the state of alarm and the censorship were lifted. Orders were given to open the Casas del Pueblo and party centres closed after October 1934.

At once the Left press began publishing the truth about the Asturias repression. Presented soberly, with full documentation, it was so damning an indictment of the armed forces that public feeling, which had not been allowed to read the little that did appear in foreign papers, was sickened.

Even the Minister of Agriculture, Mendizabal, was so shocked that he publicly let fall "an expression insulting to the mentality of army officers". It was at once reported to Robles, and a tremendous scandal followed. There was an attempt at mutiny by the officers in the Madrid Barracks. Republican officers in Seville, equally enraged by Robles' interpretation, rioted and four were arrested. Challenges to duel flew around. The Cabinet was in danger. Minister of War Molero was kept calm only by being kept uninformed. Slowly and timidly, he was weeding out some of the more obviously disaffected officers, thinking of transferring General Franco to an honourable but distant post.

In Barcelona, the new Civil Governor, Duelo, fresh from suppressing workers' demonstrations in Saragossa, paraded round the streets a new fleet of armoured cars, refused to open the C.N.T. centres. The C.N.T. replied with the threat to open them themselves and keep them open by violence if need be.

Portela scrambled to appoint his friends as Civil Governors, who really control the elections, before the electoral period began. No one knew who these creatures were, simply that they were Government puppets.

The question of the Mayors was more complicated. The republican corporations of 1931 had been illegally replaced by Commissioners (*gestores*) in 1934. The Left demanded the replacement of the 1931 corporations, Portela hesitated, while the Chapaprietist Mayors had to be forcibly ejected by Portelists.

In Seville, the nominally impartial Civil Governor collected the local worthies and told them that since to vote Left meant revolution and to vote Right meant civil war, he would tolerate only votes for the Centre.

The usual electoral haggling went on. March put up the seven deputies for the Balearics to auction quite openly. "Good friends of mine," he said. "I am more than satisfied with Portela's appointments." In Valencia and Castellon, he offered to the Radicals comparatively safe seats for those particularly involved in the Straperlo Scandal. But the stench left by Lerroux was rather too strong even for Valencia.

Don Juan March had suddenly edged very much out into the dimmed limelight of ministerial corridors.

The sinister ballet of under-secretaries and liaison-officers, apparently mere stuff for the tittle-tattle of Madrid *tertulias*, was to end, six months later, in a dance of death on the streets of half the cities of Spain.

Joaquin Payá was Chapaprieta's Under-Secretary for Finance. He was also Ceda candidate for Murcia. Shortly before the elections, his candidature was suddenly annulled. The local Ceda leader had told him that the Government

was asking really too much in return for guarantees of protection on the streets, that is, that the police would be put at the service of Right fixers. Payá was to oppose the Centre candidates. Payá had almost literally thrown March out of the Ministry of Finance when he pressed Chapaprieta too hard about the Porto Pi payments.

Rico Avello, Chapaprieta's successor at the Ministry of Finance, hated his predecessor. Juan March returned to the armchairs of the comfortable offices, the eternal cigarette drooping from between his thin lips. There was a creature of his, Echeguren, in the Under-Secretaryship of the Ministry of the Interior. Portela was Minister of the Interior as well as Premier. It is possible that he may not have known who Echeguren was.

Payá appealed to Robles and Alba. Neither could do anything. March had never previously had much hold in Murcia. But now he was master of the elections, Echeguren liaison-officer between the Centre and Right. The electoral treachery of the Portela Government seemed settled, and once again Carner's remark seemed true: "If the Republic does not smash March, March will smash the Republic."

Even Robles had to come to heel. March's Jesuit friend, Angel Herrera, ex-director of *El Debate*, then "planning to go into ascetic retreat in Germany", remonstrated with him. His violence was scaring the conservatives, and his backers were really alarmed when he tried to carry the warfare into Portela's own territory, was hooted in Lugo and called to order by the police. Robles quietened.

Violence increased in the streets. The Acción Popular Youth Movement, the JAPS, beat up sellers of the Communist *Mundo Obrero* and slammed anyone who refused to raise his hand in the fascist salute at their meetings. Huge posters denounced the Revolution and Radical corruption, and when the electoral allies complained, Robles could do nothing. Finally, he was forced to drop the Radical alliance in the same way as the Catalan League

had dropped him, and move right over into the monarchist camp.

José Antonio Primo de Rivera had suggested the idea of a great National Front. The position of his own Falange was on the margin, rather in the way that Maurin's new Workers' Party for Marxist Unification (POUM) in Catalonia was on the margin of the Popular Front.

The Falange, composed of typical "naive" Fascists, students, unemployed or rancorous workers, clerks, romanticising younger sons of the big bourgeoisie, was vociferous and murderous rather than powerful. The Falange organisation called itself the *Juntas Ofensivas Nacional-Sindicalistas* (JONS), the National Syndicalist Offensive Committees, cleverly combining an appeal to the C.N.T. (Syndicalists), the Monarcho-Fascists (National) and the Army (Offensive *Juntas* recalling the military Defensive *Juntas* of 1917).

Its programme was more Hitlerian than Mussolinian. Its twenty-seven points included restoration of "Spanish greatness" and "dignity" to the Army; totalitarian State, all Spaniards participating through their "family, municipal and syndical functions"; private initiative compatible with the collective interest; producers' syndicates; defence of "the tendency towards the nationalisation of banking and public services"; agrarian credits and tariffs protecting agriculture and stockbreeding; universal "pre-military" training; concordat with the Church. "Falange Española's style," declares Point 26, "is by preference direct, ardent, combative. Life is militant and must be lived with a spirit fired by service and sacrifice." "We desire to triumph in the struggle solely with forces subject to our discipline. We shall make few alliances. Only in the final drive for the conquest of the State our High Command will negotiate for the necessary collaborations, always providing that our predominance be assured." "Our triumph is certain," declared another pamphlet. "Perhaps some sceptic may smile at this. But sceptics have always been wrong."

Falange, well-armed and fairly well-organised in Madrid, Seville, Barcelona, Vigo and Valencia, were chiefly a shock force. They made little attempt to achieve a mass-basis. This they left to their "necessary collaborators".

The National Counter-revolutionary Front strictly speaking was composed of the Ceda, Renovación Española, the Traditionalists and the Agrarians, all banded together to defend in one way or another the interests of Church and Feudalism.

Numerically, the Ceda, the Spanish Federation of Independent Right Parties, was the most important. At the elections of 1936, the two biggest groups were still Gil Robles' Acción Popular and Bosch Marin's Valencian Regional Right Party (D.R.V.). The Acción Popular Youth Movement, more radically Fascist than the parent party, just as the Socialist Youth was more radically-Marxist-Leninist than the Parliamentary Party, was well-armed, organised locally and exercised considerable pressure upon Robles' backers, Azpeitia and Jiménez Fernández. The JAPS had increased considerably since the elections of 1933 and inclined strongly to an Austro-Fascism modelled more on Dollfuss and Schuschnigg than on Prince Starhemberg.

The exact difference between Fal Conde's Traditionalists and the Renovación Española of Goicoechea and Calvo Sotelo was difficult even for them to define. Strictly speaking, the Traditionalists were Carlists, Renovación Legitimists. It was not quite clear whether the two branches of the Spanish Royal House had made more than a temporary pact or whether they had been really fused, both the aged Pretender Carlos and the ex-king Alfonso resigning their claims. In actual fact, Monarchy was not an immediate question with either party, who thus admitted the historical fact that the Carlist Wars of the nineteenth century had not been between Isabel II and Don Carlos, but between the feudal and clerical forces of Navarre and the bourgeois and commercial forces of Madrid.

The chief difference was that the Legitimists preferred a centralised but constitutional regime such as that of Alfonso XII, while the Carlists favoured a federal but authoritarian system.

Both parties had their armed militias, the more important being the Carlist "*requetes*" with their scarlet berets and yellow tassels, the old monarchist colours. Whereas Falange inclined to Hitler Fascism, Acción Popular to Dollfuss, the Carlists and Renovación drew their inspiration from the "Latin" Fascism of Mussolini and were really more interested in what might be called the D'Annunzio than in the social aspect.

In alliance with these forces were a few small groups such as Melquíades Alvarez's personal following who represented northern big industry somewhat as Cambó's Catalan League represented similar Catalan interests, and Martínez de Velasco's Agrarians, the organ of the big Castilian and Leonese landowners.

In the Centre, there were Portela Valladares' Centrists, the Catalan League, the Radicals and the Basque Nationalists. Their position was representative, in general, of the republican middle classes whose interests were opposed to those of the Church as an economic power and those of the agrarians. They were Catholic but not clerical.

On the Left were Azaña's Left Republican Party (*Izquierda Republicana*), Martínez Barrio's Republican Union (*Unión Republicana*, remains of the old Radical-Socialist Party), Sánchez Román's National Republican Party (*Partido Republicano Nacional*) and Luis Companys' Catalan Left (*Esquerra*), all representing sections of the petty-bourgeoisie.

Representing the working-class were the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, Ángel Pestaña's small Syndicalist Party (a section of the C.N.T. which had given up its anti-political standpoint) and the Workers' Party for the Unification of Marxism (POUM, *Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista*), a fusion of the Workers'-and-Peasants'-Block and the Communist Left after a

congress on September 29, 1935. POUM, allied loosely with the British Independent Labour Party and similar groups in other countries, was more or less dissident-Trotskyist, working, it said, for the creation of a single strong revolutionary proletarian party. It was fiercely opposed to the official Moscow Communists and the various small socialist groups in Catalonia, where its chief strength lay.

Each party had its Youth Movement more radical than itself. The Communist and Socialist Youth Movements had fused into the Unified Youth. The POUM was forming the Iberian Communist Youth, a gesture towards the Iberian Anarchist Federation. The Socialists had their union, the U.G.T., the Communists the C.G.T.U., the POUM the FOUS (*Federación Obrera de Unificación Sindical*).

On the Left margin was the imposing mass of the C.N.T., the FAI and the Libertarian Youth.

Miguel Maura read in the Cortes an interesting police-statistic of the relative party-strengths at the beginning of 1935. The Socialists had 1,444,474 paying members, the Communists 133,266, the Anarchosyndicalists 1,577,547. Only a part of the workers' movement could gather nearly three and a half million adherents. Against this, paying members of Right organisations totalled only 549,946. "If these forces once unite, what will become of us then, Señor Gil Robles?" asked Maura.

In August 1935 the Seventh Congress of the Communist International had resolved: "Under the conditions of a political crisis, when the governing classes can no longer dominate the powerful development of the movement of the masses, the Communists must emphasise *cardinal* revolutionary slogans (such as control of production and the banks, dissolution of the police, its substitution by an armed militia, etc.), calculated to shake the economic and political power of the bourgeoisie even more, strengthen the forces of the working class, isolate the conciliatory parties, and lead the masses towards the revolutionary seizure of power. If, in face of such a rise in the movement

of the masses, it should be possible and necessary in the interests of the proletariat, to form a *government of the united proletarian front or of the popular antifascist front*, which will not yet be a government of proletarian dictatorship but will undertake to carry out decisive measures against Fascism and the reaction, the Communist Party must procure the formation of such a government.

"The essential premise for the formation of a united front government constitutes a situation with the following factors: (a) when the bourgeois state apparatus is so far paralysed that the bourgeoisie is not in a position to prevent the formation of such a government; (b) when the broadest working-class masses are launching themselves massively against Fascism and reaction without yet being ready to fight for Soviet Power; (c) when a considerable part of the organisations of social-democracy and other parties which form part of the united front is demanding the application of relentless measures against the Fascists and other reactionary elements and is ready to fight in conjunction with the Communists in order to carry out these measures.

"In the measure in which the united front government really takes decided measures against the counter-revolutionary financial magnates and their fascist agents and in no way restricts the activities of the Communist Party nor the struggles of the working-class, the Communist Party will support this government in every way. As regards the problem of the participation of the Communists in a united front government, this will be solved according to the concrete situation in each case." (*Resolutions*, Chap. II. 8.)

The concrete situation in Spain at the beginning of 1936 contained all three factors which were the "essential premise for the formation of a united front government." Portela Valladares was the concentration of the "paralysed bourgeois State apparatus." The bourgeoisie had chosen him as a "way out", but he was quite incapable of resolving their contradictions: the formation and very name

of the Centre Party proved it. The hatred of the Black Two Years, the Straperlo and Nombela scandals, the complete disarticulation of parliamentary life, the desire to liberate the prisoners of 1934 were only a few elements in the broad drive against Fascism which extended all the way from Azaña to the C.N.T. Just because of the breadth of this protest, the masses as a whole were not prepared for an immediate attempt at the installation of Soviet Power, even in a specifically Spanish form, and the Anarchosyndicalists were still decidedly opposed to positive revolutionary seizure of power and still believed that the smashing of the capitalist regime would *automatically* create a new proletarian society. The republican petty-bourgeoisie and the reformist Socialists had shown already in October 1934 that they were anxious, if not yet able, to attack Fascism and reaction simply as a defensive measure. Asturias and the repression both there and in Catalonia had shown them that the offensive could now be the only safe defence.

All sectors of the Left were therefore ready to enter into an alliance upon a basis which would guarantee the minimum conditions for an offensive against the Fascism of the National Counter-revolutionary Front. The Popular Front Pact was drafted. It was left to circumstances to decide whether this was to be simply an electoral platform, whether the resulting government was to be merely transitional or whether the Republic of 1936 was to evolve from the petty-bourgeois Popular Front Government. It would subsist for at least the time necessary to carry through the agreed measures against Fascism and the reaction: whether it should exist after the Pact had been fulfilled or whether all parties should then recover complete liberty of action would depend largely upon the efficacy of these measures.

The Popular Front Pact was signed by representatives of the Left Republican Party, the Republican Union, the Socialist Party, the U.G.T., the National Federation of Socialist Youth, the Communist Party, the Syndicalist

Party (Pestaña) and the Workers' Party for Marxist Union (POUM).

It was, however, a purely bourgeois republican document. It aimed chiefly at reasserting the principles of 1931, restoring the damage done in 1933 and reinstating the victims of 1934. On several points it frankly stated that the Republicans were unable to agree with the workers' parties.

It defined the ideals of the Republican Parties: "The Republic conceived by the Republican Parties is not a Republic directed by social or economic class motives but a regime of democratic liberty inspired by reasons of public interest and social progress. But precisely for this reason republican policy must raise the moral and material conditions of the workers to the highest level permitted by the general interests of production, without hesitating before the sacrifices which must be imposed upon all social and economic privilege."

The first point in the Pact was the amnesty for all politico-social offences committed later than November 1933. Workers dismissed for their political ideas or their participation in strikes were to be readmitted in all public corporations. The Minister of Labour would take measures to see that they were also readmitted to private enterprises. All political prisoners would be released.

The administration of justice and policing was to be reorganised, and members of the State forces accused of acts of violence would be punished. There would be stricter control over civil servants, especially against political action contrary to the Republic's interests and against bribery and embezzlement.

A large programme of public works was promised, the Republican Parties being unable to accept the principle of unemployment relief suggested by the workers' representatives.

They could not accept the nationalisation of banking, but the power of the Bank of Spain was to be curtailed and it was to lose its privileged position as successful

competitor against private banking. Taxation was to be made more equitable. Industry, especially small commerce, was to be protected.

Schools were to come under State control, and a big new educational programme was outlined.

The Autonomous Regions were to have restored to them the statutes, repealed by the Rights, guaranteed to them by the Constitution.

Workers' control, suggested by the Socialists, was refused, in favour of social legislation, independence of labour jurisdiction and minimum wages for agricultural labourers. A new offence would be created and penalised: wage-cutting below the minimum wage-level.

A very important, possibly a cardinal, point was the refusal of the nationalisation of the land. Instead, the peasants and small farmers were to receive various assistance, such as reduction of rates and taxes, repression of usury and exaggerated rents, intensification of agrarian credits, revision of elections, settlement of families on the land, repeal of the law according return of expropriated properties and payment of compensation to the nobility.

Finally—a threat to Alcalá-Zamora—investigation of “transgressions of the fundamental law” and reform of the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees “in order to prevent the defence of the Constitution being entrusted to consciences formed by a conviction or an interest contrary to the safety of the regime”.

This very non-revolutionary document could satisfy only the immediate demands of the workers: reparation for the abuses of the 1934 repression. The rest of the programme, strongly tinged with Rooseveltism, could do little more than restore the *status quo* of 1932. No fundamental capitalist interests were threatened; indeed, in several places these were explicitly safeguarded. The Republic of the Popular Front definitely repudiated class legislation.

There was nothing of “Bolshevism” in the Pact, but, as the more intelligent Rights saw, the execution of even

the Spanish Constitution of 1931, a far more revolutionary document than the Popular Front Pact, would threaten their interests more seriously than they had ever been threatened before. The danger of the Pact was that now the masses were fully determined to see that their leaders did put it into execution.

Portela, entrusted with the task of keeping electoral order and also selling out politically to the Right, was in a difficult position. Robles' attacks on him and the President were infuriating and dangerous, but Echeguren and March prevented him from more than platonic disapproval. In the Government's electoral manifesto he said: "We will not tolerate the preaching of sedition even under the banner of Order. White demagoguery is just as bad as Red demagoguery."

Meanwhile, Robles used every kind of electoral trick to counteract the visibly rising menace of the Left. Huge posters decorated the walls of all Spanish cities and villages. A vast portrait of "*El Jefe*" spread his features across all one side of the Puerta del Sol. The ladies of Acción Popular offered blankets to the poorer peasants in exchange for their votes. Ceda agents bought voting-cards for as much as fifty pesetas and boasted that they had acquired 28,000 in Madrid alone. In Huelva, beggars were told not to apply for any more municipal assistance unless they voted Right.

Attempting to exploit the C.N.T.'s opposition to all political action, the Ceda published strongly anti-Marxist posters signed by a mythical "Comite Nacional de Defensa de los Trabajadores", C.N.D.T.

The clergy were valuable aids. Doctor Gomà, Archbishop of Toledo, recently raised to the Cardinalate, declared that the Pope himself had asked him to recommend all Spanish Catholics to vote for any party which supported respect for the rights of the Church, purification of the schools, sanctity of the family. "God," said the Cardinal-Primate, "will humiliate the opponents of his religion and his concerns if he so wills it."

Oviedo and Barcelona followed Toledo. Oviedo hoped that all laws passed contrary to the principles and commands of God would be repealed. The Bishop of Barcelona, Irruita, a fine intriguing prelate of the Merry del Val tradition, ordered that prayers for the triumph of Jesus and His Church should be held for at least three consecutive days in his diocese.

The minor clergy went about spreading horrifying rumours: the Anarchists were preparing revolutionary strikes, they said. In Barcelona, Ramón Salas' Catholic Free Unions armed their gunmen, sent them into the streets.

Violence increased. The Falange provoked more student riots. There were shootings in Madrid. *Agents-provocateurs* abounded. In Malaga, 20,000 men and women of the People's Front attended the funeral of a *Mundo Obrero* seller, despite the Civil Governor's ban.

Robles still sought allies. More and more he was driven to open alliance with Calvo Sotelo's Renovación Española with its fascist corporative and authoritative programme. Robles' election slogan was "For the three hundred"—the three hundred deputies necessary to revise the Constitution. But he had only 285 candidates in the field. Abstention, which ruined the Left in 1933, was his great fear. At Toledo he declared that to abstain from voting would be a crime against God and the Country.

At a meeting at the house of the ex-Marqués de la Vega de Anzo, head of the Monarchists, Calvo Sotelo proposed to Robles a four-point programme: the next Cortes to declare itself Constituent; the Government to be declared provisional; the President of the Republic to be impeached and deposed; the new President to be chosen by Calvo Sotelo, probable candidate being General Sanjurjo.

Robles was unable to consent, and Calvo Sotelo, in a fury, revealed the whole plot in an election-speech at Cáceres a few days later.

In Estoril, General Sanjurjo declared that he was on the point of leaving for Germany and swore on his word of honour that no overtures had been made to him. He

had already sworn on his word of honour that he would never again enter Spain.

Monarchist circles were stirred by the news that Alfonso was going to Rome for the christening of his grandchild, whose mother had married the most influential of Italian bankers and big landlords, Prince Torlonia. Of even greater importance, in view of what had happened in Greece, was the fact that members of the Spanish royal family had attended George V's funeral, after the two royal houses had not been on speaking terms for years.

The Popular Front candidates were satisfactorily settled all over Spain, except for some local trouble in Almeria. In Madrid, the voting for the candidates showed a decided victory for Caballero's "bolshevising" wing, with the easy success of Caballero himself, the lawyer Jiménez de Asua, Alvarez del Vayo and Luis Araquistain, the "brains" of the party. The reformists Besteiro, Saborit and Cordero were thoroughly disavowed.

In Catalonia, the People's Front decided to present a list composed entirely of the Generalidad Councillors, in jail for their share in the October rising.

All over the country, there was the triumphant feeling that Spain was awaking from the nightmare of the "Black Two Years". Popular Front meetings drew delirious crowds, clamouring for the release of their prisoners and vengeance for the horrors of Asturias. In the smallest villages, spontaneous Popular Front committees were formed to explain the programme to the peasants, and all the sabotaging of the Portelist Mayors and the advice and threats of the *curas* were vain. For the first time, women took an active part in the struggle, were no longer the dead mass of pathetic prejudice which the clergy had been able to throw into the balance in 1933.

The people were ready to come out into the streets. It was no secret that the Right had hired gunmen to coerce votes or smash the urns if they could not fill them with their own papers. In many places, members of Right organisations provocatively advised the Sisters in the

convents to have a few rifles under the altar just in case God should not protect His own. There was danger in the air, but the Left, certain of their victory, were prepared only for defence. The C.N.T. held aloof, but its members eagerly attended election meetings.

Don Juan March y Ordinas booked a first-class sleeper to Paris for February 17.

II

THE ELECTIONS

SPAIN WENT TO the polls on Sunday, February 16. There was little violence. The *caciques* of the Right turned to their traditional methods in many places. In Granada, the most scandalous case, gangsters held up the polling-officers while they stuffed votes into the urn. Over 4,500 firearms-licences had been distributed, and one armourer sold 4,000 weapons on one day. In a single town, 10,435 arms of various kinds were later collected; and in another, 368 persons possessed over 1,000 knives, pistols, shotguns and rifles. On the whole, however, the elections were as fair as they ever could be in Spain, and even Right leaders admitted that at least 80 per cent of the Left votes were strictly legal.

There could be no doubt about the result. The Spanish voting system is somewhat illogical. In few cases is there a single candidate, mostly a list. There were only three lists elaborated: one for the Popular Front, one for the National Front, one for the Centre. So that it was perfectly possible for a conservative Catholic to find that he had voted for a Fascist or for a moderate Republican to vote for a Communist. The Right claimed that the majority of the country had voted or it although it received a minority of seats. This could have been possible, as it is possible under the English system. Available figures, however, give 4,523,000 votes for the Popular Front, 4,541,000 for the Right and Centre combined; and this figure includes the Basque Nationalists who later joined the Caballero Government.

When the results of the complementary elections had come in, the final situation was: Left 265 deputies, Centre 64, Right 144. The Ceda had lost twenty seats; the Socialists had increased their representation; and the Communists raised their numbers from one to fourteen, the biggest Communist group in any European Parliament at that time.

Robles' own explanation of his defeat was: "(1) the people voted Left out of sentiment, thinking only of the release of the political prisoners; (2) the sudden inrush of C.N.T. voters at the last minute; (3) the abstention of many Right voters, deceived by the calm before the elections and supposing the victory over the Revolution was assured; (4) the Ceda had no martyrs."

Robles analysed well enough the immediate reasons; but he did not go far enough. The real reason was that the Spanish people was sick of a regime which had done nothing whatever to relieve its sufferings or fulfil its aspirations, but had, on the contrary, tried to restore all the forces against which it had revolted in 1931, adding to them all the oppression of modern Fascism; that had undone whatever was healthy and constructive in the programme of the first Republican Government and had nothing to offer in exchange; that had readmitted the clergy, paid vast sums to the *Grande*s and the financial oligarchy while it failed to balance the budget, help the exporter, keep up the level of agricultural prices except to the benefit of the big landowners exclusively, and relieve the misery of the peasants or give them the land for which they hungered. Its Republicanism was more than dubious; it had been openly contemptuous of the demands of the workers, it had been discredited by a whole series of scandals of which the *Straperlo* affair was only the most sensational, it had maintained restrictions on press and personal liberty; and above all it had on its hands the blood of Asturias and Barcelona. Its vague electoral programme, despite the spending of half a million pounds on electoral propaganda, had been unavailing against the

universal hatred it had aroused. Asturias had awakened the people's political conscience which had been dormant or disappointed in 1933, and the tactic of the Popular Front had given it consistency and direction. In face of these factors, Robles' explanation is puerile.

"How many heads have fallen!" said Portela gloomily, when they brought him the results. The "Straperlist" Radicals, headed by Lerroux himself, were all out. The electors had refused nearly all of Portela's shadow Ministry. Echeguren, too, was out, and Portela himself could only scrape in on the second ballot. Rico Avello, with Juan March behind him, had just managed to get in for dirty, backward Murcia, but Cambó, the millionaire leader of the Catalan League, and his confidant, Ventosa y Calvell, were out. José Primo de Rivera had to wait for the second ballot.

Madrid had triumphantly elected the whole Popular Front list, headed by Manuel Azaña. It rejected Robles, Calvo Sotelo, Primo de Rivera and the furious anti-Catalanist Royo Vilanova. Robles, however, was elected by his University city, Salamanca, and Calvo Sotelo by crooked Orense.

In Red Madrid, Julian Besteiro, the reformist Socialist, received a few more votes than Largo Caballero, but this was probably due to his personal popularity and the petty-bourgeois vote which saw in him a "safe" man. The Caballero wing triumphed, while Indalecio Prieto was sent by Bilbao. Asturias sent the fighters of October, among them Communist Dolores Ibarruri, La Pasionaria.

The Right reacted immediately against their defeat. Gil Robles had been unable to keep his promise to return to the Ministry of War. He had spent millions on propaganda, contracted every kind of dubious alliance, mobilised every last resource of *caciquism*; and he had failed lamentably. The Spanish Military Union began to stir. General Amadeo Balmes, one of the commanders of the Asturias repression, plotted hurriedly in Madrid.

Franco was not prepared, but the officers could not wait. Arms were distributed to civilian adherents.

The Left parties realised what was afoot and remained in the streets to prevent it by sheer mass. They were badly armed, badly organised, but they were determined to check any attempt to reverse the victory at the polls.

The revolt was to begin in Madrid. Provincial garrisons were privy to it. In Alicante, Valencia and Saragossa, the officers kept their men alert, ready to bring them out into the streets.

In Madrid, a loyal officer informed General Pozas, commander of the Civil Guard, and General Masquelet, one of Azaña's most intimate friends. Portela Valladares was desperately alarmed. His Civil Governors had simply vanished in many places. One large town was left in charge of a captain of Shock Police. The masses had been infuriated by the discovery of gangsters hidden in the Right clubs, centres and newspaper-offices. News of the plot preparing spread like wildfire.

In the Benalua Barracks in Alicante, a Captain Gisbert, closely connected with the Spanish Military Union, attempted to lead his men out on to the streets. The Civil Governor had completely lost his head—or was privy to the plot. From district after district poured in news of Left victories. The Governor longed to resign, but Chapaprieta, the local political boss, refused to allow it. Desperate, he phoned Portela, told him that the Alicante crowd was completely out of hand and had released the lepers from the colony at Fontilles. Fontilles is in fact some sixty miles from Alicante amid inaccessible mountains. But Portela accepted the report and ordered the Governor to declare martial law. This was Gisbert's chance. Before he could carry out his *coup*, eleven Republican corporals shot him, three times through the heart, twice through the head. The Governor ordered the local press to report it as suicide, and when asked the motive, said that he supposed that Gisbert's remarkable act was due to pessimism about the future of Spain.

Such incidents happened in a number of cities between the night of February 16 and the morning of February 19. Portela, who had spread the Fontilles story over the radio and to the foreign press, was increasingly impotent to control the situation. It is possible that he did not wish to do so, though it has not been suggested that he was actually involved in the plot.

The masses, inflamed with victory, remembering all the miseries of the Black Two Years, and provoked to fury by the plot now suspected by everyone, showed their feelings in the only way possible. Rightist casinos, clubs and newspaper-offices were assaulted and burned. Churches flamed.

The church-burning was almost entirely the work of irresponsible elements, as it had been in Barcelona in 1909. Every party in the Popular Front vigorously repudiated the action. At the same time, the mass of the people did not attempt to interfere. They did not approve but they did not actively disapprove. It is highly significant that in nearly every place the church-burning began *after* the wrecking of the Right centres; it was, therefore, not deliberate but due to the contagion of destructiveness.

Portela Valladares realised that neither he nor his Civil Governors had a shred of authority. He persuaded the President to summon Azaña at once. Only a Popular Front Government could control the Popular Front masses. Azaña would have to take the responsibility for whatever might happen.

The President, who by now hated Azaña the more for the complete failure of the Centre Party, reluctantly consented. He demanded as one condition that the new Premier should maintain martial law. Azaña, with the information of Pozas and Masquelet at his disposal, flatly refused. The President had to yield.

Azaña formed his Government on the evening of the 19th. It was composed entirely of Left Republicans, many of whom had worked with him in 1931 and 1932. Marcelino

Domingo was back at Education, Ruiz Funes was Minister of Agriculture, José Giral, Azaña's best friend, Minister of Marine, Masquelet at the War Office, Casares Quiroga at Public Works. Amos Salvador, a sick man, was Minister of the Interior, the only rather unsatisfactory appointment in a very able and moderate combination.

Not all the Civil Governors, appointed hurriedly after the flight of the Portelists and Chapaprietists, were so wise as Azaña. In Alicante, Valencia and Saragossa they declared the state of war. The Socialist and Communist leaders protested. Repeatedly they declared that if they were allowed the use of the radio they could restore order in half an hour. The bourgeois Governors distrusted the power of proletarian discipline and refused.

Luckily for the Popular Front, no word of the declaration of martial law was allowed to reach the rest of Spain. But there had been real danger at three key-points that the military might have been able to follow Gil Robles' advice publicly given a few days before and have "pacified the masses as we pacify Moroccan tribes". The military insurrection was postponed.

The clamour for the release of the political prisoners, immediately, without waiting for the Cortes, was insistent. Crowds gathered to cheer at the prison gates. In Valencia, Alicante, Malaga, Saragossa, Oviedo and Madrid, the prisoners rioted and broke out. A few days later, the Government signed the paper which would restore 28,000 men to their homes.

The masses remained in the streets. They had suffered too much for five years to trust Republicans entirely. The failure of the Right plot was assuredly merely temporary, and the Republicans had very nearly allowed it to succeed by distrusting the workers' leaders and calling in the military. There had been some rioting, and the police had killed men in various places. But in general it followed Sanjurjo's instructions of April 14, 1931, and allowed the "expansions of the people" free course. In Madrid, when the Right attempted a demonstration of

force to attract the police by a show of strength, both the soldiers and the Shock Police fraternised with the crowd, raising their fists in the Popular Front salute.

The country was disturbed. The revolution, forecast by Gil Robles, had begun. But what appeared fundamental to the nobles and bankers now filling the hotels of Gibraltar, Lisbon and Biarritz was in reality merely accidental. The burning of churches, political centres and prisons, the occupation of latifundia by the eager peasants, were merely an unthinking exteriorisation of a process which was being carried out by the legally-elected Government in an ever-increasing tempo. Violence was merely the accompaniment of this revolution, not the cause. The cause was plain for all to see: first, the misgovernment of Lerroux-Gil Robles; second, the resulting Popular Front pact.

In rapid succession, the Azaña Government freed the political prisoners, suspended payment of the 577 millions to the expropriated nobility, stopped the ejection of small farmers (50,000 in Catalonia alone), ordered the readmission of workers dismissed for political reasons and the payment of compensation, reversed the measures which had "devolved" property to the Jesuits, drafted a plan for an immense increase of schools and jobs for 5,300 school teachers, and restored the Catalan Statute. The Spanish Republic, in fact, was once more precisely where it would have been had the Left won the 1933 elections—with one very important exception, stressed by Gil Robles: the Anarchosindicalists had voted, not for the Popular Front, but against Fascism, for the release of their prisoners, for the readmission of their workers. Whatever the immediate dissensions, however much opposed to Azaña the C.N.T. and the FAI might show themselves, they had voted for the essence of the Popular Front if not for the thing itself. Unity had been obtained, and Asturias was being avenged, not so much by burnt churches and jailed Fascists, but by the fact that a legal, moderate, liberal Government was carrying out the action

from the base. While crowds burned churches, the Government which represented these crowds was attacking the Church itself in its weakest place: its property.

The Right immediately cried Kerensky, without much knowledge of what Kerensky had been. The comparison simply did not stand. Only if Azaña attacked his supporters could the question arise; and he could not attack his supporters. The danger to Azaña came quite obviously from the Right, not the Left; and the Kerensky cry came from a sector which had evolved a tactic not for a moment sanctioned by Azaña himself; or rather, only for a moment, on July 20, and in quite other circumstances.

Defeated at the polls, baffled in the streets, baffled again on the Bourse, when Spanish stocks actually hardened on the accession of Azaña, the Right inclined to a new tactic, that of emasculating the victory. The Right began to offer "concessions". It had to gain time for the final attack.

Herrera, the power behind the Jesuit *El Debate*, Juan March and Azpeitia, the Ceda's "brains", decided that Robles had very much outlived his usefulness. He had overreached himself and he had failed lamentably in the election campaign. He was too well known and too well hated. Pressure was put upon him to withdraw a little. At the Ceda Executive meeting on February 26, Robles stated that he needed a rest-cure. Robles forecast Azaña's future as he wished to see it: "Azaña will have an easy time at first, passing the amnesty and a few social reforms. But of necessity the Left coalition will then split. It will be almost impossible for the Government to stand the enormous brutal pressure of the Socialists egged on by the Communists. The Socialist Youth are already more Communist than Socialist."

The Right's immediate hope was to save what could be saved for the Church. One of the first measures of the Popular Front Government had been to cancel "devolution" of Church property. By a law of September 12, 1932, the "fair-play Republic" had granted compensation

plus 5 per cent interest to third persons whose property had been only nominally used by the Jesuits but had been confiscated by the Government Commission, the *Patronato*.

The *Patronato* had seized 19 churches, 47 buildings, 33 schools, 79 urban and 120 rural properties, as well as some two million pesetas in bonds: a total value of some 580 million pesetas. Cash confiscated, curiously enough, amounted to precisely 201 pesetas 32 centimos.

Under the Lerroux-clerical Government, the *Patronato* had been dissolved, its functions transferred to the Ministry of Finance, which, especially under Chapaprieta, never inquired into the real ownership of the property to be "devolved". "Devolution to limited companies in reality controlled and owned by the Society of Jesus had amounted to some 150 million pesetas already. The Church Militant was out to fight for the 430 million pesetas still outstanding, plus its 5 per cent. Hence the Chapaprieta-Robles alliance.

While the Government attacked from one side—or rather simply put into operation Article 26 of the Constitution—the workers themselves attacked from the other—or rather simply ratified an existent fact. The decree ordering the readmission and compensation of dismissed workers met with furious opposition from the employers. The British-owned Rio Tinto copper mines, for example, told the English press: "The Company was compelled not only to re-employ the men who had been imprisoned after the abortive revolutionary outbreak in 1934 but others who had been dismissed for various reasons, the most important of which was lack of employment for men of that type."

Many employers had to be compelled by the Ministry of Labour. Others simply refused to continue working. Faced with unemployment, the workers took over the running themselves in the expectation that the State or Municipality would later legalise the position. For the

moment, it was more important to eat than to trouble about legal scruples.

In some cases, it was found that there were no owners. The enterprises were bankrupt and no one would take responsibility for them. It was interesting that one of the more important enterprises taken over was the Madrid-Ciudad Lineal tramway line. The owner who refused to take responsibility turned out to be don Valentin Ruiz Senén, the Jesuits' agent. Thus the Society of Jesus was being attacked from two sides, although in fact it had no legal existence in Spain at all.

The Rights' onslaught repeated the three stages which it had taken in 1931; financial, obstructive, armed. In 1931, March had nearly smashed the Republic in the Porto Pi case, the Rights had obstructed the Cortes and raised their representative to the Presidency, Sanjurjo had attempted a military *putsch*.

In February and March 1936, the military *putsch* had been temporarily checked; the Rights were even now planning a vast campaign of Parliamentary intrigue and obstruction; the employers, many of them acting upon direct instructions from the political centres, were doing their best to sabotage the Government's economic measures.

The abandonment of factories, the transfer to the Government of businesses whose accounts were visible only on the debit side, the flight of their owners who succeeded in smuggling out huge quantities of capital despite the Government's rigid prohibition, were a serious threat. It was not entirely a concerted attack, and quite probably many of the fugitives really believed that they were about to be subjected to a Red Terror. The French Right wing press certainly assured them so, but this was chiefly due to the French Popular Front election campaign against the Two Hundred Families. The most amazing atrocity stories about the Spanish elections were published broadcast in France, and passengers in the Paris-Madrid express found their carriages flooded with the most

horrifying photographs of infuriated Spanish mobs being shot down by the police. Closer inspection, indeed, revealed that the photos were "stills" from the Russian films *Potemkin* and *The End of Saint Petersburg*, but the desired effect was created. Bela Kun, as usual, was reported to be organising a Tcheka in Barcelona. The eastward migration of the aristocracy began.

Juan March did not fling his millions into the financial battle. The time was not suitable for a large-scale attack upon the peseta or the Republic's credit. For the moment, he reserved his millions for a better, surer investment.

At the first meeting of the Azaña Cabinet, on February 22, the President of the Republic reported, according to the official statement, on "certain aspects of Spanish foreign policy which could not be reflected in the State Department documentation". Rocha's famous "dossier" already contained matters best not mentioned in polite society.

The last attempt to re-form the Right front was made shortly before the Cortes opened. The question of the Catalan Statute was brought before the Cortes Standing Committee. This was still composed of members of the previous Cortes, since the new one had not yet been constituted. Catalonia could not wait, but the task was very delicate.

The immediate problem was the legality of the decree of January 2, 1935, repealing the Statute. The repeal of an article of the Constitution was the province of the Cortes. The decree therefore had been illegal. Lucía Lucía, who realised that the repeal was bound to be passed by the Cortes a few weeks later and did not wish to accumulate more public hatred than necessary, especially in Catalonia, persuaded the Right not to obstruct. Maura, however, still negotiating with Cambó, brought in an amendment to the effect that the Catalan Parliament might meet but only to elect the President. The Catalans replied that this was absurd, since they had never ceased to have a President, Luis Companys, released from jail

two days before. The Committee, however, accepted the Maura amendment in order to save debate, and a few days later the Court of Constitutional Guarantees, a gathering of reactionaries who had passed the Law of January 2 as valid, contradicted their own decision and declared it illegal. Catalonia was back where it had been at five minutes to eight in the evening of October 6, 1934.

While the second ballot in Castellon, Soria and the Basque provinces was bringing in fresh victories for the Left, and half a million Antifascists held a victory demonstration in Madrid, all Catalonia came out to welcome back Luis Companys and his Councillors.

Only a few days before, Companys had met his Councillors at the little village of Ocaña on the high, bleak westward road from Madrid. All through Andalusia up from the prison of Puerto de Santa Maria, through Castile and La Mancha, for the first time in history they had heard shouts of "Long live Catalonia!" In Madrid, cheering crowds had welcomed them.

In Barcelona, they danced and sang *Els Segadors*, the national anthem banned by Madrid since October 6. In the evening Buigas' great illuminated fountains blazed from Montjuich.

Under the stifling glare of four huge camera spot-lights Juan Casanovas, President of the Catalan Parliament, renominated Companys President of the Catalan Generalidad, restoring Catalonia's autonomy.

From the historic balcony where he had surrendered to Batet seventeen months before, Companys, utterly broken by emotion, waved to the delirious crowd. Perez Farras took his place, shouted: "Long live Democracy! Long live Catalonia. . . ."

The crowd cheered frantically. Not a few supposed that he had said "Catalonia Free!"

Ten days before, José Badia, Miguel's popular, impulsive brother, had led an Estat Catalá demonstration towards the Generalidad. There had been shooting, one dead, twelve wounded.

When Companys had recovered from his emotion, he went to place a wreath on the tomb of Francisco Maciá, the Liberator. It was perhaps to lay the spirit which had stood beside him on the balcony of the Generalidad on October 6.

III

COUNTERATTACK

THE POPULAR FRONT had begun to carry out its programme. At a political dinner, Azaña declared that the Government would stick to every word of the Pact. "Not a step backwards!" a voice interrupted him. "I welcome the interruption," cried Azaña. "Not only shall we not take a step backwards, but we shall go further."

The people remained in the streets: not only to counter any attack from the Right, but also to see that the Government did not weaken. For electoral purposes they had allowed a purely Republican Government to represent them, and, although it was fiercely argued whether the Popular Front Pact was simply an electoral convenience or a permanent alliance, the Government must not be allowed to take a step backwards whatever opposition it had to face. The popular forces had no intention of eventually overturning the Azaña Government unless it betrayed the Pact and was forced by the same dialectic as had ruled the Revolutions of 1848 in France and Germany, 1873 in Spain, to turn against its own followers. The bourgeois revolution, which had deviated in 1931, must now be carried through to its historical conclusion.

The danger that the Azaña Government might be forced into a Kerensky position was not small as the Right manœuvred into the offensive. But Azaña himself—and Azaña was of a stature which was an historical factor in itself—had no intention whatsoever of being a Kerensky. "I will not be a civil war Premier," he said.

Prieto anticipated the Right manœuvre: "The Popular Front has a parliamentary basis, and if this is eventually undermined, Azaña will find compensating votes in the Centre and a benevolent attitude on the Right. Should the Marxists try to turn the democratic parliamentary Republic into a Soviet, the Centre and Right would support Azaña unconditionally to prevent it."

Prieto, whom people were already beginning to call the "Spanish Blum", was disturbed by the fact that the masses remained in the streets, the irresponsible elements still sporadically burning churches. For three reasons: first, he feared that this would inevitably provoke Right retaliation—and he had exclusive information as to just how strong the Right fighting forces were and how weak the socialist militias;—second, he had not exactly understood the tactic of the Popular Front and supposed that the violent attacks by Caballero against his Centrism were based upon an immediate aggressive intention; and third, he calculated that this aggressive intention would mean an alliance with and eventual penetration by the irresponsible elements among the Anarchists.

The Communists had again formed unofficial Workers' and Peasants' Alliances in some districts, such as arose in Asturias in 1934. The immediate demands were: distribution of all lands confiscated from the nobility and Church; cancellation of agrarian debt and feudal dues; abolition of taxes; nationalisation of the big industries and communications; seven-hour day; wage-increases; unemployment-relief; unemployment-, sick-, maternity- and old age-insurance; purification of the army; arming of workers' and peasants' militias; dismissal of fascist officers; bread, peace, land, liberty.

Some of these had already been put into operation. Some were under consideration. The really important demand, the arming of workers' and peasants' militias, was provisionally dropped when the Government, rather timidly, began to weed out fascist officers, transferred Generals Franco and Goded to distant posts,

and imprisoned the Asturias butcher, General Lopez Ochoa. But the Alliances had too much faith. The failure to arm the militias was fatal, but inevitable in March.

The Right were quick to seize their opportunity. The agitation, continuous since the elections, dictated their policy. The Falange Española began to shoot down militant workers. The Ceda, more Jesuitic, sent *agents-provocateurs* into the crowds to incite them to acts of violence. The object was to start riots, force Azaña's police to intervene against his own supporters, raise against him an agitation such as Juan March had set on foot after the Casas Viejas shootings in 1933. The great hope for the Right was the split in the workers' movement: Caballero against Prieto and Prieto against the C.N.T. Wherever possible, the shootings of socialist and communist militants were attributed to the FAI.

The Right had key-men among the Judges. When three Falange amateur gunmen attempted to assassinate Jiménez de Asua and shot his personal bodyguard, Gisbert, the Courts permitted witnesses to salute in the fascist manner. Evidence from France implicated a wealthy Monarchist, and some of those implicated escaped in his plane to Biarritz, where Juan March and Gil Robles had hired expensive villas after the elections.

Within the Right the insurrectionary front was being gradually formed. Robles had been entirely discredited by his election failure. The backers of the Ceda had poured money into his election fund. They had insured his life for nearly £60,000, paying the first three years' premiums, and had guaranteed his personal election expenses at £3,000. His "discoverer" in 1933, Jiménez Fernández, was looking for a new leader. The candidate was Lucía Lucía, a Valencian lawyer closely tied to the Jesuits. The Ceda conference was to be asked: "Monarchy or Republic?; Democracy or Fascism?; Social Justice or No Social Justice?" "Republic, Democracy, Social

Justice" would mean a definite move to Dollfuss' Christian-Socialism.

Meanwhile, Calvo Sotelo and his Renovación Española had moved to an aggressive position. Monarchist restoration was no longer an issue; there was a definite swing to corporative Fascism on the Italian model. The democratic Powers were still arguing about sanctions against Italy, for the Abyssinian aggression, but the real question had already been raised behind the scenes: Mediterranean hegemony. An ally in Spain would be valuable to Mussolini. The relations between Calvo Sotelo and Rome became closer; and, to counter or complete them, Angel Herrera, the backer of the Ceda, went to Germany to "seek ascetic retreat in a monastery near Heidelberg".

Hitler marched into the Rhineland. The Azaña Government announced its policy of initiating immediate diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.

Provocation in the streets, mainly the work of the Falange and the Ceda Youth Movement, the JAPS, was paralleled by a parliamentary manoeuvre which extended all the way from the Moderate Republicans of Sanchez Román's National Republican Party to Prieto. Sanchez Román had refused to enter the Popular Front because his backers, the Madrid Chamber of Commerce, were afraid of its "Communitic" programme. But Sanchez Román was undoubtedly a Republican. He gathered the two best-informed and most influential politicians in Spain, Miguel Maura and Prieto. Azaña and Martinez Barrio followed. The idea was to avoid a big crisis, which well might mean civil war, by forming a "National" Government on English lines, grouping all the "moderate" forces against the extremists on both sides. There were two conflicting motives here: the Rights hoped to "noble" Azaña and turn the Popular Front programme into the mild and more or less innocuous revival of 1931; the Lefts hoped to placate the Rights, call off the coming *putsch* by taking the wind out of the Fascists' sails and at the same time debilitate the Socialist

Party by putting all the strength of the combination behind Prieto. "Order" was the watchword.

Men with an international-commercial standpoint like Prieto were becoming alarmed. The assassinations, church-burnings and riots were increasing, but they were not abnormal. What was really dangerous, in this view, was the economic situation.

Prieto recalled only too clearly those days in 1931 when Juan March had the whole Republic at his mercy. An armed rebellion could be defeated; a financial crash would mean utter chaos and a revolution in entirely unfavourable circumstances. Export of currency had been limited to 5,000 pesetas, but smuggling was flourishing. On the Barcelona Black Bourse, sterling and dollars were at a 10 per cent premium. Foreign-owned concerns were sending their capital to holding-companies abroad. There was talk of the devaluation of the peseta. Rail shares, as usual, were a drug on the market. Speculators had been squeezed, a 350 million loan at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent was covered, a large sum of gold was sent by the Bank of France to unfreeze credits blocked by the recent Franco-Spanish trade-war, but the situation was still gloomy. The export deficit for 1935 totalled several millions, and the Catalan textile-manufacturers were demanding devaluation. Several factories had closed down for lack of raw materials, unemployment had risen to 800,000, food for Fascism. A Catalan, Nicolau d'Oliver, had been appointed Director of the Bank of Spain.

Crowding back into the factories from which they had been dismissed for political reasons, the workers demanded new terms: shorter hours—the forty-hour week had already been introduced in the steel industry—higher wages. Strikes were common everywhere, spontaneous, mostly unauthorised by the Unions. The workers, by the terms of the Popular Front Pact, were to be paid compensation, and the employers, pointing out that they had dismissed them at the bidding of the Government of Lerroux, were lobbying the Government of Azaña to pay the cost.

The Right, especially the Monarchist paper, *A.B.C.*, had begun to raise a subscription for the "yellows" admitted after 1934, organised in the *Federación Española de Trabajadores* (Spanish Workers' Federation), which might well prove the basis of a new "Free Syndicate", the gunman-organisation of the Barcelona employers in 1921.

In Madrid, the workers of the Tramway Company, affiliated to the U.G.T., found that no one was willing to admit ownership in face of the demand for readmission and took over the running themselves. The trams came out adorned with the "U.H.P." slogan of the Asturias miners.

In this atmosphere, the Cortes opened. Its present task was simply to enquire into the validity of the elections in various places, hear complaints. The *pucherazo* had been scandalous in Granada, Saragossa, Lugo, Orense, Cuenca and the Balearics. The Cortes, to save time, decided only to contest Granada and Saragossa.

There was a foretaste of the coming storm even at the formal opening. It was presided, according to custom, by the first member to take his seat: Largo Caballero. Following the custom, he handed the chairmanship to the oldest member, white-bearded aristocrat don Ramon Carranza, the secretariat to the youngest, the Communist Youth leader, Vicente Uribe.

Ramon Carranza failed to end the session with the customary "Long live the Republic!" Someone reminded him. "I'm damned if I do!" shouted old don Ramon. There was a terrific uproar. The old aristocrat was hustled out while the Popular Front deputies shouted the *International*.

The Validity Commission held riotous sittings. Little of the happenings were known to the public, for the state of alarm was still in force and the censorship fierce. The Right attempted to force a full-dress debate on Public Order, its only way of publicly attacking the Government. The Government managed to adjourn the debate *sine*

die. The official recognition of the violent incidents which were common knowledge but could still be dismissed as rumours would have undoubtedly given a magnificent opportunity to *agents-provocateurs*.

The municipal elections, which had not been held since 1931, were scheduled for April 12. The Rights were divided on the question whether to participate. Calvo Sotelo was strong for abstention. Robles hesitated. With Maura's plan in the background he was not yet ready to break entirely with the regime.

The agitation in the country continued. Impatient of legalistic delay, the workers and peasants took matters into their own hands, decided to have their position legalised afterwards. Ruiz Funes at the Ministry of Agriculture was carrying out the reform, but too slowly. The peasants went straight ahead and started working the land which had not yet been officially given them. For the first time in history, the Civil Guard stood in the fields, grim, grotesquely uniformed, cloaked, with their rifles pointing at the bands of gunmen hired by the dispossessed landowners. This was a fact of immense psychological significance. For the first time in Spanish history, the peasants saw that the Central Government was on their side against feudalism.

Attempts to assassinate prominent persons continued. After Jiménez de Asua, Largo Caballero. One of the amateur gunmen was the son of a major in the Civil Guard. He was sentenced to two months' nominal imprisonment. The Court accepted the explanation that the loving father used to give his twenty-two-year-old son bullets with which to make lead soldiers. A schoolmaster deposed that the boy took so little interest in politics that he had often been rebuked for reading nothing but children's papers.

The fascist organisations were afoot and armed, though chiefly only with revolvers. Secret meetings were discovered by the police. The Falange was banned and Primo de Rivera jailed.

In face of the growing danger, the workers' movement grew towards unity. The Communist and Socialist Youth Movements fused and stood square behind Largo Caballero. The Caballero wing succeeded in gaining its point that the Party Conference should be held in Madrid. There seemed every chance that the forthcoming C.N.T. Congress in Saragossa would show a distinct tendency towards alliance with the U.G.T. In Catalonia, the small Marxist groups signed a permanent alliance. The POUM was the only one which refused to join.

The situation grew tenser. Robles published the usual "Red Hand" story to scare the middle classes. The Comintern was sending Bela Kun and Lozovski to Cadiz with a million dollars to cover the initial expenses of the Red Revolution. Their task was to be: creation of a workers' and peasants' dictatorship; immediate confiscation of the land, nationalisation of the banks, mines, factories and railways; evacuation of Spanish Morocco, followed by the creation of a native revolutionary government to carry the revolution into French Morocco, Algeria and Tunis; the liquidation of the bourgeois parties, a reign of terror, the creation of workers' militias; the destruction of all churches and convents; suppression of the bourgeois press; and, finally, war against fascist Portugal by way of a "trial" revolutionary war.

This *canard*, laughed at when it appeared in Robles' *Ya*, and in certain foreign newspapers which ought to have known better, is worth examining; for few of Robles' stories were based on mere frivolity. The points about Morocco and Portugal are particularly interesting as being a kind of alarm call. The rest was a common-sense deduction of what would be likely to happen if the workers were provoked. But from this display of common-sense prophecy to the idea that the aged Bela Kun and the busy Lozovski were needed to put the ideas into the Spanish workers' heads was pure malicious fantasy.

It was significant that this story was published almost simultaneously with the re-ratification of the Tangiers

Statute. Spain did not obtain the advantages due to her. Moles, the new High Commissioner for Spanish Morocco, attempted to put on pressure where Rico Avello had deliberately remained quiet. Peyrouton, the fascist Resident in French Morocco, worked hard against him. Moles was willing to make a good bargain with England. To Peyrouton, directly or indirectly in touch with Italy, this was dangerous. Moles had arrived too late.

The Granada elections were debated by the Cortes on March 31. It was proved that no less than 58,200 false votes had been recorded and that 4,000 pesetas worth of arms had been distributed to Right gunmen. Headed by Gil Robles, ninety Right deputies walked out. The question of total break with the regime had been decided.

The Popular Front pact had stipulated that "transgressions of the basic law of the Republic" would be punished. This was a direct threat to the President, who had quite arbitrarily turned out Azaña in 1933 and again attempted to enforce his personal policy by the Portela Valladares Centre Party in 1936. Alcalá-Zamora was a dangerous person in the present circumstances. By no means a firm Republican, he appeared to be on the point of creating a *coup d'état* such as Marshal MacMahon had attempted on May 16, 1877.

For three weeks, Alcalá-Zamora had refused to speak to the new Premier personally. All communication had gone by messenger. At last, the President had been forced to attend Cabinet meetings. The last of these was on April 2.

Some days previously, Calvo Sotelo had visited him. Calvo Sotelo had dropped the plan of making Sanjurjo President. He made an agreement with Alcalá-Zamora to oppose Azaña by every possible means.

A republican deputy overheard Calvo Sotelo informing his friends of this agreement in the Cortes lobby and at once informed Azaña. Azaña refused to take it seriously until the Cabinet meeting of April 2, when the President

was so openly hostile that his indictment could not be delayed, despite the imminence of the long-awaited municipal elections.

Azaña was prevented by a scruple of "elegance" from impeaching the President himself. It would not look well for the head of the Republic's Government to attack the Republic's President. He entrusted the task to Indalecio Prieto.

On April 4, Prieto petitioned the Cortes that they discuss Article 81 of the Constitution. This states that the President may dissolve the Cortes twice during his term of office. In the case of a second dissolution, the first act of the new Cortes will be to examine and resolve upon the necessity of the preceding Cortes. An unfavourable majority automatically leads to the dismissal of the President.

Alcalá-Zamora in 1933 had handed over the Republic to its enemies. He had attempted to do so again at the end of 1935.

Prieto stated his case simply and precisely. Thereupon Maura asked Azaña to say a few words. The Premier replied with a splendid but apparently irrelevant speech. "We are going to carry out the Popular Front programme without removing a stop or comma but also without adding a stop or comma. I may observe that this is the basic method for the pacific progress not only of republican policy but of the whole parliamentary regime."

All parties praised the speech. Jiménez Fernández said that he agreed with 90 per cent of it. José Díaz, secretary of the Communist Party, declared that it proved that Azaña was prepared to fulfil the electoral pact. Even Calvo Sotelo only grumbled: "A cocktail of two or three drops of Anarchism and two or three of Conservatism."

The real point of this irrelevance was that Azaña was simply refusing to provoke civil war. The dismissal of the President, although a big election slogan of the Ceda, might now look like the Cortes become revolutionary Convention.

Prieto exploited to the full Gil Robles' previous attacks on the President, some of the Ceda leader's finest oratorical efforts. There were few incidents, save a short bout of fisticuffs between Miguel Maura and Portela Valladares. At 10.10 p.m. on April 7, the Cortes dismissed the President by 238 votes to 5, those of Portela and his friends. The Right had abstained.

There was immediate turmoil. Phones rang. A delegation was formed to report to the ex-President, Jiménez de Asua leading it. There was no reply from the National Palace. Alcalá-Zamora was at home, in bed.

The President's Secretary was nowhere to be found. Wild rumours circulated. The President was going to resist. Armed men had occupied the streets. The *coup d'état*, so long awaited, was at hand. Only Azaña and discreet Diego Martínez del Barrio, President of the Chamber and interim President of the Republic, remained calm.

At last the delegation went to the President's house. Outside swarmed spectators, police, reporters, cameramen. The delegation entered the overladen Moorish room with its rich carpets, statuettes, its huge gilded chimney-piece.

Herrero, the reactionary head of the Press Department, met them. The President was in bed, could not be disturbed. "Don Niceto says that there is no constitutional clause which obliges him to receive you." "Sure," said one of the delegation, "and we could have sent the cop on the corner."

They decided to go to the National Palace. As they left, they heard through the open door familiar steps softly on the creaking parquet.

At the National Palace, in the great square, sensationally lit by the cameramen's huge arc-lights, armed police stood with submachine-guns crooked over their elbow.

In the official rooms, once those of the Duke of Genoa, with their rich yellow silk hangings and fine Tiepolos, they found the President's secretary, formally notified

him that Don Niceto Alcalá-Zamora y Torres was dismissed.

Back at the Cortes, Diego Martinez Barrio swore: "I promise solemnly upon my honour before these Cortes, organ of the national sovereignty, to serve the Republic faithfully, keep the Constitution and see that it is carried out, observe the laws and to consecrate my activities in the provisional Presidential office confided to me to the service of the Republic and of Spain." "In the name of the Cortes," replied Jiménez de Asua, "I say to you: Do this and the Nation will approve you; if not, it will demand a reckoning from you."

It was 12.30 a.m. of April 8, 1936.

In the country as a whole, the dismissal of the President was popular, but the election of the *compromisarios* for the choosing of his successor had cut straight across the plans for municipal elections. For a country so profoundly locally-minded, the doings in Madrid were necessarily subordinate to the recovery of local representative institutions.

Shootings still continued. The *lumpenproletariat* was taking advantage of the situation and irresponsible elements were paying off old scores. In Seville, employers were murdered and a few manor-houses were burnt in Andalusia. Workers, too, were shot by Fascists, and a bomb exploded in the house of Ortega y Gasset, popular secretary of the International Red Aid.

Despite Azaña's speech, the outbreak was very near. The Falange Española men were being hunted down for moral responsibility for the assassinations. Friends and backers were being shot as reprisals. José Primo de Rivera was in jail. The Ceda was slipping towards Centrism. The Left press was clamorous for the purification of the Army. The socialist militias, as yet very poorly armed, were nevertheless drilling. The Agrarian Reform was being carried through vigorously in Badajoz, Cáceres and Toledo. Strikes were spreading all over the country. The workers,

despite political divergencies, were forming a united front against Fascism. The shadow of vengeance for Asturias hung over Spain.

The Right, impotent in the Cortes except to obstruct and make provocative speeches, intensified the "Azaña-Kerensky" campaign, aided particularly by the Right wing French organs of the menaced Two Hundred Families. Agents of the Communist International, they reported, had landed in the West. The Communists were going to rise and seize power on April 13.

A suitable atmosphere for a "defensive *putsch*" had been created. The Spanish Military Union (U.M.E.) was stirring. The Falange was lurking in every corner, ready for murder.

The C.N.T. caught the infection. It was the eve of a big taxi strike in Madrid, probably to be declared illegal. Certain elements which had crept into the organisation from no one knew where were not unwilling to lend a gun against the Socialists. The FAI had to impose a moral influence on Madrid, for the C.N.T. was numerically too small to break the hold of the U.G.T.

The rumoured Communist "*putsch*" naturally did not take place on April 13 because it never was planned. But the "*counter-putsch*" was now on a hair-trigger.

April 14 was the annual celebration of the Republic. The armed forces were to parade before the President and the authorities.

At 11.30 that morning, the President, the Premier, the Cabinet and the Diplomatic Corps took the salute of the Artillery. Suddenly, an explosion rang out behind the Presidential tribune. The Cabinet almost as one man dived for the floor. The Portuguese Ambassador put up his umbrella. Only Azaña and Martinez Barrio stood above the panicking crowd calling for calm.

Ten minutes later, shots rang out again. The troops halted, ready to fire. There was a huge panic. When order was restored, the Cabinet was unhurt, but a Civil Guard

officer in plain clothes was dead, another seriously wounded and several other persons hurt. The dead man had had his revolver trained upon Azaña.

On the same day, similar attempts were made in Segovia, Vigo and other places.

The plot was widespread but still extraordinarily loose. At present, it was no more than a mere murder campaign, comparable to that of the Anarchists in the Nineties. It was planned, if it can be said to have been planned at all, by the Falange Española, leaderless and disorganised but desperate, with little political sense owing to their "national-syndicalist" opposition to politics.

At the Civil Guard officer's funeral, his comrades of the XIVth Division turned up in full force. In the crowd there were many men dressed as officers, who were in fact the retired officers of the U.M.E. permitted to keep their uniforms by Azaña's military laws. Gil Robles was prominently present. The route was guarded by the blue-uniformed Shock Police.

Firing broke out almost at once. The Civil Guard gave the fascist salute. The Shock Police under Lieutenant José del Castillo fired back, smashing the demonstration. The shooting went on all the afternoon. Sixteen were badly hurt and five killed. Among the dead was a cousin of José Primo de Rivera, Heredia, shot, it was reported, by José del Castillo himself.

In the evening two Civil Guard barracks mutinied, but surrendered to the Shock Police when they saw that they were isolated. In Valencia, the officers tried to bring their men out into the street, but were ordered back by a loyal major-general.

The workers were well aware of the menace implied by the Civil Guard revolt. The murder campaign had become an attempt at civil war. The Government had shown itself feeble in not having taken measures to purify the armed forces long before. Even now, it hesitated to undertake a radical reform, dissolve the fascist gangs and the fascist-influenced armed forces.

All evening, the U.G.T. and the C.N.T. discussed calling a preventive or protest general strike. The U.G.T. was dubious. It would embarrass the Popular Front Government, possibly smash it. The risk of not responding to the fascist provocation was enormous, but the risk of a broken Popular Front, a Cabinet crisis, when the fascist aim had been precisely to overthrow the Azaña Government, was even bigger.

The Casa del Pueblo seethed all night. Demands for arms were insistent. At two o'clock, the political consideration prevailed, and the U.G.T. decided not to call the strike.

But the Madrid C.N.T. had none of these scruples. It was not a supporter of the Popular Front, it did not care if it were broken. At four in the morning, it called the general strike, although it controlled hardly any unions in Madrid.

The first underground trains ran, the shops began to open. The C.N.T. pickets circulated. There were a few incidents. Shops preferred to close again to avoid violence. By noon, the whole of Madrid was still. Not a café, tram, bus, shop—nothing. A few cars of the strike committee and the big green police patrol waggons. Children played football in the Puerta del Sol. Only long-distance trains, phones, telegraphs, water and light worked. In the hotels, the guests ate sandwiches behind closed shutters.

Urgently summoned, the Government decreed the dissolution of the fascist leagues, heavy penalties for retired officers taking part in subversive politics. It arrested 800 Civil Guards, a number of Fascists. Doubtful officers were transferred and the XIVth Division of the Civil Guard was dissolved. Casares Quiroga, hastily appointed Minister of the Interior, replacing the sick and ineffective Amos Salvador, had handled the situation as effectively as he had handled Sanjurjo's rising in 1932.

The militant Fascists had been beaten for the moment by the workers' rapid retort, but they were by no means

broken. The Madrid incidents were simply incidents, the fringes of the great plot which was preparing.

Within the Right, reorganisation was going on apace. Secret groups were forming in every town and village. In reply to the workers' militias were forming fascist militias, far better armed, but as yet with little cohesion. Dissident members of the Acción Popular Youth, Carlists, a few workmen from the Catholic Unions. Foreign adventurers came in to organise them in "an attempt to put some guts into Spanish youth". Not deliberately fascist save in so far as they approved of Nazi militarism, not interested in politics, they gathered round the slogan of "protect Mother Church from the Red scum".

These were the small fry, dangerous because irresponsible. In the higher spheres of the Army and the Cortes, Calvo Sotelo and his Renovación Española had definitely superseded Gil Robles as the future Leader. For Calvo Sotelo, allied with the seditious elements in the Army, the Cortes was merely a public platform, a sort of broadcasting-station. He had openly broken with the political manoeuvrers who still hoped for a parliamentary counter-revolution. The Right carried on the attack on two fronts: the conspiratorial and the political.

The great political question was the choice of a President. Azaña was the natural candidate, but he was also the only possible Premier, the only personal force sufficient, it seemed, to preserve the unity of the Popular Front and withstand the attacks of the Right. It was a bad dilemma.

The Right might well support Azaña for the Presidency. This would discredit him in the eyes of Caballero and the Communists and remove a dangerous enemy from active politics. He would be replaced by someone less able to stand against the pressure from the Extreme Left and the "defensive Left *putsch*" upon which the Right erroneously based many of their calculations.

In Barcelona, Miguel Badia, who had, with Dencás, been largely responsible for the failure of the October 6

rising, strolled home with his brother, José. He had won back much of his popularity, Barcelonese concentrating their hatred on Dencás. Someone tapped him on the shoulder, and he turned to meet a bullet. José dropped dead beside him. The gunmen's car was found; in it, a copy of the C.N.T. paper, *Solidaridad Obrera*. The plant was too obvious: the object, to stir up the old struggle between the Anarchists and Estat Catalá, at the same time paying off old scores against Badia. The funeral was a huge indignation demonstration, but, despite rumours of shooting, no one was badly hurt.

In Madrid, gunmen mowed down Captain of Engineers Faraudo, a leading instructor of the socialist militias. Republican officers attended his funeral amid a huge crowd of socialist and communist workers. An officer read a funeral speech threatening that the Army would take a hand in wiping out the fascist murderers if the Government failed to do so at once.

The May Day demonstration was particularly impressive this year. Every worker was out, and thirty thousand militias in the blue shirt and red scarf paraded on the Castellana. Their discipline was ragged but cheerful. They were as yet very far from being a militarist formation.

Faraudo's murder—he was shot with a dum-dum bullet—had immediate political consequences. There seemed nothing for it but that Azaña must take the Presidentship, but it was increasingly difficult to find a new Premier. All sorts of names were canvassed. The real difficulty was that the Popular Front had been forced to dismiss Alcalá-Zamora before the question of Azaña's successor had been solved.

Moves towards the formation of a National Government headed by Prieto became more rapid. The initiative came from the Basque Nationalists who had entrusted him with the business of putting through the Basque Autonomy Statute. The suggestion was taken up by Sanchez Román, now an unofficial channel for Republican feelers and

extremely influential in Madrid financial circles. With such backing, a Government could detach a large body of middle-class opinion from the Right. "Abandon the people to gain the bourgeoisie," Varlin told the Communards in 1871, "and you will see whether it is with the bourgeoisie that revolutions are made."

Prieto was perhaps not unwilling to take the Premiership to canalise what he felt to be the suicidal mass-action of the people in the streets. Caballero's wing in its paper, *Claridad*, bitterly denounced this idea. The Madrid Socialist Group and the U.G.T. threatened to "consider itself free to act in accordance with the orientation demanded by the interests of the working-class which it represents", should there be any attempt at such a breach of the Popular Front agreement.

The day after Faraudo's murder, Prieto, who had never lacked moral courage, wrote in the Bilbao *El Liberal*: "To-day, after the insults thrown in my face and the murder of poor Carlos Faraudo, I am beginning to think seriously, very seriously indeed, if I have not been a perfect imbecile in the direction in which I have lately turned my energies."

Caballero called off the inner-party struggle for the moment. Addressing the socialist *compromisarios* who were to elect Azaña President that afternoon, he said: "I am quite certain that new developments, and serious ones, will arise in Madrid very shortly. In that case, the working-class will be obliged to take advantage of the situation to impose its class policy. When the President of the Republic has once been elected and has promised to fulfil the Constitution, I don't know why, but I have a premonition that his attitude towards us will change. . . . Our friends of to-day will be our enemies to-morrow if we attempt to *impose* our doctrine, tactics, ideals. . . . This does not mean that we should not be loyal to our present pledges. We must be. It is absolutely essential that when the separation comes, the historical responsibility for the split should not fall on us but on the bourgeois class."

Therefore, said Caballero, the working class must be united in a solid block before the "separation" came. Already the Socialist and Communist Youth and Unions were fused. The big question remaining was, as ever, the C.N.T.

The C.N.T. had made overtures already in the spring. The two Unions had been working together in many local strikes. The C.N.T. had imposed the Madrid general strike, although against the U.G.T.'s will, and, for all its opposition to politics, that had been in essence a political strike.

The C.N.T. had just held its first conference since 1931 at Saragossa. Amid many conventional resolutions, there were some of the utmost historic importance.

Between May 1 and May 10, the Conference argued all its problems. The FAI persuaded it to reaffirm and define its object, Libertarian Communism. Private property and the State were to be declared abolished. Society would be organised on the basis of Communities with complete autonomy; in the countryside Councils of Cultivators would be formed. "Rational activity" would be based on medicine and pedagogy. The Revolution would have no direct bearing on the family but would guarantee the independence of both sexes and establish Free Love, the Community safeguarding the resulting children. Religion would be respected as a matter of individual conscience, but in no case would it be permitted as a form of public display. Money would be substituted by production-cards, which would at first constitute a symbol of exchange and on which would be registered the value worked per unit per day.

More important was the resolution that the best guarantee for the defence of the Revolution was the arming of the people.

The Congress then turned to the essential question: proletarian unity. Considering that the Asturias revolt had shown that the Spanish proletariat had recovered the "revolutionary validity" long sapped by the U.G.T.'s

collaboration with the bourgeoisie in a purely reformist policy, the Congress demanded: that the U.G.T. should cease all support of the existing regime, which must be completely destroyed, the Revolution then being defended by the Revolutionary Alliance of all the workers against the "attacks of national and foreign capitalism".

The U.G.T. replied cordially. The Parliamentary Socialist Party had been rapidly losing touch with the U.G.T. owing to Prieto's "perfectly imbecile direction". A very large section of the workers, including the Unified Socialist and Communist Youth, was behind Caballero, secretary of the U.G.T. The Revolutionary Alliance, working outside the Cortes and in alliance with no political party, was by no means an impossibility.

Azaña was duly elected President and, after wild surmises had mentioned half the politicians in Spain, the Premiership went to Casares Quiroga, late Minister of the Interior, the man of Casas Viejas and the deportations to Villa Cisneros and Bata. An appointment which would hardly please either the Monarchists or the Anarchists. His Cabinet was remarkable only for the large share given to Catalan interests. The Esquerra had only one actual representative, Juan Lluhi Vallesca, Minister of Labour. But the Minister for the Interior, Juan Moles, had been a popular Governor of Catalonia and Azaña himself had the closest connexions with Barcelona. If the C.N.T.-U.G.T. alliance should go too far, the Esquerra would assume its historical role of checking the C.N.T. in Catalonia where its chief strength lay.

Catalonia had been rather significantly quiet since the triumphal return of Companys on March 1. The Esquerra had entirely renounced separatism. At a big public meeting on March 10, a speaker asked the crowd whether it wanted Dencás included in the amnesty. "Dencás, no!" shouted 35,000 Catalans. An official paper remarked: "What October 6 ended was separatism. What has been born is fraternal federalism." Companys reiterated his federalist ideas.

Separatism had become simply a tactical position of the Estat Catalá, heartily tired of the Esquerra, in whom it saw nothing but the failures of October 6. A section still remained faithful to Dencás. When Badia was murdered, after Companys had refused him a gun-licence, the last link with the Esquerra was broken. At a heated sitting of the Catalan Parliament to debate the responsibilities of October 6, the whole chamber was hostile to Dencás. "What a fool you are, Dencás!" shouted long-haired poet Ventura Gassol, Councillor for Culture.

The Estat Catalá Congress decided that Dencás should resign his seat in the Catalan Parliament. It expelled its moderate members, Aiguadè, the popular ex-Mayor of Barcelona, Soler, Bru, Puig y Ferrater, Jaume Miravittles, their best propagandist, and Ventura Gassol. It attacked the one socialist Councillor, Juan Comorera.

After Lluhi had gone to the Madrid Ministry of Labour, the Generalidad was reorganised. Comorera resigned in order to maintain the Popular Front agreement that the Government should be entirely in the hands of the Republicans.

The situation in Catalonia had resolved itself into the possibility of an alliance between the fascising nationalist Estat Catalá—fascising simply because it did not know where it was going—and the fascist Carlists and Falange Española, with the possibility of an accidental extension towards their old enemies, the FAI, should the attack on Comorera become generalised into an anti-Marxist campaign. The loose tie-up of the small Marxist parties was square behind the Generalidad, but they in turn were attacked by the POUM.

Somewhat similar conditions were the norm in all the "nationalities". Prieto was carefully lobbying through the Basque Statute. Quiroga obtained a Statute for Galicia. The Valencians were beginning to demand their rights, and the Aragonese, involved in a complicated quarrel with Catalonia about the hydro-electric exploitation of the Ebro, were recalling their ancient *fueros*: "We who are

as good men as you and more powerful than you elect you king on condition that you guard our liberties and franchises; if not, no."

Gil Robles at once started agitating for a Statute for Old Castile and Leon. This was not a poor joke but an attempt to build a reactionary territorial block, the land of Guzman el Bueno and the Cid. It would be a nucleus against the New Castile of "Red" Madrid and the Catalonia of "Red" Barcelona.

The federal conception had been strongly threatened by the Ceda's accession to power in October 1934, and it had intensified proportionately to the threat. Even less now than then was separatism the issue; but it was very convenient for the Right to make the accusation. "Against national disintegration" was an excellent rallying-cry, and the Right needed as many arguments as it could find to justify the use of naked force.

The country would not be still. The first fascist attack, April 14 to May 2, had been defeated; but the defeat had merely embittered the struggle. The Cortes sessions were at first stormy, with Calvo Sotelo leading the Right, answered by Marcelino Domingo, Ruiz Funes and La Pasionaria. Fantastic rumours spread about Madrid, or were spread by *agents-provocateurs*. An absurd report that the Fascists had been distributing poisoned caramels to workers' children in the suburb of Cuatro Caminos raised a wild riot in which six churches were burned. The infuriated crowd started to march upon the centre of the city, but discipline prevailed when the socialist and communist leaders managed to order the invaders back and calm them. It was a measure of the tenseness of the situation; also of the way in which the workers' leaders had their people in hand.

The employers did their best to sabotage the readmission of workers dismissed for political reasons. Often, they simply refused to continue working their enterprises. After the Madrid trams in Ciudad Lineal, the Aguila brewery, the Echavarrieta shipyards in Cadiz, the Andalusian

Railway Company, the Pontevedra trams. There appeared a curious figure, the absentee industrialist.

Every trade wanted its strike. In Madrid, waiters, tailors, chemical workers, mechanics. In Barcelona, a seventy-two-hour waiters' strike. In the smaller towns, general strikes in solidarity with some particular branch. The fever even spread to the bull-fighters, annoyed by the big importation of Mexican *toreros*. Some of the most famous fighters were arrested in the arena.

The Aragon Central Railway was out for nearly six weeks, affecting over 2,000 workers. There was no strike-pay, and, while the whole traffic of an almost roadless province stood still, the strikers steadily ate their way through the allotments along the line. Wages on this railway were unbelievably low, from five to nine pesetas a day (2s. 6d. to 4s. 6d.), a full two pesetas less than on any other line. The Government arbitrator insulted the strikers with the offer of one peseta daily increase, and, on their refusal, threatened to militarise the line, that is, call all the railwaymen to the colours. They challenged him to do so and see what would happen. "What" would have probably been a general railway strike. Already the trains were running all over the country with huge chalked signs on them: "*Viva the general railway strike!*"

It grew hotter in Madrid. The Cortes were deserted. The Syndicalist Party leader, Angel Pestaña, furiously denounced this slackness. The Rights were being allowed to discredit the Parliamentary system. A few days later, he demanded that the Cortes should be adjourned and the Government rule by decree.

Maura had been working along the same lines. His plan, carefully noised behind the scenes, was: full powers for the Quiroga Cabinet; extension of the Popular Front to include all "Republicans" when the split came with the Socialist Party, itself apparently ready to split at any moment; "restoration of order", i.e., use of police against the strikers; a "national government", i.e., including Prieto and himself.

Prieto and the Party Executive had been intensifying their offensive against Caballero. It was decided to "tighten up Party discipline"; Caballero's *Claridad* was disowned and asked to pay back immediately the money advanced for its new machines; the Party Conference was postponed until October.

Matters were hastening to their tragic end. The Right were making their final fighting reorganisation. Regional groups within the Ceda were taking their own line. Bosch Marin, leader of the Regional Rights in Valencia, a key-position in the offensive, declared himself a "Republican within the Right Wing". Lucía Lucía, who at one time seemed likely to replace Robles, approached Maura. The Ceda, still intent on forming a big Centre-Right alliance, expelled its more extremist members, who took their guns straight over to Calvo Sotelo's Renovación. In Valencia, they plotted to smash the Regional Right for its "treachery".

The fighting forces of the Right were now definitely gathered round the Calvo Sotelo Monarchists, although Monarchy itself was merely an emblem. The fascist militias of the Falange, the Carlist "*requetes*" and the Acción Popular JAPS were armed and ready. In Seville, it was dangerous to ask for a coffee in some places, for "c.a.f.e." was the password of the Cruzadas Aliadas de Falange Española, the Allied Crusaders of the Spanish Phalanx, which were far more dangerous than their romantic name sounded.

A surprising number of aristocrats found it convenient to take their holidays—and their cash—abroad; some at Biarritz, where Juan March had rented a fine villa, some at Estoril, whither Sanjurjo had returned from Germany.

The Black Bourse began to function openly in Barcelona and Madrid. The Amsterdam jewel-market became choked. A movement against the peseta was felt in Brussels and London. The Right papers no longer troubled to pay their bills.

In Teneriffe and Las Palmas, transport and tobacco-workers' strikes were increasingly violent. Two workers attempted to assassinate General Franco and were sent to military prison, not to the civil jail. In Tangiers, there was a fierce strike against the manœuvres of the British and Italian members of the International Commission who cut down the Spanish Commissioners' term of office by three years. Fifteen "agitators" were deported. In French Morocco, Peyrouton, the fascist Resident, allowed the Croix de Feu to organise openly. There were strange movements in Spanish Morocco, where the Foreign Legion was awaiting the Government's verdict on the responsibilities for the Asturias repression.

General Franco wrote a polite but threatening letter to Casares Quiroga. "The state of unrest which the latest military measures are causing in the minds of officers," he wrote, "is so serious that I should be contracting a grave responsibility if I did not communicate to you my impression of the military situation, and the peril involved for the discipline of the Army, deprived of all private satisfaction, and in a state of mental and material unrest which is seen—although not expressly demonstrated—among both officers and men." "The lack of dignity and justice in the Army in 1917," he continued, "caused the formation of the Committees of Military Defence. One may say that those Committees are virtually re-created. The movement of collective indiscipline in 1917 was caused in a great measure by favouritism in the matter of promotion, but this was then felt in a lesser degree than it is now in the various Army Corps. I do not conceal from your Excellency the peril in this state of the collective conscience at the present time, in which the professional anxiety of every good Spaniard is combined with that of grave dangers to the Fatherland. . . . The same state of affairs exists perhaps in a greater degree than here in the garrisons and all the military forces charged to keep public order in the Peninsula." "I can assure your Excellency," he concluded, "that such is the sense of justice which prevails

among our military orders that any unjustified violence will meet with resistance among the general mass of the Army, who now feel themselves at the mercy of anonymous and calumnious acts and accusations."

There could not be much doubt about the threat from the Army. Casares Quiroga, however, still did his best to prevent any knowledge of it reaching the public. First, he had to manœuvre into a position of legitimate defence. Calvo Sotelo's speeches in the Cortes were increasingly violent. At the big debate on public order, which the Rights forced through on June 16, Robles read statistics of the violence committed since February 16. According to Robles, there had been 170 churches burned, 251 assaults, 269 killed, 1,287 wounded, 69 political centres destroyed, 312 attacked, 113 general strikes, 228 partial strikes, 148 bombs which exploded and 78 which did not. Calvo Sotelo took up the defence of the Army, exploited various incidents and quite openly threatened the Government with military revolt. "After what I have heard here to-day," replied Casares Quiroga, "I make my honourable friend responsible to the country for whatever may occur."

War had been declared, war between the Government and Calvo Sotelo. "Calvo Sotelo has had occasion before now to meet Santiago Casares Quiroga," said the Premier, "to-day he will meet only the head of the Government."

The latent war intensified. The police worked night and day. Arrests, the discovery of arms, fascist emblems, documents, the raiding of conspiratorial meetings were reported daily; and many were not reported. The documents seized were rarely published.

Casares Quiroga's policy of keeping the public in ignorance of what was happening appears to have been based upon the calculation that knowledge would have precipitated either the famous "Left preventive *putsch*" and the consequent break-up of the Popular Front or an immediate "Right preventive *putsch*" to save what was left of the conspiracy. The great aim was to keep the

struggle on the ground of civilian action, prevent the Army and police being involved. The loyal police, especially the Shock Police, could deal with the Falange and *requetes* without open civil war, and the Anarchists could be neutralised so long as their action was confined to labour troubles. This, too, was the reason for attempting to avoid any heated Cortes debates, for the sessions could not be kept secret, and Calvo Sotelo was using them simply as a medium of nation-wide propaganda.

The impression that the general public was given, therefore, was that the employers, acting upon the instructions of their political leaders, were deliberately embittering the labour struggles by their intransigence. It was obvious that a new wave of employer-terrorism, similar to that of 1921 in Barcelona, had begun, whether the employers had actually hired the gunmen or were being "protected" for political reasons by the Falange, revival of the old Free Syndicates. In either case, the Government could feel more secure if the struggle was non-political, and it would not be forced to arm the workers, might even be able to disarm them as well as the Fascists.

Casares Quiroga supposed that he had time to carry out this plan. Almost everyone had placed a definite date for the coming rebellion: August 10, fourth anniversary of the Sanjurjo rising. Calvo Sotelo's indiscretion in allowing it to be known that he had toyed with the idea of making Sanjurjo President, had aroused suspicions. It appeared very plausible that the revolt should break out on a date of symbolical significance. Sanjurjo could be made to seem the persecuted Liberator of the new Corporative Spain. This calculation had been so generally accepted, even as far back as April, that even if the project had not existed, the Right would have been practically forced to make at least a demonstration to save its prestige. Actually, the original rising was planned by Goded and Mola for June 15, since they had calculated that both the national and the international situation would be more favourable to surprise at that time and that a *fait accompli*

would have more favourable chances of being recognised without undue trouble. By that time, fascist influence should have greatly increased in France, and England should have been completely neutralised by Italy and Germany, while this was the last day before a new batch of conscripts was called to the colours.

Meanwhile, the state of latent civil war would exhaust the Government and quite possibly split the Popular Front. The more unpopular the Front became, the more chance there was of having the Anarchists as tactical allies. Casares Quiroga was an old enemy of the FAI and Prieto's collaborationist policy would further discredit large sections of the Socialist Party in the eyes of the C.N.T.

The Right continued its plan of partial actions. Plots against the communist leaders, against Azaña, Casares Quiroga, Prieto were discovered and widely published. The bigger plot, that of Calvo Sotelo and the Generals, was concealed.

There were, however, reports which seemed to show that something more serious than murder and sabotage was afoot. Civil Guard uniforms were discovered at Pamplona, in Navarre. There were stories of large-scale gun-runnings over the Pyrenees. Mass-dismissals in the Civil Service hinted that all was not well there. The Government's whole aim, however, appeared to be to pass the summer somehow and, in October, hand the power to a National Government headed by Prieto, who might well resign from the Socialist Party after the Congress. Caballero and the Communists attributed Prieto's warnings to a mere manoeuvre in the inner-party struggle, an attempt to blackmail the power from Azaña as Robles had attempted to blackmail Alcalá-Zamora.

Despite the strike wave and the burning questions dividing the working-class movement, attention was fixed upon the peasantry, who, inspired by the really vigorous action of the new Agrarian Reform and the visible fact that the armed forces of the Government were

with them, had already begun to expropriate the latifundia without waiting for the bureaucratic processes of Madrid. The peasant problem was obviously the fundamental problem in Spain, and it was agreed that the coming struggle must inevitably be planted in terms of the land. "The land to him that works it" was the slogan of the Anarchists; "nationalisation" was the socialist programme; "equitable distribution" that of the petty-bourgeois Government. Unfortunately, none of these programmes had been very thoroughly worked out and propagandised, and, as always, the anarchist slogan was the voice of the starving, unorganised masses.

Public attention was directed brutally to this problem by the horrifying case of Yeste, in the province of Toledo. Ruined by the creation of a reservoir which had drowned all their arable land, the peasants had been driven to wood-cutting on former common-land, now enclosed. Acting on the instructions of the Governor of Toledo, who was one of the first to go over to the rebellion, the Civil Guard drove the peasants away. There was a bitter struggle, followed by a manhunt all the afternoon. By nightfall, one guard and eighteen peasants were dead, fourteen guards and fourteen peasants were badly hurt. The peasants were buried where they lay and just as they lay. One even still had his pack on his shoulders when they dug him up.

There was tension in Madrid all the week before the Cortes debate on Yeste. There was every chance of its becoming a second Casas Viejas. Casares Quiroga, people said, had too much blood on his hands. But, in face of the common danger, of which the Left parties had at last become aware, it was decided not to press the matter, and the censorship prevented the Right papers' denunciations.

Already, in the big debate on the agrarian problem on July 1, Calvo Sotelo had spoken out clearly. He worked up to a fierce denunciation of the whole democratic parliamentary system. "By the fascist revolution the middle-classes can defend themselves against proletarianisation.

You," he shouted to the Popular Front benches, "you shall not succeed in causing this proletarianisation in Spain!" The Right cheered wildly. "The solution," he ended, "is not in this Parliament and not in the political parties, but in the Corporative State!" Gil Robles, definitely putting himself under Calvo Sotelo's leadership, agreed with everything he had said. The Monarchist paper, *A.B.C.*, and Robles' Clerical *El Debate* came out openly for the "corporative state" as the only possible remedy for "the present chaos".

The day following this debate, the Socialist Party's Executive Committee, controlled by Prieto, spoke openly: "They wish to break democracy's neck by violence."

Before this could happen, the C.N.T. moved to their last big offensive: with the building strike in Madrid, the dock transport strike in Barcelona, and lesser strikes elsewhere, particularly Malaga.

The C.N.T. had seen the danger of the Right "*putsch*", but even more clearly they had seen the danger to them and to what they considered the true interests of the working class in Prieto's centrist policy, Caballero's growing influence over the masses and the Esquerra-Estat Catalá situation in Catalonia. Even more, the masses were seething, the workers were out in the streets and the atmosphere was that of revolt. The masses could not wait, and it was a splendid opportunity for the C.N.T. to increase its hold over them a hundred-fold, a thousand-fold, until the One Big Union should become so much of a reality that it would be a very short step to Libertarian Communism.

Already the C.N.T. had gained notable triumphs in the Madrid general strike and the waiters' strike. By a decided stand, sabotage and picketing, it had forced the U.G.T. to follow its lead. As the situation became tenser, the masses more radical, the opportunities became proportionately bigger.

This policy again placed the C.N.T. in a false position. The C.N.T. complained bitterly and has always com-

plained that there have been unjust accusations of its complicity with the Fascists, disproved by its tremendous fight against them in the Barcelona streets and the Aragon front. Nevertheless, two things are fact: that the Right speculated sufficiently on the known attitude of the C.N.T. to use its name plausibly to cover its tracks; and that by initiating an attack on the U.G.T. and the Popular Front Government at a time of the utmost danger, the C.N.T. however hostile to the Fascists, allowed the Right to speculate on the division of the working class, was placed for a moment in tactical alliance with the Right and thereby, historically speaking, provoked the rebellion. In fact, the C.N.T. played the Right's game almost as if it had pacted with them, and it is not so strange that its innocence appeared for a time dubious. Only because they really had their roots deep in the Spanish people, to whom Spanish Fascism was the revival of the Black Spain that had driven them into the arms of the C.N.T., could the Anarchosyndicalists react at the last moment and the first aggression, thereby smashing the forces which themselves had been deceived by the C.N.T.'s false position. But this position, though inevitable, was extraordinarily dangerous: as some observer has remarked, it was "the old case of the vicious circle which the Anarchists hoped to square". It was the repetition of the alliance between the Anarchists and the Right in January 1933, at the elections of November 1933 and on October 6, 1934. Now as then, their position was impossible, and their best leaders were jailed by the representatives of those whose real interests were identical with theirs.

It is not possible to say how far the dialectic alliance with the Fascists ever became a tactical alliance, although it is certain that there was close co-operation between some irresponsible individuals and the Falange Española. An organisation so loose as the C.N.T. and with such a history of violence could not fail to include certain gunman elements who would not enquire too closely into the

political motives for an "action" against old "blackleg socialist" enemies. It is equally certain that these individuals were completely disapproved by the responsible Committees.

Undoubtedly, the "C.N.d.T." abstentionist posters at the February elections were pure Right exploitation. The copy of *Solidaridad Obrera* left in the car of Badia's murderers may or may not have been a double-bluff; almost certainly not. The Civil Guard uniforms discovered at Pamplona were reported to have been addressed to an alleged C.N.T. arms deposit in Madrid, but there is no proof that this deposit existed, and the Madrid Regional Committee denied it. What is much less certain, but of extreme historical importance, is how far the Government, deceived or not by the police riddled with fascist agents, deliberately spread the idea that various incidents in reality connected with the preparing fascist insurrection were the work of the FAI. This may well have been so with the Pamplona uniforms. It seems that Casares Quiroga's idea was to divert the coming struggle into what he appeared to think was simply gang-warfare between the unions' gunmen, leaving the Governmental police to settle the Fascists. This would avoid the necessity of arming the people and deprive the Fascists of a possible ally.

The Madrid building strike began on a question of wages and hours. No one took much notice of it, except when gutters and drains were not repaired and when it was impossible to hold the annual *verbenas*, the traditional Madrid fairs.

Lluhi, the Catalan Minister of Labour, made a compromise which the employers refused. He then decided that the agreement was binding on both parties—upon which the C.N.T. refused it. It could not accept the principle of State-intervention in a strike, and negotiations must be direct between employer and employee. At the same time, it raised its demands. But this was mere "face". The point was to show the builders and

the broad masses that the C.N.T. was a "fighting" organisation while the U.G.T. was reformist. In Barcelona, the situation was similar. The U.G.T. decided to go back to work, the C.N.T. to stay out. A quarter of a century's experience in picketing and sabotage had taught the C.N.T. how to make sure that if they did not go back to work, no one else should. In Malaga, Socialists and Communists were shot by Fascists and Syndicalists, Syndicalists were shot by Communists and Fascists, Fascists were shot by Syndicalists and Communists: Casares Quiroga's gang-warfare to the *n*th degree.

In Madrid, the U.G.T. decided to go back to work on Monday, July 13. With this announcement appeared a manifesto of the Socialist Party Executive Committee: "The special circumstances of the present moment demand that all elements in our Party must be on the alert to prevent the manœuvres of the enemies of the working class."

The "enemies of the working-class" were not the builders in the C.N.T. They were the Fascists, to whom Gil Robles had said: "Now or never!"

Things moved fast in Valencia, too fast. Few people knew exactly what happened, and nearly all those few are dead. The result of a long intrigue was that at 9.15 on the night of July 13 a band of armed men broke into the Valencia radio-station, held up the speaker and shouted into the megaphone: "Union Radio Barcelona speaking. Falange is occupying the Valencia station. In a few days the Syndicalist Revolution will be out in the streets. We are taking this opportunity to greet all Spaniards, especially those who think as we do!" When the police arrived, the Falangists had vanished. A huge crowd gathered in the streets and burned all the Right political centres, clubs and newspaper-offices.

On the same evening in Madrid, the police raided another fascist military organisation, the "TYRE", and found important documents. Hundreds of arrests were carried out.

Undoubtedly, everyone, on both sides, believed that this was the proclamation of civil war, and this belief did much to rouse the workers' organisations and frustrate the fascist plot.

The Valencia affair might have blown over, but next night there came another accident. Here again, the story is confused, the motives questionable. Provocation had become so common during the past five months that nothing could be taken at face-value any more.

At ten o'clock in the evening of Sunday, July 12, a Lieutenant of Shock Police, José del Castillo, was going on duty. For a long time he had been "on the spot". He it was who discovered the plot against the Premier on April 14; he was accused of shooting Heredia, José Primo de Rivera's cousin, during the funeral on the 16th; he had been extremely active against fascist conspiracies ever since; he was a known Communist. A voice behind him said: "That's him!" He fell dead.

Five hours later, patrol-waggon No. 17 went to the house of Calvo Sotelo. In it was a captain of the Civil Guard—later killed on the Guadarrama front—some officers and men of the Shock Police and some civilians. They arrested him.

At 4.30 that morning, a police car delivered at the Morgue what the driver said was the corpse of a night-watchman found dead in the street.

Sotelo's family had meanwhile rung up Police-Head-quarters, found that no warrant was out for him. He had been simply taken for a ride. At noon on Monday he was identified. He had been shot twice in the head. Wild rumours raced round Madrid that he had been tortured.

That Monday there was something near panic in Madrid. Everyone felt that Sotelo's murder could not fail to unloose the rebellion that no one had quite taken seriously. Hundreds of persons were arrested. The Government declared the state of alarm in Madrid. The C.N.T. builders had refused to go back to work, and the first

shots had been exchanged between their pickets and the U.G.T. men. The Government closed down the Renovación and Traditionalist centres but also the Anarchist Ateneos, and C.N.T. militants were arrested as well as Fascists and Traditionalists.

The working class was at once on the alert. Their unofficial patrols were everywhere at strategic positions. At eight that night, the Left and Right wings of the Socialist Party, the U.G.T. and the Communist Party issued a declaration of solidarity with the Government: "Realising the intentions of the enemies of the Republic and the proletariat, we offer the Government the collaboration and help of the masses as a permanent agreement so long as circumstances demand."

At midnight, Prieto and a delegation from the Socialist and Communist Parties, the Unified Youth and the U.G.T. visited Casares Quiroga to demand arms. Quiroga thanked them, but refused. Matters had not gone so far as that. Next morning, Prieto wrote: "If the reaction is dreaming of a bloodless victory as in 1923, it is wrong. If it thinks it will find against it an undefended regime, it is wrong. To win, it will have to climb the human wall which the proletarian masses will raise against it. It will be a struggle for life or death, for both opponents know that a victorious enemy will know no mercy. But even so, a decisive battle is better than this continued blood-letting."

The C.N.T. were naturally not behind the Government with the other proletarian parties. Why should they be? The Government's first act had been to close their centres. It seemed that the tragedy of October 6 was to be repeated; and it would not be a lesser tragedy because the C.N.T. in Madrid had relatively little strength. The tragedy of October 6 was not the surrender to Batet's guns, but the division of the proletariat in face of the enemy. The defeat of Asturias had been a victory for the working class of the whole world; the defeat of Barcelona had been a disaster; and the disaster would be irremediable tragedy unless the working class could profit from its lessons.

The building strike went on, and fighting became more frequent. The buildings were heavily picketed by police, and the U.G.T. workers went home guarded by armed members of the Socialist Youth. The last big battle took place on July 18 itself, in the University City, when Franco's Moors were already on the mainland. The last shootings in the Barcelona strike happened in full Ramblas on July 28, after the Fascists had been driven out of the city and the Aragon front had been formed.

The Right, stampeded by the Valencia incident and infuriated by the shooting of Calvo Sotelo, swung into the offensive. Franco shrugged, said, "If it must be now, it must be." Gil Robles rushed back from Lourdes to recover the leadership an accident had returned to him. The Ceda had agreed to the adjournment of the Cortes, leaving Casares Quiroga a relatively free hand, as demanded by the Maura Plan. Robles whistled them back, forced the Government to call the Cortes Permanent Committee for the 15th.

Calvo Sotelo's funeral was a huge fascist demonstration. The Cortes Presidency sent a delegation, but it was forced back. It gave up the attempt when it saw that this was nothing but a seditious gathering. Over Calvo Sotelo's body in its Capucin hood and gown, Goicoechea, leader of the Monarchists, cried: "Over this grave, I swear to God that I will use all my strength to follow your example and to avenge your death!" Robles placed his wreath beside one sent by Alfonso de Borbón. "Let us break off all dealings with this Government and with this situation," he shouted, "and swear that this shall not rest unpunished, pass what may and cost what it may!"

On the way back to Madrid, the crowd assaulted the Shock Troops. Shots were exchanged: one dead and three badly wounded.

The session of the Permanent Committee next day was so furious that at first it was censored out of all papers, then only permitted if all the speeches were printed in full. Robles made the speech of a life of speeches. "Calvo

Sotelo's blood is upon you and the responsibility will fall on your parties and on the whole parliamentary system. The country is already fascist in its great majority. And, the stronger the force, the stronger the reaction. We shall perhaps have few more words to say to each other in the Parliament. The day is not far when the violence you have unleashed will turn back upon you." "A declaration of civil war", the Government itself called the speech.

The Government could not keep this out of the papers, although it did its best to drown it in verbiage. But still it could not quite realise the imminent danger—or would not, for that would have meant arming the people. The Cortes was summoned for the following Tuesday, and it was requested that deputies should check their revolvers in the cloak-room before entering the Chamber, "in order to contribute to the tranquillisation of spirits". Madrid wits immediately named it the "Disarmament Conference".

Madrid frivolity was hopeless. Gil Robles had stormed out of the Permanent Commission with "Right! and now let justice take its course!" but only the journalists heard him, and the censorship would not permit them to repeat it. In the cafés that night, they sat laughing at the idea that Madrid was now as good as New York since there was an elevator strike in both. People were planning to go to that other grim farce, the German Olympic Games, and smiling contemptuously at the rival show, the People's Olympiad, to begin on Sunday in Barcelona with a motley crowd of Jews, Negroes and exiles. The President was going to San Sebastian for his holidays at the end of July. Alvarez del Vayo and Luis Araquistain were away. None of the leaders of the Unified Youth were in town. *El Socialista* naïvely asked: "Is Señor Gil Robles really set on driving the political tragedy to extremes?"

But later, when the cafés closed at two, those who knew took taxis. The taxis acted as couriers between the militia vigilance posts, and from them could be heard the nightly tale of shootings, knifings and arrests. From them too could be learnt that the militias were chewing

their nails with rage because they had no arms save antiquated six-shooters.

Those to whom Gil Robles' speeches were no novel announcement were well enough armed, and powerful allies waited in Morocco. They too were at their posts. There was hardly a Ceda deputy in Madrid. Officers had left for the posts assigned them. The "holiday" exodus had begun. Lerroux made for Portugal and, in the same train, Calvo Sotelo's widow and children. The Falange cleaned their automatics. The Carlist *requetes* too. On Sunday evening, there would be no papers. On Sunday, too, the Olympiad of the "Red scum" would be solemnly opened by the "separatists" of the Generalidad. While the Madrid of 1931 joked in the cafés and the Madrid of 1936 cursed their helplessness, the Madrid of August 10, 1932, thrust the last cartridge into the magazine.

In the offices of Renovacion Española they were hanging a great placard:

"Spaniards! The man is dead but he has left us his ideals.

He lived for Spain and taught us to serve her.

He gave up his life like the martyrs.

He was the scourge of Masonry and Marxism.

Champion of the fight against the chaotic Parliament.

Forerunner of the new Corporative Spain.

He forged a strong and united Nation against Anarchy and Chaos.

Religion had in him a mighty Captain. '

Long live Spain! Long live Calvo Sotelo!"

As the workers passed the militias' vigilance patrols, from the dark corners, away from the roving police of a Popular Front Government, clenched fists rose, and a voice murmured: "U.H.P.!"

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In Barcelona, there was little of Madrid's frivolity. The city, pock-marked with bullets, the wounds of October 6 still gaping in a dozen façades, realised sooner than the

capital what exactly it had to face. Yet preparations for the People's Olympiad went on. Six thousand competitors and twice as many visitors were expected. The Generalidad had given its blessing and a promise to open the Games with an official ceremony.

Barcelona Rights whispered that this was simply a communist gathering in preparation for the "preventive *putsch*". They pointed out that the financing was so fantastically hazardous that the thing could not be genuine. Barcelona, wrapped in its own concerns since Companys' return on March 1, contemptuously replied that that was simply "things of Spain", nothing to do with Catalonia. Catalonia had become in feeling, though not in politics, distinctly nationalist. The Esquerra, with Lluhi as Madrid Minister of Labour, suffered the illusion that they were the deciding factor in Spanish politics, an illusion which had often been shared by Catalan big business—and the shell-scars in the city's public buildings bore witness to the error.

The news of Calvo Sotelo's murder came as a bomb-shell. "Death of a prominent Right leader" said the papers, and the censorship had scratched suggestive blanks.

Tension rose. The reports of the Permanent Commission debates were not released in time for the morning papers, and they appeared with four blank pages. What had happened so important and so terrible that it could not be mentioned?

The leaders of the Catalan Regional Committee of the C.N.T., Ascaso, Durruti, Garcia Oliver, Federica Montseny, Santillan, met anxiously on the 14th. The fascist insurrection was preparing. But *they* were not prepared. They had few arms. The men of the FAI had their pistols, those they had collected on October 7 and those they had acquired somehow, but that was all. The Barcelona garrison was not certain. Still less certain was the attitude of the Generalidad. Was there to be another October 6?

There were no militias in Barcelona, well trained though badly armed, as in Madrid. But there were the unions with their men well in hand.

On the Wednesday night, July 15, there was an unaccustomed crowd slumped in the chairs on the tree-bordered Ramblas opposite the Transport Union offices. Passers believed that they were merely waiting for news of the strike negotiations.

On Thursday night, the crowd had extended all the way up the Ramblas. It was hot, and their women and children sat, gently sweating, beside them. The strike negotiations were unsatisfactory. News of Calvo Sotelo's funeral was filtering through. The tension rose.

On Friday, came the news in the evening papers that the regiments in Morocco had risen. The Government declared that it had the movement well in hand, that it was ridiculous to suppose it could pass to the mainland. No one in Barcelona believed that.

That night, ten thousand men stood on the Ramblas demanding arms. C.N.T. leaders demanded arms from the Generalidad. Companys hesitated. He had already issued a press-communiqué that no arms had been distributed to civilians, that the armed police of the Generalidad were sufficient to keep the situation under control.

On the Ramblas the crowd shouted for arms. Outside the Generalidad, too. A group of men went down to the harbour, "found" arms on a boat there, originally destined for the transport strike. With 150 rifles, they enforced their demands. A limited number of rifles were distributed.

On Saturday morning, people who had been trying to speak by phone to Madrid on Friday night and had been told the line was out of order, were informed that all phone calls, even to places within ten miles of the city, were prohibited "by order of the superior authorities". It was never explained whether these authorities were in Barcelona or Madrid. Wires were passed, but failed to arrive. Barcelona was in effect cut off from the world.

The radio, that radio which had been so terrible on October 6, suddenly began to speak again in Castilian. The dance-record broadcasts seemed particularly loud, as if to drown something.

At midday, the unions broadcast to their members instructions which had not been allowed to appear in the morning papers. All organised workers were asked to come immediately to their union centres, with arms if possible. Then the dance-records began again, announced in Castilian.

The offices of Ramon Salas, gangster leader of the Free Syndicates, were raided, and arms, fascist emblems, monarchist flags and documents found. All public meetings were banned, including two by the Anti-War League. In the early dawn arms were being offered freely in the Barcelona underworld and on the Black Bourse the pound rose to giddy heights.

Saturday afternoon was outwardly calm, but the sun-beaten streets were strangely empty. As it grew dark, the usual Rambla *paseo* was unusually animated. As always on a Saturday night, rumours, half-truths and unpublishable truths were passing from mouth to mouth. The Foreign Legion was in Cadiz, they said. The Navy was coming to bombard Barcelona. The Anarchists were going to plunder everything, said those whose idea of Anarchists was based on hearsay legends of the black days of 1921.

In the union centres, the volunteer patrols were organising. There were not nearly enough arms. The Shock Police seemed loyal, but the Civil Guard, as always, was an unknown factor, and there were strange tales from the barracks up in the north of the city. A crowd of men, well organised, went from the Transport Syndicate up the Ramblas to where Beristain's big arms-shop presented its iron shutters. Upstairs, there was light. Beristain was popular: he had allowed his shop to be gently sacked on October 6. The crowd gathered good-humouredly. A night-watchman was found. They held

him up, demanded the keys. He had lost them, he said, with a wink. They were found quite easily, and the men went away with an amazing collection of antique sporting-rifles. One boy carried two splendid but quite useless Toledo rapiers. Other armourers, not so popular as Beristain, were properly sacked. But there was a minimum of violence.

Doubts about the loyalty of the Civil Guard were set at rest when a section of the 19th Division, who were to fight so well both in the streets and at the front, appeared on the Ramblas late in the evening. The crowd applauded them, and, after a moment's hesitation, they raised their fists in the Popular Front salute. For the first time, that cold band of Government killers was on the side of the people. The crowd broke into frantic "*Vivas!*"

The workers, the Young Libertarians, Communists and Socialists, slumbered fitfully in the yellow iron chairs all that hot night. They sat carefully, so as not to disturb the set of their hip-pockets. Late passers were solicitously advised that it would be as well to get some sleep before the opening of the Olympiad "week of sport and folklore".

As the cars turned off the streets of the Barrio Chino cabarets and picked up theatre-goers, they were politely but firmly requisitioned. At the deserted end of the Ramblas, down by the harbour, a reserve was hastily collected to act as couriers. The workers were alert, but terribly badly armed. Orders came to them from time to time from the Transport Union. The Socialists gathered their instructions from the CADCI building next door, where the Olympiad Committee's headquarters were in darkness.

Barricades of sandbags, defended by machine-guns, had been built outside the chief public buildings. At Police Headquarters in the Via Layetana, every man was alert. There was a police cordon semi-circled round the building. Plain-clothes men in the café next door made no secret of their revolvers.

It was five past three in the morning of Sunday, July 19, 1936. A phone rang in Police Headquarters. Orders were snapped. Patrol wagons began to move, carrying blue-uniformed Shock Police armed with rifles, revolvers and sub-machine-guns. The cordon stood facing the Plaza Cataluña, strategic centre of the city. "Here they are!" shouted an officer. "Let's go!"

PART IV

THE NINETEENTH OF JULY

I. The Plot

II. Madrid

III. Barcelona

IV. Non-Intervention

I

THE PLOT

THE TIME FOR the final attack had come. The Right had exhausted all peaceful methods of smashing the Republic. These methods had at least the advantage that a retreat was possible without too much damage to the attackers.

The military insurrection had been long preparing and needed now only the final touches. The conspirators reckoned up the favourable factors; but they did not stop to analyse what was implied by a *coup d'état*: they did not define what they meant by the State, and consequently, little was planned save a straight seizure of power. Franco's *pronunciamiento* was almost exactly a Figols or Casas Viejas of the Right.

Malaparte says that Monsignore Ratti carefully read the works of Lenin when, as Papal Nuncio to Poland, he was awaiting in Warsaw the attack of Budyonny's Red Cavalry in the critical days of 1920. Franco may have turned over the pages of Malaparte's *Technique of the Coup d'État* as he waited for the signal on his farm in Teneriffe. Malaparte, the Blackshirt conqueror of Florence, would certainly appeal to his cold, audacious but irreflective mentality.

The *coup d'état* without a popular basis was an extremely dangerous adventure. In modern times, the old *pronunciamiento* could not hope to succeed alone; there were too many other elements involved. Martinez Campos was allowed to make his seizure of power after the British financiers had forced the Republic to cede Rio Tinto for a ridiculously small sum. Primo de Rivera could make

his *pronunciamiento* because Cambó needed a weapon against Santiago Alba's pro-agrarian tariff policy. These were to some extent localised objectives; in 1936, when Spain's permanent revolution had reached another definite stage, when the whole world was arming and needed for armaments mercury and copper, a localised *pronunciamiento* was no longer possible.

The political war would be a copper and mercury war as well as a fencing for position preparatory to the approaching world-struggle. Raw materials and seaplane bases were at stake, and, in this sense, the Spanish Civil War would be a continuation of the Gran Chaco and Abyssinia.

Already the Secret Services of half a dozen Powers had trooped into Morocco, Rio de Oro, Ifni and as far eastward as Egypt, Palestine, Irak and Persia. England was most vulnerable in her colonial possessions, and the Spanish Civil War coincided notably with Moslem disturbances all over the Empire. Not for nothing did Franco enlist the Riffs. Away in his exile in French Réunion, Abd-el-Krim, the German-advised terror of the Spaniards, smiled.

Here was a situation to be exploited by the reactionary forces in Spain. It was no immediate concern of the Great Powers whether the Inquisition might be restored or whether Spaniards danced before the Goddess of Liberty. What did concern them was that a reliable, venal or friendly government should control the Canary and Balearic Isles, Ceuta, Ifni, the Pyrennees and the territory round Rio Tinto, Almaden and Peñarroya. Only if one of the interests intervened to acquire the lion's share would the matter be of international importance to the European capitalists. There remained the problem of the U.S.S.R., interested not in acquiring new economic or strategic advantages but in conserving the peace.

Within the capitalist international structure, the conflicts intensified by the world crisis and its first transformations into the Chaco and Abyssinian Wars could favour the rebels at least as much as the internal conflicts between the petty-bourgeoisie and the workers, and between the

two wide sections of the working-class itself. The great struggle had begun between the "democratic" powers, England and France, and the "authoritarian", Germany and Italy. The Germans and Italians called it the struggle between the "satisfied" and the "cramped" countries. In other words, a struggle for the margin of tolerance which the English and French sections of the capitalist international could still afford.

Spain had always been an English colony since Elizabeth's merchants defeated Philip II's ranchers. It was English gold and propaganda which encouraged the Netherlands' revolt, and William of Orange was rewarded by the English revolutionary throne. It was Canning who supported the revolt of the South American colonies while England's troops drove Napoleon out of the Peninsula and persuaded the Holy Alliance to restore the reactionary Ferdinand VII. It was to English capitalists that the First Spanish Republic ceded the copper mines of Rio Tinto and Tharsis while English ships intervened to restore order in Spain. England held Minorca for half a century, tore away Portugal from the Iberian Federation and, while colonising it as thoroughly as it colonised China, fostered a sentiment of Portuguese national independence. Gibraltar served British interests in the Mediterranean without the slightest thought of its hinterland; and Vickers regained the Port of Mahon lost by Admiral Byng.

Spain felt the weight of interested British benevolence. Just as Sir Basil Zaharoff created his ingenious "national" arms industries all over the world, so the British Foreign Office and Admiralty benevolently favoured the colonial expeditions of countries which could not possibly carry them out without ruining themselves. Spain was given Morocco by English pressure, in order to prevent the stronger power, France, possessing a coast too near Gibraltar. The 7,000 million pesetas spent in Morocco might have made Spain a minor European power, not a mere colonial territory. It was no accident that the liberal Monarchy in Spain coincided with the great days of the

liberal hostesses in Westminster, that Primo de Rivera's dictatorship coincided with the Baldwin-Chamberlain reaction in 1923 and that the fall of the Conservative Government in 1929 coincided with the Bank of England's offensive against the peseta.

The opponent was not only the Bank of England but the British Admiralty, which possessed the majority of the shares in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The offensive against American capital whenever it attempted to penetrate Spain was formidable. When Colonel Sosthenes T. Behn of Western Electric secured from Alfonso XIII the monopoly of the whole Spanish State telephone service in 1924, the resulting scandal, justified though it was, may not have been entirely the product of Spanish indignation.

The development of native Spanish industry must necessarily have brought not only competition with the foreign interests but also, as the Governing Board of Rio Tinto repeatedly complained to its shareholders, a revolutionary atmosphere. It was essential, therefore, to see that the plus-value should be neutralised by exportation of capital. Hence, in Catalonia, the biggest native enterprise, Cambó's CHADE, was linked to the English interests in the Argentine, especially to the Primitiva Gas Company and the Electricity Company, both of Buenos Aires. Here CHADE's millions would also be useful for continuing in the economic field Canning's political line: the strengthening of the South American Republics against Spain and the reinforcement of British influence in those Republics.

CHADE, in its new form, then penetrated into the Sofina (Société Financière de Transports et d'Enterprises Industrielles, Brussels), the Sydro (Société Internationale d'Energie Hydroélectrique) and Serma (Société d'Electricité de la Région de Malmédy). Through the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas these "Belgian" enterprises rejoined British interests and extended to the German A.E.G. It was no accident that the other big hydro-electric enter-

prise in Catalonia, the Riegos y Fuerzas, was also tied to Sofina but was alleged to be Canadian, while Sir Auckland Geddes, director of Rio Tinto, was one of the Canadians who followed Max Aiten to the conquest of England at the end of the Great War.

More direct was the interest of Italian and German capital in the Spanish minerals essential to their rearmament programmes; and the interest was reinforced politically by the closer connection in totalitarian countries between business and the State.

Late in 1934, a White Russian engineer, M. Dubnikoff, arrived in Barcelona as agent for a new Italian-German consortium formed to exploit Spanish mineral wealth. The moment was well chosen, for the Lerroux Government, having suppressed the October rising at considerable expense financially and politically, was open to receive any considerable offers. According to Mr. Hanighen, a well-informed student of such questions, Dubnikoff became interested in Aragonese lignite deposits and sent samples to the German Metallgesellschaft, suggesting that this lignite could be distilled on the ground into good synthetic motor fuel. A military memorandum was drawn up stressing the advisability of distilling fuel in Spain to supply German planes and submarines.

This consortium was made up of the Federation of Italian Industrialists, for the Italian side, and the Metallgesellschaft, I. G. Farben, Krupp, Rheinmetall, Kloeene and Siemens und Halske, for the German.

According to M. Charles Reber, the consortium was formed with the avowed object of rendering "Germany and Italy absolutely independent of London, France and Sweden", for all minerals, especially for iron. Hitler, in a speech at Würzburg on June 27, 1937, stated: "Germany needs iron ore. That is why we want a Nationalist Government in Spain, so that we may be able to buy Spanish ore." The statement was suppressed in the German press.

Such ambitions found ready supporters in Lerroux and Gil Robles, then consolidating their power. A document

signed by Gil Robles himself stated that he would be in favour of mining concessions to German firms.

This tangible support was increased by probabilities of the benevolent neutrality of British capital, which interlocked with German and Italian interests as well as with Belgian, French and American. Rio Tinto is linked with the Metallgesellschaft in European Pyrites Ltd., the largest organisation in the world for pyrites distribution, and these interlock in Spanish Morocco with the J. P. Morgan interests, which, in turn, control the State monopoly of Spanish telephones and, indirectly, are concerned in the big electrical companies. According to the *London Morning Post* of August 24, 1937, Messrs. Guest, Keen and Baldwin have large interests in the Spanish mines. This paper reported that the firm "had made an agreement with General Franco for the export of iron ore to South Wales, the freightage from Spain being far less than from America". This, indeed, was over a year after the outbreak of the rebellion and several months after the British Cabinet had been reorganised. No English Minister of course takes even a family interest in commercial undertakings such as might influence his political sympathies.

Other cases of interlocking capital which may have influenced the rebels' calculations—the financial side was planned by Juan March, of the Transmediterranea and Porto Pi, and by Ventosa y Calvell, of CHADE—are studied in Part I of this book.

Thus, Franco, March and Gil Robles could count on definite support from one section of the capitalist international and at least a margin of tolerance from the other. It was no longer necessary to divide Spain territorially; the economic share-out was more profitable and less liable to protest from indignant democracies.

The plan of territorial cession had been mooted for some time, and even as far back as the beginning of 1934 the Balearics had been more or less in the market. It is uncertain whether any definite offer was made to Franco

or his agents, and naturally it is fantastic to suggest that Majorca or Minorca would have been actually incorporated in Italian or German territory. There would have been merely a friendly military agreement. In Franco's plan for the reconstruction of the Corporative Spain, the Balearics, he told the *Echo de Paris*, would be joined administratively to Barcelona, which, with Gerona, would form a big military district. A very strong Army division would be stationed here, Barcelona would remain the capital of Catalonia and a big effort would be made to let it and the Balearics become the tourist centres of Spain. Undoubtedly, the Italian State Tourist Bureau would lend every assistance, and even in October 1936 every effort was made by this Bureau's agency in Palma to organise cheap excursions to Genoa.

Germany would be given a sphere of influence in the Canary Isles, dominating the route to South America and West Africa. This would of course be a distinct challenge to British interests in the Argentine, Germany having already thoroughly penetrated Portuguese-speaking Brazil. The route to West Africa would be important since it was calculated that the question of colonies for Germany would be re-opened, with British consent, after the rebels' victory in Spain, and undoubtedly, in view of the South African Union's flat refusal to listen to proposals about Tanganyika, Portuguese West Africa would be scheduled for sacrifice. In return, Portugal might well be given parts of Galicia as far as the River Minho. Some arrangement might be made about Ceuta and especially about Ifni, already filled for five years by secret agents of half a dozen rival powers.

Financially and territorially, therefore, Franco had something to offer and little to fear.

For some time, negotiations were carried on by minor agents, but in the spring Sanjurjo, Angel Herrera, Gil Robles' backer, and a journalist, Montes, were in Berlin. Relations with Germany had previously been very close, and José Antonio Primo de Rivera had attended the

Nürnberg *Parteitag* the previous year. Documents discovered in the Nazi Labour Front offices in Barcelona indicate that the German colony in Spain was in close touch with Nazi headquarters in Germany, that documents and possibly arms were smuggled in and that the German Consulates were at least privy to this traffic. The Balearics and the Catalan Costa Brava were honeycombed by German spies disguised as exiles.

Much of the actual work was done by a German Admiral, Canaris, who was in direct touch with Alfonso XIII during the War and did much to organise the secret supply of oil to German submarines in the Mediterranean. After the war, he remained in touch with Spain and saw that the Echevarrieta shipyards, always a shady business, supplied Germany with submarines long before Hitler denounced the Treaty of Versailles.

Canaris had been in touch with Juan March, and the connexion remained. Canaris had several conferences with March, Mola and Robles early in July 1936. When Sanjurjo visited Berlin in March, Canaris and the Spanish Military Attaché, who afterwards went straight over to the rebels, showed him round various arms-factories.

On March 31, 1934, Rafael Olazábal, representative of the Carlists, Antonio de Goicoechea, leader of Renovación Española and Emilio Barrera met Mussolini and Italo Balbo in Rome. The text of the interview ran: "After having received detailed information about the political situation in Spain and the desires and situation of the Army and Navy, as well as of the Monarchist parties, Mussolini declared: first, that he was willing to aid by active support and all necessary means the two parties opposing the existing regime in Spain in their effort to overthrow it and substitute for it a Regency which would prepare the way for the restoration of the Monarchy. This declaration was twice solemnly ratified by Mussolini and was greeted by those present with the natural expressions of esteem and gratitude. Second; as a practical demonstration of his intentions, he was willing to deliver immediately

20,000 rifles, 20,000 hand-grenades, 200 machine-guns and 1,500,000 pesetas in cash. Third; this would merely be a preliminary and would be followed by much more important deliveries according as the work done justified or circumstances demanded them. The persons present agreed about the mode of payment and distribution to their various organisations."

Although this document must be accepted with some reserves, it is probable that it represented at the very least a concrete project. How far Mussolini was then serious about the restoration of the Monarchy is uncertain. A sinister feature is the determination of parties represented in the Republican Cortes to overthrow, with foreign aid, the regime which had allowed them to stand for election and, through Lerroux, indirectly to govern the country.

In 1934, too, the Nazi Foreign Bureau became particularly active in Spain. The "Harbour Service" functioned, acting simultaneously as a branch of the Gestapo to watch over the activities of German exiles and as a political, commercial and military espionage service. Later, it became fused with the Foreign Section of the Gestapo. It was able to avail itself of consular privileges, for the German Foreign Bureau had placed reliable party-members in all responsible positions. The Italian Consulates too had their own espionage and police employees. Both kept closely in touch with the Rightist and Fascist organisations in Spain, exchanging New Year greetings, "cultural conferences", newspaper articles—the Italian Consul in Barcelona was furious because he thought Juan March's paper in Majorca had double-crossed him and went so far as to call that respected financier "a man of negative morality"—and propaganda. The agent of Junkers in Madrid was closely in touch not only with the Italian airplane manufacturers with a view to Spanish supply but also with Franco himself. On January 2, 1936, Franco sent him a New Year's greeting. A curious incident was that when the Italian tyre-firm, Pirelli, took the expensive

back-page of a Barcelona paper to advertise gas-masks "against industrial perils in mines, etc." The next day, the *Official Gazette* published an order of Gil Robles, then War Minister, that the whole Spanish Army should be provided with Pirelli gas-masks.

German and Italian agents honeycombed the whole structure of Spanish industry, much to the annoyance of English and Belgian interests. They worked in close co-operation with the Spanish Rightist aristocrats who were ubiquitous on the Directors' boards of all major Spanish firms. Such enterprises as the Spanish Society for Arms and Munitions at Eibar had German and aristocratic Spanish directors, who collaborated and shared a common hatred and fear of their workmen.

The economic tie-up of German and Spanish capitalism is studied in another place. There can be little doubt that this—and not the "anti-Bolshevik Crusade"—was the basis of the alliance between the plebeian Dictators and the disgruntled Spanish officers and Grandees. It might be possible to have some respect for poor and proud Quixotes facing death charging the windmills of an imaginary "Mongolian invasion" of their country; it was difficult to feel much sympathy for Quixotes whose Quixotry could be shown to be little else but the sublimation of a rather sordid desire to retain control of their money-bags, especially when this involved the descendants of those who had driven out the Moors in the return of the subjects of the Sultan of Morocco and in humiliating dependence upon the Thyssens, Krupps and Torlonias, the "hard-faced men who looked as if they had done remarkably well out of the war".

It is of course difficult to decide whether Franco, March and Robles believed that they were being aided by friendly Powers to achieve their aims in Spain, for which they were willing to pay a reasonable price, or whether the Nazi Foreign Bureau and the Palazzio Venezia were simply using the Spanish rebels as pawns in their own game against the U.S.S.R., France and, to some extent,

England. It is equally difficult to decide whether the Generals supposed that they were using March, Robles, the Falange and the Carlists as allies in a *pronunciamiento* or whether the political and financial elements hoped simply to exploit an ordinary military insurrection.

The contempt that the Spanish military caste felt for all civilians was shown after the outbreak of the rebellion by Gil Robles' position. Three officers actually wished to assassinate Robles in Portugal. As he was going to the Cortes Standing Committee to make his declaration of war after Calvo Sotelo's murder, Robles took leave of the Conde de Peña Castillo. He was going to Biarritz. When someone remarked to him that his presence in Madrid would be a great encouragement, Robles replied, trembling, that he had done enough when he was Minister of War. When Robles arrived in Burgos, he was kept a virtual prisoner and no one was allowed to visit him. March, too, was careful not to enter any part of Spain. He was, of course, a very old man, and had not the physical strength to withstand the hardships of war. He directed the insurrection first from his villa at Biarritz, then, after the French police had expelled him, from the Grand Hotel in Paris. His man of affairs was Monseigneur Palmer, Bishop of the Catholic Mission in France, who saw to the liaison with the Society of Jesus and Gil Robles.

It would seem, therefore, that the Generals were to be given at least the appearance of a free hand.

This is shown by a draft programme found written on a shaving-paper in the possession of Captain Lopez Varela, head of the Cadiz rebels, who was arrested and shot in Barcelona.

The first phase was to be a Military Directory, presided over by General Sanjurjo, with eight other Generals, including Franco, Mola, Cabanellas, Goded, Queipo de Llano and Fanjul, with Salazar Alonso, the only civilian, as High Commissioner in Morocco. This was to be succeeded by a "Unified Government" under Calvo Sotelo, with Franco as War Minister, Mola as Minister of

the Interior, Goicoechea as Foreign Minister, Dr. Albiñana as Minister of Agriculture and Gil Robles as Minister of Marine.

These Ministries quite obviously were to be simply representative of the parties in coalition: Renovación Española, the Carlists and Acción Popular. Significantly, there is no member of the Falange Española, and José Primo de Rivera, from his cell in Alicante, told a foreign journalist that, if the rebels won, Falange would be persecuted by them within six months.

The interpenetration of fascist and purely militaristic ideas had not gone very far, but it had been stimulated by Azaña's military reforms. The U.M.E. acted as a liaison. General Fanjul had stood for election to the Cortes in company with Goicoechea and Primo de Rivera. On the other side, an officer was shot in Pamplona as a Communist.

Franco himself, like every General of the *pronunciamientos*, declared that he was personally disinterested in the movement. He would be satisfied, he said, if it succeeded in driving the Communist peril out of Spain. "I have no intention," he added, "of causing unnecessary victims, for all Spaniards are not Communists."

Queipo de Llano, however, the burlesque Spanish General in Seville, stated to a foreign journalist: "Mola, Cabanellas and Franco agree with me that it is a stupidity to want to save the life of three or four hundred thousand persons, because if that number dies in Madrid, all will be over." "Our plans," he added, "have been worked out in accord with Italy and Germany. The Spaniards who will have to die for our final triumph approximate to three or four millions, and if these do not die fighting on the battle-field, upon my honour they will die shot or mutilated by our Legionaries or Moors. If we did not do this, we should fail to carry out the promise we made to our brothers, the Italians and Germans. And we are all men of honour."

Queipo de Llano was fond of this sinister type of military humour, a sort of *épater les bourgeois* not unpractised also by

certain sections on the other side; and he could not be taken too seriously were it not that so reliable and sceptical an observer as the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent in Seville reported that some 8,000 persons had been executed there. With Queipo de Llano, a man with curiously cold eyes, that may have been part of the joke. Franco, at any rate, seems to have taken no steps to silence the Seville Radio-station, and Right wing ladies cowering in Barcelona drank in such sinister buffoonery with watering mouths.

José Maria Pemán, the future Minister of Education in the "Unified Government", the bitter rival of the far greater artist, Garcia Lorca, shot by the rebels in Granada for being the great popular poet he was, found Queipo de Llano's radio speeches epic: "Here is a General," he broadcast on the feast of the Virgin of the Kings, "who laughs in a microphone while his heart weeps. The telephone wires trembled like the strings of a harp." "Is it not so, General Queipo de Llano, 'radio-General', tower of good humour and optimism, is it not true that in those first twenty-four hours there was something superhuman behind you? Is it not true that you felt at your back, counselling you, encouraging you, loving you, the girlish face of the Virgin of the Kings?"

"A fanatical religious atmosphere reigned in Seville," noted the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent.

Much more serious than Queipo de Llano's savage humour were the definite instructions issued to the rebel officers: a complete manual of "frightfulness", based on the "lessons of the Great War".

The main factor to ensure victory, these instructions ran, was the destruction of the enemy's morale. To accomplish this, the first thing to do on occupying a town was to execute all the notabilities who could be found, or, if they had fled, their families. The executions were to be public and as impressive as possible. The best way to discover these persons was to ask the local priest. Hesitation to obey these orders would be rigorously punished and

“an excess of zeal is better than humanitarian mildness”. Members of Falange Española might be enlisted as officers to see that the troops did not fail to carry out the executions and to denounce any such hesitations. A great lesson of the War was that the bombardment of hospitals and ambulances was particularly effective in spreading demoralisation. Even if there were few fighting forces in the district in question, it would be necessary to carry out the executions, since fugitives would spread the dismay.

A final paragraph, marked “Very important and confidential”, states that the officers will not indicate officially when the troops are to convert their cartridges into dum-dums. If the troops should do this, the officers are to take no notice. In order to be certain that the troops understand their duty in this respect, the officers are to protest continually against the abominable methods employed by the enemy, who do not hesitate to avail themselves of the barbarous use of dum-dum bullets which cause horrible wounds. “We believe that such words will produce the desired effect and perhaps the indignation will be sufficient for this method to be employed.”

The Spanish Embassy in London issued a document drawn up by the Governing Body of the College of Lawyers in Madrid which shows that these instructions were well carried out. “Although there were no troops of any kind in the Andalusian villages of Constantina, Carmona, etc., the rebel forces bombarded the peaceful inhabitants, killing women and children.” The document, composed by men of high repute, anything but extremists, exposes a number of similar cases. The world was shocked by photos of the corpses of the children deliberately bombed in Madrid. The Scottish Ambulance on the Madrid front was bombed and destroyed, despite its display of the Red Cross flag.

“The Government has not denied, nor denies now,” says this document, “that there have been excesses in the repressive conduct of the Government forces.” There

certainly were many such regrettable cases, although nothing on the scale of the "Badajoz Horror" and the massacres of Almendralejo, photographed by M. René Brut; but the very important point is that, whereas the rebel excesses were deliberately ordered in the instructions quoted above and boasted of by General Queipo de Llano, the responsible leadership of all antifascist organisations repeatedly and energetically condemned such individual actions; and the proof that this condemnation was not such hypocrisy as is recommended in the paragraph dealing with dum-dum bullets is that numbers of persons were shot out of hand for indulging in wanton murder or looting. The rebel instructions note that "in some cases it will be very effective to burn the crops and shoot the cattle": Durruti, the anarchist leader on the Aragon front, proclaimed that "the crops are sacrosanct".

It must be recalled too that the Antifascists were largely drawn from classes which had been oppressed for generations with the utmost brutality, which had suffered under Martinez Anido in Barcelona and Doval in Asturias, while the rebels were led by persons who considered themselves officers and gentlemen. The spirit of Queipo de Llano seems to have inspired the inscription scrawled on a wall at Moron: "We shall die but your women will give birth to Fascists."

A proclamation drafted by Gil Robles, destined only for officers and non-commissioned officers, and strictly not to be published outside these circles, emphasises the military aspect of the rebellion: "Our generous soldier's blood boils with indignation and the desire for action. It is not only the existence of the armed forces, the future of the Nation, the honour of the uniform and the soldier's own dignity that are at stake. It is the very life of our country, of glorious history, of radiant future. We are all transfixed with grief for Spain, for Mother Spain. We are decided to go out in defence of Spain and offer our lives for our country; discipline, honour and our oath oblige us. It is a sacred duty. It is not a rebellion but a supreme

and sublime act of service to our country. The country is in danger. In our hands lies the salvation of the glorious treasure of the past, the glorious treasure of the martyrs of Spain!"

A pamphlet spread surreptitiously in Burgos before the outbreak of the rebellion listed the grievances of certain military circles under the form of an impassioned "Although": "Although they arm the Shock Police and enlist in them all the officers who disgrace the Army; although they readmit into the Army men dismissed for the vilest murders; although there is no authority left; although Spain is ruled by traitors sold to Masonry and Judaism; although they are removing from their posts the Army's most eminent and valued officers; although they are giving the Shock Police the material and arms which the Army lacks—no matter! There are still pure and noble souls who will restore her greatness to Spain and prevent her ruin; and all Humanity will see again the country of Gentility and Nobility (*caballerosidad y hidalguia*)."

The surface of the rebellion then was to be purely military. This is proved again by the Decree which was to be posted up by General Manuel Gonzalez Carrasco, commander of the IVth Division in Barcelona. This prolix document is exactly based on the historical *pronunciamientos*, with just that amount of politics which is present in all of them.

"Once again the Army, united with the other forces of the nation, has been obliged to fulfil the desires of the great majority of Spaniards who watch with infinite bitterness the disappearance of that which can unite us all in a common ideal: Spain. We have to restore Order, not only in its appearance or external signs but also in its very essence. Therefore we must work with justice, making it available to all classes and social categories, which will neither be favoured nor persecuted, the country ceasing to be divided into two groups: one which enjoys the power and the other whose rights are trampled on, even though

it is a matter of laws made by those who break them themselves; the conduct of each one of you will guide the conduct which he will obtain from *authority*, another *element* which has disappeared from our nation and which is indispensable in every human collectivity, just as much in a democratic regime as in a sovietic, where it arrives at its maximum rigour. The restoration of this principle of *authority*, forgotten in the past few years, demands inexorably that the punishments shall be exemplary for the *seriousness* with which they are imposed and the *rapidity* with which they are carried out, without hesitation or vacillations."

The laborious military prose lacks all suspicion of fascist rhetoric. General Gonzalez Carrasco must have sat up many a night trying to put his thoughts on paper.

Martial law was declared. All sabotage, attempts at flight, threats to or contempt of the agents of the authorities, distribution of subversive propaganda, etc., would be punished by death. All the Constitutional personal guarantees, all laws not uniformly applicable to the whole Spanish territory and all newspapers would be suspended, the papers being substituted by a single official sheet and the radio. Lockouts and strikes were strictly forbidden, the "right to work" guaranteed. The General hoped that employers and workers would "fraternise in reason, justice and patriotism". If anyone refused to be a brother, he would be "the first and chief to suffer the consequences".

The final paragraph was particularly military: "I hope for the collaboration of all patriotic persons attached to order and peace, who sighed for this movement, without the necessity that they may be required for it, being, without doubt, the majority, through convenience, lack of civic valour or through belief in a common element which should unite the forces of all of us who have been hitherto dominated by audacious minorities subject to orders from internationals of various kinds but all equally

anti-Spanish. Therefore I end with a single cry, which I desire shall be felt by all hearts and echoed by all wills: 'Long live Spain!'"

This peculiar statement may not appear very clear. The General, in his repudiation of the "various anti-Spanish internationals", seems to have become somewhat entangled in his own Castilian. But he had already threatened with "expeditious proceedings" anyone who might show "contempt" for the military authorities.

A draft-plan for the future State of the reactionaries was found in a raid on a rebel's flat in Madrid. It provided for: abolition of the Constitution and drafting of a provisional new version; amnesty for all offences committed after February 16, 1936; provisional abolition of the whole press, to be substituted by a single official paper until a new press-law had been drafted completely destroying the Marxist and "anti-Spanish" press and forbidding the reconstructed press even to discuss the basic principles of Christian civilisation, religion, the country, the family, etc.; complete annihilation of Marxism and "anti-Spain" (separatism, etc.); modification of personal liberties, the right of assembly, etc.; appointment of Generals as provincial Governors with technical commissioners attached to them for administrative purposes; immediate measures for the agrarian reform, study of a plan for public works and the working-out of a wider planning of work-schemes; urgent measures for the solution of the currency and foreign trade problems; repeal of all measures directed against the Church since February 16; absolute liberty for clerical teaching, restoration of crucifixes in the schools, abolition of communistic teaching, religious teaching by priests, dismissal of all university professors who had taught things contrary to Christian morality; immediate Concordat with Rome; inability of the State to decide matters of conscience; dissolution of the Marxist trades-unions; repeal of the law enforcing the re-employment of workers dismissed after October 1934; prevention of reprisals and similar abuses by the employers; abolition of the

Mixed Labour Arbitration Juries and their substitution by social delegates from the State.

Thus, apart from the two obvious tendencies, in favour of the Church and against the Marxists, there was little concrete in this programme. The problems were listed but not solved. Significantly, it mentions only the "Marxist trades-unions", neglects the big factor of the anarcho-syndicalist C.N.T.

There was some doubt about the burning question in Spain: federalism. Mola appeared to be strongly hostile to the rearrangement of the provinces and especially furious against Catalonia. Franco had drafted a plan for the dividing-up of the territory administered by the Generalidad. "Catalonia will of course lose the autonomy she has abused," Franco told a French paper, "and the teaching of the Catalan language will be forbidden." Lerida and Tarragona would be united with Aragon, Barcelona and Gerona would be united with the Balearics in one military district, all the northern part of Gerona becoming a vast military camp whence troops could be sent either to quell internal disturbances or to guard the Pyrennees. Castile would be given an outlet to the sea and part of Galicia would pass to Portugal. Basque autonomy would be restricted. Spanish Morocco would be given a Statute of autonomy, and the Tangier international zone would probably be enlarged.

Whether this meant a form of regionalism or merely military administrative convenience is not certain.

The internal divisions in the rebel camp were as serious as those among the Governmentals. The Carlists, the Cedists and the Falange had entirely different criterions and aims, and all of them differed from the militarists. Primo de Rivera stated from prison that he did not believe that Franco was basing his army on colonial troops and mercenaries. Undoubtedly, many Catholics were shocked by the cynicism of some priests who hung silver crosses round the Moors' necks and assured them that if they fell fighting they would go straight to Paradise; if they did

not fall, they received 1,000 Austrian 1902 kronen per month or cheques on banks in the Government's possession.

Pemán could go so far as to say publicly in Seville, centre of the importation of Moors: "The providential and historical mission of Spain has always been to redeem the civilised world from all its perils: expel Moors, detain Turks, baptise Indians and offer herself, crucified and drained of blood, in generous unctions of human redemption. Therefore the war they are waging against us is no civil war: this is a new War of Independence, a new Reconquest, a new expulsion of the Moors!"

Personal letters found among dead rebel militiamen's papers reveal that bitter hatred reigned in many places between Renovación Española and Acción Popular, between the officers and the civilians who rarely fought in the front line.

Thus there was an inevitable contradiction inherent in the rebel union: that between the military and the civilians. Whereas the contradiction between the petty-bourgeois Republicans and the proletarian Socialists could be solved by the natural course of events and the necessities of war-time, there could be no solution of the conflict on the other side since it did not rest upon an historical process.

Franco was too intelligent to neglect his civilian bases. There were two regions where he could recruit men to replace the soldiers who were killed or deserted: Navarre and Andalusia. In Navarre, the backward peasants, ferociously Catholic and ferocious haters of Basques and Catalans, could still be rallied for God and Don Carlos. In Andalusia, the sons of the ranchers and that class of small professional petty-bourgeoisie who had joined the Anarchists with the early Radicals of the Nineties, formed another nucleus, enrolled chiefly in the Falange Española. In Madrid, General Mola's famous "Fifth Column" might be relied upon to sabotage the defence should the insurrection fail at first. But a long war was not

envisaged, and Franco hoped to be in Madrid by July 22. Both sides made the initial mistake of believing that the war would be brief and that therefore the future shape of things could be settled afterwards.

The military plan was worked out by General Goded, but Franco was always the leading executant. He had decided upon August 10. He put the final touches to the plan and entrusted the actual organisation work to General Balmes, one of the commanders of the Asturias repression.

All was carefully concerted. In every garrison town, the officers had been formed into a revived form of the Military Defence Juntas of 1917 under the orders of Generals Goded, Balmes, Franco, Mola and Fanjul. The idea was simple: the simultaneous rising of all the garrisons in Spain. Madrid and Barcelona were naturally the most important points, but if they should fail, there were the trenches in the Sierra constructed during the "manœuvres" that Goded had held there when Gil Robles was Minister of War, and there were the Navarrese *requetes*, protected by Saragossa and Huesca should Goded himself fail in Barcelona. In Red Seville, the Falange could be trusted to hold the workers of the Triana suburb until the military arrived. The Civil Governors were either bought or surrounded by bought agents, and it was probable that they would not move in the only way that could imperil the conspiracy, by arming the workers, until long bureaucratic procedures had been accomplished. In the Balearics, Majorca was a matter of foreign politics which could be looked after by the politicians and Juan March. The signal would be a rising of the Foreign Legion and Moorish Regulars, both terrified by the threat of the Popular Government that it would investigate the responsibilities for the atrocities of the Asturias repression.

The conspirators forgot the Air Force and the Navy: the Air Force with no long tradition of caste behind it, and the Navy which is in all countries the section of the armed forces most open to revolutionary propaganda and most organised by the conditions of work to welcome

it. Franco had not calculated on the mutiny of the sailors and had supposed that even if they did mutiny, they would not be able to sail the ships. He was not entirely mistaken in the last point, but after a few elected masters had been shot for inefficiency, some of the Governmental warships, especially the *Jaime I*, did useful work. Franco's main error in this as in his whole preparations was a contempt for the capacity of the working class. He may have reckoned, with Prieto, that the Spanish working class was still incapable of a movement on a large scale because the backwardness of Spanish industry had not yet produced a strong organised proletariat.

The two chief defects of the plan were obvious: that it must succeed immediately, by surprise, or the loyalty of the deceived soldiers could not be trusted; and it must take place simultaneously all over Spain, since the strength of the Lerroux Government in 1934 had resulted precisely from the fact that the revolt was dislocated. In this case, of course, the Army was the rebel; but the simultaneous action all over the country would unite the working class, not leaving Andalusia two weeks behind Catalonia and Madrid ten days behind Asturias. Franco had to oppose the mobility of his armed forces to the immobility of the unarmed general strike. The workers' chief advantage would be the presence of skilled technicians. Franco's civilian allies were mostly drawn from the upper and middle classes and from the peasants. It would be difficult to find men to break the general strike if force or the hostility between the Socialists and Anarchosyndicalists failed to do so.

The plot was, therefore, extremely audacious. The organisation was excellent, but, owing to a series of chances, the element of surprise was lacking. The capture of the Valencia radio station by alleged Falangists, the killing of Calvo Sotelo, the civil element's insistence upon immediately exploiting the Madrid and Barcelona strikes and the belief that the accidental death of General Balmes in Teneriffe on July 15 was not really accidental forced

Franco's hand before he was quite ready. In another three weeks the rising might have succeeded.

The strategic plan was simple. Six thousand Foreign Legionaries and Moors would be transported to Seville, whence Queipo de Llano would lead them through Cadiz, Jerez and Cordoba to Madrid, where he would meet Mola's column from the North with elements drawn from the Basque country, Vitoria, Burgos, Valladolid and Segovia, and Cabanellas' column from Saragossa, strengthened by Goded's from Catalonia. The columns having met in Madrid, Franco and Mola would officially announce the *coup d'état*, depose Azaña, make Sanjurjo President, with a Military Junta to rule the country. Gil Robles had assured the Generals that the Vatican would recognise them immediately, and there could be little doubt that Italy, Germany, Portugal and a few miscellaneous Central American Republics would follow suit. Since the Generals felt certain of entering Madrid by July 22, no serious diplomatic preparation had been made. The recognition of the *fait accompli* had been a common practice of European diplomacy from the days of Vilna and Memel to those of Addis-Ababa.

The immediate instrument of the plan was an innocent British pilot, who was hired by a mysterious Spaniard at Croydon on July 9. On the 11th, he left with the mysterious stranger, Major Hugh Pollard ("an authority on fire-arms"), his nineteen-year-old daughter Diana and her friend Miss Dorothy Watson. "My family," said Major Pollard, "is Catholic, and I could not allow my Spanish friends to be murdered by the Reds. I knew Franco was the man who could save Spain."

At Bordeaux and Lisbon, the pilot noticed that the mysterious Spaniard had earnest conversations with some of his compatriots. There was a complicated affair at Las Palmas. Franco was in the country on Teneriffe, "a political prisoner watched by the Government's spies", said Major Pollard. However the General at last boarded the plane, threw his uniform and all his

documents into the sea. The excuse for Franco's visit to Las Palmas was precisely General Balmes's funeral.

The pilot took Franco to Tetuan via Agadir and Casablanca, and in Tetuan the Foreign Legion gave the General a clamorous welcome. The pilot and the mysterious Spaniard returned to London, then to Biarritz, then to Marseilles. The international intrigue became fast and furious. There were secret conferences, recognitions by torn playing-cards, rapid journeys by various emissaries to Rome, Berlin, Bordeaux and Nice. In Biarritz, Juan March joined the plane to go to Majorca, but once again bad luck dogged the conspirators. The plane had to land at Perpignan and was detained by the French police. March travelled back to Paris and thence to Lisbon, taking Robles with him.

Secret agents handed the pilot sealed envelopes to be delivered in Pamplona and Burgos. The secret police detained him, but he managed to get rid of the compromising documents, and at last arrived back in England. Only then did he realise that he was "being used as a tiny cog within a huge machine ready to be set in motion as the result of a long and well thought-out plan".

Major Pollard stayed in the Canary Isles, and a few days later four English planes arrived in Bordeaux and were unable to explain just why. They had to return, and another small cog had failed to work.

A few days later, when the rebellion had already broken out, the socialist deputy, Angel Galarza, had to flee from Zamora over the Portuguese border. In Chaves, he met a friend, who "made me a sign by which we became brothers immediately. . . ." The conversation turned to "subjects of such transcendent importance" that Galarza and his friends went rushing to Lisbon. There he met another "brother" who informed him of Sanjurjo's movements. There was a plane, but in the military airfield. Galarza mobilised all his friends to protest, and finally the plane was transferred to another field. That afternoon, an envoy put a fat envelope in Galarza's

hands: "guarantee that all will go well." He vanished in a car before Galarza could reply.

A few minutes later the rumour spread round Lisbon that Sanjurjo had been burned to death when his pilot, Ansaldo, had smashed into a tree when taking off. A phone rang. "Are you Galarza?" "Yes." "Then here are my best wishes." The caller rang off.

Another cog had failed.

In a farm not far from Biarritz there were gathered some of the noblest names in Spain. Every day, huge cars drew up outside. The drivers used the names of their own chauffeurs and passed the International Bridge at Irun without being disturbed. March and Robles were in Biarritz for a brief moment, until the French police requested them to move further. But in Hendaye, Saint-Jean-de-Luz, Estoril and Lisbon the Spanish Monarchists remained, talking high and loud of the redemption of Spain. The French and Portuguese authorities looked on.

The machine whirled and moved, checking a little for the loss of its tiny cogs. It was still powerful enough to spatter all Spain with blood.

II

MADRID

MADRID DID NOT at first realise what lay before it. Involved in the minor tittle-tattle of politics, so used to rumours that no one could ever believe the truth where so many cried "Wolf!" so urbanely, Madrid thought that the Moroccan rising was a mere incident and returned to discussion of ministerial probabilities.

Only afterwards did they know how tense matters had been on Friday morning. At ten o'clock, Cartagena had radioed to the Marine radio station in Ciudad Lineal an official proclamation which was to be retransmitted to the garrison in Madrid and to the rest of Spain. Franco had joined the Morocco insurrection to "save the honour of Spain and rescue her from the Marxist policy of the Popular Front".

The Operator, Benjamin Balboa, did not forward this message but, in defiance of military discipline, communicated with the secretary of the Admiralty. He asked Cartagena how it could send out such subversive messages. Cartagena replied that the officers there were on the point of rising.

While Balboa was talking to Cartagena, a naval captain, Ibañez Aldecoa, cut the station's wires and began to send out Franco's proclamation on his own apparatus. Balboa rushed out and spoke to the Admiralty on the public phone. When Ibañez tried to take over the Ciudad Lineal radio station, Balboa thrust a revolver into his ribs, held up his superior officer and arrested him.

A whole day had passed while Ibañez was trying to spread Franco's proclamation. The *Ferrandiz* had already

transported the first Moroccan Regulars from Ceuta, where she had put in a few days before under the pretext of disembarking a sick engineer.

Vaquez Seco, commander of the naval wireless services, a Socialist, had hastened to Ciudad Lineal in answer to Balboa's phone-message. He succeeded in picking up the *Ferrandiz*. Urgently he told them that they had been deceived, that this was a fascist movement against the Government. The *Ferrandiz* replied that the crew could do nothing: the ship was full of troops; on the way back. . . . On the way back, the crew mutinied, shot the officers and rejoined the Government. Later, similar news arrived from other ships. *Jaime I*, the biggest warship in the navy, radioed: "What do we do with the corpses?" But that came later. On Saturday night, only two ships, the *Ferrandiz* and a destroyer, were known to be loyal.

News was astonishingly scarce and confused in Madrid that Friday. It was known that Morocco had risen, but not how serious it was. There were rumours that the Burgos garrison was uncertain, that General Queipo de Llano seemed to have raised the Seville garrison, that there were coloured troops at Cadiz, perhaps at Seville. Had "it" come? No, said most people: the Fascists were not yet ready; this was simply another Valencia.

The Government, still uncertain, mobilised its Shock Police on Friday night and kept the Civil Guard in barracks. The Civil Guard had been considerably cleaned up since April 14, but its loyalty was not at all certain. The police rounded up hundreds of suspects, but such of the leaders as were in Madrid could not be caught.

Yet one of them, the sinister Salazar Alonso, sat surrounded by jubilant friends in Madrid's most prominent restaurant, Molinero. Outside, on the uneasy Alcalá, the riot-cars screamed by. Salazar Alonso, already appointed rebel High Commissioner for Morocco, dined with his friends. Molinero was always a Fascists' meeting-place. General Mola was there, greeting his acquaintances with the fascist salute. When Salazar Alonso entered the café

at eleven o'clock, cheers saluted him. "Quiet, gentlemen, quiet!" he said. "That's for to-morrow."

On Saturday morning, the official radio confirmed the news that had been printed in Friday night's Barcelona papers. Part of the Army had risen. General Nuñez de Prado was being sent to quell it. There was no need for alarm. The movement, "mad and absurd", had not had the slightest echo on the mainland.

Nevertheless, Left politicians went round the Civil Guard barracks to remind the men of their loyalty to the Republic. Mixed detachments of Civil Guards and Shock Police were sent to guard the strategic points of the capital.

The commanders of the Madrid garrison were summoned to the Ministry of War. The news from all over the Peninsula was alarming. Saragossa, Burgos, Pamplona, Valladolid, Seville were more than dubious. In Valencia, there appeared to be a strong rebellious movement inside the barracks. The Madrid commanders gave vague assurances of loyalty and returned to their quarters. General Nuñez del Prado was sent to Saragossa instead of Morocco. Nothing more was heard of him.

In the Casa del Pueblo the Socialists began to distribute what arms the militias, organised by Enrique Puente, possessed there. There were arms for some 8,000 men, but arms of every inefficient sort, and very little ammunition. Another 8,000 men stood around the doors vainly demanding weapons of some sort. The Anarchists drew their few pistols from under their mattresses.

Leaders of the Popular Front parties demanded arms from the Government. The Government possessed about 55,000 rifles, besides the reserves of the Shock Police. But 50,000 of the rifles had no bolts. These were kept in the Montaña Barracks, and the officers there refused to give them up when Brigadier-general Miaja demanded them. It was a general custom to keep the bolts apart from the rifles in case the arsenals should be stormed.

The Cabinet debated anxiously. Members of all the Popular Front parties, with whom consultation had been

increasingly frequent since the murder of Calvo Sotelo, were called in. The first steps were obvious: martial law was repealed in those places where the rebels had declared it, the soldiers in the rebel garrisons released from their oath of obedience to their officers and their divisions dissolved, Generals Franco, Queipo de Llano and Cabanellas dismissed from the Army.

The workers' organisations declared the general strike wherever the Generals had declared martial law.

It was obvious that these measures alone would not counter a military rebellion which was more than a mere *pronunciamiento*. The Navy's loyalty was quite uncertain. Barcelona phoned that the insurrection was expected from one moment to the next. The Madrid officers' refusal to arm the workers showed clearly enough that their commanders' vague expressions of loyalty meant nothing.

There was just a chance, thought the bourgeois Ministers, of taking the wind out of their opponents' sails by reviving the old plan—the "Maura Plan"—of a National Government. Casares Quiroga must go. That was certain. Whatever might be his personal reliability, he was too badly hated by the victims of the Sanjurjo rising. If the Government decided, after all, to resist, Casares Quiroga had failed by allowing the situation to arise at all.

The bourgeois parties, faced with the alternative of arming the workers, were for capitulation. Not only had they not learned the lesson of Companys in 1934 but they were ready to repeat it on a far more fatal scale. In 1934, Companys was a rebel between two fires; in 1936, the bourgeois Ministers were a legitimate Government opposed to rebels.

The Ministers, including Casares Quiroga himself, believed that the movement was directed chiefly against him. Calvo Sotelo's threats during the big debate on Public Order seemed to have reduced the affair to a duel between two men: or between two bands, Calvo Sotelo's officers and Casares Quiroga's Shock Police. Starhemberg and Fey may have been in the minds of politicians so

conscious of a parallel between Austrian and Spanish affairs.

While 3,000 Madrid taxis packed with armed militias, childishy proud of their rifles, roared through the city; while the phone in the Ministry of War rang incessantly, carrying ever blacker news; while Benjamin Balboa was holding back Ibañez and Franco's proclamation up at Ciudad Lineal, the Ministers and the Popular Front leaders debated anxiously.

"Discreet Diego" Martinez Barrio seemed the most appropriate person to carry through the manœuvre. Sanchez Román, key-man of the "Maura Plan"—but where was Miguel Maura?—would deal with the rebels personally. Could March reasonably fight the Madrid Chamber of Commerce? Azaña himself—"I refuse to be a civil war Premier"—appears to have acquiesced when Quiroga and Martinez Barrio brought it from the Ministry of War to the Presidential Palace.

The workers' leaders had fought the plan. For two hours Prieto had argued against it. Even if the idea were feasible, the masses would never accept surrender. Already the slogan: "*No pasaran!*" "They shall not pass!" was flying from lip to lip among the masses packing the streets in the hot night. And the workers' militias were armed. Badly armed, but well enough armed to smash a mere surrender-Ministry.

At four in the morning of July 19—in Barcelona the troops were moving down in the bright hot dawn—the Madrid radio announced the formation of the Martinez Barrio Ministry. Five from the Premier's Republican Union, four from Azaña's Republican Left, three from Sanchez Román's National Republicans, one Independent Republican and one from the Esquerra.

The crowd, waiting with ghastly tension around the loud-speakers, roared their disapproval. "They shall not pass!" and the Government had been made especially to let them pass. Taxis of armed militias rushed into the Puerta del Sol. Huge demonstrations of protest marched

along the streets. It seemed that the revolution had come—from the Left: the Rights' bogey of the "*preventive putsch*".

But it was nothing of the sort. In Barcelona, their comrades were already dying on hasty barricades. The guns were roaring in the streets there. The rebellion had begun and the antifascist Popular Front which had made the Casares Quiroga Cabinet to represent Antifascism and nothing more than Antifascism, would not permit surrender. "Not a step backwards," Azaña had declared; and the new Cabinet contained Sanchez Román who had refused even to enter the Popular Front. Martinez Barrio resigned before he could even take up his office. Of all Spain's short-lived Governments, this was the shortest.

In the Presidential Palace, Prieto stuck to his point. The workers must be armed, and there must be no surrender. At last the Government was formed under Giral, Azaña's best friend and confidant, late Minister of Marine. Minister of the Interior was General Pozas, an excellent appointment, since he was Commander of the Civil Guard and could thus assure their loyalty to the Government. Later, he was to prove himself one of the Republic's best Generals. The Minister of War was General Castelló, a popular Republican officer. Otherwise there was no change. In fact, since Giral was an excellent person, an eminent scientist, but hardly a man of Casares Quiroga's stature, it meant that Azaña himself was assuming all his responsibilities. For the man who had avoided making the revolution in 1931, this was an immensely important step.

The announcement of the new Cabinet at once restored calm. The crowds went home to sleep. Only the Left Republican circles wondered anxiously how they were going to disarm the workers again. "I wish that was all I had to worry about," remarked Prieto.

In Barcelona, the rebel troops had reached the heart of the city, and the Plaza Cataluña was a hell of bullets,

corpses and plunging horses. In Madrid, they waited, preparing feverishly the assault.

Barricades rose in all the suburbs, cleverly and scientifically constructed. There were sandbags protecting all the important public buildings, on which flew the flag of the Republic. But the cars and taxis crammed with militias triumphantly waving ancient rifles and Wild West pistols carried red flags, as did the riot cars of the Shock Police and Civil Guard. Everyone greeted the passing cars with the clenched fist. The militias wore their ordinary Sunday clothes; the famous *mono* appeared only two days later.

From the Shock Police barracks behind the Ministry of the Interior in the Puerta del Sol, riot cars rushed to the places where the insurrection had already begun: the airfields of Cuatro Vientos and Getafe, the churches from which came the first shots.

A huge crowd in the Puerta del Sol itself shouted for arms. But still the arms did not come. The new Government still hesitated to arm the workers.

The militias, faced with the Government's hesitation, began to search the houses of Right sympathisers and arrest known Fascists. It became more and more obvious that the insurrection would break at any moment. The Montaña Barracks were surrounded by watchful militias, but as yet they did not move.

By noon, isolated actions were beginning all over the city. The churches, from which the Fascists and some police had begun firing too soon, were stormed, a few of them burnt. The most important was the Cathedral, a building of no particular historical or artistic value. All parties shared in these fights.

It almost seemed that perhaps the insurrection was only one of the hundred false alarms which had momentarily perturbed Madrid for the past six months. The afternoon was tense, the streets were deserted, but there were few shots to be heard. The militias, however, remained on the watch.

In the afternoon, General Fanjul, Under-secretary for War during Gil Robles' period, arrived at the Montaña Barracks. He gathered the officers and made them a speech ending with cheers for Spain, the Army and the King. Then he telephoned the other Madrid barracks and published a proclamation declaring martial law and the constitution of a military dictatorship. The troops were to march out in the evening. The regimental bands were refused leave of absence since they would be needed to celebrate the victory.

With Fanjul had come all the cadets and reserve officers in Madrid who sympathised with the Right. The barrack-yards were crowded with fascist civilians who greeted each other with raised arm.

The radio announced at five o'clock that Franco had phoned Azaña to tell him that all resistance was useless. The President had replied in the appropriate manner.

The Montaña Barracks stand on a hill commanding the centre of the city, the Gran Via, its main street, and the Presidential Palace.

At seven o'clock a militia car was shot at from the barracks. The main battle for Madrid had begun.

The militias placed a huge loud-speaker in the square in front of the barracks and summoned the soldiers to surrender, informing them of the Government's decree dissolving the regiments. Two guns were placed to cover the high wall, and two police tanks patrolled the square. The shooting became more generalised as the night went on.

At three in the morning, the militias ceased fire and again offered an armistice. The officers refused to surrender. At five, two planes bombed the barracks, and the two guns, the tanks, machine-guns and rifles opened a heavy bombardment. The barracks replied with light artillery, mortars and machine-guns.

The siege of the Montaña Barracks was one of the many astonishing incidents of the Spanish Civil War. While the guns thundered and the bombs fell, the cafés just round

the corner of the Gran Via were open and crowded with thirsty spectators. The Madrid population not enrolled in the militias simply enjoyed the spectacle.

The militias, however, had heavy and heroic work before them. The rifles they so badly needed were inside the barracks and even more important than to crush an enemy stronghold inside the city was to get arms. Mola's insurgents from Burgos might attack Madrid at any moment, pouring over the Sierra.

At the height of the battle, a soldier succeeded in escaping. The crowd carried him shoulder-high, encouraged him with brandy and coffee and took him off to the President's Palace. Azaña embraced him and at once appointed him to his personal guard.

At ten o'clock on Monday morning, the barracks at last ran up a white flag. For the moment the soldiers had the upper hand inside. But as soon as the firing had ceased and the militias approached the great doors, the officers mowed them down with machine-guns. This happened twice more, until the police officers directing the siege decided that the barracks could be reduced only by renewed bombardment from artillery and the air.

But the militias would not wait. They had little to fight with but their own enthusiasm. By sheer mass they swept the police aside and stormed the barracks. There was no chance of resistance. Many fell, but the solid mass of shouting, infuriated workers roared in to avenge their comrades. Nineteen officers fled into a back-room and poisoned themselves. Others tore off their uniform jackets, hoping to be mistaken for private soldiers. Few succeeded.

Fanjul surrendered and was taken to police-headquarters in an armoured car. He was an utterly beaten man. "It's all a mistake," he muttered again and again. But it was no mistake.

In the Montaña Barracks there was an enormous store of arms. The first militiaman to enter ran to a window precariously balancing a dozen rifles. A thousand hands reached for them. Arms! The very fact of possessing

arms drove enthusiasm to a crescendo. Bands of a score or a hundred paraded the city cheering and singing. The crowds fraternised with them, and all that afternoon there were songs and cheers throughout Madrid.

There had been little serious fighting in Madrid besides the siege of the Montaña Barracks. The Pacifico Barracks was a serious problem for some hours but finally surrendered. The other military centres surrendered to the militias and the officers were carried off by the Civil Guard.

The Cuatro Vientos airfield remained loyal all through, thanks to the energetic action of a republican captain who assumed command. The artillery at Getafe and Carabanchel rose, and Getafe bombarded the airfield there for some time, without doing much serious damage. Finally they were reduced by militias and planes after a bloody struggle.

The engineers from the Prado marched away northwards to join Mola's army in the Sierra. On their way they attempted to cut Madrid's water-supply, but were beaten off by peasants and Carabineros.

After eighteen hours' hard fighting, Madrid was free again. The officers had made the fatal mistake of deferring the offensive. Certainly, they could not trust their men, and they were not numerous enough to prevent fraternisation. Franco had always wished to prepare the insurrection more fully, with special attention to this critical point. There had been bad miscalculations: the loyalty of the air-force, the Government's determination to use artillery, the loyalty of a large part of the well-armed Civil Guard, above all, the fighting spirit of the workers' militias. But for the mass-assault on the Montaña Barracks, Fanjul might have held out until Mola arrived from the rebel north, Cabanellas from Saragossa and possibly Goded from Barcelona, to hold out again until Franco's reliable Moors and Foreign Legion made their way from Estremadura or Seville. This appears to have been the rebels' general calculation, as shown in Granada, Cordoba,

Saragossa, Huesca, Oviedo, Gijon and Toledo. But it was extraordinarily risky strategy when applied to a position like Red Madrid.

"The defensive is the death of every armed insurrection," said Engels.

Yet the situation, both military and political, was far from clear. There was little reliable news. Malaga appeared to have been bombarded, Algeciras, La Linea. But Franco's Legionaries were on the mainland and he boasted that he could make his headquarters in Seville when he wished. Barcelona broadcast good news, but in Barcelona the Anarchists dominated. In Madrid, they had not yet definitely declared their support of the Giral Government, but they had played a leading part in the fighting. Navarre appeared to have declared frankly against Madrid and it was not impossible that Catalonia might decide to fight its own battles in its own way. Gradually news arrived.

In Saragossa, long a stronghold of the C.N.T., the workers rose. The general strike was declared. But the Civil Governor refused to distribute arms, and, after a brief but violent struggle, they were crushed. On Monday morning the shootings began and continued all the week. Every man with a union card was arrested and shot out of hand. At least 1,500 died.

In other cities it was the same. The Civil Governors, even when they remained loyal, hesitated to arm the workers, and were lost. The Civil Guard either refused to act or joined the rebels. In Badajoz, the Governor, after professions of loyalty, betrayed the Popular Front.

In Valencia, where the workers had been on guard all the week after the Radio Station incident, the soldiers did not move from their barracks. The militias, armed with ancient shotguns and revolvers, watched anxiously from the other bank of the Turia River. They heard shots inside the barracks. Afterwards, it was known that one man had saved the Republic in the key-point dominating not only the whole coast between Cartagena and Barcelona but,

more importantly, nearly the whole of Madrid's food-supply and its communications with the coast. But that came later. On July 19, the situation in Valencia was still uncertain.

Queipo de Llano was in Seville. This fantastic personage, who had once caused some amusement by ordering the whole Spanish Army to grow moustaches within twenty-four hours, could not at first be taken seriously. In Barcelona there were even rumours that he had been sent to Seville to negotiate with the doubtful regiments there. Nothing more was heard from Seville until Sunday afternoon. The last phone-call received in Madrid was from Queipo de Llano asking at the Ministry of the Interior to speak to General Mola, whom he supposed to be already member of the new Government. After this, Queipo de Llano, who appears to have a passion for modern means of communication, rang up the Governors of all the Andalusian towns which had not yet joined the revolt, in terms of such military ferocity that certain of them kept a policeman standing by.

In the workers' quarter of Red Seville, the Triana, Communists and Anarchists raised hasty barricades, on which they held out under artillery fire for five days. Even after they had been driven in, snipers made the Triana unsafe for the military for several weeks.

The general strike held. There were no trains. But there were no arms. Each town was isolated that week-end, at the mercy of the radio. The Tetuan station had already usurped the Seville wave-length, and Franco's broadcaster spoke Andalusian from Africa.

Asturias was the Government's greatest worry. A few days before, 600 hardened Asturian dynamiters, the *dinamiteros* who were to do such good work in Toledo, had arrived to strengthen the Madrid militias. Madrid felt that it could count on Asturias, the fighters of 1934. But the Lerroux-Gil Robles Government had taken good care that 1934 should not be repeated. The Oviedo garrison had been greatly strengthened. Colonel Aranda, a man of

brutal intelligence and considerable military talent, was in command. Aranda seemed to be a good Republican, a conservative certainly, but by no means a Fascist. The same was true of many of the rebel commanders. It is quite probable that many of them sincerely believed, at first, that they were freeing the Republic from the "Red scum."

On July 18, the socialist deputies Gonzalez Peña, Amador Fernandez and Antuña discussed the situation with the Civil Governor. They phoned Aranda and told him to arm the workers. Aranda arrived, greeting them with the raised fist of the Popular Front. He did not refuse, but thought that the situation was not yet so serious that this would be needed. A better plan would be to send a column of trustworthy miners to Leon, where they would be armed and could then take over the defence of the province.

A column of the best miners from Mieres and Sama, centres of the October Red Army, went to Leon, some seventy miles from Mieres. But in Leon they were told that there were no arms. They had better go to a number of small, scattered villages where the situation was still uncertain. The miners grew suspicious of this attempt to split the column, phoned Aranda and were told that there were arms in Ponferrada.

Ponferrada's market-place is the traditional square, shut in on all sides by high houses with balconies. The miners formed up there and waited for arms. Machine-guns hidden in the houses mowed them down as they waited there unarmed. Very few escaped.

Aranda repeated this plan in Oviedo itself. Peña received confidential information that the garrison was going to rise that evening. Aranda agreed at last to arm the workers and invited their leaders to meet him in the Shock Police Barracks. There, Ponferrada was repeated. Antuña was killed, Peña and Amador Fernandez managed to escape. But the best elements of the October Revolution were dead, the miners scattered, the province desperate and leaderless. If Aranda had advanced from Oviedo that night, he

could easily have mastered all Asturias and made a solid block for the rebellion in all the north-west from Vigo to Burgos and Valladolid. But he could not trust his men, and Oviedo remained besieged by the miners as soon as they had recovered. They unburied their old arms-deposits—thousands of rifles simply vanished after the surrender in October 1934—succeeded in defeating and disarming 180 Civil Guards with them and slowly began the reconquest of Asturias.

On the morning of July 19, only Valencia, Bilbao and Murcia had not risen. In the evening, the Government held Bilbao, Murcia, Madrid, Barcelona, Malaga and Minorca. Valencia was again doubtful. The Government held the whole coast except the stretch from Malaga to Huelva and from Vigo to the borders of Asturias. Communications with France were assured. The rebel towns seemed dispersed, and the failure to seize Barcelona, Madrid and Bilbao deprived them of all heavy industry. The Rio Tinto miners held firm far inside the enemy's country. But really, on the night of July 19, the countryside was one vast no-man's land.

With ten thousand men, the heavy artillery from Segovia and Medina and the air squadrons from Leon and Logroño, General Mola marched into the Sierra Guadarrama towards Madrid. The battalions moved up steadily to the Alto de Leon, the pass which commands the road from Segovia to Madrid. The rest of the column spread out over the range towards the cement trenches built there when Gil Robles was Minister of War.

Then happened one of the most important events in the whole Civil War. Without officers, with almost no ammunition, with no communications and without orders, the workers streamed out in taxis, commandeered cars, buses, anything, into Sierra to meet a modern army. The Anarchists advanced into the hills armed only with sticks of dynamite wrapped in bundles of newspaper. Later, they received a share of the rifles found in the Montaña Barracks.

The Young Socialists rushed towards the Alto de Leon. Almost all their leaders had actually left for their holidays. The organisation of the first column was carried through entirely by the only member of the Executive Committee in Madrid, a twenty-two-year-old girl, Aurora Arnaiz.

With wild enthusiasm—and almost nothing else—the first columns stormed into the passes and held them all except the Alto de Leon. Even here, the enemy was blocked. The loyalists could not enter, but the rebels could not advance. Gradually, 8,000 men spread over the ranges and far round the eastern edge and over the northern plain towards Segovia. Another column was almost at the gates of Avila. Madrid called them back lest they be surrounded. Some of the columns had absolutely no regular communications with the rear. The militias felt they were unnecessary—the war would be over in a few days. And their forward drive was such that literally nothing could stop them in those first days.

All chance of surprising Madrid was lost when the militias, strengthened by detachments of police, Civil Guards and soldiers, occupied the passes. Only the Alto de Leon held out against them, and its heavy artillery shot incendiary shells which made whole valleys blaze.

In the east, too, the militias and loyal troops drove all before them. Alcalá de Henares, the birthplace of Cervantes and Azaña, fell. Then, after a fierce struggle, Guadalajara. Eastwards towards Saragossa, upon which the Valencians and Catalans were converging from the south-west and south-east, the Madrid columns assaulted Sigüenza and pushed as far as Medinaceli. To the south, they took the lower part of Toledo. The insurgents, officers, soldiers, Civil Guards and Shock Police from the whole province, retreated into the huge mass of the Alcazar, taking their women and children with them. They were to be there for ten weeks.

The immediate advance of a workers' militia, without orders, although in defence of an established bourgeois

Government, was something quite novel. The Anarcho-syndicalists, hardened and eager fighters, drove forward beside the parties of the Popular Front. The columns were organised by each party, and at first each was so anxious to be the first to reach the enemy that they took no trouble to have their flanks covered. On July 23, the C.N.T. officially placed itself beside the Government. Outside its headquarters in Madrid a huge poster showed two dying militiamen, one of the U.G.T., the other of the C.N.T., their blood mingling. "With our blood," said the legend, "we seal our union."

III

BARCELONA

AT FIVE O'CLOCK the first shots disturbed Barcelona's uneasy sleep. The Sunday morning was particularly bright and hot, a fine day for fighting.

The regiments from the barracks in the north had begun to move down on to the centre of the city. At the other end of the town, down by the docks, the rebels held the Atarazanas Barracks. Generals Goded and Burriel and Captain Lopez Varela were in command, the Generals directing operations from their headquarters in the Capitania. Two machine-guns had been placed on the high platform of the Columbus Column, commanding the square flanked by the Atarazanas Barracks, the Divisional Headquarters and, further to the right, the Capitania. If the troops marching from the north could cross the central square, the Plaza Cataluña, and make the junction with Atarazanas, at the other end of the Ramblas, the main part of the city would be cut in two and the two semi-circles could be reduced by other columns moving round their perimeter, the Rondas. The plan was simple, but it called for rapidity, determination and, above all, a continuous advance.

The soldiers were roused early by their officers, told that they were to march round the city in a military parade—the Olympiad that afternoon had received official blessing and Companys was to open it formally—and were served with a liberal ration of brandy.

Soon after five, the action became general. The first columns had exchanged shots with a few police patrols who retired before the overwhelming odds. But when the

troops arrived at the outer circle of the inner city, the Calle Cortes, which leads straight to the University and the Plaza de España, key to the west part of the city, resistance was intense.

At first the action was sustained by the Shock Police and loyal Civil Guards supported by a few militia patrols. But soon the whole population of Barcelona joined in. In the Plaza de España, machine-gun fire raked the Olympic Hotel where 2,000 foreigners were staying. Hasty barricades were erected everywhere. The 75's of the horse-artillery came into play, rousing the echoes but doing comparatively little damage to the solid houses.

The troops arrived in the Plaza Cataluña with their artillery. From the Via Layetana, Shock Police from the Jefatura, their headquarters, held them for half an hour. Suddenly, the troops, headed by their officers, shouted "Long live the Republic!" and flung their caps into the air. Firing ceased, and a detachment of Shock Police walked across the square to fraternise. Together, they strolled over the the Telephone Building, guarded also by Shock Police. They chatted awhile, discussing the situation. The officer in command declared that they had been fired at by civilians and supposed that an Anarchist insurrection had broken out. He was assured that it was all a mistake.

While the Police Lieutenant was talking, he suddenly felt the officer's pistol in his ribs. A score of revolvers mowed down the guards at the door, and the rebels were in the Telephone Building. Rifles rang from all the upper windows of the Hotel Colon on the other side of the square. In a few minutes, the Plaza Cataluña was under fire from all sides save from the Ramblas.

The battle began again furiously. But now the militias were in action. On the Ramblas, lads of sixteen with ancient carbines sheltered inefficiently behind the trees and held the advance of a regular army for five hours. A rebel machine-gun at one corner of the square held the militia's advance. A captain of Shock Police ran straight at it, the

bullets thudding into his body. He must have been dead before he had crossed half the eighty yards that separated him from the gun, but his body went on and fell over the tripod. His comrades rushed the emplacement, and that entry was free.

Similar heroism was shown all over the city. The militias, men, women and children, fought like furies. There were two machine-guns sweeping the street from the Woodworkers' Union headquarters, captured by surprise. A captain of Shock Police held his men under cover on the other side of the impassable street. The anarchist leaders, Francisco Ascaso and Buenaventura Durruti, with ten men each, came up and declared they were going to take the building. "It is militarily impossible," replied the captain. "I am in command here and I forbid it." "We're Anarchists," replied Ascaso. "We are going to take it." Somehow, some of his ten men crossed the street and got up the stairs, while Durruti's band kept up covering fire. The machine-guns were captured. "It *was* militarily impossible," muttered the captain.

It was now perfectly clear that this was an officer's *putsch*, not the reply to an anarchist insurrection. The soldiers, realising how they had been deceived, fraternised with the workers wherever they could. They brought over much-needed arms, and they were welcomed with frantic enthusiasm.

The insurrection was lost as soon as the soldiers fraternised and the militias had arms. Some of the guns were captured and turned against the Hotel Colon and the Telephone Building. Outside the Capitanía, where Goded and his officers had barricaded themselves, the guns roared against the building, smashing splinters off the façade.

By noon, the strategic plan had crumpled against the militias' resistance. The action did not slacken, but it became sporadic. The columns which should have made the junction became isolated, and separate actions were being fought in the Plaza Cataluña, the Plaza de España,

the University, in which the rebels had placed machine-guns, at Atarazanas and along the Rondas. The churches and convents had become machine-gun nests, and it was not rare to see the whisk of a cassock behind a matted window.

Into some of these convents and churches the rebels had undoubtedly broken, seeking a strategic position in friendly hands. Some of the priests undoubtedly fired in self-defence, for they knew well what awaited them at the hands of what they considered an infuriated mob. But there was no doubt whatever that some of the churches had been used as arms-deposits, planned long beforehand and that many of the priests and their allies definitely opened fire, deliberately, and on unarmed persons.

The struggle in Barcelona had an atrocity almost unparalleled in other cities. Some of the officers' actions were deliberately sadistic. In the doorway of one convent were found the bodies of two boys, unarmed but wearing the C.N.T. red-and-black scarf, with their throats cut from ear to ear. This was only one of a hundred such affairs, and news of them spread round the barricades.

Driven to bay, the rebels used every building favourable to them, and it is certain that with many they had made agreements before. Shots were fired from the Italian Shipping Office opposite the Atarazanas Barracks and from the headquarters of the German Labour Front.

All Sunday, the fighting went on, far into the night. The streets were deserted save by armed patrols racing the city from end to end in requisitioned cars. There was a brief pause at midnight, but few slept. Those not manning the barricades and balconies hung on their radios. The news from Radio Barcelona was reassuring, though punctuated by shots from the streets and roofs.

At dawn, the firing began again. The Atarazanas Barracks still held out, and all the end of the Ramblas was under fire. The Capitanía was taken by storm after bombardment. It had hoisted a white flag, and two militia leaders entered to parley. They were never seen alive

again. After that, there was no holding the workers. The officers promised to surrender to the Civil Guard, but the Guards were told to stand out of the way. Goded, however, was removed in a police-car. Few of the other officers survived. Beside Goded lay the body of a blonde woman, and Goded was a beaten man.

Goded was taken to the radio-transmitter at the Generalidad. There was a dramatic scene, not unreminiscent of Companys' surrender on October 6, 1934. After a short conversation, Goded came to the microphone. "Fate," he said, "has gone against us." He called upon his troops to surrender.

The officers had expected to hear very different news. The Civil Guard had been expected to capture the radio-station and broadcast a proclamation calling upon the civilian Rightist militias to join the movement. The Civil Guard had remained loyal, and the Falangists and Requetes had waited in vain.

The proclamations over the radio were very different. The call to the general strike, the call to the long-awaited general strike of the railways, issued in the name of Largo Caballero, Secretary of the U.G.T., himself. The radio messages turned the movement from the offensive to the defensive, and all that the rebel officers could do was to sell their lives dearly, abandoned by their leaders and by their men. Many preferred to commit suicide. Only a few strong centres continued to hold out.

The attack on Atarazanas became fiercer. The officers resisted with machine-guns. In one assault Francisco Ascaso fell at the head of his men. Beyond the barracks-square was a building in which the rebels had shut several prisoners, including Angel Pestaña.

At last, the C.N.T. decided to finish. Two machine-guns were mounted on a lorry, which, crammed with determined men, crashed through the fire and through the great door. Then, it was a matter of a few minutes.

The fire from the Columbus Column had been galling. The men up there must have been desperate, for it was a

supreme speculation: if the rebels won, they were heroes; if they lost, they were isolated on the column. The Anarchists sought along the roofs for a place from which to enfilade the column. They found it on the Chamber of Commerce. They placed machine-guns.

They had found a commanding position and kept it. Ammunition, more guns, guards crowded into the building. But there was also administrative work to be done, a bulletin to be issued, for no newspapers appeared. Gradually, room after room was occupied out of sheer necessity, and the C.N.T. found itself in possession of the whole building, although it had had no intention of taking it over.

The fighting degenerated into the isolated sniping, the *paqueo*, which was to make life uncomfortable for the next few days. Orders had been issued by radio that all shutters were to be kept open. Later, small white cloths were to be hung from the balconies in token that the inmates were well-disposed. In the streets, scared passers scuttled, holding handkerchiefs high. Cars full of militiamen in tense attitudes, lying along the mudguards, on the roofs, thrusting rifles from the windows, roared by on perpetual patrol.

Save for the sniping from the roofs, which always brought a long salvo in reply until the militias were ordered not to waste munitions, the battle of Barcelona was over by Monday evening. The hospitals were crammed. The Antifascists had about 450 dead, and the real total must have been nearly a thousand. The wounded were about three times that number.

The general strike held. Every shop and café was shut, there were no telephones after a shell had smashed the Telephone Building switchboard. In the Plaza Cataluña lay bodies of men and horses. Beyond broken windows, a shell-hole in the Colon Hotel, one or two others in other buildings, and a spatter of bullet-splashes in the plaster of hundreds of façades, the material damage had not been large. The streets were filled with rubble and shattered fragments, and no one cleared them.

The first churches had already begun to blaze. From these priests and rebels had fired on the militias. For these there could be no pity nor excuse.

On Monday, churches and Right political centres went up in flames, one after another. A huge circle of smoke hung low over the city. The great oily smoke clouds puffed suddenly in quarter after quarter, drenched in valuable petrol. At one church, young Anarchists made a mock Mass. At another, a priest, shot in the fighting, burned with his church. At the Salesians, they disinterred the mummies and arranged them picturesquely round the doorway. The Cathedral was spared because it was Barcelona's own.

Foreign Right-wing papers shrieked with horror about the Barcelona church-burnings. "Eye-witnesses" sitting in Paris or idling in Cerbère behind the closed frontier "saw" the heads of priests carried round the street on silver salvers. Nuns were, of course, raped, priests quartered, and foreigners insulted.

Nothing of the sort happened. Certainly, some priests and a very few nuns were killed. Some of the priests had been fighting and were shot simply as rebels. Others were shot because they were priests. This sounds horrible. In Seville, Saragossa, Badajoz and a hundred other places workers who had taken no part in the fighting were shot for the possession of a union card. That is to say, both priests and workers were shot for belonging to an opposing side. It was not pretty, but the provocation had been overwhelming; and martyrdom is simply a professional risk for a Spanish priest. Tortured they were not, and extremely few were even killed. No heads were carried round on pikes or salvers. Nuns were nearly all sent back to their villages. A few were killed, but a movement so fierce and so bitter will necessarily give a chance to the sinister elements which hang on its fringes, especially in a Mediterranean sea-port like Barcelona.

The church-burning was different. This was deliberately done, although of course it was not ordered by any of the

responsible organisations. It was no new thing, and, as has been explained, it was based on a deep-seated necessity for revenge and punishment for a betrayed trust. The crowd was attacking its enemy in its most obvious and material form. Probably the very anthropomorphic feeling that the Spanish Church had given to its teaching hastened its destruction. The people in the street could not yet destroy the Church's economic basis for its tyranny, but could at least smash the material form in which this tyranny was visible. The famous display of mummies at the Salesians would naturally appear blasphemy to believers; but as the vast majority of the spectators were not believers, blasphemy meant nothing to them. It was simply a fine theatrical show, very Spanish in its grim realism, and exactly on a par with the Church's own gelatine tears and blood on its images.

Some of the discoveries made in the convents and churches justified whatever might have happened to them. Several were simply arms-deposits, and people were hurt when the cartridges exploded in the flames.

But there were worse things. The "valuable" images traditionally revered were found to be made of papier-mâché and wood. In some statues were found wads of bank-notes and securities. In many famous treasures the jewels had been substituted by paste years before. The Church had bought railway-shares with the money which believers had given to glorify their Virgins. The Incorruptible Body of Saint Narcissus which made Gerona a famous pilgrimage was found to be anything but incorruptible, being actually composed of odd bones and bits of wire and glass, the fake dating back to the fourteenth century.

There were far more horrible revelations. The Spanish Church was reputed even by Rome to be corrupt. The stories told by some of the nuns seemed like passages out of *Maria Monk*. A whole fetid, ingrowing sexual system was dragged out into the daylight. They found instruments either of punishment or self-penance that might have come from the Museum of the Inquisition in Toledo. But

Falcon. The Communists and U.G.T., soon to fuse into the United Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC), rose in the world with bewildering speed, occupying and abandoning palaces in the back-streets, moving into the Guell mansion on the Ramblas, where their men, attired as picturesquely as they could be, sat solemnly in great plush chairs on the balconies with the huge crystal chandelier behind them giving them romantic shadows. Later, they moved into the Hotel Colon, and a great banner informed Barcelona that this was the headquarters of the PSUC, adhering to the Third International.

In none of the buildings was the slightest damage done. Huge notices on the walls told the Catalan workers to respect their own property.

In the bedrooms, card-rooms, billiard-rooms, men who had not slept for nights worked over typewriters organising the defence. Armed militiamen snatched a fragment of sleep on couches and chairs. Machine-guns guarded the doors. The shuffle of Catalan hemp-sandals was continuous on the stairs. Women brought sandwiches or lumps of dry bread. Men begged a twist of tobacco, for there were no cigarettes to be had. It was almost a matter of honour not to sleep until there was no more Fascism in Spain.

Cars, requisitioned and battered—the militias' driving was far more dangerous than their rifles—tore round the streets. Every now and then a car would dash past, spitting fire from half a dozen rifles. These were the famous fascist "phantom cars", pure suicide. Cars all the time, full of rifles, splashed with great initials: FAI, C.N.T., PCC, U.G.T., POUM. The passers saluted with raised fists. Shots rang from the roofs, the inevitable *paqueo*. Armed detachments circulated shouting the greeting which was the password after nightfall: "FAI-FAI-C.N.T.!" (pronounced "fie-fie-say-enna-tay").

Since there were no restaurants, huge public eating-places were opened. The Transport Union and then a Committee saw to supplies, and there was little shortage

except of cigarettes. Each party had its own dining-place, and the C.N.T. served three thousand meals daily at the Ritz. There were similar eating-places in every district, and this system lasted long after the ordinary places became available again.

It was the period of requisitions. Anything like petrol, a meal, a bed could be obtained by a voucher from one of the parties. There was really little else possible in the absence of any controlled central system.

After the fighting was over, Barcelona rapidly became almost normal. The Ramblas were filled with people, since the cafés were shut, and news, usually wildly inaccurate, passed freely. The enthusiasm was enormous, and everyone used the Popular Front salute until their arms ached. The general strike continued.

Exquisite and almost embarrassing attentions were showered on foreigners, especially if they belonged to the Olympic teams. So confident, indeed, had people become, that the British team resumed practice. A revolution, they supposed, was what one had most week-ends in Spain, and it was just like Spanish casualness to have one the day the Games were supposed to begin.

The Consulates thought otherwise. Elaborate measures were taken to evacuate every foreign resident or visitor. Long after the trains had begun running normally again and the frontier was open, cautious Consuls played the great game of Rescue by Warship or, more bravely, organised desperate and complicated caravans of cars.

Only the Germans and Italians were looked upon with some suspicion. This was entirely their own fault. Shots had actually been fired from the Italian Shipping Office, and the crowd gutted it. Its furniture was flung in a great pile on the street and guarded by armed militiamen. Over it was a huge placard: "This is the property of foreigners who have disgraced themselves. Do not disgrace yourselves by touching it."

The Germans, too, brought upon themselves what little discomfort they had to suffer. Shots had come from the

headquarters of the Nazi Labour Front building. A party, chiefly composed of German exiles who had fought splendidly in the streets, raided it and found most compromising documents showing that the organisation was simply a cover for a vast system of espionage. It appeared too that the imprisonment and persecution of many German exiles under the Lerroux and Portela Governments had been due to Nazi intrigues. Besides this, the Germans immediately set about spreading fantastic and alarming rumours, and it is almost certain that this was part of a deliberate campaign to undermine the morale of the Barcelonese.

German papers howled about the murder of an employee of the Labour Front and the sacking of its offices. Neither was true. The Labour Front secretary was unrecognised, and the only sacking was the removal of the papers.

One aged optician was killed by accident and universally lamented. Three more Germans were killed by passing patrols for not replying to their challenge. The patrol had no means of knowing that they were foreigners.

A British-protected person and an American were killed when peasants fired on their car, not recognising the American flag. That was all.

So polite and considerate was the treatment of foreigners that ordinary middle-class tourists swept into the turmoil went home to form a Popular Front in their own countries, so impressed were they by its discipline and efficiency in Spain. The worst that happened to them was to have their cars requisitioned and somewhat damaged.

While life in Barcelona gradually settled down to the new state of affairs, two questions were worrying everybody: what of the Fascist counter-attack; and what will happen now that the Anarchists are ruling the city?

There were insistent rumours of a rebel column marching down from Saragossa. It was said to be approaching the Catalan-Aragonese border at Mora del Ebro. Orders were sent to mine the bridges over the Ebro and to hold out as long as possible.

All Catalonia was up to sweep out the rebels. In Lerida, Gerona and a dozen smaller towns, the rebels had been forced to surrender. Catalonia was free of them, but for how long?

While the last snipers were chased from the roofs, the columns were forming. Huge queues stood outside the parties' recruiting offices. C.N.T. columns had already gone out towards Mora. Now the first spontaneous militias were forming. Men of no party rushed to the nearest recruiting office, regardless of whether they agreed with the party's politics. Women joined up too, and boys of twelve had to be forcibly held back by their parents.

"Who's for Saragossa? Enlist for Saragossa!" the posters appealed, and harassed clerks were overwhelmed with applications. Buses, lorries, trucks, taxis stood on the Ramblas outside the Transport Union, surrounded by cheering crowds. Ten thousand people stood on the streets to cheer the first columns and fling flowers. In two days, the C.N.T. had enlisted 13,000 men, the Marxist parties 2,000, the bourgeois Left 3,000.

Amid scenes of frantic enthusiasm, the first car-loads of cheering volunteers moved off on the road to Saragossa. Men and women, waving every kind of weapon, gay with the red-and-black scarves of the C.N.T. and the red scarves of the Marxists. The Catalan "four-bars", the Republican flag, the dramatic red-and-black and the hammer-and-sickle streamed from the cars. Loud-speakers roared the *International*, the *Segadors* and *Riego's Anthem*, the national anthem of the Republic. The crowd clapped and cheered, but, strangely, there was no singing. The first time the *International* was sung on the streets was when an Olympic Team gave a demonstration solidarity march.

The first column left the Paseo de Gracia at noon on July 22. It disappeared down the long avenue, and the crowd returned to watch the enlistment. At two o'clock, news came back: the column had forgotten to take any food.

Four lorries stood on the Paseo de Gracia, empty. In twenty minutes they were crammed with all the delicacies that the neighbouring streets could bring from their shops. And these were bourgeois streets, here lived those who might have been expected to be at the very least lukewarm. A fat rich grocer chased the lorries for a quarter of a mile, brandishing a particularly expensive sausage.

The March to Saragossa had captured the imagination and enthusiasm of all Catalans. No one seemed to remember that Saragossa was one of the most highly militarised towns in Spain, chief defence of the route between the Pyrenees and Madrid; that there were at least 7,000 men there under Cabanellas, armed with all the most modern weapons. The militias had rifles, for a large store had been found in the barracks, but very little ammunition—for weeks it was impossible to give them more than five rounds musketry practice—practically no artillery and, for several weeks, no really efficient armoured cars. They had to wait weeks for heavy artillery, months for tanks.

Yet no one thought of less than Saragossa. Even judicial foreign correspondents only reminded their readers that it might take as much as three or four weeks to reduce Saragossa, so contagious was the confidence. And Saragossa taken, said the Catalans, the insurrection is over.

Cabanellas' column never appeared at Mora del Ebro. It hardly advanced at all. In Saragossa itself, the officers were occupied in shooting militant workers, and the soldiers were doubtful. There was a curious state of unreality in the city. As late as September, Carlist volunteers there told some French journalists that Thorez, aided by Blum and Daladier, had made a communist *coup d'état* in France, and that Marshal Pétain was fighting against them in the South; while Laval, once the revolution had been crushed, would put his army at the Spanish rebels' disposal.

If the Catalan forces had pushed on to Saragossa, it might really have been possible to take the city, although at a terrible cost, as the leader of the Carlist *requetes* later

admitted. The Madrid militias might have taken Avila and Segovia. The rebels, demoralised by the failures in Madrid and Barcelona, disappointed by the loyalty of the Navy and the Air Force, and increasingly uncertain of the attitude of their own troops, were actually panic-stricken. But they did not know how terribly badly armed the militias were. Cabanellas might have scattered them with a couple of thousand well-armed men. The vice of the whole Civil War became apparent: on the one side, man-power, enthusiasm, but no arms; on the other, arms, desperation, but no men. The militias had literally only their enthusiasm with which to fight; but they had the big industrial centres where a war-industry could be created. They were defending a legitimate government, and they held the frontiers to a friendly country ruled by a Popular Front government which was bound, by trade-agreements, to supply a certain amount of arms. They had the offensive—"a military insurrection which lasts more than three days is doomed". The enemy had few planes. In the early days, in July, there seemed no reason, military or political, why the Spanish Popular Front should not dominate the rebellion by the end of August.

This going out of the Catalans was something new and something quite unforeseen. It is claimed that the plan—what plan there was—was due to the foresight and energy of Federica Montseny of the FAI. It is certain, at any rate, that the FAI put itself at the head of the offensive, and the first columns were commanded by one of its most popular militants, Buenaventura Durruti. With him went Perez Farras commander of the Generalidad's own defence-corps, the *Mozos de Escuadra*.

The Catalans had not sallied out in defence of a central Government for centuries. They would defend their own liberties tooth-and-nail, and Madrid armies had often been hard put to it to cross the Catalan frontier. Now, the Catalans were going to Saragossa, not so much to meet Cabanellas' advancing column as to free the communications between Madrid, Barcelona and the Pyrenees.

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Only later was the idea of striking further north into Navarre seriously discussed as a strategic move. The Catalans had not shown themselves ungrateful for the shouts of "Long live Catalonia!" in the night when Companys met his freed Councillors at Ocaña. The Anarchosyndicalists might proclaim that they were fighting only to save themselves, not to support the Popular Front, that the matter at stake was the freeing of the whole Peninsula from the reaction; but the FAI was by no means the whole of Catalonia, and absolutely all antifascist Catalonia was agreed upon the necessity of taking Saragossa.

A new unity had grown up on the barricades. It was a sentimental unity, and many doubted whether it would survive military success. But after fighting shoulder-to-shoulder, the rank-and-file of all parties and organisations were impatient of dogmatic differences. The aim was to defeat Fascism; after that, discussion between comrades.

Forty-eight hours of fighting had worked a great change in the anarchosyndicalist outlook and also in the opinion of the C.N.T. held by the other parties. So widespread had been the notion that the FAI were nothing but a bunch of crooks that people were almost hysterically relieved to find that Barcelona had not been given over to looting and massacre; and that what inevitable excesses had occurred were not necessarily to be attributed to the FAI.

The fact remained: for the first time in history, the C.N.T. and the FAI had been fighting on behalf of a democratic Government. They had deliberately refrained from attempting to make their revolution immediately and had not tried to implant Libertarian Communism. The same was, of course, true of other parties: but what was in the Communists a result of strategy was in the Anarchists a self-denying ordinance.

The Anarchists had the power. They refused to use it. They still stood on the margin, and, while they refused

Companys' offer of a leading share in the Generalidad Government, they equally refused to destroy the Generalidad.

In the first days, the recruiting of the militias was somewhat haphazard. Every party worked separately. Each armed its men with what rifles it could find. Transport was provided by requisitioned cars. Each party issued its own passes and requisition-vouchers, and a C.N.T. patrol would not accept a PSUC pass and vice-versa. The atmosphere of general fraternisation was such that disputes between the various patrols were comparatively rare; but there were many irresponsible bands, usurping the name of some party, which committed regrettable excesses on the outskirts of Barcelona and in the villages. Spontaneous Committees, simply the old ward-committees, street-cells, district-groups and so on, sprang up everywhere.

The Generalidad, composed entirely of members of the bourgeois Esquerra, was not an adequate instrument to cope with this situation.

On the 22nd, the Generalidad had decreed the formation of Citizen Militias under the command of Perez Farras. The provisioning of Barcelona was in the charge of the Municipality and the Transport Union. That afternoon, the first columns set out for Saragossa.

Next day was formed the Antifascist Militias Committee. The Committee was composed of representatives of all the antifascist parties and organisations: three from the C.N.T., Durruti, Garcia Oliver, José Asensi; two from the FAI, Aurelio Fernandez and Santillan; three from the U.G.T., del Barrio, Salvador Gonzalez and A. Lopez; three from the PSUC, Miret, Musté, Pousa; three from the Esquerra, Miravittles, Artemio Aiguader, Pons; one from the "Rabassaires", José Torrent, and one from the coalition of Republican parties, Fàbrega.

These sixteen men were to rule Catalonia in fact, if not in name, for the whole first stage of the movement. They were, however, not simply an arbitrary minority. Each representative had been duly chosen by the organisation

to which he belonged. Nor was it originally the Committee's intention to do anything but see to the direction of the recruiting and the war. On July 23, no one supposed that the war would last more than two or three weeks at most.

Of the sixteen, Durruti and del Barrio distinguished themselves as military leaders; Aurelio Fernandez and Artemio Aiguadé later administered the police; Garcia Oliver became Secretary of the Defence Council and then Minister of the Republic; Miravittles took charge of the propaganda services.

Of the Committee, Durruti, Garcia Oliver, Santillan, were the only militants at all well known outside their organisations, except Jaume Miravittles who had been present at almost every important event in Catalonia since he rose with Maciá at Prats de Mollo at the age of twenty, and appeared to have been at one time or another in almost every militant organisation except the FAI.

The Committee existed beside the Generalidad, closely connected with it but not of it. The Councillor for the Interior, España, and the Chief of Police, Escofet, were entrusted with public order, although the party patrols worked beside them until a special Investigation Committee was formed of 700 trustworthy men, 325 of whom were members of the C.N.T. or FAI.

A Supplies Committee was formed, at first independently by the unions controlling transport and food; later, this Committee was subordinated to the Militias Committee, and thus, by the force of circumstances, the Militias Committee spread its sub-committees over the whole life of Catalonia. It controlled the two essential activities: the conduct of the war and the organisation of the rearguard. Its decisions were subject to the Generalidad's approval, but this approval was rarely withheld.

The duality of powers was quite logical. The Generalidad represented only the vague entity of Catalonia but was in fact composed entirely of members of the petty-bourgeois

parties who had not taken a leading part in the struggle, who had no control over production, and could not put a great many militiamen into the field. The Generalidad, therefore, became increasingly neglected while the queues grew longer outside the vast shabby building of the Naval School where the Committee had its offices.

The U.G.T. and the PSUC had been given parity of representation on the Committee although the number of their members was at that time infinitesimal compared with the 350,000 of the C.N.T. The U.G.T. in Catalonia had only about 12,000 members on July 19, although it increased to 35,000 in ten days.

The increase in U.G.T. membership—which was to rise in Catalonia to a claimed 467,000 in nine months—was partly due to the entry of autonomous unions, many of which had been in the C.N.T. until the 1932 split, partly by the general necessity of holding some party or union card in order to obtain food, safe-conducts and other privileges, partly by the urge towards association common in such circumstances. Many joined the U.G.T. as being supposedly less “violent” than the C.N.T. The very important CADCI (Central Association of Catalan Employees), a specifically Catalanist organisation which was intended to play in Catalan social relations the same part as the Nationalist *Solidaridad Vasca* in the Basque Country, applied for affiliation to the U.G.T., although retaining a considerable autonomy.

Similarly, some sections of Estat Catalá entered the PSUC. The Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia, formed a few days after the outbreak of the rebellion, was a fusion of all the small Marxist fractions in Catalonia save the Workers’ Party for Marxist Unification (POUM). The main groups were the Catalan Socialist Workers’ Party, the Catalan Proletarian Party and the Communist Party of Catalonia (PCC).

The Catalan Socialist Party was numerically the largest, and its leaders, Juan Comorera and Pedro Corominas, members of the Catalan Parliament, were the best-known

Socialists in Catalonia at that time. Comorera became General Secretary of the PSUC. The Communists had distinguished themselves in the street-fighting and afterwards, especially by their organising abilities. They at once took the lead of the Marxist parties, persuaded the PSUC to affiliate immediately to the Third International, and soon obtained such leading positions in the U.G.T. that it was possible for the same persons—usually Comorera, Socialist, Vidiella, secretary of the Unified Communist and Socialist Youth, and Valdes, secretary of the Catalan Communist Party—to represent the PSUC or the U.G.T. in the various Catalan Cabinets according as circumstances and the C.N.T. demanded a “party” or “union” Government.

This drive for Marxist unity, with firm backing in the Third International, was the more necessary in that the POUM at once became the source of diversionist tendencies.

The POUM had been formed by fusion of Maurin's Workers' and Peasants' Block and Nin's Communist Left at a congress on September 29, 1935. Maurin was now trapped in rebel territory in Galicia whither he had gone for a holiday, and nothing definite was ever heard from him again. It seemed almost certain that he had been shot. The rush to join some party or union had been so great that there was no time to investigate closely the political and moral qualifications of all the applicants. Many spies, Fascists and *Lumpenproletariat* were able to enter the organisations.

There was a big rush of applicants for membership of the POUM. This gave the party its peculiar nondescript character—“a stray dog's home”, it was described. Many persons with revolutionary or at least insurrectionary leanings joined the POUM simply because they disliked the discipline of the PSUC or the PSUC would not admit them. Equally, they were not Anarchists and it was almost impossible at that time to enter the groups affiliated with the FAI, and, of course, quite impossible to join the

FAI itself without long preliminary experience in the anarchist movement.

The danger inherent in the POUM came not so much from "uncontrollable elements", for these there were in all parties, but could be comparatively easily eliminated; rather it arose from the heterogeneous mass of mutually dissatisfied and objectively non-antifascist elements within the party. The POUM grouped Trotskyists, Brandlerians, the Bolshevik-Leninists (Fourth International), Communist Opposition, dissident Trotskyists, and a large number of perfectly honest but politically unreliable persons who joined the POUM simply because they had nowhere else to go. This latter element was vastly increased when the recruiting for the march to Saragossa began; and a distinction was always made by other parties between POUM militia and POUM militants. The POUM militias, some 6,000 of them at this time, were never satisfied with the definitely "Trotskyising" tendency of the party's paper, *La Batalla*, the direction of which had been captured by such dissident Trotskyists as Andrade, Arquer and Gorkin. Lérida, the big stronghold of Maurin's Workers' and Peasants' Block, often disagreed with the directives of the Executive Committee in Barcelona.

A feature of the POUM was the influx of foreigners, mainly German exiles. These brought with them all the quarrels of the emigration and gave to the POUM a specifically doctrinaire and un-Spanish direction. Lacking any deep appreciation of the specifically Spanish situation, usually unable to speak either Spanish or Catalan, considering themselves free from any obligation to a Spanish government, they were in a position to try to carry out dangerous experiments based on their schematised views of a "revolutionary situation" as such, without the slightest understanding of the immediate issues involved. They never considered that what Lenin may have said about a particular situation in Russia in 1917 did not necessarily apply to a quite different situation in Spain in 1936. Insurrectionist doctrinaires, afflicted with an almost

pathological violence resulting from equal hatred of the U.S.S.R. and the Fascism that had expelled them, they had forgotten the fundamental teaching of Marxist philosophy: the "dialectic of the dialectic".

This was to be the more unfortunate in that it unhappily involved foreign parties which in reality had nothing in common with the POUM. POUM was a member of the International Bureau for Revolutionary Socialist Unity, a sort of Third-and-a-half International (although it deprecated the suggestion that it was an International), of which the most important section was the British Independent Labour Party.

The I.L.P. observers attached to the POUM understood no Spanish and were thus dependent upon impressions received from non-Spanish members whose personal prejudices and intrigues undoubtedly coloured their information. Thus, the I.L.P. never really understood the role of the POUM in Spain and was misled into support of attitudes entirely foreign to its own character and interests. The distorted view of the POUM'S policy in turn enabled certain tendencies in the I.L.P. not shared by the rank-and-file to capture the party organ, in precisely the same way as the POUM leadership captured *La Batalla* and gave it a direction opposed to the sentiments of the bulk of the POUM membership. This was doubly unfortunate, in that it presented to foreign opinion a completely falsified view of the POUM and that it opened the way for the unwanted sympathies of all those persons, chiefly disgruntled intellectuals, who wished to be revolutionaries without accepting the discipline of a revolutionary party. Based upon hatred of all existing parties and often upon personal subjective grievances, the party's policy often appeared pathological rather than political.

The POUM was often accused of being Trotskyist. Certainly there was a Trotskyist minority, chiefly composed of the Germans and Belgians in the Marxist-Leninist Group. Nin, Trotsky's ex-secretary, had quarrelled with

his master two years previously on the question of joining the Workers' Alliances in 1934. When the Fourth International wished to run the projected Barcelona Congress of the International Bureau, the offer was refused and it was finally decided not even to invite its representatives. On the other hand, when the German S.A.P. (Socialist Workers' Party) branch in Spain favoured closer co-operation with the PSUC and the U.S.S.R., it was severely rebuked by the POUM Executive.

The truth about the POUM'S Trotskyism was that it was *objectively* helping Trotskyism—and, by extension, Fascism—by its loud, untimely and vicious attacks upon the Communist Party and the U.S.S.R., by its inopportune launching of exaggerated and schematised slogans, by its diversionist intrigues and by its declared refusal to acknowledge any loyalty to the Spanish and Catalan Popular Front Governments. Here it was carrying on, in far more dangerous circumstance, the splitting of the united front against reaction and Fascism which had at one time characterised the FAI and C.N.T. This had made possible the rebel calculation in the summer of 1936 that the split in the Spanish proletariat would enable them to isolate one section of it with at least the benevolent neutrality of the other. This had been perilous enough before the war; in wartime such an attitude could be little short of criminal. The Anarchists and Anarchosyndicalists had at least the excuse of half a century's fratricidal struggle and all the bitter memories this had entailed; and in Catalonia the C.N.T. was the majority organisation. The POUM had neither of these excuses; and its diversionist campaigns often appeared as mere querulousness. Unfortunately, they could not be taken so lightly, especially when they coincided with certain politically-uneducated sections of the C.N.T., behind which the POUM usually sought to shelter. The C.N.T. was none too grateful for being placed in this avuncular position by a party which appeared to it as merely a quarrelsome branch of the "Marxist family".

POUM was not represented in the Antifascist Militias Committee, although it had members in the various departments. At this time, the party was in process of formation and devoted most of its energies to spectacular recruiting parades and to painting its initials on requisitioned cars. It had been almost unknown before July 19, for the famous Workers' and Peasants' Block had lost much of its prestige after the failure of the October 1934 rising, and under the reactionary Governments which followed there had been no opportunity for public propaganda. In Catalonia, the state of alarm had existed almost continuously, enforced by a succession of ruthless police-chiefs.

The C.N.T. gave the U.G.T. and the PSUC parity on the Catalan Antifascist Militias Committee in the expectation of receiving parity on a National Antifascist Militias Committee in Madrid, where the numerical proportion between U.G.T. and C.N.T. membership was almost exactly the reverse of that in Catalonia. There was a tacit agreement that the U.G.T. representatives on the Catalan Committee would vote with the C.N.T. if the Esquerra attempted to put a brake on the movement. Thus the FAI and the C.N.T. could count on eight votes, the majority.

There was some ground for expecting an Esquerra and Estat Catalá counter-attack, although the C.N.T. had publicly announced that it would not take its opportunity of seizing supreme power and implanting Libertarian Communism. The bourgeois parties feared that the FAI and C.N.T. leadership could not control their followers, basing this fear on the FAI reputation for banditry and the anarchist creed of individual independence from superior control. The Generalidad began to organise a defence-corps with the Catalan police (the *Mozos de Escuadra*), the Shock Police, the Civil Guard and the *escamots* of Estat Catalá in order to repress "excesses". This rough organisation turned out to be unnecessary, for the C.N.T. and the FAI themselves took stern measures

against looting and murder. Planes dropped proclamations over the city declaring in the name of the C.N.T. and the FAI: "We shall proceed to shoot any individual who is proved to have acted against human rights, usurping functions conceded to a Commission composed of responsible and reliable men. What we say, we do. Barcelona knows, Spain and the whole world know, that the FAI must put a stop to such excesses. And we shall stop them." Nevertheless, there were still shots at night on the lonely Rabassada road over the Tibidabo hill which rises straight and menacing behind the city.

On the 24th, the Unions ordered their men back to work, and the city gradually became normal. Except for the absence of taxis and theatres and the presence of ubiquitous barricades, there remained little trace of the two-days' fighting. In the residential quarters, house-searches still went on and the streets were patrolled at night. The sanitary services began to remove the accumulated ordures. The dead horses which had made the Plaza Catalunya stench for three days were burned. The churches and mansions which had not been burned were taken over by the Generalidad. The collections and works of art were sent to the museums. The papers came out regularly from the 22nd, but some of them were changed beyond all recognition. The old clerical *Vanguardia* kept its old make-up, suppressing only its "Religious Life" column; but the text was far to the Left, though no less dull. The rabid Right *Veu de Catalunya*, Cambó's organ, appeared to have been written by the C.N.T. Many other papers were taken over and run by their workers co-operatively, and it was surprising to find how many Left-wing hearts had beaten behind a Right-wing exterior.

The Generalidad had at once shown itself grateful to the workers. There is reason for believing that the supply Companies would have been willing to grant even more than he was asked. Wages were raised 15 per cent, the forty-hour week was imposed, a minimum wage-scale under consideration, old-age pensions were to be modified.

the pawn-shops had to restore all articles pledged for less than 200 pesetas (£6), workers' insurance was to be studied, wages were to be paid for the days since July 19 until the renewal of work, the jobs of the militiamen at the front were to be kept open for them, all feudal dues paid by the "Rabassaires" since October 6, 1934, were to be returned and the Law of Agrarian Contracts was repealed until the Catalan Parliament could introduce a more satisfactory solution of the land problem. A moratorium was declared for all outstanding debts.

In order to carry on the struggle against Fascism with the greatest possible efficiency the Generalidad controlled all banking, allowing the withdrawal of only limited sums, in the first instance only for the payment of wages; it also controlled the chemical, textile, metallurgical and other essential industries; the property of those who had joined the rebellion and of the Church was confiscated.

This was merely the speeding-up of an ordinary reformist programme, and the workers' parties were not particularly grateful. The PSUC, however, publicly approved, lamenting only that nothing had yet been done for the unemployed. The POUM congratulated itself that the Generalidad had carried out some of the demands formulated by it, "the revolutionary proletariat's own party", complained that others had not been considered, and turned to painting more confiscated cars to keep its name before the public. The C.N.T., obsessed by the war, said that it was no time to talk about forty-hours at the moment; after the victory, much more fundamental questions would have to be solved. In the meantime, it suspected that its columns were being unfairly treated in the matter of arms. The Generalidad was still extraordinarily suspicious of the FAI's lamb-like but practical behaviour.

The U.G.T. issued a manifesto pointing out the necessity for complete proletarian union by fusion with the C.N.T. Already, the independent unions were coming into the U.G.T., particularly the railwaymen, the waiters and the hydro-electric workers. The dissident syndicalist unions

of the "Thirty" split were returning to the C.N.T. It was no moment for dissensions.

The last flare of the dock-strike, however, came on the 29th, when Trillas, President of the U.G.T. Dockers' Federation, was shot on the Ramblas not far from the Transport Union headquarters. The Militias Committee as well as the U.G.T. published their indignation, and the C.N.T. agreed. The time had come to finish with such terroristic acts, and a vigorous purification of all parties began. Even the POUM, while congratulating itself that irresponsible persons when usurping the names of organisations to cover their crimes chose POUM, as showing that this party had been most prominent in the fight, was glad to announce that the C.N.T. shared its views. The C.N.T. remained unmoved by this remarkable statement.

It was, however, the proof of the depth of the desire for real unity that no public split followed this murder, which, in normal times, would have at once been answered by a recrudescence of gang warfare. If the shots on Tibidabo increased, the public were kept in ignorance.

The Generalidad still did not trust this proletarian unity. It encouraged middle-class young men to enter the Civil Guard training-schools and shortened their training period. Several more companies of Civil Guards were sent to the front.

In Aragon, contact had been established with the enemy near Caspe. Government planes under Lieutenant-Colonel Diaz Sandino had already bombarded Saragossa without much effect. The columns were still very raw, completely unaccustomed to fighting in open country, and there was nearly a panic the first time enemy planes bombed an advancing column. This was not serious, however, and the militias rapidly became accustomed to the conditions of war.

The real trouble with the militias was their suicidal bravery and the rivalry between the columns. Each organisation wished to show that it was the leader of the proletariat by leading it into Saragossa. There was a

complete blind confidence, and whole columns charged and captured perfectly impossible positions. Once there, however, they rarely dug themselves in, but simply hoisted their flag and either advanced or retired to their previous positions. Only too many strategic places were lost because a C.N.T. column, for instance, would advance far beyond the line and a PSUC column be unwilling to imperil its existence by guarding the C.N.T.'s flank. This was not due to cowardice, but chiefly to complete lack of communications and a certain amount of common sense.

The rebels in Saragossa were hardly more sensible, although they were trained soldiers. When Sandino's planes bombed the Pillar Cathedral and the bomb did not explode, the escape was attributed to the Virgin of the Pillar and the whole town spent a long time over a fantastic Te Deum service, at which, French observers reported, the spick and perfumed officers were extremely bored.

The militias were determined to remain a political army; that is to say, they refused to return to the old, betrayed system of service under regular officers. When Madrid ordered the classes of 1933, 1934 and 1935 to the colours in the barracks, ten thousand young men demonstrated in Barcelona and at a great meeting in the Olympia Theatre flatly refused to serve under the regular officers. The Committee and all the organisations approved what was actually an act of mutiny. Many of these called to the colours were already in the voluntary militias. The problem was solved by a compromise: the conscripts would serve in barracks, but under the command of representatives of the parties in the Antifascist Militias Committee. More than the principle of military or political discipline was at stake: Catalonia had definitely refused to obey an order from Madrid.

Catalonia had proved that it was not separatist by sending its forces to Saragossa; but its conception of what was happening differed totally from Madrid's. In Madrid,

the profound social and political change was slower and deeper: in Catalonia, the break with the world of July 18 was almost complete.

The Generalidad, or rather Companys himself, was sincerely anxious to reflect this new state of affairs. There was a duality of powers, on the one side the Generalidad controlling Catalonia's politics, its official police and such things as education, finance and justice, with the Municipality controlling the civic life of Barcelona, and on the other the Militias Committee and the Supplies Committee controlling in fact the war, recruiting, public order, transport, supplies and most of the vital industries.

The various parties were approached to widen the basis of the Government. The C.N.T. refused, because it did not yet feel inclined to enter a "State-apparatus" and lose its non-political principles. Nevertheless, it promised its loyal co-operation through the Committee. POUM, more and more feeling the lack of Maurin, prisoner in Galicia, refused chiefly because the C.N.T. had refused and because it had committed itself to the demand for a purely workers' government; a particularly absurd demand when the Esquerra could put in the field some 8,000 men and controlled all the regular armed forces.

The remodelled Generalidad was, however, formed on July 31. Companys became President of Catalonia, leaving the Presidency of the Generalidad to Juan Casanovas, lately President of the Catalan Parliament. The new Council was much enlarged by new posts. Of the fifteen Councillorships, Esquerra held nine, Acció Catalana one, the "Rabassaires" one, the PSUC three, and the Councillor for Defence was Felipe Diaz Sandino, commander of the Air Force. It was to be a pure war government and the participation of the PSUC was to open the way to the collaboration of all the workers' parties. PSUC held the three Councillorships most related to the Committee: Provisioning, Communications and Economy.

The PSUC had been over-eager to put into practice the whole Popular Front line. Catalonia, dominated still by the C.N.T. tradition, had not yet learnt its necessity. The C.N.T., the FAI and the POUM put on pressure to oppose PSUC participation, and the reorganised Generalidad could never do more than simply exchange views. The "Trenchardising" of the Civil Guard, the early opposition to Madrid's attempt to reorganise the regular army, the dubious attitude of the FAI (although its Regional Congress of August 2 had reaffirmed its decision to work in all the Committees), the belief that the war would be ended very soon, had made it necessary for the PSUC to enter the Government. PSUC believed that the issue was simply the fight against Fascism, not the proletarian seizure of power. Only by winning the support of *all* antifascist elements could Fascism be defeated. Excessive optimism about the degree of the revolutionary potentialities of the masses at this stage could only be an "infantile malady of Communism". Anarchism was, as has been shown, not revolutionary at all in the last analysis, and the POUM, by insisting on absolutely inopportune slogans, was objectively even an obstacle to revolution. It was therefore essential to consolidate the positions already gained and prevent the petty-bourgeois Esquerra and Catalanist counter-attack by making it unnecessary, meanwhile winning over the rank-and-file of the C.N.T., most of whom were not Anarchists at all.

PSUC, therefore, concentrated its attention on winning mass support by merit. Even in the first hectic days of enlistment, its militias received professional military training. It neglected none of the forms of ostentation calculated to win a Mediterranean people, but did not concentrate all its attention on them, as POUM did.

The PSUC paper, *Treball*, appeared in Catalan, while POUM replaced its early Catalan paper, *Avant*, by *La Batalla* in Castilian and was never able to revive *Avant*

as a weekly, as it promised. One important result was that a section of Estat Catalá entered the PSUC.

The news from all over the country was optimistic, if contradictory. It was almost impossible to judge whether the war was over or only just beginning. Hence the many political miscalculations by all parties at this time.

On July 23, was announced the taking of Guadalajara, Toledo, Murcia, Almeria and Gijon. On the 24th, Cordoba and most of the region round Seville, while Corunna had been successfully bombarded. On the 25th, Chinchilla and Albacete. On the 28th, Madrid reported that the Toledo Alcazar had fallen, but that Cordoba, supposed to have fallen, was being bombed by loyal planes and was appealing to Seville for help. On the 29th, again, that Cordoba had fallen, the revolt in San Sebastian had been crushed and that the Toledo Alcazar could not hold out another day; the fall of Granada was imminent, and Saragossa could not hold out a week.

Only later did the public learn that Tolosa, a very important strategic position at the junction of the Pamplona-San Sebastian-Bilbao communications, had fallen on the 28th, that the rebels had assaulted and captured Oyarzun and were pressing towards Pasages or Renteria to cut San Sebastian from the French frontier and open the way from Pamplona to the sea. The papers spoke cheerfully of "the last nuclei of the rebellion", and Prieto's wireless speech on the 24th, showing the true position and demanding preparations for a long war, passed unheeded in Catalonia.

Life in Barcelona was suspiciously normal again, outwardly. Few showed too much curiosity about what might happen at night on Tibidabo, although all the papers daily published energetic threats against "individual actions". The advance of the militias was highly satisfactory, Saragossa was being bombed after repeated summonses to surrender, and the Militias Committee had announced that they would bomb Palma night and day

if it did not surrender at once. The seaplane squadron under Captain Alberto Bayo showered on Palma daily hundreds of copies of the Barcelona press, and the clerico-military rebel Junta forbade any Majorcan to pick up the papers under pain of death.

Known casualties were slight, the weather was splendid, the war on the Aragon front was not too arduous and the Sierra was far away, Catalonia was free of Fascists. The radical liquidation of the big capitalists seemed to mean at any rate the beginning of the liquidation of capitalism itself, and the way was open to every kind of daring experiment. The workers were at last in control, and, against all expectation, in the highly respectable position of defenders of order and supporters of a democratic bourgeois government.

There could even be a question whether a revolution was taking place at all. "Collectivisation and the gradual implantation of Libertarian Communism," said the Anarchists. "Workers' control of production through their unions," said the Syndicalists. "Support of the Popular Front and gradual movement towards the complete alliance of petty-bourgeoisie and proletariat," said the Communists. "Restoration of peace and order as it was before July 19," said the Esquerra. "Government of Soldiers' and Workers' Councils," muttered POUM.

IV

NON-INTERVENTION

THE CHIEF FEAR in Barcelona was that of foreign intervention. The fleets of all nations had entered Spanish ports to evacuate their subjects, prey to an unreasoning terror not unfomented by the Consuls. Tourists living up-coast were "rescued" very much against their will by British destroyers, leaving the villagers hurt and puzzled.

Orders were issued by the Consulates to all subjects to leave Spain immediately. In Madrid, the foreign colony publicly protested against false reports that they were in danger; but in Barcelona they crowded into a comfortable refuge in the old Yacht Club, guarded by the very militiamen they feared and by the guns of warships in the harbour. The *London* came racing up to Barcelona from Alexandria, and the indignant Anarchists compared the high-handed way it had sailed in to the permanent insult of the British occupation of Gibraltar.

The British Navy had not only sailed into Spanish ports to evacuate its citizens. When shells from the fighting Spaniards fell uncomfortably close to Gibraltar, the *Queen Elizabeth* moved spectacularly and squarely across the Straits, effectively blocking the loyal bombardment of rebel Algeciras. The German *Deutschland* had already similarly blocked the *Jaime I's* bombardment of Ceuta, and its commander had paid a courtesy visit to Franco.

The Barcelona papers spoke of "an intervention just possibly imminent", but, curiously enough, believed that it would come from Britain. News of the incidents in the Straits and the bombing of the Rock Hotel in Gibraltar

filtered through, but was not published in the Barcelona press, and no foreign papers were on sale. Particular attention was paid to the interests of British subjects, and when a representative of the British Consulate handed to the C.N.T. a list of British property to be respected, these terrifying Anarchists thanked him warmly and publicly asked other Consulates to follow his example.

There had been rumours of a difficult international situation when Germany protested against the raiding of the Labour Front offices and declared its belief that the staff had been massacred. There was also the case of four Germans supposed to have been tried by a "secret Communist court" and shot at dead of night. While four Germans had indeed lost their lives, the "secret court" was of course fantastic; but the rumour ran that Hitler had demanded from Companys a public funeral complete with swastika banners and that Companys had been forced to reply that he could not answer for the consequences if a swastika banner appeared in the streets of Barcelona.

The Italians, too, were protesting, and counter-protests were made when it was learned that the Italian Consulate, like several others, had been acting the Scarlet Pimpernel against all diplomatic legality.

The really sinister report of the six Savoia Marchetti seaplanes which had left Italy on July 30 bound for rebel Ceuta and had been forced down in Algeria did not at once cause dismay. The full implications were not yet understood, and it was firmly believed that England would intervene decisively. England's interests in the Mediterranean were more dangerously threatened than they had been in Abyssinia, and Spain had been deeply impressed by the popular reaction against the Hoare-Laval Pact. The T.U.C., in conjunction with the French C.G.T., had declared its solidarity with the Spanish Government and the Spanish workers, and, despite the Abyssinian betrayal, Spaniards still believed that British egotism would prevent any intervention by any other Power.

The British Government's agreement in principle with the French initiative for non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War was actually greeted with approval in Barcelona, for it seemed to remove the most pressing danger. If England refused to intervene in the restoration of order in Spain, it seemed certain that no other Power would dare to challenge the might of the British Navy.

The Spaniards still could not realise that British policy since 1931 had been based precisely upon making whatever terms possible with the most aggressive Power in order to divert war eventually eastwards.

So far did the old illusions about English "fair play" and "egotism" dominate in Catalonia, and even in Madrid, that *Solidaridad Obrera*, whose biggest international target had always been the League of Nations, actually invoked Wilson's doctrine of the right to self-determination.

The reality was quite different. For the Powers, Spain was simply an incident in July 1936, as it had been in July 1870. No doubt the Civil War was taking place in territory with a strategic and economic value to several foreign countries. The same had been true of the Venizelist Greek revolt and was currently true of the disturbances in Egypt and Palestine. Direct non-intervention was merely common sense if it were interpreted in the sense that the Governments, as Governments, were prepared to agree not to exploit the Spanish incidents.

There could be no kind of doubt, despite the clamours of the *Daily Mail* and the hesitations of *The Times*, that the events in Spain could not constitute a civil war at all, from the foreign point of view. A legitimate Government was repressing disorder, and if it had been true that in the course of this repression certain elements working in tactical alliance with it had committed excesses, that too was a matter for the Spanish Government. No one had supposed it was the British Government's business to interfere in the repression of the Sanjurjo or the Casas

Viejas insurrections. The Spanish Government was in precisely the same position as had been the Greek Government in the spring of 1935, and at that time the Foreign Office had worked actively against the insurrection. Its object was of course not altruistic: Greece was a strategic position very badly needed once the insufficiency of Malta had been suspected; but none the less, it could aid the Greek Government although Madame Venizelos had powerful financial friends and Venizelos himself strong sympathisers in London.

It was, however, known to the Quai d'Orsay, to the Kremlin and almost certainly to Downing Street that Franco had a definite working agreement with Italy and probably Germany. Unofficially, protests could be made. Any show of firmness could at once have put a stop to this agreement.

In July, there was little immediate question of the Spanish Civil War being a struggle between Communism and Fascism. Communists and Fascists formed perhaps 10 per cent of the opposing forces. Certainly, the ultimate result of the reaction's victory would be a form of Fascism, since that was the modern aspect any such movement assumed. Certainly, the victory of the Popular Front Government would lead to a regime in which some parts of the communist programme would have a very much increased emphasis. Neither of these eventualities was strictly the business of a foreign government.

The British Government's observers in Spain, however, were not aware of the real situation. "For the purposes of this report" they called Socialists, Anarchists, Anarchosyndicalists and Communists indiscriminately "Communists". At the time of Casas Viejas even well-informed British circles believed that Seisdedos was a Communist. The Government of Baldwin, MacDonald, Eden and Vansittart could obviously not countenance support of a communist regime, and so it was convenient for the mine-owners to spread this false impression.

The influence and willingness of the British Government had been tragically overrated by France. Delbos appears to have believed that England was all-powerful in Portugal and could be all-powerful, in alliance with France, in the Mediterranean. But this was an error. Since the Imperial Conference behind the scenes of the Royal Jubilee, when the struggle between Canadian and Argentine meat-interests nearly broke out into the open, and since the "strictly unofficial" journeys of Sir Maurice Hankey, British policy in the Mediterranean had been confined to mere bargaining with the second strongest power, Italy. The route to India had receded half a century and the Cape of Good Hope had once again become a strategic position of world-importance.

This meant the security of South Africa; and the Union seemed anything but well-disposed to the Mother Country. Faced with internal troubles, the Union had revived "nationalism", a form of separatism. At the same time, Germany had raised the question of the redistribution of colonies, and it was essential to satisfy Germany in order to divert Hitler's energies more profitably towards the Ukraine and the Lena Gold-fields. The question of Tanganyika had been mentioned, and the Union was not going to yield one of its richest possessions. The sacrifice, however, had to be made, and the chosen victim seemed to be obviously Portugal.

The Nazi Foreign Bureau had not been idle. It had long realised that almost anything could be bluffed out of the British National Government. To save its remaining positions, the British Admiralty at any rate, if not the still-Francophile Foreign Office, would be willing to accept a bargain over a *fait accompli*. The Oliveira Salazar dictatorship was extremely precarious in Portugal, and a disguised Nazi *putsch* could easily upset it. The resulting regime would then of course be "conciliatory" about the colonies. British wine and textile interests in Portugal would be respected and even favoured. Monteiro, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, was discussing the question

in London, and, although Baldwin stated in the House that Pirow had not been authorised to declare in Cape Town that the British Government had decided to cede Germany any part of British possessions, it was noticed that there was a certain implied emphasis on the "British".

Thus, the probabilities that the British Government would oppose any initiative by Germany were slight. France could expect no real assistance, especially after the British Government had already refused support against the German occupation of the Rhineland even in exchange for French support in the Mediterranean. Lake Tana, Rio Tinto and Angola were obviously more important than international justice.

Delbos and Blum knew that they could do little without British support. Hitler had already intensified his anti-Soviet campaign which was to rise to a paroxysm at the Nürnberg *Parteitag*. The Franco-Russian Pact might be strong enough to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on England later, if the suitable organism could be found. The Five-Power Conference scheduled for September could not be directly reached by Soviet diplomacy. The League of Nations was far too complex, the absence of Germany an insuperable obstacle. Unofficial information reached Delbos that Germany and Italy had reached a tacit offensive agreement on Spain. The danger of war was intenser in July than it had been even in March.

Soundings had been made immediately by English diplomatic circles whether France would agree to a non-intervention pact. Delbos had really no choice, although refusal to aid the Spanish Popular Front, a legitimate Government even less Left than the French, might well split the Popular Front in France. In fact, the only thing that could keep it together was the imminent peril in which it stood: from Germany and from the Croix de Feu, already almost openly preparing a civil war of which Germany would undoubtedly take advantage. Lacking the support of the British Government

Delbos was forced to take the lesser evil of Non-Intervention and trust in the ability of the Spanish Government to solve its own problems. In the first weeks of the Civil War, no one realised how ill-equipped was the Spanish Popular Front nor to what extent Italy and Germany were supplying the rebels.

On July 25, a French Cabinet meeting considered a request for arms from the Spanish Government. There was a heated debate. The Left saw every reason to grant the request. Blum and Delbos urged the paramount claims of French security. There was nearly a Cabinet crisis, but finally it was decided that no war material would be allowed to be exported to Spain. Fearing, however, the anger of the French masses and the decided opposition of the Communist Party, the Cabinet allowed the C.G.T. to understand that it would not put obstacles in the way of any arrangements they might make independently of the Government, and this hint was conveyed to a delegation of the Catalan Antifascists then in Paris.

This solution, however, did not succeed; for two reasons: first, the reservations made by the interested Powers, to whom it became necessary to give ostentatious guarantees of good faith; and second, the lack of gold and valuta in Catalonia.

There was nearly £80,000,000 of gold in the vaults of the Bank of Spain in Madrid; but Madrid refused to send it to Catalonia. For a few days, Catalonia was in a position to buy what arms it wanted to, and was unable to do so for lack of the means to pay for them. This question, still obscure, was to determine important aspects of the Civil War.

On the 27th the French established an air-patrol along the frontier to prevent the crossing of unauthorised planes, and orders were issued in Marseilles that no cargo of any kind was to be loaded on Spanish vessels, after two Spanish boats had attempted to obtain petrol for the Spanish Air Force.

Three days later, Blum told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate that no military planes or war material had been or would be delivered to Spain; commercial aircraft, fuel and food supplies would, however, be permitted. The civil aircraft sent was of such inferior quality that Xavier Vallat, the Right wing leader in the Chamber, denounced them as an insult to the honour of France.

On August 1, the French Cabinet appealed to the British and Italian Governments for the rapid adoption and rigid observance of an agreed arrangement for non-intervention in Spain. Meanwhile, since war supplies were reaching the insurgents from foreign countries, the French Government "reserved its freedom of judgment in regard to the application" until a "community of views" was established.

In the next few days, negotiations went on in London and Berlin. The British Government suggested that Germany and Portugal be included. Neurath let it be understood that Germany would be guided by the conduct of the U.S.S.R., and the official press agency at once prominently featured a Soviet world-revolution scare based on alleged "material and moral support in the Soviet Union for the Spanish Marxists".

It was perfectly true that there was at least moral support in the Soviet Union for such "Marxists" as Azaña, Giral, Companys, Casanovas and the C.N.T. Huge meetings all over the Union gathered to show their solidarity with the Spanish Antifascists and collected 12 million roubles from their pay. Nor was this only in the Soviet Union. In France, Belgium and England hundreds of thousands of persons met to send their best wishes to the Spanish people. Unfortunately, it was only their wishes that they could send. Mexico, however, stoutly remarked that it would do just as it liked and freighted the *Magellanes* openly with a battalion of volunteers and a cargo of German arms it owed the Spanish Government in barter payment for a destroyer just delivered. The first columns

of antifascist volunteers, mostly German and Italian exiles in France, began to arrive in Barcelona, despite the difficulties placed in their way by certain disloyal Spanish Consuls.

On August 5, the U.S.S.R. replied to the French Chargé d'Affaires that it was willing to join the non-intervention agreement provided that Portugal also joined and that the assistance rendered by certain States to rebels against the legal Spanish Government should be immediately discontinued. Next day, Italy adhered in principle, asking, however, that all private displays of solidarity, collections of funds and enrolment of volunteers should be forbidden. Belgium joined the agreement. On August 8, the German Government informed the French Government that no war material had been or would be sent to the Spanish rebels. On the 10th, the U.S.S.R. adhered.

The day following the German statement that no war material had been sent to Spain, a German plane landed at the Barajas airport near Madrid, tried to escape when it found that Madrid was still in the hands of the Government but had to land again at Azuaga. It was a Junker, built entirely for military purposes. All the evidence shows that it was not a commercial machine used for evacuating the German colony in Madrid. This was only one of a series of sendings to the rebel forces, details of which were carefully sifted by the Committee of Enquiry into Breaches of International Law relating to Intervention in Spain. By August 8, nearly seventy German and Italian planes had been received by the rebels.

Spain remained in ignorance after the first reports of the Savoias which landed in Algiers. Only one newspaper in Madrid, Caballero's *Claridad*, reported the Azuaga Junker.

Madrid showed an astonishing anxiety not to offend German or Italian susceptibilities in any way. The censorship even went so far as to forbid the use of the swastika in caricatures and antifascist posters. The publication in

London of the documents found in the German Labour Front offices in Barcelona was considered tactless.

A certain amount of blame must be attributed to Augusto Barcia, the Foreign Minister, accustomed to the drawing-room atmosphere of Geneva. Despite frequent complaints, he did little to clean up the Spanish Embassies and Consulates abroad, and some of his appointments were lamentable. Agramonte in Berlin went over to the side of the rebels, taking with him most of the staff, after Fiscovick, transferred from Stockholm, where the previous Minister had also joined Burgos, had declared for Franco the day after his arrival. The Republican Embassy in Berlin was run by a Second Attaché named Rivera, without authority and almost without credentials; and when Franco's entry into Madrid was rumoured on November 8, Agramonte was able to take possession of the Embassy again and run up the monarchist flag.

In the Vatican, the Republican Ambassador actually came to blows with his disloyal staff. In Rome, the dismissed rebel Ambassador would not allow his successor to enter, and the Italian authorities refused to intervene. The Burgos Junta was permitted to open "delegations" in every capital, and only when Alvarez del Vayo became Foreign Minister in the Caballero Cabinet in September was a strong but unavailing protest made. Not a word of the incidents in Berlin was published in Madrid, and in Barcelona few commentaries were passed by the censorship.

Only Caballero and Prieto opposed this policy. Caballero allowed his secretary to publish the story of the Azuaga Junker in *Claridad* and Prieto personally signed an account in his *Informaciones* describing the delivery of foreign fighting planes to rebel headquarters in Morocco.

There was no doubt whatever that Franco was receiving this foreign aid. At the outbreak of the rebellion, the rebels possessed fifteen Breguet XIX planes, representing the equipment of the Moroccan Air Force. In Seville,

they captured three three-engined Fokkers and one Douglas. The rest of the material in Seville, Logroño and Leon consisted exclusively of Breguet XIX's and one squadron of Nieuport 52's. There were no Capronis, Savoia Marchettis or Junkers.

Yet Franco, having lost the command of the Straits when the loyal fleet arrived, was able to transport his troops in detachments of thirty by air to Seville. The loyal fleet, unprovided with anti-aircraft guns, was unable to prevent it. Foreign tanks had also come and with them foreign experts who introduced the new tactic of combined attack by plane and tank. The first success of this tactic was the break-through at Badajoz.

The foreign experts were not volunteers fighting solely for what they considered a good cause. It is possible to make out a case for fascist volunteers joining Franco if antifascist volunteers joined the Spanish Governmental forces. But there are two important differences: the antifascists came voluntarily, chiefly from exile in France, and the French authorities put every difficulty in their way. The fascist volunteers could not even leave their country without the full knowledge and permission of the authorities, most of them were paid, and many of them were actually sent by the General Staffs to try in action various tactical manœuvres recently elaborated.

As soon as this was an established fact, it became obvious that ultimately the victory of Republican Spain must be won in the sphere of foreign politics. Either the rebels must receive no more material or the Spanish Government must receive parity. Even in August it was not yet believed that Non-intervention would become a tragic unilateral farce resulting in an embargo on arms strictly upheld by just those Powers which most stood to gain from the Republic's speedy victory.

It needed considerable cynicism and knowledge of world politics to realise the full implications of the Non-intervention Pact; although Germany's flat lie on August 8,

proved without hope of contradiction the very next day, should have been a clear enough indication. But the Spanish Foreign Office still had a pathetic faith in England and France, especially in England. France's difficult position was realised; but England was in no such pressing danger, and, as master of the League of Nations, was in a position to give guarantees to France. The danger of world war depended entirely upon the English attitude. England could give it clearly to be understood that she would countenance no further meddling in the Mediterranean. There was no doubt whatever that the vast majority of Englishmen were favourable to a legitimate Government attacked by fascising rebels. If it took Mosley's provocations in the East End of London to arouse some sections of the Trades Unions and Labour Party at the Edinburgh Congress, nevertheless the feeling had been there and had not expressed itself for two reasons only: the deplorable inefficiency of the Spanish Government's propaganda abroad and the block-vote system in the T.U.C. Congress which allowed the reformist leadership to stifle a movement which might have menaced their own positions and future knighthoods.

Prieto, cynical and well-informed, an independent rather than a Marxist, devoted most of his attention to foreign politics. He had an office in the Ministry of Marine, and it was noticed that it was he, not Barcia, who received the foreign diplomats. Working twenty hours a day, he was the real Government, and he and Caballero had replaced Barcia and Giral long before the Cabinet was officially reconstructed. It is possible that if they had had a free hand earlier, the war might have been finished sooner. Caballero's energy coupled with Prieto's intelligence and negotiating capacity might have carried the day on both fronts, the internal and the international. It would have at least prevented the shameful incident of the *Kamerun*, which was held up by a Government warship in what may or may not have been Spanish territorial waters. Germany made furious protests and saw

to it that England was duly scared. The old "big stick" policy was simply a pretext and the question did not arise; for, on August 20, the *Kamerun*, this harmless and wronged ship, delivered a cargo of arms in Lisbon. It was of course impossible actually to prove that the arms went straight to Burgos, so that Hitler was permitted to thunder in the *Völkischer Beobachter*: "The halting and search of the German steamer *Kamerun* on the high seas by Red Marxist marines is a serious breach of international law!" with such effect that his friends and dupes in London believed that war was imminent and that Barcelona was to be, if it was not actually being, bombarded by the *Deutschland*.

Mussolini, with a more Latin diplomacy, simply went on rushing Capronis and other supplies to the rebel armies until the last possible moment when, threatened with a mass-meeting of Radicals likely to put pressure on Blum to implement the reserves contained in his note of August 1, he had safely landed a final big cargo of planes in Vigo on August 28.

The British embargo had been declared on August 19, the German on the 24th and the Portuguese on the 27th.

Not for one moment after these dates had the supply of arms to the rebels ceased. Nobody had supposed that it would do so, but it had been believed that the traffic would be diminished when it became clandestine. Unofficial gun-running is a traditional feature of all civil wars. The supply of arms to the Republic by signatories of the Convention did in fact diminish enormously in September; but the supply to the rebels actually intensified when it appeared highly probable that Madrid would fall.

The Portuguese, making the most of their limelight and perhaps eager to avenge the famous British divisional order which referred to "our noble but nimble allies" during the Great War, had insisted on a number of outrageous reservations: their right to "save Western

civilisation", their indignation at the "destruction of all the values of Spanish wealth, culture and history"; and stated that Portugal, "knowing that the Communist and Anarchist militias have proclaimed a reign of terror, indulging in mass killings, thinks it would be wise to condemn such a method of conducting social evolution and to make a public declaration of this on signing the Non-Intervention Pact".

As the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senhor Monteiro, explained at Geneva, "without the policy of non-intervention they might easily run the risk of helping a Government which differed from the national will, at least in legitimate character, and perhaps even in authority; at a certain moment, legitimacy might be nothing more than a faint appearance of non-existent conformity with the law". Ossorio y Gallardo, the Spanish delegate to the League, might well point out that a State was not more or less legitimate according to the enemies who plotted against it. In practice, the Portuguese thesis was as good an excuse as any other, and a current joke in the Lisbon cafés was the remark that the Great Powers were so neutral that they did not care whether the Falangists, the Carlists, the Monarchists or the Moors took Madrid.

There were plenty of grounds for this jest. The Spanish Government still believed that justice and right were factors which could outweigh copper-mines and submarine-bases. In September, this was just sufficiently true to be slightly embarrassing to a Government, such as the British, which was not yet assured of Labour's acquiescence and had not yet fully planned the masterly diversion of the "constitutional crisis".

The Governments were in fact becoming alarmed by the volume of mass sympathy for Spain. "Arms and planes for Spain!" resounded everywhere. The German and Italian secret police worked night and day to discover what hands had splashed the walls of Turin, Trieste, Berlin and Hamburg with "Long live Antifascist Spain!"

In the first days of September, La Pasionaria came to Paris to tell huge meetings that the Spanish people would rather die on its feet than live on its knees.

When the Spanish Government wished to bring before the League the concrete accusations against Italy and Germany drawn up by Del Vayo on September 15, the League's President, Dr. Saavedra Lamas, of the Argentine, attempted obstruction. In this he was ably seconded by M. Motta, of Switzerland, whose Government had already forbidden its nationals to mention Spain in public.

The session was completely unsatisfactory, and the League refused to publish the text of the Del Vayo Note. The Spanish Delegation had to circulate it themselves. The League's refusal was not surprising, for Del Vayo was so embarrassingly in the right. The concluding paragraphs of the Note addressed to "the signatories of the Non-Intervention Agreement other than Germany. Italy and Portugal" ran: "Matters have come to such a pass that the constitutional Government of Spain has felt it incumbent upon it to approach your Government, as a signatory of the non-intervention agreement, and to ask it whether it has realised that the embargo on the exportation of arms to a legitimate government and the toleration of direct intervention by Italy and Germany in favour of the rebels are bringing into existence an extremely serious precedent in the international sphere: are ushering in a new era in Europe in which certain states practising a system of government by force are allowed, in silence and with impunity, to impose their ideas and conceptions of the State upon another country by keeping up civil war there and by furnishing armed aid to the rebels? The Spanish Government, being convinced that your Government will not wish to accept so unheard of a violation of international law and practice, which would furnish the basis for a policy bringing Europe under the governance of reckless violence, and would gravely imperil the peace of the world by striking

a deadly blow at the principle of collective security, asks for the raising of the embargo laid upon the export of arms to the Spanish Government and a strict prohibition to supply war material to the rebels."

Del Vayo was in the right; but the tactic was hardly modern. The sole fact of being in the right was not a sufficiently strong claim for aid. Franco could make out just enough of a case to give Germany and Italy the excuse to recognise him; but in addition, he could offer the Balearics, the Canaries, Ceuta, the Riff mines and, as it then seemed, military successes which would limit the expenses of his supporters.

On September 9, Mr. William Shepherd Morrison, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, presided over a meeting of twenty-six countries pledged to Non-Intervention. The South and Central American Republics were not represented, so that smuggling could still be possible, although slightly more expensive.

Portugal, too, did not attend. There could be only two explanations: either that the British Government did not want its attendance, thus to deprive the whole conference of value, or that British influence in Portugal had been decisively cancelled by German pressure. Mr. Morrison decided that the best thing to do was to adjourn until "sufficient data" had been gathered for another meeting to take place, and the delegates dispersed to see what evidence of gun-running they could manage to suppress.

The real truth was that all the interested Powers were only too anxious to play for time. In early September it was still impossible to decide which side in Spain would win, and Hitler and Mussolini were just as anxious as England not to make any too-decisive move. If the Fascist Powers too openly supported Franco, their prestige would suffer badly if he were defeated. If Franco won, the Baldwin Government would have to face its infuriated democratic electors sooner or later, and war-scares and Royal red-herrings could not always be relied upon to

stampede them. The Blum Government could claim a diplomatic victory for "collective security", and the Spaniards, as an American paper vividly put it, could for the moment be left to "stew in their own blood".

"The initiative," said Downing Street, "is with France." "We are only too anxious to fulfil our obligations by supplying the legitimate Spanish Popular Front Government," replied the Quai d'Orsay, "but England must commit herself first." "The slightest incident," chorused both, "will give Hitler an excuse to declare war!"

Deliberately or not, both overlooked two cardinal facts: that Addis Ababa had been occupied although Italy had never declared war upon Abyssinia, and that Hitler could manufacture a pretext for declaring war, if he wished to do so, anywhere between the Atlantic and the Pacific, just as Bismarck, his model in foreign policy, had manufactured the famous Ems telegram.

"I cannot understand why France and Great Britain can be so blind," said Indalecio Prieto. "How can they envisage with pleasure the establishment of a fascist regime in the west of Europe?" As far as the British Government was concerned, it did not envisage the prospect with the least pleasure; it did not envisage it at all; it just shut its eyes and prayed that all would be over before it had to open them again.

At the end of August, Sir Henry Chilton, British Ambassador to Spain, living comfortably but remotely at Hendaye, agreed with the other equally comfortable and remote Ambassadors to find a diplomatic formula to be submitted to Spanish leaders of both sides urging them to "humanise the civil war and mitigate its sufferings". The Argentine Ambassador coolly referred to the "Governments of Madrid and Burgos", thus for the first time stating diplomatically the Powers' *realpolitik* view that the Civil War in Spain was not the suppression of a revolt by a legitimate Government but the struggle of

two equally-legitimate belligerents. The phrase was of course immediately denied, but it had not been challenged by any of the Ambassadors. The Soviet Ambassador, Marcel Rosenberg from Geneva, was absent, for he was then the only Ambassador remaining in Madrid, brought there on August 27 by Prieto's urgings.

When Rosenberg, the first Soviet Ambassador to Spain, went to hand his credentials to Azaña two days after he had been greeted at his hotel by Prieto, the Presidential Guard in full uniform accompanied his Mercedes. There was a significant alteration in the Guard's dress: the white plumes were now red. A cheering crowd pushed right into the Palace and for the first time those august halls heard the *International*.

That night, Madrid was bombed for the first time, by Junkers. A few miles from the Ambassadorial Conference in Saint Jean-de-Luz, a crowd at the French end of the International Bridge watched ill-armed militiamen holding Irun desperately against the rebels' foreign-made artillery and aircraft.

The Archbishop of Canterbury asked plaintively: "Mediation? Who can undertake the task? It would be a great thing if the leading European Powers would attempt it, but this might lead only to dissensions among themselves. Disquieting signs that the world seems to be going mad have come from this horrible civil war in Spain."

Since the probable solution of the Spanish Civil War was to be the "sacrificing" by England of a Portuguese colony to Germany, Portugal was forced to offer some sort of immediate services with a view to ultimate compensation—besides the fat commissions to the Portuguese gun-runners sitting in the Hotel Aviz in Lisbon.

Portugal, therefore, attended the Non-Intervention Committee for the first time, on September 28. It announced that it maintained its original reservations published in Paris on the 10th; protection of Portuguese territory and security; mediation; defence against any

regime of social subversion; maintenance of relations with a *de facto* or new Government.

The stressing of the "protection of Portuguese security" was due to an incident some days previously. The crews of two warships in Lisbon Harbour, the destroyer *Dão* and the sloop *Alfonso do Albuquerque*, had mutinied against their officers. The shore-batteries had opened fire, slightly damaged the ships, which were then towed ashore and easily repaired, while the mutineers had been imprisoned. Oliveira Salazar stated that the Portuguese Government had known of the mutiny beforehand, and had preferred to allow it to come to a head and crush it in an exemplary manner. In other words, as neat a police-job as never deceived anyone in Lisbon. "At a certain moment," Senhor Monteiro had said, "legitimacy might be nothing more than a faint appearance of non-existent conformity with the law."

International politics dealing with Spain became positively metaphysical, until finally an Italian representative could be forced into the position that "the Italian troops which are *not* in Spain will stay there!" Despite every kind of documentary and physical evidence, the British Foreign Office could say that "there was no Italian or German intervention in Spain, and if there is, we regret it". The Spaniards were comparatively simple and honest people: to them this peculiar sophistry appeared "unheard-of".

The superficial wrangle about the violations of the Non-Intervention Pact went on and on throughout September and October. The U.S.S.R. threatened to consider itself released from the Pact, for "the situation created by repeated violations of the agreement might render the agreement virtually non-existent". Italy, Germany and Portugal took turns in making scenes and walking out. England, subtler, did its best to adjourn any decision. France pathetically waited to see what England would do, and did nothing because it received no lead.

If the Spanish Government could have persuaded France to be another Portugal, everything would have been settled. The Non-Intervention Pact would have been a useful document, like the League of Nations Charter or the Kellog Peace Pact. No one would have taken it seriously, but it would have been there to act as a damper on any too-hasty interference in Spain. Arms-smuggling would thereby have become, if not legitimate, at least "nothing more than a faint appearance of non-existent conformity with the law".

But this was just what France could not do without guarantees from England. Blum told a private meeting of the National Council of the French Socialist Party on November 8 that "if concerted action with England should be possible, France would agree to undertake" the raising of the arms embargo. Three days later, Mr. Eden, metaphysically, stated that he had no information that the French Government had modified its attitude.

Certainly, he had "received no communication, official or otherwise"; but, as the National Council of Labour had put it in their letter to Mr. Eden of October 21, "His Majesty's Government . . . must have had at their disposal through their consular officers and their agents information. . . ." Or they might have read the morning papers.

All this was perfectly incomprehensible to the Spanish Government representatives. Trained themselves in labour politics, but unaccustomed to diplomacy, they failed to see where the line must be drawn, and even more, where it would be drawn. "Officially," the British Foreign Office had no evidence whatsoever that the Non-Intervention Pact had ever been broken. To do it justice, there was no reason save common sense to believe the reports of practically the whole English press rather than the reports of the *Daily Mail*. Obviously, too, the accusations made by Spain had no more weight as evidence than the accusations made by Germany, Italy,

Portugal or the U.S.S.R., since these were all parties to the dispute, and one man's word is almost as good as another's, even if he has previously been convicted of perjury.

What was difficult to understand was why the British Foreign Office had received no information from its "consular officers and agents". The mystery was less profound when the capacities and activities of these persons in Spain was examined—unofficially, of course. The British libel law and the unofficial censorship of the British press prevent any comment upon this subject.

To analyse the whole wrangle was futile. It was no kind of good trying to find out what was an "official intimation" because it soon appeared that the Foreign Offices of all countries would hear "officially" only what they wanted to hear. A certain scepticism as to the nature of evidence was an admirable political tactic.

If the arrival of ten thousand Italian troops were reliably reported from Seville and the Italian Foreign Office chose to say that they were ten thousand sanitary inspectors needed for humanitarian reasons because the Spanish drains were appalling, the most one could do, after several weeks' negotiation, was to set up an International Committee of Investigation into Spanish Drainage and wait for its evidence. If, after some months, it reported that Spanish drainage was in fact perfectly satisfactory, one could then spend some time deciding whether it was satisfactory before or after the arrival of the Italian sanitary inspectors, and, if it was so before, why the inspectors had been sent. Upon this, Italy could remark that the ten thousand were not in fact sanitary inspectors, but plumbers, and what were Russian drains like, anyway? After having discussed this for some time, the Committees and Sub-Committees would then have to turn their attention to the relief of some ten thousand widows and orphans caused by the activities of the dubious arrivals.

Meanwhile, a certain amount of market-rigging and political intrigue in the Far East, for instance, would have deprived the whole question of its original interest and the position of Spain as a pawn in the international game of concessions and power politics would have been changed, at the cost of thousands more Spanish lives. But since it was only Spaniards or Moors or possible foreign out-of-works who died, this could not be considered important. The situation was to change radically when, in 1937, the Spanish rebels more or less vanished and were substituted by an Italian Expeditionary Force; but in 1936, the Civil War still preserved some of the characteristics of a Spanish Civil War.

While the rebel columns of Moors and Legionaries hammered their way towards Madrid and Junkers and Fiats began to bomb the city, the Great Powers fenced for position in a game in which Spain was only one piece. Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Little Entente, Palestine, India, Arabia, Yemen, Abyssinia were supporting pieces, and it was dangerous to become too deeply engaged in any one place. That autumn of 1936, Spain was the stickiest spot; and there began the joint manœuvre of England and Germany to involve Mussolini, who had threatened the one Power in the Mediterranean, the other in Central Europe.

To meet such a situation with even the noblest exposition of injured right was likely to be futile. Nevertheless, it was necessary that Spain's protest, like Abyssinia's, should be entered in the shameful record, for even ambulances cost money, and the Spanish Government needed all it could find to buy arms how and where it could.

On October 7, the Soviet Government had told the Non-Intervention Committee that "it was compelled to declare that if violations of the agreement were not immediately stopped, the Soviet Government would consider itself free from the obligations arising out of the agreement".

On October 9, the British Labour Party Conference, startled by the revelations published by the unofficial Committee of Enquiry into the Alleged Breaches of International Law in respect of Intervention in Spain on the 3rd, reversed its previous decision supporting non-intervention and passed a Resolution asking that the French and British Governments "should take steps forthwith to restore to the Spanish Government their right to purchase the arms necessary to maintain the authority of the Constitutional Government in Spain and to re-establish law and order in her territory". Law and order were much in the Conference's mind, for the whole of the London East End had risen with barricades against Mosley's Fascists, to the cry of "*No pasaran!*"

The Soviet representative repeated, on October 23, his statement of October 7; the Soviet Government "could not consider itself bound by the agreement for non-intervention to any greater extent than any of the remaining participants".

The following day, the Portuguese representative heatedly alleged that the Soviet Government wished to turn Spain into a Communist Republic, and broke off diplomatic relations with Spain. Portugal had obviously been put up by Germany to initiate future German action, and this had the advantage that if the German anti-Bolshevik-Spain campaign or the German recognition of the Burgos Junta were attacked, Germany could always plead that it was coming to the rescue of a small, threatened and noble nation which had the Interests of Western Civilisation as much at heart as Herr Goebbels himself. Long before the Civil War, the bogus "Bela Kun Plan" for the Spanish Revolution published by the monarchist Madrid paper *A.B.C.* had provided for an "experimental Red war" against Portugal. The anti-Bolshevik-Spain campaign and the "Bela Kun Plan" obviously came from the same office.

Pius XI had already addressed five hundred Spanish refugees at Castel Gandolfo: "These tragic happenings

in Spain speak to Europe and the whole world and proclaim once more to what extent the very foundations of all order, of all culture, of all civilisation are being menaced. This menace, it must be added, is all the more serious, more persistent, more active by reason of a profound ignorance and a disclaiming of the truth by reason of the truly satanic hatred against God and against humanity. Such trials have been unfailingly accompanied by universal propaganda intent on subjecting the whole world to those absurd and disastrous ideologies with which they have seduced the masses, aiming at nothing less than throwing them madly against every form of constitution, human and divine."

It is worth recalling the Portuguese Note of August 15: "Knowing that the Communist and Anarchist Militias have proclaimed a reign of terror, indulging in mass killings, Portugal thinks it would be wise to condemn such a method of conducting social evolution and to make a public declaration of this on signing the non-intervention pact." There is a curious similarity between the speeches of the ageing Pope, and those of the highly devout Oliveira Salazar, the "Bela Kun Plan" and the anti-Bolshevik crusade. The attitude was reflected in certain circles in London not without contacts with a certain Spanish aristocrat whose brother had been one of the most famous Cardinals of modern times.

Against this well-orchestrated propaganda campaign, the Spanish Government could bring few forces into play. The International Federation of Trades-Unions had demanded a "reconsideration" of the non-intervention policy, the Second International had agreed. In every country, enthusiastic meetings had been held in favour of Spanish democracy. The Russian workers, especially, collected vast sums. Food-ships and ambulances were sent. Refugees were cared for. But all this was on the idealistic level of Del Vayo's notes to Geneva. It was more or less unco-ordinated, although the International Red Aid did admirable work. International sympathy

for Spain was abundant, and in England Spanish Aid could unite figures normally so far apart as Harry Pollitt and the Duchess of Atholl.

The fact remained, at the end of October, with Mola's four columns marching on Madrid, that generosity was as impotent against high-financial politics as heroism against Heinkels.

PART V

THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

- I. The End of the Bourgeois Republic
- II. Four Aspects of the Civil War
- III. Organising the Revolution
- IV. Madrid Digs In
- V. The War Goes On
- VI. The Civil War in 1937
- VII. Social Change

I

THE END OF THE BOURGEOIS REPUBLIC

THE FIRST MILITIA columns were in the Sierra and Mola was held in the Alto de León. That the columns had nothing to eat or smoke for four days showed that everything had been improvised. Madrid had been caught unprepared, despite the warnings from Barcelona. The city had, to its cost, been directed by a Government which could not make up its mind, not by the unions. Casares Quiroga donned the militiaman's overalls and vanished into the Sierra. Nothing more was heard of him until he was stopped by a patrol in Barcelona in mid-November.

The militias began to clean up Madrid. The snipers on the roofs were troublesome for a few days, until every man with a gun in his hand and no good cause for possessing it was shot at sight. Then appeared the "ghost cars", generally Red Cross, which shot at the patrols as they rushed past.

Soon these too ceased, and relative peace settled upon the city. The militias arrested hundreds of Right supporters, and there was short shrift for them. Azaña's sleep was broken by the shots in the Casa del Campo, the park just behind the Presidential Palace. On July 22, he protested against the indiscriminate liquidation, but the executions went on.

That the executions in Madrid were just as numerous as they were in Barcelona, Seville, Saragossa or Granada cannot be denied. This was a civil war, and it had been declared by the Right. They had taken the initiative and the risk.

Extensive liquidation was certainly necessary. Madrid, a bourgeois bureaucratic city, contained a large proportion of "anti-Reds". Since civil war is a category of politics, it is reasonable that a man should be liquidated for his opinions. It is even more reasonable that he should be prevented from doing active harm. The whole of the Madrid antifascist Governmental and administrative apparatus was hollowed out by espionage. The Red Cross, a bourgeois organisation, was full of spies. They abounded among the "rearguard heroes", that new class of young gentlemen who filled the caf  s and the requisitioned cars with their spick *monos*, shining Sam Browns, magnificent but unused pistols, and their blondes. They were everywhere among the "temporary workers", bourgeois rather ill at ease in their *monos*, or, hatless and tieless, so successfully proletarianised in appearance that some na  ve persons boasted that the caf  s of the elegant Alcal   had become the property of the people and that their middle-class habitu  s had all been liquidated. Closer observers noted the danger of the attitude in these circles: "Everyone is a Socialist these days."

Here was already the nucleus of General Mola's Fifth Column, which was to take the city from within while the other four hammered their way from the Sierra and up the Tagus Valley. Mola's declaration cost the lives of hundreds of his supporters, since the Madrid militias, warned, took no chances. The Fifth Column certainly existed. There were secret broadcasting-posts, conspiracies, centres for spreading false rumours and inciting one party against the other. There was fascist infiltration into the actual commanding bodies. Mangada stated that at least 80 per cent of Casares Quiroga's War Ministry was sympathetic to the rebels if not actually treacherous, and even after the formation of the Giral Cabinet, at least half the War Ministry Staff could not be fully trusted. The whole General Staff, which went on working for a few days after the rising, was openly on the side of the rebels. The police force was full of conspirators and its Chief

had to resign. Rivas, Chief of Police until July 18, was arrested. There were uncomfortable rumours from the Valencia garrison. The Civil Guard was becoming uneasy at the frequent dismissals and new appointments. The "brains" of the fascist movement, Dr. Albiñana himself, was discovered in Madrid.

The first revolutionary police, the feared "Dawn Patrol" of Garcia Atadell, a thick, mysterious, cold person, took up its headquarters in the Fine Arts Club, after the Republican Ateneo and the U.G.T. had wrangled fiercely for possession. Nothing whatever was known by the public about Atadell, and when *Mundo Obrero*, the Communist organ, published a short biography, Atadell stated in print that it was completely false. The "Dawn Patrol" worked hard to scatter the Fifth Column, but the citizens of Madrid looked over their shoulders as they passed the roped-off doorway of the Fine Arts Club.

Later, Atadell was to flee abroad with the cash, be caught in Tenerife and, ironically, be shot in Seville.

In the first excitement of victory and relief, Madrid paid little attention to this inevitable darker side of the situation. The flags taken from the rebel garrisons of Madrid and Alcalá de Henares were exhibited on the balcony of the Ministry of the Interior in the Puerta del Sol, and cheering crowds marched past triumphantly. The weather was hot, the cafés open all the time, and the streets were never empty.

All churches and convents were shut, under protection of the Government. Flags waved from every house. Many palaces were taken over by the Left organisations. The papers had appeared all the time, and now moved into the offices of the old Right-wing organs. The Communist *Mundo Obrero* and the Azañist *Politica* shared the splendid machines of the clerical *El Debate*, and appeared with a two-colour head. *Informaciones*, Juan March's paper, became Prieto's organ; and Prieto's daily articles stood out from the somewhat hysterical rest of the press by their sobriety and even pessimism, a sort of stoic courage.

The monarchist *A.B.C.* gave its readers a shock by appearing in the same format but an extremely radical text. It was perhaps the most daring of the Madrid papers in the scope of its reportages, and was even suspended for one day for reproducing a photo of C.N.T. members dressed in priests' cassocks. Until August 2, papers appeared on Sunday night and Monday morning as well as on working days. The C.N.T. at last found the chance to publish its national organ, *C.N.T.*

The political parties took over new headquarters. The Unified Socialist and Communist Youth requisitioned Juan March's mansion and the Communist Party occupied the magnificent Acción Popular centre, flying the republican flag beside the hammer-and-sickle.

Life in Madrid became outwardly normal. True, no one wore a hat or tie, and the militia *mono* was everywhere. But all the public services functioned and there was only a shortage of cigarettes. This caused the first queues, but was soon remedied. The streets were clamorous with loud-speakers, with news of exaggerated optimism and speeches by political leaders. Caballero rarely spoke. He was in the Sierra, agile for his years, talking to his men, seeing for himself how the war should go. Prieto, too, was rarely heard; so that when he did speak, his words carried weight.

The first funeral of a militiaman fallen in battle took place on July 24, and Madrid was hushed. That day, the first train left the South station for Talavera. In the evening, Prieto spoke. A long, stoical speech, without brilliance, but full of a bitter truth. "They will find corpses but not cowards." All Madrid stood in the streets to hear the man who, it was known, worked twenty hours a day at all the tasks of the Ministries of War, Marine and Foreign Affairs. Prieto had dismissed Alcalá-Zamora; his had been the hand behind all the events since those March days, and it was he, not Giral, who was in fact Premier. Madrid was unpleasantly surprised. It had expected simply another fiery appeal. It was faced with the truth.

All was not well with the war. People were too ready to believe that it would be a matter of a few more days; but the long summer days drew on, and the rebels were still there. Indeed, they advanced. The Catalan armies were making unexpectedly slow progress towards Saragossa. The Valencian column had been decimated by the treachery of the Civil Guard. Seville had failed to hold out against odds. Galicia was scattered. The Carlists were pressing ever harder towards Irun and San Sebastian. Malaga was bombed. Córdoba, Oviedo, the Simancas Barracks in Gijon, Granada did not fall. The Toledo Alcazar could not be taken. Mola was checked in the Sierra, but the Alto de León had cost tremendous losses. Franco was bringing more and more Moors into Seville with German passenger planes.

Yet little of this was known in Madrid. Small victories were exaggerated by the press, which lost no opportunity of stressing the cowardice and absurdity of the traitors. So that it was a disagreeable surprise to hear Prieto say in his second and last radio speech a fortnight later: "We have got to prepare for the war lasting a long time. It is a *war*, and we must arm for a long war."

The real reason for the comparative ill-success was revealed by the Madrid papers' enthusiasm when the first Valencian columns arrived through Albacete. "An army without officers," they cried in high delight. There was the crux. The spirit of the militias was magnificent but suicidal. These builders, waiters, dustmen, railwaymen, carpenters, completely without military training or experience, had done wonders. But, ill-armed, lacking discipline, organisation, communications, the necessary apparatus of an army, even though it was a people's Army, they were not capable of combined action. They were splendid material, but a skilled hand was needed to use them. As Prieto had said, it was a war; not a man-hunt, not a guerrilla, but a war of the most serious kind. They were forced to improvise everything, finding themselves in a position exactly the reverse of that of the French

Revolutionary Armies to whom enthusiasts so often compared them. The French armies of 1792 were *first* of all officered by regulars, men who had served in the Royalist armies. Kellermann raised his glass in the officers' mess on the night before Valmy with the old toast: "*Messieurs, le Roy!*" It was only after the experience of Valmy and Jemappes that elected officers were the rule.

The Spanish Antifascists had to build from the bottom. At first, the labour was sporadic. The Giral Cabinet was very necessary from the international point of view and might have been very useful if it had had the least idea how to exploit the startling fact that it was legitimate and supported by parties regarded abroad as revolutionary. But it was not capable of giving to the war that energy and direction which come from deep political conviction.

In its overwhelming majority, the militia was proletarian, revolutionary. A People's Army is in effect an armed political party, for a civil war is a category of politics. The old rebellious army had been dissolved, and there was every opportunity to build a new one; but it needed a basis, even if that basis were to be only temporary. The spirit of the militias, of the Revolution, was in itself an inestimable weapon, especially when used against dubious soldiers, uncivilised Moors, mercenary Foreign Legionaries and Fascists of whom even their military associates had to confess that an eagerness to man the front-line was not among their characteristics.

The reformation of the militias and the creation of a Popular Army was necessarily slow because the political conditions for success were not present. The petty-bourgeois Government had not yet recovered from its audacity in arming the workers. It was distinctly afraid that these arms might be used against itself. Azaña's broken sleep beside the Casa del Campo by no means strengthened his determination, and Giral was simply a confidant of Azaña. The Jacobin Radical had been tried

too high, and the failure of nerve was apparent in a man courageous enough to assume responsibility for a hundred thousand deaths, but not determined enough to carry out all the implications of that responsibility. The old cleavage became apparent in many places. The Madrid Anarchists complained that the Government would not arm them, favouring its immediate supporters. How far this was true it is impossible to say; but undoubtedly it was a true statement of Giral's desire. The latent dissensions behind the lines, however, were nowhere near so strong in Madrid as they were in Catalonia; and perhaps this lack of conflict, failing to create acute situations to compel radical decisions, is one factor which accounts for the slow development.

The Madrid garrison was called back from its hasty expedition into the Sierra. The hospitals were militarised. The first voluntary militias were formed, and did not refuse, as they did in Barcelona, to be incorporated under loyal officers. The first organised battalions, however, were the work of the parties themselves, notably the famous Fifth Regiment, composed almost entirely of Communists, which became the special defence corps of Madrid.

The Alto de Leon had cost huge losses which would have been avoidable had the militias been disciplined and well-officered. But there were few officers, and of these not all could be trusted. After the first enthusiasm, too, a certain demoralisation appeared in the militias, or rather, a kind of casualness. Many simply grew tired and went home. Detachments deserted, and, although they of course did not go over to the enemy, lived on the land. A considerable proportion of the *Lumpenproletariat* had gone out with the first column and had to be liquidated or neutralised.

There were all manner of picturesque and popular columns: women's battalions, the bullfighters' column and so on, but their military value was negligible. Sometimes, they were actually dangerous. The world's press

featured a particularly pretty militia girl fighting in the Sierra. This was fine and picturesque propaganda; unfortunately, the girl happened to be a spy.

The first and biggest problem had been planted: the creation of a Popular Army. There were plenty of admirable potential officers: Paco Galán, the Communist brother of the Jaca rebel against the Monarchy in 1930, slim, bearded and bright; Colonel Mangada, small, wrinkled, myopic, but the rebels called him "the Red Devil"; and, in Catalonia, Durruti and del Barrio. But they were rather guerrilla fighters, uncertain how to handle big bodies of men.

The development of a revolutionary organisation of production went forward more slowly but perhaps more profoundly than in Barcelona. This was due to three things: the fact that the Republican Government had its seat in Madrid and could directly control the measures taken; the nearness of the front, which caused the modifications to depend largely upon the immediate necessities and conditions of the war; and the predominance of the U.G.T. over the C.N.T. In Barcelona, the slogan was "War and Revolution"; in Madrid, "War and the defence of democracy". The "defence of democracy", however, necessitated revolutionary measures, and the workers' own instinct led them to steps not entirely due to the Government's initiative. There is a strong parallel here with the Paris Commune which, subjectively, was "the first stage in the proletarian revolution, Soviet Power being the second" (Lenin). The subjectively socialist measures of the Commune, occupation of abandoned factories by the workers, cheap government, popular army, etc., developed not from a preconceived programme but from the needs of the situation.

In the earliest days, the Government decreed a moratorium and limited withdrawals from current-accounts to 2,000 pesetas; but this was merely the prolongation of measures against financial sabotage already taken by the Casares Quiroga Cabinet. At the same time,

the people themselves forced the return of all goods pledged in the pawnshops. Popular pressure is to be traced in certain other Governmental measures such as the Decree of July 28 providing for the control of certain industries and in some cases their confiscation. Reorganisation of the Civil Guard, mass-dismissals of civil servants, arrests of prominent Right-wing persons, such as that of the Marqués de Urquijo, the great Basque banker, showed a strong tendency towards proletarian domination.

The necessities of the civil war dictated the confiscation of 117 car workshops, 48 coal stores, 49 textile warehouses, 19 textile factories, 31 medical and 54 chemical stores, 3 paper factories, 4 lorry factories, 33 radio factories, all the newspapers, 8 sugar factories, the aircraft and munitions factories in Madrid and the arms factory in Toledo. These are the official data. But very many enterprises were taken over by the workers themselves: all the city's transports, the railways, all the rest of the big industry; and this tendency gradually intensified its range. This happened more slowly than it did in Barcelona but in a far more organised and scientific manner.

Since the U.G.T. controlled by far the majority of the Madrid unions, production was directed by the Socialists. The first revolutionary measure which reached further than mere isolated expropriations was the taking over of all industry connected with war-supply by the Ministry of War. This was originally intended to apply only to certain firms; but other firms, fearing individual initiative by the various Committees, applied to the War Ministry for control. Even German firms asked for this form of protection. The control of production and distribution, however, was handed over to Workers' Committees, which soon became extremely efficient, and therefore radical, in their action. If the directors and managers of these firms had realised that the protection of the War Ministry was not to be a mere bureaucratic formality, it is probable that they would not have applied so eagerly.

The second Government measure was the confiscation of all enterprises abandoned by their owners; but the decree merely legalised an accomplished fact which itself was not more than the intensification of a process which had been going on since February. Here again, the implications were wider than the measure, for workers' committees were soon formed and these committees extended their influence over any activities which in any way were connected with the fight against Fascism. The managers, terrified by this "Red terror", often asked the Committees to share their responsibilities in the complete control of the enterprises, and naturally the Committees very soon completely replaced the managers.

There was no preconceived plan in all this, although Caballero's hand may be traced in the way in which the political parties were able to use the Factory Committees in the gradual proletarianisation of the whole of Madrid's big industry. The workers themselves took the initiative dictated by the circumstances, and the proletarian parties simply organised the Committees, tightening their hold on the Unions in a way which would bring political consequences in the sphere of the State.

The Giral petty-bourgeois Government did react in protest, and, on August 14, issued a decree declaring unauthorised expropriations illegal. Both in the military and in the economic process, the division between the real situation and the Government's intentions became ever wider; and since, as Prieto pointed out, it could only be increased as circumstances grew more critical, it appeared time to make a change which would represent the real state of affairs. Even at the beginning of August, the necessity for the Caballero Government was apparent; and it would probably have come some weeks before it did, had the international situation permitted it. For the moment, it was essential to gain foreign support for a highly respectable Government which conservative Governments such as the English could approve without laying themselves open to the accusation of favouring

"Bolshevism". Non-intervention, even, appeared unreasonable but not necessarily stupid, for the full measure of the German and Italian aid to the rebels was not yet known.

Work had begun again in all the industries, perfectly normal where they were not needed for the immediate necessities of the war. Trains ran to every part of the territory in the Government's hands. In the North Station, the restaurant-cars were put together in a long train and served meals to the station militias and the workers building an armoured train which later fought on the Talavera front. The builders began work again, and, on August 3, the U.G.T. and the C.N.T. agreed formally to end their quarrel and work on the terms ruling before the big strike of July. Lifts ran again, the houses were repaired; and for some time, Madrid was more peaceful and comfortable than it had been for months. What might happen in the Casa del Campo was the business of nobody save Garcia Atadell.

But early in August the first signs of a food-shortage began to make themselves felt. The queues began again. Now they were in the markets, and the daily menu underwent strange modifications. The meat-eating Madrileños became vegetarians devoted to a frightful dish called *pisto*, a sort of vegetable stew which tasted of nothing but red pepper. Then, a few days later, wonderful rare fishes would be available at extremely low prices. Prices were never raised, and the Municipality strictly forbade profiteering. Several tradesmen were arrested for speculation.

The food-shortage was due chiefly to the cutting of usual sources of supply, but also to the tremendous requirements of the militias, the wounded and the poorer inhabitants. First the C.N.T. and then the U.G.T. Socialists and Communists had issued vouchers—*vales*—for provisions, which shopkeepers had to accept in place of money. Money, too, was scarce, despite the issue of crisp new notes and bright *Sevillano* duros which the Bank had been trying to take out of circulation. The

Municipality centralised the issue of *vales*, and had therefore to supply the families of the militias, the unemployed and even the beggars. The militias' families received five pesetas a day, in coupons of fifty centimos, the persons unfit for work received four pesetas, or, if they had families, seven pesetas. This last produced the unusual spectacle of a Madrid without beggars; or rather with a new type, the prettiest girls in Madrid collecting for the Red Aid and children at every corner making mud-castles to collect for the militias.

Later, special shops were organised for *vales* and the haphazard distribution of meals in cafés and restaurants to militiamen and party-members was brought to an end by the institution of big popular kitchens. This stopped one of those generous but unpractical initiatives which distinguished the Anarchists from the Socialists. In the early days, the hotel and restaurant industry controlled by the C.N.T. had made all hotels and inns give a certain number of free meals to their militias. A really greedy militiaman might never have slept again if he had accepted all the free coffees offered to him in a single street. This "socialism as a system of distribution" was terribly wasteful although it was extremely well carried out by the organised waiters and the anarchist *Ateneos* in every district. It might have succeeded if the supplies had been inexhaustible, but even in Barcelona the system had to be centralised in the end, for a civil war is chary of generous initiatives.

The foreign colony was an oasis amid the queues, as it was in the Russian Revolution. The "British Thesis" ("I have been here years and you can't trust these blighters") was combined with the extreme solicitude of the Spanish Government, so that the British *Chargé d'Affaires* finally had to remark that the British Embassy was not an hotel. As a matter of fact, it was. The Municipality opened a special store for the personnel and refugees in the foreign Embassies, and during the whole of this period a foreigner with a certificate from his

Minister could buy all that Madrid lacked: butter, ham, eggs, potatoes, sugar. Foreigners could live like aristocrats, too, for many rich Spanish families had appealed to the Embassies to send their subjects to live in their palaces in order that they might receive the protection of a foreign flag. There was even a brisk trade in selling such protection carried on by certain Embassies which also appeared to have suddenly become Great Powers, to judge by the number of magnificent cars needed by their staffs.

When the first trains began to leave for the coast, the majority of foreigners departed to spread fantastic atrocity stories to the reporters from the Hearst and Rothermere press writing "eye-witness accounts" from the hotels in Marseilles. The Diplomatic Corps wanted to organise a refugee train of its own, but the Government refused to allow foreigners to make use of any but the perfectly efficient ordinary trains. After this, the Diplomatic Corps recalled its dignity and visited the Foreign Minister to protest against the false rumours spread abroad and to assure him that they would remain in the city to fulfil their obligations. The Ambassadors themselves, however, decided to take their summer holiday, first at San Sebastian and then in Hendaye, where they had the pleasure of encountering many of their old friends among the Spanish aristocracy.

The appearance of Madrid was becoming that of a city in time of revolution, but there were still, of course, broad masses of the middle class which took little active part or even interest. Nevertheless, even here the political parties began to make their influence felt, and in a rather curious way. The first air-raids were the real cause of the change. The persons living in the upper floors of the houses were afraid that they might not hear the sirens announcing the raiders' arrival and therefore pressed for the formation of House Committees to take turns listening for the signal and informing the other tenants.

The Government had decreed a rent-reduction of 50 per cent and a moratorium for all rents in arrears,

and, since the text of these decrees was not very clear, the House Committees began to look into the matter in their own interests. So that here too the tendency towards socialisation was due to the owners' own desire; and the political parties' information bureaux were able to canalise the House Committees' problems and gain an influence over them. The Committees themselves extended their activities over all related questions, such as economic problems, protection against unauthorised raids, etc. Protection against raids led to the formation of a kind of special constabulary which spread outwards from the individual houses to the whole street and even quarter. Naturally the Communist and Socialist street cells and district committees co-operated closely and thus tightened their hold even over unorganised citizens. Finally, when the danger of Mola's Fifth Column of spies became acute, tenants had to register their political convictions in order to save themselves from suspicion. Thus, without any outside compulsion, the whole of Madrid gradually became politically organised.

The unity of the political parties behind the Popular Front was a less complex matter in Madrid than it was in Barcelona. In Madrid, there were only two main blocks of importance: the petty-bourgeois Government and the Socialist-Communist combination. The Anarchists, numerically small but of increasing influence among those sectors which were impatient of Giral's slowness and Caballero's continued support of a Government which had long ceased to be either adequate or representative, placed themselves on the margin, speculating chiefly on bargains in Catalonia. They had observers in all the Committees and even in the Ministries, but as yet co-operated while they criticised. The call of the Catalan Regional Federation for a National Militias Committee or a Revolutionary Defence Council with Anarchist participation was growing, but the specific weight of the C.N.T. and the FAI in Madrid was not yet sufficient to make the proposal serious. Madrid had little idea of

what was happening politically in Catalonia, and was rather contemptuous of what it did know.

A few small districts were organised in a form of Libertarian Communism, but Madrid Anarchism, being new and therefore of necessity extremely truculent, did not show the same constructive talent as it did in Catalonia.

It was, however, the C.N.T.'s pressure that caused the abandonment of anti-air-raid practice three days after it began. The panic caused by the sudden failure of the lights, the shooting which broke out—some of it Fifth Column sniping, some nerves, some worse—made it too dangerous. The renewed shooting of August 6-9 woke Madrid out of its easy optimism.

The military situation had been favourable at the beginning of August. In the centre of the Sierra Guadarrama, the loyalists held all the passes. In the east, in the Somosierra pass, Paco Galán, raised to the Generalship by popular acclamation, held firm. In the west, the rebels held the Alto de León, barring the advance to the north, but were unable to advance themselves. West again, where the Sierra de Guadarrama falls steeply from the Alto de León, Colonel Mangada, the "Red Devil", operated in the wide valley which leads to Avila between the Guadarrama and the Gredos Sierras. There were frequent reports of successes, especially from the village of Guadarrama, where Colonel Asensio held the Alto de León line. General Riquelme, the victor of Toledo, was in general command. His slowness began to arouse criticism.

Peña grumbled from Asturias that it was time that the Government air forces dropped something more effective than pamphlets upon Oviedo. Public opinion wondered why the first triumphant rush had slowed. The War Ministry had to issue a verbose explanation of its strategy, which convinced no one. People began to talk of the need to form a War Government, more representative of the new military and social developments.

The dragging course of the war had permitted the rebels to receive huge shipments of arms from Germany and Italy. It was quite untrue that time was working for the Government, as it was consolingly stated in those days. On the contrary, the longer the rebels could postpone the Government's attack, the better armed they would be to meet it; they might even be allowed to continue their offensive. The Non-intervention Pact, a tricky snare into which Blum had so easily fallen, may not have been actually part of the rebels' original calculation; but it aided it in the best possible way. Giral could not make way for Caballero until every international recourse had been proved futile; and the shipments to the rebels could continue openly until the last possible minute.

The militias were gathered in besieging concentrations around Córdoba, Granada, the Toledo Alcazar, Saragossa, Huesca, Oviedo and the Simancas Barracks in Gijon. They had few forces available for attack, and perhaps the raw troops might have been able to take advantage of this comparative leisure by obtaining military instruction and organisation. The tragedy was that there was practically no ammunition for musketry practice, there were practically no officers or instructors and there was little efficient artillery or aircraft to reduce the strongholds. Raw troops are notoriously inefficient in open country if faced with scientific resistance. They will advance and retreat with equal ardour. A popular army must have a continuous forward movement to maintain its morale. The spirit of the militias was superb, but it was undirected; and since this was a political army, failures were attributed to political machinations in the rear.

It was true that the arms were few enough and bad enough in all conscience. This situation was not improved by the retaining of a large percentage at the base. Political divergences still threatened to break into bloody fighting behind the lines, and no party was willing to send all the arms in its possession to the front, in case any other party

should take the opportunity to try to disarm it finally. All parties, it must be remembered, considered themselves the vanguard of the movement, and, although their columns often committed military suicide in their eagerness to be the first to take a position, the parties were unwilling to weaken their hold on the rearguard. Hence, the demand of all parties that all arms should be sent to the front was universally approved but reluctantly obeyed. When *El Socialista* was the first to raise this cry, *Claridad* replied furiously.

The lack of arms was the most serious obstacle to success in the war. At the great battle of Sigüenza on August 7, a small force smashed through a huge rebel concentration at this important strategic point and drove them to headlong flight. It would have been quite possible to advance on Calatayud, the capture of which would have threatened Saragossa, Teruel and even Burgos itself. The loyalist leadership was admirable, the troops were excellent: but they used every cartridge in the battle, and no more could be obtained. The pursuit was impossible.

Meanwhile, Franco had been able to import more and more tanks, planes and Moors. After the fall of Sigüenza and the deadlock in the Sierra, the plan changed. Madrid was still the objective, but the new attack was to come from the south-west, from Estremadura, while a heavy attack in the north would cut loyal communications with the French frontier.

Since the failure of the initial rising, Mola had been cut off from Franco, and consequently joint action was impossible, owing to the difficulty of swinging reinforcements in the wide circle round Madrid. Now the junction was made.

This second stage of the war was preceded by the final act of the rebellion: the rising of the Civil Guard in Badajoz. A similar attempt had been made, but checked, in Valencia after the first columns had gone to the Sierra. The object there appeared to be a junction

with the rebels in Teruel and a joint action against Catalonia from the south-west. This had failed, but Badajoz remained.

Using property on the other side of the Portuguese frontier as an air-base, traitors within the city and a huge contingent of Moors, Franco entered the city. That bright afternoon, in the bull-ring, 1,500 persons were slaughtered, cold-bloodedly, sadistically and pointlessly. It was by no means the first of these horrors, but it was the worst.

News of the Badajoz Horror directed attention away from the far worse strategic disaster, although the leaders of the workers' organisations reminded the Government that they had long warned it against the danger in the west, attributing the defeat to the "lax and lukewarm bourgeois direction". It was true that the resistance in Estremadura had been too slight; but even the best troops the Government possessed could have done little against Franco's well-armed, professionally-led, trained troops. The fault was not there: it lay in the failure of the Government's foreign policy.

Moors appeared in the Sierra. On August 17, the militias won a big battle at Medellin in the south-west, destroying a column of 200 troop-lorries. It seemed that the rebel junction had not been made after all.

Medellin had in fact changed the rebel strategy. The offensive was transferred to the Tagus Valley. The series of battles began: Puente del Arzobispo, Oropesa, Talavera, Toledo. The militias retreated and retreated. Heroically overwhelmed at Oropesa, shamefully at Talavera. The officers failed, and, lacking direction, the militias broke. General Riquelme had to resign.

The general offensive raged. The Government threw its best troops from the Sierra into the Tagus Valley, but they were completely unused to the conditions there. The Valley is treeless, hand-flat and bone-dry. Water had to be brought ten miles. There was awful thirst, and hemp sandals frayed on bleeding feet. The militia were

driven into the marshes, real African land, perfect ground for the Moors and Foreign Legion. The militias had few marksmen, few cartridges. The Moors shot like automata. The panic caused by dead-shooting set in. Mass-desertions, the failure of nerve in this black hell.

The desertions were simply the reaction from the heroism in the Sierra. The boulders and ravines there gave the illusion of prolonged street-fighting, the pleasant sensation of a solid building at one's back. In the Tagus Valley, there was no cover and there was an enemy who gave no quarter. Lack of discipline, officers, arms could not stand against a regular African army.

Madrid, infuriated by the perpetual defeats, correctly blamed the High Command. The FAI published a poster: "Praise of Indiscipline." Indiscipline, it said, had led the masses, taught by the FAI for years in the school of individual direct action, to the heroic storming of the Montaña Barracks and the superhuman heroism in the Sierra. . . . Madrid was sceptical.

Observers with experience of the Great War were unanimous in their surprise that no trenches were dug. But trenches are not for the militias, they were answered; they are guerrilla fighters. A war of movement, not trench-warfare, was the correct thing for them. In the Sierra, this guerrilla had answered well enough; but in country where the minimum of military experience positively dictated entrenchment, it was madness. Possibly a big counter-offensive might have been possible, although the Government did not possess the necessary tanks and planes. But, for political reasons, the Governmental officers had long been employed in training the militia precisely to resist, to stand firm, to sink their individual initiative in mass-discipline. "They shall not pass!" had become a kind of strategic plan, although it had originally been the war-cry which took the Montaña Barracks. The trenches were dug only after long hesitation, practically in self-defence. The Madrid War Ministry

considered their greatest advantage was that they made desertion more difficult.

On August 17, the day of Medellin, a second decree was issued creating volunteer militias, and all parties worked eagerly to recruit and organise their men. Militia pay of ten pesetas a day was granted, about the wages of a semi-skilled worker in Madrid.

Mola daringly brought cavalry to the Sierra, storming wild heights in the moonlight. In the Tagus Valley, the militias went back and back. From Aragon the news was not encouraging. The Catalans were wasting their strength on a senseless and unauthorised expedition to the Balearics. In the South, nothing was happening. A sudden offensive was crashing down on Irun. The big rebel push had begun.

Yet, optimism rose again. In Gijon, the defenders of the Simancas Barracks surrendered. In one corner there was a radio. For weeks, the starving, thirst-tortured defenders had listened to Queipo de Llano's thick voice announcing the successes of the relieving column which never came. The clatter of Queipo's *manzanilla*-glass on his table, the smacking of his lips must have been torture to the victims of the "little talking devil in the corner".

Gijon was free, and the big attack on Oviedo could begin. It was thought that even Bloody Aranda could not hold out long. Córdoba and Granada seemed to be on the point of falling. The Toledo Alcazar could hardly hold out, thought people who had not seen that rocky and monstrous fortress. The Catalans promised Madrid a speedy victory in Aragon. Mangada was doing extremely well in the Sierra, pushing on to Avila. On August 23, all the papers declared: "This week will be decisive."

It was not. The rebels' offensive intensified. The troops in the Tagus Valley could not stand. The Alcazar did not fall. The guns thundered in the Basque country.

There was an essential thing lacking: unified plan under single command. "They shall not pass!" must become: "We shall pass!"

Darkness was settling over Madrid, an unpleasant kind of dimness, a feeling of isolation, a sensation that something had missed fire.

After eleven at night, the streets were black. Only at spaced crossings was there a dim blue lamp. Blue lamps showed the entrance to the underground, blue lights in the trams, blue over the headlights of the few cars on the streets. Blue lights faintly illuminating placards: "Refuge for 200 persons."

When the sun went down, two captive balloons hung over Madrid, with direct telephonic communication with the War Ministry. Great beams swept the sky from dozens of towers. But there could be no lights in the houses after eleven, and few dared walk the streets. It had been discovered that persons had signalled with little red lights; red is visible a long way in the dark.

García Atadell's Dawn Patrol prowled long before daylight. Treachery abounded and arrests increased as the danger drew nearer. Albiñana's secretary was caught with a letter from ex-king Alfonso. "On with the movement! Spare nothing! The victory is ours. I am at your disposal for whatever you may need." General Lopez Ochoa, the represser of the Asturias rebellion, arrested after February 16, "died". *El Socialista* protested against the nightly shootings.

Madrid had not recovered from the wild fusillade during the air-raid practice on August 6. That night showed that there were dark things moving under the surface. Either all was not well with antifascist unity or Mola's Fifth Column showed a devilish ingenuity and the political organisations a criminal carelessness in the scrutiny of applications for membership. Or the roots went further back, back beyond the July building strike, back to the ugly—and mostly false—rumours of certain collaborations which went beyond the merely objective alliances of the bad winter of 1933. The very uncertainty was a danger.

The darkness was caused by the first air-raids, though it excellently expressed the state of Madrid. On August

23, the rebels had bombed the Getafe air-port. Then Cuatro Vientos, then, on the night of the 25th, Madrid itself. The planes—Junkers—flew very low over the working-class quarters, and the militia tried to drive them away with machine-guns and even pistols. The visits were repeated, and when the Madrileños found that they did no particular harm—in those days!—the irresistible Castilian humour nicknamed them “*churro-bakers*”, for these bakers rise at dawn. Madrid was bombed again on the 27th, the night of the arrival of Rosenberg, the Russian Ambassador, and again on the 28th, at midnight, when the rebel planes bombed four places in the middle of the town. Their objective was the Ministry of War, and three bombs fell close beside the main door. Their effect, however, was simply to shatter all windows in the neighbouring buildings, especially in the Bank of Spain and the Post Office. A garage was destroyed and several persons wounded. The air-raid warnings had not worked. The officers entrusted with them were traitors. They died “face to the wall”.

The city was quite dark when the raiders appeared. They dropped rockets on small parachutes before they bombed. As the blaze lighted the objective came the crash of bombs bursting. The militias answered with a shout of “Long live the Republic!” and in the dark the shout spread and spread across the city.

For all this fine spirit, for all the arrival of the Russian Ambassador, bringing the knowledge that the Spanish people was not utterly isolated, the uneasiness grew. Queues in front of the provision shops, anxious housewives, the dark fears after the putting-out of the lights, the uneasy and crackling nights; yet, against it, the ever-growing hold of the workers, already masters of the factories, carried by the very circumstance of time and place towards the mastery of the State.

On August 15, General Fanjul and the Commander of the Civil Guard stood their trial before a Court-Martial. Fanjul admitted that he had had a conference with Mola

in Pamplona on July 5 and recognised Mola as the leader of the rebellion. Otherwise, no new revelations. Fanjul behaved badly, wept, refused to take responsibility. The verdict was the only possible one, and at five o'clock in the morning of August 17, the black flag was run up over the Model Prison. Fanjul had died for military rebellion, for breaking his oath of loyalty to the Republic; he could not yet be condemned as an Enemy of the People.

Five days later, a great plot inside the Model Prison set the building on fire. The Fascists hoped to escape in the confusion, but the militias were alert, extinguished the fire and drove the prisoners back. They took over the guard of the prison from the warders and a few days later the Prison Department in the Ministry of Justice was dissolved.

The whole system of justice had been reformed a few hours before the fire in the Model Prison. The Prison Department had been changed into the Directing Body for Social Protection and Defence. Popular Tribunals were created, composed of the President of the Supreme Court and two professional judges, two Socialists, two Young Socialists, two representatives of the Casa del Pueblo, two Communists, two Left Republicans, two members of the Republican Union and one representative each from the C.N.T. and the FAI.

The Popular Tribunal began its work at once. The first case was that against four officers from the Getafe Artillery Regiment which had risen on July 19. The sentence was pronounced—death—at ten o'clock that evening and carried out at six next morning. At eleven, a new case began, against the mutineers of Carabanchel.

The revolutionary course in Madrid went on beside the Government, although the duality did not become apparent here, as it did in Catalonia. At the end of August rumours about the unreliability of the Civil Guard had spread, although it is quite uncertain whether they were based on truth, whether they were spread by the Fifth Column to undermine confidence or by the popular forces

to force the Government's hand out of fear that Giral might use the police against further progress in proletarianising the movement. There was no doubt of the loyalty of their commander, General Pozas, whose relations with the leaders of the proletarian parties, especially Prieto, were extremely good. The Civil Guard had demonstrated, amid the rather servile cheers their appearance always evoked, their loyalty; but it was thought safer to dissolve the whole Corps and solve the crucial problem of new appointments by the creation of the National Republican Guard. The famous cocked hat was replaced by field-grey forage-caps with a red band.

The German Embassy in Madrid took the excuse to move to Alicante, where it could be far more useful in directing arms-smuggling to the rebels, espionage and other such necessary activities; also could be quicker aboard a German warship when the infuriated Spaniards heard just what the Germans had been doing in the way of aiding the rebels. Hitherto, the Embassy had been guarded by Civil Guards. The Ambassador stated that the National Republican Guard was not sufficient protection; and indeed it may have been that the rumours of Civil Guard disloyalty may have emanated from the whispers around the doors of the palace on the Castellana. The Government, somewhat cynically, offered militiamen instead. The Italian Embassy followed its fellow-conspirator to Alicante.

The Militias were organising themselves, in default of direction from the Government. On September 1, in celebration of the International Youth Day, a huge procession of militiamen marched through Madrid for five hours. They marched well, were admirably armed and were all uniformed. The workers were showing their constructive capacity.

But time was terribly short. Oropesa was lost and the columns of Moors, Legionaries and Fascists were drawing nearer. Madrid began to wake from its false security and from its internal apprehensions. *El Socialista* renewed its campaign against the "street heroes" and proffered

dark threats against the Anarchists, who, it hinted, formed the majority of this class: "If there are any general laws of history at all, there is one: that every revolution devours at last such parties or groups that are not ready to serve the final objective seriously, soberly and constructively."

The Madrid Anarchosyndicalists were not of the stature of the Catalans: they produced no Durruti, Peiró, Montseny, Santillan, Garcia Oliver, Ascaso. They were new, violent, unformed, very much like the Barcelona Anarchists of the early twenties. They had no popular basis, and they could not have that intense, if erroneous, feeling that made possibly fools but certainly sublime fools of the Catalans, the feeling that they really were the quintessence of the revolutionary working class, that it was a point of honour both to direct and to serve them. They could have only the simplicity of violence, never the simplicity of constructive obligation. At the same time, the Madrid Socialists, true representatives of the Madrid proletariat, based their conception of the FAI upon its Madrid members and neglected to study the very real and serious constructive effort being driven through—at what cost!—in Catalonia. Therefore, it was inexact to accuse the Madrid Anarchists of being mere "street heroes"; they had certainly taken a fierce part in the storming of the Montaña Barracks, even if their conduct there had been un-social-democratic if not positively uncivilised. The reason why they did not go to the front—and the accusation was to some extent true—was that they were determined to implant their influence in the rear, later to take over the war and win it. The project was absurd, but not treacherous nor cowardly. The crux lay in that the Madrid Anarchosyndicalists believed that they could and should do in Madrid what their companions in Catalonia were doing in quite different circumstances; while the Socialists, ignoring the importance of Catalonia and practically driving it into a separatist position thereby, were not willing to understand the anarchist imitation in Madrid.

In Majorca, the Catalan columns were holding their own but not progressing. In Irun, that "city of men", the shells were falling on Militias who had not a spare cartridge. Politically and militarily, the situation imperiously demanded a new unified command. The Republic could be saved in only one way: by the Great Spontaneous Commune of September 1936.

Azaña had come to this realisation, and José Giral could not but reflect his friend's decision. There could be no doubt that there was only one man who could save the Republic; not as a man but as the representative of a real force, that of the fighting workers.

At 2.45 on the afternoon of September 4, Giral told the reporters that Spain's last bourgeois Government had resigned, handing them an explanatory note. "The serious circumstances in which the nation finds itself," it said, "and the prospect of a long war induce the present Government to desire and advise its substitution by another which shall represent each and every political party and syndical workers' organisation of recognised influence over the mass of the Spanish people whence originate always all powers. . . . Other men and other political forces must take over the command with the primary aim of ending this war."

"I," added Giral, "am remaining as Minister without Portfolio with the object of demonstrating to the country that the new Government is simply an extension of the old, since the Premier of the resigning Cabinet forms part of the new one."

The new War Government was composed of six Socialists, two Communists, two members of the Republican Left, one of Republican Union, one of the Catalan Esquerra and a Basque Nationalist.

Francisco Largo Caballero was Premier and Minister of War. The second of the Socialist Left triumvirate, Julio Alvarez del Vayo, became Foreign Minister, the third, Luis Araquistain, Ambassador in Paris. Jesus Hernandez and Vincente Uribe represented the Communists at

the Ministries of Education and Agriculture. The Minister of the Interior was that Angel Galarza whose "brother" had been so useful in the matter of Sanjurjo's plane. Indalecio Prieto was Minister of Air and Marine, a position of overwhelming importance, since the chief strength of Franco's army at the moment resulted precisely from the smuggling of German and Italian planes. Aircraft would be the decisive factor in both defence and offence, shipping in supplies and possibly the blockade of the enemy's ports.

The Basque Nationalist, Irujo, joined only a fortnight later, when he had received the assurance that the Cortes, a hurriedly-summoned skeleton, would grant the Basque Statute. This again was one of the great services rendered by Prieto. He had stated at the time of the big struggle with Caballero, when there had been a distinct possibility that he would be forced to resign from the Socialist Party, that his single desire was to pass the Basque Statute before he was politically dead. The Basques had trusted him implicitly, and those middle-class Catholics were fighting like Reds to prevent the rebels taking Irun. They were well aware that the cutting of communications with France in the north would be even more perilous for Spain as a whole than for the more or less self-supporting Basque Country; and they fought.

It was, significantly enough, Prieto who gave the press the new Government's ministerial declaration at midnight. "The Government declares: first, that it considers itself representative of all the political forces which are fighting for the existence of the Democratic Republic against which the rebels have risen in arms. Second, the ministerial programme is based essentially on the firm determination to speed the victory over the rebellion, co-ordinating the people's efforts by means of the necessary unity of action. To this are subordinated other political interests, putting aside ideological differences since at this moment there can exist only the desire to secure the crushing of the rebellion. Third, Spain being

free from every imperialist design, the Government proclaims a pácificism which responds not only to the Ministers' unanimous opinion but also to the highest national interests. Fourth, the Government affirms Spain's friendly feelings towards all nations, with unhesitating adhesion to the basic principles of the League of Nations, hoping that in just reciprocity our country will obtain from all others the same respect as that which we shall employ towards them. Fifth, the Government reaffirms its unshakable determination to maintain the integrity of the national territory at all costs. Sixth, the Government's supreme aspiration is to be worthy of the heroic land, sea and air forces, defending republican legality, whose legitimate desires for social reforms will find in it a most decided supporter."

The really important points in this manifesto emphasised the new Government's international relations. Two days before, Prieto, in one of his last journalistic articles, had published the truth about foreign intervention: the rebels' two main successes, the transport of Moors to the mainland and the junction in Estremadura, could have been possible only by foreign aid. It was known, confidentially in Government circles in Madrid, to every old woman in the queues in Barcelona, that the price of this aid was to be territorial concessions. It had been known to the Catalans assembled in Minorca. No Spanish paper had dared speak out save Prieto's own organs, *El Liberal* of Bilbao and *Informaciones* of Madrid. But the Catalan censors had not thought fit to suppress lengthy quotation of the *Manchester Guardian's* revelations.

With the formation of the Caballero Government, the Government of War, the struggle was at last posed in its true terms. Finished were the mutual hopes of Madrid and the European Foreign Offices that the contest could be confined to a mere Spanish *pronunciamiento*. Spain had become, as Azaña was to say, "the first battlefield of a world war"; and the civil war in Spain was to be accompanied, inevitably, without chance of withdrawal, by the

Revolution, permanent since 1930, provoked by the reaction, but absolutely determined by a long historical complex.

The following night, the Generalidad issued a queer announcement: "The heroic Catalan columns have returned from Majorca after a magnificent action. Not a single man suffered from the effects of the embarkation, for Captain Bayo, with unique tactical skill, profiting by our strong positions, succeeded in carrying it out thanks to the high morale and discipline of our invincible militias. The withdrawal was ordered directly by the Government of the Republic. At this moment, the Government of Catalonia, which had no notice of the order for withdrawal, with full responsibility congratulates Captain Bayo for his actions and the Catalan columns for their splendid behaviour." And then: "The Central Committee of the Antifascist Militias orders all the militiamen forming the columns which have arrived from Majorca to present themselves the day after to-morrow, Monday, September 7, at noon, at the Pedralbes Barracks to leave for the front in the afternoon."

On the night of the 5th, haggard, bearded men had slunk up the Ramblas singing the obscene soldiers' songs they had learned in the Islands. Next morning, shaved, but wearing the jet-black chin-beard which was to become so fashionable in the militias—Paco Galán had a splendid one in the Sierra—red scarves bound around their heads, some wearing the jaunty Majorcan felt hat, red carnations in their rifle-muzzles, a column of men strode behind the banners of the FAI and the Estat Catalá, the triangled blue with the silver star on the red-and-yellow Catalan "four bars" and the dramatic red-and-black, looking like nothing so much as the last of the Barbary Pirates.

Caballero had said: "The Minister of War has taken over the supreme command of all military forces, so that the Catalan forces too coincide with all other operations in the General Staff. A new General Staff has been formed, but the problem of the unified command will be solved

only when we have appointed in every sector leaders directly responsible to me and to the General Staff . . .” In Catalonia, the reference to the Catalan forces was blocked out by the censor in many papers.

On Irun Bridge floated the Monarchist scarlet-and-gold. The very last cartridge had been fired in that “city of men”.

The red flag waved from the flagstaff over the door of the Ministry of War.

II

FOUR ASPECTS OF THE CIVIL WAR

I. GIJON

AMID THE INCIDENTS of the middle period of the Civil War, certain stand out with a symbolic value. The Siege of Madrid ranks with the Sieges of Paris under the Commune and of Petersburg under the Soviet; but it is in itself an incident so huge that it cannot possibly be studied in detail within the scope of a general history of the Spanish War and Revolution of 1936-37.

During the long autumn, there were four military events which were intimately linked with the issues at stake: the Siege of the Toledo Alcazar, the Siege of the Simancas Barracks at Gijon, the Battle of Irun, and the Majorcan Expedition. Only one of them, the Siege of the Alcazar, lasted into the period of the Caballero Government. The fall of Irun, indeed, brought in the Caballero Cabinet, whose first measure was to countermand the Majorcan Expedition.

Simancas and Irun, the one in Asturias, the other in Guipuzcoa, were the tragedy of the shortage of munitions. The 600 men of Irun began to defend the town on August 26. Rifles were fairly abundant—of a kind; but there were hardly ten cartridges per man. The organisation was certainly as defective as it was hastily improvised by ferociously anti-militarist Basques, by libertarian anarchist fishermen from Renteria and Pasajes, and by willing but inexperienced French, Czech and Polish volunteers. This would not have been so serious had supplies been sufficient to discount wastage.

Help came too late. A Norwegian boat, the *Tourcoing*, had landed supplies at Verdun on September 2. At Hendaye the trucks were held by the police. There was no open opposition to their passage, but every bureaucratic device known to the French authorities was brought into play, until it was too late. Franco's Legionaries entered the smoking ruins of Irun on September 4.

At that time, the policy of the French Government—probably despite M. Delbos, who, less clever than the British Foreign Office, appeared to take Non-Intervention so seriously that he did not even envisage the prospect of eventual diplomatic advantages on the wider international market—was fairly simple and quite immoral: the simple and immoral policy of the United States Government and its gangsters. Blunders, for the Neo-Jacobins of the Popular Front, brought up like all Radicals on the implicit tradition of Talleyrand, Fouché and Ranc, were worse than crimes, or, at any rate, major crimes: the only important thing was not to be found out.

Unfortunately, the French Popular Front, with its initial disadvantage of the radical tradition, inseparable from the support of the petty-bourgeois masses, could not possibly avoid the same errors as those which had permitted Sanjurjo to rise against Azaña and Franco against Casares Quiroga. The minor police and customs officials were undoubtedly loyal to the Popular Front, but they could not contend with the Police Commissioners, Prefects and even Ambassadors, whose whole training made the alliance of workers and middle-class repugnant to them.

Hence Irun showed that the Popular Front of M. Blum could not really adopt any policy whatsoever with regard to Spain until it had "purified" its own executive; while the good faith of M. Delbos, who quite probably believed that British foreign policy was directed by the Cabinet and was limited to the narrower issue in hand, was incapable of compensating his immediate disadvantages by eventual gains.

The Siege of Simancas and the counter-seige of Gijon were perhaps more characteristic of the early stages of the War. Colonel Aranda, the rebel commander in Oviedo, seemed to the last moment loyal to the Government. He had replaced Lopez Ochoa after the 1934 repression, had attempted to keep his garrison out of politics, and had actually incurred the disfavour of the Monarchist officers under his command by transferring obviously disloyal members of the garrison denounced to him by the vigilant Left-wing Captain Castillo, cousin of that Castillo whose murder brought reprisal on Calvo Sotelo.

On Saturday, July 18, Aranda told Castillo that a rising which relied on Moorish troops was a disgrace to Spain. Castillo knew, too, that the insurgent leader, Commander Caballero, had actually made plans to murder Aranda in Oviedo.

Then, on July 19, came Aranda's incomprehensible treachery and the massacre of the socialist miners in the Police Barracks in Oviedo. In Gijon, Castillo and a friend, Gomez, were arrested and threatened with execution. The rebels dared not shoot these popular commanders, however, although they refused them medical aid when the first loyalist planes bombed the barracks.

The Siege of Simancas went on into August, while Aranda, in Oviedo, dared not come out against the disorganised bands of miners, so great was the fear of their dynamite.

The loyal planes had gone away. They had practically no bombs. The first flights had been in small commercial planes, the observer simply dropping the bombs over the side on the off-chance of hitting something without destroying the plane.

The rebel *Almirante Cervera*, one of their best cruisers, came up and anchored three miles out of Gijon in August while the battle was still going on around the barracks. For fifteen days she lay there, bombarding for six hours a day, regularly, from three to six in the afternoon, from

nine to twelve at night. And the Asturians had not a single battery, ship or plane which could reply. Nothing could be done. Whole districts were smashed. The heavy naval shells blew to pieces the positions attacking Simancas. For a mile around, there was no house which, if it did not fall down, did not show in its plaster the splashes of shrapnel and high explosive.

Under the *Cervera's* fire, unity was formed in Asturias. Its growth was slow, as it was everywhere in Spain. The C.N.T. had traditionally held Gijon, with the dockers and fishers of the Cimadevilla quarter, dominated by the fortress-like mansion of the local seigneur, and La Felguera, with its huge foundries. The Asturian Miners' Federation, solidly allied to Prieto by its leaders, the Peña brothers, Belarmino Tomas and Inocencio Burgos, the first Committee of 1934, controlled the bulk of the fighting forces and the majority of the *dinamiteros*. The Communist Party, small but active, could strongly influence the young workers of Mieres and Sama, tired of the reformism of the Peña policy, which, despite splendid organisation and heroism, had failed, not entirely through its own defects, in 1934.

Since 1934, a change had come over the Asturian miners. As the Communist Party had stressed, the "instinct for Soviets" had become firmly rooted, although the thing itself had not then existed. Many of the fugitives from the Repression had taken refuge in the U.S.S.R., where the organisation of the Five Year Plan had impressed them even more than the political system. Planning came to be as much of an Asturian instinct as "the Soviet idea".

Finally, the Repression had shown that, while the reformism which had made Asturias one of the most advanced proletarian countries in Europe could bring certain benefits, it could not be an effective policy for a life-and-death struggle, especially when this struggle must depend upon the offensive.

Among the rank-and-file, especially among the younger workers, the desire for unity was forged by the struggle.

Much was done by the director of the famous "Avance", Javier Bueno, ascetic and gay despite his sufferings in the prisons of the Repression. He had already received the compliment of being condemned to a fine of 70,000,000 pesetas as "morally responsible" for the whole 1934 rising.

Javier Bueno was later to express the Asturian Socialist dilemma: it was obvious that the proletarian forces must unite; but they must unite around some concrete organisation; the Spanish Civil War was not purely Spanish, but international in two senses: it was at the mercy of foreign intervention and it was only part of the war of the world proletariat against its exploiters. Therefore, unity must be formed around one of the world proletarian organisations: the Second or the Third International. The Second International had repeatedly failed either to defend the workers' specific interests, or to do anything for the Spanish workers in the present Civil War. Therefore, whatever one might think of the Third International, it could be the only rallying-centre for a united proletarian movement. Reserves might be formulated, but they could not be so essential as the fact of unity round a concrete and powerful centre.

This did not necessarily mean the recognition of the dominance of the Asturian Communist Party, which had given to Spain Dolores Ibarruri, La Pasionaria. It did mean a basis upon which Prietist and Caballerist Socialists could agree with the Communist Party, and, by extension, with the Anarchosyndicalists. In Asturias, the bourgeois parties hardly existed.

It had to be recognised that the Communists, although they were even yet numerically insignificant, had increased their membership five-hundredfold. Their paper, *Euzkadi Roja*, published in Bilbao, circulated throughout the North and its circulation and influence rivalled Javier Bueno's *Avance* and Prieto's *Liberal*. To these Communists were due the measures which were eventually to create an efficient war-machine in Asturias. Here, as elsewhere, the

Communist Party set its face against economic experiments before the war was won. It fought for the organisation of the militias, in place of the guerrilla bands of comrades acting sporadically with dynamite all over the province; for the unification of the militias and of the police; for the abolition of the hundreds of "irresponsible committees"; for the nationalisation of the factories, as against their confiscation by workers' committees.

Asturias' was merely a "delegation" of the Central Government. Belarmino Tomas, squat, square and energetic, the typical miners' leader, was simply the Governor of Asturias and Leon. Thus, even after the cutting of communications with Madrid, Asturias had not a completely free hand; but equally it received few instructions and little aid, save financial, from the Government. As in 1934, it had to solve its own problems.

Both the U.G.T. and the C.N.T. had increased enormously. The U.G.T. obtained a solid footing in Gijon and La Felguera, the C.N.T. in Mieres and Sama. Thanks to the strength of the Miners' Federation, the C.N.T. could never hope to obtain even parity in Asturias, and, perhaps owing to the general reformist character of a well-educated, relatively prosperous district with a long proletarian history, for once did not act as "the nemesis of reformism". The FAI never succeeded in dominating the Asturian C.N.T. as it did the Catalan and Basque Regional Federations.

Nevertheless, when the chance of complete unity appeared strong, the FAI launched a rather subtle campaign. Unity, it said, was highly necessary, but it should be polarised. The U.G.T. was represented by the Socialist Party; the C.N.T. should rally round the FAI. Thus both union centres would have their "political" expression and be able to confront a political situation.

The Delegation of Asturias and Leon was constituted on a common-sense rather than proportional basis. Its President, Belarmino Tomas, held the "delegated" func-

tions of the Central Government: Presidency, War and Police. Another Socialist, Amador Fernandez, a reformist who, disgusted with politics, had torn up his deputy's pass in April, was Councillor for Commerce. Two Communists, two members of the C.N.T., two of the FAI, two of the U.G.T., two of the United Socialist Youth, one of the Anarchist Libertarian Youth and two of the bourgeois Republican Left completed the Delegation. Thus, excluding the President, there were seven Marxists, five Anarcho-syndicalists and two Republicans.

Naturally, the chief interest in the construction of the new society in Asturias lay in the mining district, where, in Sama, for example, nearly three-fifths of the male population was in the firing-line, while the rest of the inhabitants, men and women, kept the mines working.

The great necessity was to assure the loyalty of the technicians. For this reason, there was created a Technico-Workers' Administrative Council of the Mines of Asturias and Leon, composed of the Director of Mines, representing the State, a vice-President and Secretary chosen by the Councillor for Mines and Commerce, a mining engineer, a mining inspector, an accountant and three workers chosen by the National Spanish Miners' Federation.

The administration of the Asturian mines was a compromise between nationalisation and worker-control. The Director would have the final word, but could not act without the consent of the workers' representatives. Since the Councillor for Commerce and Mines was a representative of the U.G.T., Aquilino Fernandez, the control of the Miners' Federation was assured.

Though the leadership of the Miners' Federation might still be reformist, the current towards unity springing from the Workers' Alliance of 1934 could not be checked. There was a positive feeling in Gijon, where all the inhabitants were workers. The cafés might be crammed during the short time they were open, but the men at once returned to their jobs.

The Public Works Council had destroyed more than the bombardment in its ambitious new programme of parks and urban improvements. Gijón, with its ruins, its queues, its empty shops, its smoky cafés and the huge loudspeakers that clamoured to deserted streets after ten at night, resembled strangely the Moscow of 1928. The same poverty, sordidness and strain: the same energy, determination and faith in the future.

The Asturians, hard drinkers with weak heads, sombre men who sang much, repeated often the Complaint of Langreo which came from the Thirty-Four: "Oviedo is burning, and the men of Langreo are weeping because all Oviedo is not burned!"

The Siege of Oviedo was heroic, but not so much in the way in which it was publicised by the insurgents: "Oviedo the Martyr". Fantastic and historic, made up of the miners' bluff, of the memories of 1934 and the Repression; one more instance of the importance and disadvantage of the moral factor in a civil war.

After Irun, Asturias was isolated, and news became scarce. The rest of Spain and the outside world simply heard of advances by both sides, of successes and struggles—and then silence. Defeats were not broadcast, and it was even hard to say whether defeats were really defeats. In Asturias first, it became obvious that the Civil War was indivisible, and that the Spanish Civil War was only a sector in the international civil war which had opened in 1917 and fought its preliminary engagements in 1934 in Paris, Vienna, Barcelona and Oviedo.

After the first consternation caused by Aranda's treachery—a real treachery because it was personal, between him and Belarmino Tomás, Castillo, Amador Fernandez and others, to whom he had been a friend—the miners had gone into the hills armed only with dynamite and the rusty rifles buried in 1934. And Aranda dared not come out.

For ten weeks, the miners hemmed in the Oviedo garrison by sheer bluff, the age-old but effective bluff of

whistling up non-existent reinforcements every time an action was engaged. And it is a virtue of dynamite that the spread of its explosion conceals the fewness of the throwers.

A slow Asturian fury grew as material increased, and the miners were determined to avenge upon Oviedo the Thirty-Four. Time after time, they summoned Aranda to surrender, not with fierce threats, for many, still incredulous of the limits of treachery, believed him to have been misled or even forced into his treachery at the point of the revolver. Naturally Aranda, lulled, like the garrison of Simancas, by the radio stations of Corunna and Lisbon into the certainty of relief, refused.

On the anniversary of the Thirty-Four, October 4, the miners went out to finish Oviedo. They had little artillery and few planes. The Governmental planes had bombed Oviedo "pitilessly" in the early days, but even the Governmental press had had to acknowledge that one could bomb a city of Oviedo's size for two days without appreciable result. The miners could no longer wait for Madrid: they determined to blow their way into the hated city.

Dominating Oviedo on the north-west is the range of hills which ends in the famous Naranco. On the slopes is the Orphanage, built out of the funds of the Miners' Union. Into this, the rebels had packed the miners' children. Aranda had promised to evacuate the civil population and fight it out, man to man. But the authorities had demanded a deposit of 450 pesetas (about £10) from all those who left the city, and so the working-class families had to stay. The Governmental planes, by some wild blunder, had laid in ruins a whole working-class quarter; but even so, the rebels could never recruit enough hands to set working efficiently the famous Oviedo Arms Factory.

The miners, neglecting the Naranco, refusing to fortify their positions, ill-armed, dressed in the Sunday best they had worn ever since July 19, went up against Oviedo in the rainy first days of October. They blew their way into the suburbs, half-way into the city. It was a wild raid of all Asturias, with almost no communications, no second

line, no reserves. Through the first days of October they fought, as they had fought in the Thirty-Four.

Aranda's radio filled the air with appeals for aid. Franco, ready to concentrate all his shock troops to continue Yagüe's rush to Madrid, was forced to detach a large column of Moors. The miners had not taken the slightest care of their rearguard, open to attack from rebel Galicia over the range from Escamplero.

The Moors poured in, seventeen hundred of them, taking the miners in the rear. It was a massacre—but not a massacre of the miners. These fought their way back to their positions dominating the town from the hills on the south. The River Nalon was in flood. Aranda was relieved, for the Moorish column was able to throw itself into Oviedo. But of the 1,700 Moors there remained only 367 by the end of the year. Oviedo had become uncomfortable, although not untenable. The weight of the operation had been transferred to Grado, the strategic point commanding the road into Galicia, whence the rebels could be dislodged only by a considerable operation; but from Grado the rebels could not extend their front beyond Oviedo. Their line had bulged in a dangerous salient, threatened from Avilés on the coast and from the Cordillera to the south.

After the fall of Irun, Asturias remained in communication only with the two northern provinces of Santander and Vizcaya, neither of which were likely to be very sympathetic to the deep proletarian movement radiating from Gijón, Sama and Mieres. Since Franco's junction with Mola after Badajoz, Galicia had been pacified relatively easily. The Galicians were slow-witted, peaceable people, strongly attached to their families and completely astonished by the autonomy conferred upon them by Casares Quiroga. There was no hope from the West.

II. BILBAO

Beyond Irun and beyond San Sebastian, which had fallen without a blow on September 12, the Basque

Nationalists, fearing the Anarchists from Pasajes far more than the Moors from Pamplona, and fearing more the British Government's annoyance at the possibility of having British-owned hotels destroyed, still held the ranges, retreating only when their munitions were exhausted. Driven from Navarre and Guipuzcoa, pushed back almost to the limits of Alava, they held Vizcaya firmly.

Of all the strange companions united against the rebels, the Basques were the strangest. The Basque Nationalists, who held an undoubted majority in the country, were not even members of the Popular Front. Yet they had placed themselves publicly beside the Government as early as July 17.

The chief complaint against the Statute of Autonomy finally granted by the Cortes on October 1 was that it did not give the Basques full liberty in social legislation. Although Madrid itself had asked the Basque Nationalist Party to allow a representative, Manuel Irujo, to enter the Cabinet, it was hardly possible that a Left Socialist Government would look with entire favour upon a sociology which cut straight across two fundamental socialist ideas. In the Basque country the International's two theses: "the salvation of the workers must be won by the workers themselves" and "proletarians of all lands, unite", were met by the theses: "the salvation of the workers will be gained by the co-operation of employers and employed" and by "workers of the Basque Provinces, unite".

With this ideology, the Basques exercised what the President called "an exquisite tolerance". Monarchists were allowed to walk the streets, at any rate until they were actually caught in the act of subversive or treacherous behaviour. Consequently, espionage flourished. Monarchists, however, in the Basque Provinces, were not necessarily members of a reactionary organisation, but simply conservatives who had retired from politics in 1931. Nevertheless, they could be dangerous.

The big capitalists, the Urquijos and their like, had fled. Their property was confiscated only when it was

proved that they had taken an active part in the rebellion. The chief measure taken against them was a decree forbidding the same person to act as director of more than one company, except in the case of interlocking holding-companies.

The chief social measure, apart from the admirable organisation of public assistance, soup kitchens, lodging of refugees, etc., was a new form of banking control. The new boards of directors were composed of four of the old board, two shareholders, two depositors and four representatives of the employees, elected by them and drawn from the members of the two bank-employees unions affiliated to Solidaridad Vasca and the U.G.T. But the members of the old board and the employees' representatives had to be approved by the Ministry of Finance, which actually elected the shareholders and depositors on the board. In the Bank of Bilbao, three of the four members of the old board transferred to the new were openly "Monarchist", although less virulently so than their sixteen former colleagues.

The Ministry of Finance was controlled by the Nationalist Party, so that virtually the whole of the financial system, like the Army and the police, was in their hands. The intention was democratic, but the situation looked suspiciously like the dictatorship of a single party, although this party had had an undoubted democratic majority in February. In the three truly Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa and Alava, the February elections had returned nine Nationalists, seven Popular Front and one Right. Navarre, with its wide plains, its latifundia and its traditional hatred of both Madrid and Guipuzcoa, had been solidly Right.

Thus, the eighteen battalions of Nationalists, wearing the red beret, swastika in buttonhole (the Hitlerian swastika reversed is an old Basque symbol), heartened by their priests, and strong in their faith in God marched against the *requetes* with their red berets, their swastikas, their priests and their God; and the fighting at Villareal

although not one of the famous battles of the Civil War, was one of the bloodiest, 6,000 dead remaining on the field.

These swastika-adorned petty-bourgeois devotees were linked with Communists who believed that "religion is the opium of the people" and Anarchists whose slogan was "neither God nor Master". They sat round the council-table with Communists and Socialists, and all decisions were taken unanimously. Priests walked freely in the streets, the churches were crowded, nuns worked in base-hospitals; and to the shocked astonishment of the Asturians, a whole front-line section would descend the hill on Sundays to hear field-Mass.

The movement by the Nationalists was largely defensive. A list of nationalist leaders to be executed was found in the house of a rebel supporter. But equally, they were opposed to militarism and especially to military dictatorship. Like the Catalans, the Basques had always violently opposed the obligation to serve in the Army outside their own territory. As Catholics, they were shocked by the perjury implied in Franco's breach of his oath of loyalty to the Republic and still more by the breach of the Catholic prohibition against taking up arms against a legally-constituted Government. In return, Prieto had assured them that he would obtain their Statute of Autonomy despite the opposition of the centralising Caballero wing of the Socialist Party.

The petty-bourgeois Basque Nationalists, with their democratic Christian-Socialist aims which amounted in fact to a strong leaning towards non-oppressive corporativism—if such a thing could exist in any way except as an ideal—feared their "Red" collaborators almost as much as they hated their militarist and centralist opponents. The Socialists were strong in the mines and foundries, where the Communists were increasingly challenging their predominance. The Anarchists controlled only the builders and fishermen, but the Nationalists were exaggeratedly afraid of them, and police stripped from the walls C.N.T.

posters which would not have aroused the slightest attention anywhere else than in Bilbao. The C.N.T. had not been given the opportunity of showing that it was at least as much a constructive as a destructive organisation, and the old legend of the Anarchist as the mere bomb-thrower persisted.

Here was the source of future danger. The Nationalists, fearing the "Reds", created such forces as the highly-efficient armed motorised police, into which Communists and Anarchists found it difficult to enter. The loyalty of the Nationalists who controlled the force was, however, dubious; for in the attempt to keep "Reds" out, the Nationalists allowed many "Whites" in. Similarly, when a "disciplinary battalion" with a strict discipline was created to employ "hard cases" and deserters, the Government was astonished by the increase in desertion and the voluntary applications by prisoners. This "disciplinary battalion", trained by loyal Basque nationalist officers, became the shock-troop of the traitorous "Fifth Column", while the motorised police corps was the first to turn against the Basques' Asturian allies and their own socialist and communist battalions "in the name of order" when the rebel troops were close on Bilbao.

Already at San Sebastian, Basque nationalist guards had been left behind to see that "Anarchists" did not blow up the churches and public buildings before the rebel troops entered. It was alleged that these unfortunate sticklers for property rights had been shot by an ungrateful soldiery after the town's surrender. Even if this were true, the method of handing over San Sebastian should have warned both Valencia and the Basque Nationalists' allies in the North to be on their guard. While the Nationalists would fight heroically for "God and the Ancient Laws", their Catholicism inevitably led them into an erroneous or at least dangerous conception of "order", incompatible with the revolutionary defence of a country. It is possible that their close ties with both London and the Vatican may have been strong contributing factors.

Basque Catholicism particularly infuriated the rebels. To Queipo de Llano the Basques were more traitorous and *canallas* than almost any of his enemies except Prieto, La Pasionaria and the Catalans. Miguel de Unamuno, that paradoxical Basque of Basques, was to lose his chair at Salamanca, and possibly his life, for contradicting Millán Astray when he repeated 'the Queipo de Llano thesis.

The Requetes, red-bereted Navarrese Catholics, were particularly furious against the Basques. Persons caught in Vitoria with Basque names were persecuted, and one woman signing her name "Miren" was told to "use a Christian name (Maria), not such a heathen word", under pain of imprisonment.

The Carlists of Vitoria, seat of the Bishopric which includes Bilbao, shot several priests for the mere fact of being Basque Nationalists, while, in Bilbao, the "Reds" not only did not shoot their priests but gave comfortable refuge to the Bishop of Santander. The rebels expelled the Bishop of Vitoria, although he was at least as favourable to Franco as the Vatican appeared to be. Such semi-neutrality, however, although it was enough to inspire Basque Catholics with strange hopes, was not satisfactory to the authorities of Vitoria.

The Basques, although they frequently stated that there was no intention of making a schism in the Church and creating a separate Basque Church united to the Vatican by nothing stronger than a Concordat, were troubled by the fact that the Catholic Hierarchy made no move to ratify their stand, no protest against the shooting of Basque priests and gave no approval to their young men's action of "legitimate self-defence". They were to cherish the illusion that right behaviour according to the most modern Catholic tenets could not fail to receive the approbation of a Catholic centre situated in the city of Rome, where another palace, not two miles distant, was actively organising support of General Queipo de Llano, the Basques' worst enemy.

In the first days, the Civil Governor of Bilbao formed a Defence Junta, of which he was President, with the Nationalist Party and the Popular Front. The C.N.T. refused to participate, as it had refused at that time all over Spain.

On October 7, in the cold autumn sunlight, the Basque Municipalities elected, under the traditional Tree at Guernica, don José Antonio de Aguirre y Lekube first President of the Basque Government by nearly 300,000 unanimous votes.

The Government was formed by four Nationalists, three Socialists and one Communist, one Nationalist Action, one Republican Union and one Left Republican. The Nationalists held the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Finance and combined Justice and Education.

The Government announced its determination to guarantee the individual and social rights of all Basque citizens, and therefore the security of all religious institutions and their property; the single command and the militarisation of the militias; rigorous maintenance of public order even by extreme and exceptional measures; formation of a new police corps; an advanced social policy by the "access of the worker to capital, to the profits and co-administration of businesses", going so far as confiscation and nationalisation if need be, but always avoiding unnecessary damage to the producers' interests; a big public works programme; regulation of production and consumption; control of rent; special care for education and for the Basque language; respect for foreign commercial interests wherever these did not conflict with wartime necessities; good relations with all foreign countries, more especially those "which maintain democratic forms of Government".

The declaration had been passed by all parties in the Government, but it was remarkably like the ordinary programme of the Nationalist Party.

This was not without its dangers. Nationalists still looked upon their Marxist collaborators and upon the

C.N.T. as "Reds". The C.N.T. had not been invited to form part of the Government: it was to be composed of "political", not "syndical" organisations; Solidaridad Vasca and the U.G.T. were not represented either. The Nationalists had, however, invited the FAI—well knowing that it would not accept on any conditions the Nationalists might offer. But the Government's conscience was, in the Basque manner, clear. The FAI were "irresponsible"; and "public order would be maintained even by extreme and exceptional measures"; a new police force would be formed.

This was undoubtedly laying up trouble for later. Meanwhile, all efforts were to be directed towards winning the war; or, at least, to driving the invader out of the provinces of Alava and Guipuzcoa and to strengthening the defences of Bilbao. A new circle of fortifications surrounding the city, the famous Iron Belt, was constructed. The front-line was carefully entrenched; and the Basques set about creating and arming a regular fighting force. Supplies of munitions were bought abroad and run in through the blockade, and the beginnings of a war industry created. The famous workshops at Eibar could produce only small-arms; but, after considerable wrangling, plans for heavy armament were obtained from the Trubia Factory in Asturias.

The exaggerated nationalism of Euzkadi—exaggerated rather by those outside than by the Basques themselves—tended to hold up operations in the North. There was a perpetual struggle between the civil and military authorities, a struggle inevitable during various phases of a civil war and even more probable in the curious amalgam which made up the Army of the North.

In Vizcaya, there was no immediate sign of the Revolution whatever; in Santander, a weak and lazy Delegation of the Central Government tended to refer all difficult questions to Madrid, although communications were almost non-existent; in Asturias, a "Red" Delegation—whose "Redness" was as much exaggerated by the

Basques as Basque Nationalism was exaggerated by the Asturians—carried on heroic war without arms and raw materials. Asturias and Bilbao were ready to form a united front, but everything had to pass through Santander, that long Castilian “corridor” which at one time closed its frontier with the Basque country to recoup the lack of supplies caused by the Delegation’s short-sighted rationing system.

The General Staff of the Northern Army, stationed in Santander and formed by regular officers and reformist Socialists, left much to be desired. The Russian technicians were unable to adapt themselves to the peculiar and quite unreasonable local conditions, and soon left.

The Asturians demanded large reinforcements of men and munitions from Bilbao, where the line could be lightly held with perfect safety. The Basques pleaded that they were unable to send, and the Asturians, supposing that the Nationalists were refusing to arm the “Reds”, the allies of potential political enemies within the Basque country, refused to concede the Asturian products demanded by Bilbao, even after the express orders of Largo Caballero himself.

Thus the need for unified command became more and more pressing, and, by sheer force of circumstances, the North was increasingly forced back upon its own resources and its own problems. After the opening of the Siege on November 7, it was no longer possible to wait for Madrid to make the decisions and take the responsibility. The fate of the three Northern provinces became so interlinked that once more unity became a possibility because it was at last based, not upon an ideal nor upon platonic declarations, but upon the necessities of a concrete situation.

Irun fell on September 4. While the fate of San Sebastian was being debated between the Basque Nationalist police and the Anarchists, the attack upon the Toledo Alcazar was renewed.

III. TOLEDO

The legend of the Alcazar will rejoin in history the legends of Irun, Oviedo and Madrid. In a rather remarkably inaccurate booklet, Henri Massis, the famous "defender of the West" states this deliberately: "There is no faith which can do without images, and it is useless to try to deprive us of heroes and myths. Russian Bolshevism alone has understood the virtue of images. From the mutineers of 'Potemkin' to the 'Sailors of Cronstadt' a whole series of symbols rise before the masses to magnify their work and spread their ideology. Is it not time to place against the heroes of this primitive humanity, which honours only revolt and approves self-sacrifice only in so far as it is instinctive, other heroes, men who know why they are dying, who know the value of what they are defending? Let us not forget that it is the cause that makes the martyr. Therefore all sacrifices cannot be equally honoured, and we must always prefer those illuminated by a lofty and pure reason. *We, the men of the West, henceforward have our 'Sailors of Cronstadt': the heroes of the Alcazar.*"

Giménez Caballero, the Catholic propagandist, wrote of the Alcazar cadets: "I speak to those who would be the new Lords, the Dukes who will once again conduct their men, the Marquises who will defend the new Marches of our country. Listen to me, to the Spanish Gospel which speaks to our hearts with utter clarity: 'To the King one must give goods and life, but honour is the patrimony of the soul, and the soul belongs only to God.'"

The Siege of the Alcazar was worth a legend, but not precisely the emotional and lofty conception of Giménez Caballero. Rather, it is a legend in the style of the Quixote, which itself is based on the profound Spanish humour of making a mountain out of a molehill and then denying the existence of both. The foreign press helped by producing all the platitudes of "indomitable heroism" and all the incidents that could be hastily gleaned from text-books

of Spanish history, in precisely the same way as it had made a really fine collection of all the atrocity stories recorded in Europe for ten centuries to describe the events in Barcelona in July. As for the two opponents, their behaviour was so "Spanish" that they might have sold the film-rights of the Siege.

A few examples of initial misconceptions. The Alcazar is not a single building, but a vast complex, including storehouses, esplanades and the huge fortress of the Military Governor's quarters. It is largely built in the rock, and can be approached only from one side, the Plaza de Zocodover. It is not, therefore, a sort of "last outpost", but in fact a roomy and immensely strong block of buildings, well-provided with water, dominating the city of Toledo. It is no work of art: the famous towers were rebuilt after the fire of 1887. It was not even a very dangerous position: after two months' siege culminating in ten days' heavy fighting, only eighty-two of its 1,900 defenders were killed. Food was short in some respects, though considerably less so than in Madrid; water was abundant, though rationed; and the sole—but terrible—discomfort was the lack of light and exercise, and, at the end, the fear of being blown to bits by the colossal dynamite bombs. At no time was the Siege of the Alcazar so terrible as that of Simancas.

But the Army of the South, hurrying to relieve the Alcazar, the besiegers, encouraged by visits from Margarita Nelken and Caballero himself—rather discouraged by the latter—the Diplomatic Corps and the world's press all failed completely to reckon up the factors involved, the relative advantages of besieged and besiegers.

The whole story is full of the most improbable incidents, most of which appear to be true. The siege began with an astounding muddle. At 7.30 in the evening of July 18, the Ministry of War phoned to Colonel José Moscardó y Ituarte, Commander of the Cadet School at Toledo, to take delivery of the million cartridges stocked at the Arms Factory. Moscardó had had no notion of their

existence and had been worried by his lack of munitions; Madrid had solved his problem.

Half an hour later, General Riquelme phoned and ordered Moscardó to surrender at once. Naturally, he refused. He shut himself up in the Alcazar with the Cadets, 650 Civil Guards who had assembled from all over the province, Civil Guards who had taken part in the Yeste massacre, and 150 more from the 14th Brigade from Madrid, the Brigade which had taken part in the April 16 shootings. With them went their wives.

On July 22 came the incident which one has the impression of having heard once or twice before.

The phone rang. "Colonel Moscardó," said a voice at the other end, "your son, our prisoner, is going to speak to you. If you do not surrender, we shall shoot him at once." The son's voice: "Father, it's I. What are your orders?" "I order you in the name of God to cry: 'Long live Spain! Long live Christ the King!' and to die like a hero. Your father will never surrender."

There were other fantastic incidents. The "defenders of Western culture", according to M. Henri Massis, used the books of the rich library as sandbags. The Governmental troops declared repeatedly that they could not attack because of the women and children shut up inside the Alcazar, while the rebel press and its allies abroad clamoured against the "Red barbarians" who did not hesitate to attack defenceless creatures, and Franco was preparing the bombardment of Madrid. While food ran relatively short, the Cadets insisted on caring tenderly for the thoroughbred race-horse belonging to Captain Silio. The corpses were inserted roughly into the walls, as it was impossible to dig proper graves. "Why did you not burn them?" someone asked, after the relief. "We are Catholics," was the reply.

There was something too "Spanish" about the whole affair. During the hot evenings, besiegers and besieged exchanged patriotic songs and insulting "*coplas*" through huge loud-speakers across the smashed Plaza de Zocodover.

Toledo became almost a tourist centre again, for one could watch the shells and bullets spurt off the granite walls in perfect safety.

The day following the fall of Irun, Yagüe's column was in Talavera de la Reina. He had not met the slightest difficulty. The militias, who had never yet experienced fighting in open country, simply ran. It was not so much their fault as the fault of Madrid, as has been explained in a previous chapter: unfortunate and inevitable rather than disgraceful.

Faced with disaster in the North and on the Tagus, the Government decided to make an effort at Toledo. Too many men were being immobilised in a position of relative unimportance. Largo Caballero had already realised the importance of concentrating forces on the important fronts and cared little for the "Spanish" or almost "touristic" aspect of the war, which was, after all, to meet the psychologic strategy of a Queipo de Llano on his own ground where the Popular Front could hardly hope to win. He not only withdrew the Catalan expedition to the Balearics but insisted on the liquidation of the Alcazar siege. Insensitive to the moral aspect of the war, he supposed that Yagüe would hardly be foolish enough to deflect his drive from Talavera towards Toledo. Yagüe could be smashed outside Madrid, and the Alcazar could be reduced afterwards, should it not fall immediately.

The last attempts at mediation were begun, for the militias could still not bring themselves to destroy a "work of art" and seriously endanger the lives of women and children. On September 9, Colonel Rojo, a former instructor at the Cadet School, spoke with Moscardó under a white flag, but was not able to persuade him even to evacuate the women. All the besieged asked was a priest.

Madrid decided to liquidate the whole affair. Next day, all women and children were evacuated from Toledo, and the bombardment began in earnest. But the 15.5's

could not make upon the huge granite walls of the Alcazar the same terrible impression as they had made upon the bricks of Simancas. Although the bombardment went on, well photographed, all night in the glare of huge search-lights which continued the theatrical atmosphere of the whole siege, little effect was obtained.

The following night, the Government made another attempt at conciliation, sending the priest demanded, the highly respected Enrique Vasquez Camarasa, Canon of Madrid, as popular with the savage "Reds" as with his devout parishioners. The interview was dramatic but futile.

While Camarasa was hearing confessions, delivering communion and baptising two babies born in the cellars, the militiamen, taking advantage of the three-hour truce, offered cigarettes to the besieged Civil Guards, whom they still hoped to win over. Officers from the upper windows stopped this fraternisation.

Next day, San Sebastian was evacuated by the Basques. Nuñez Morrado, Chilean Ambassador and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, attempted a last mediation with the Alcazar but was told to communicate with Burgos. The besieged were now certain of relief. They had heard on their radio that Yagüe had taken Santa Olalla with a reinforcement of 25,000 men. He could now advance on Madrid via Maqueda, Navalcarnero and Alcorcón or upon Toledo via Torrijos. Madrid wondered anxiously which route he would take: towards strategic or towards moral advantage?

Yagüe, one of the rebels' best strategists, failed to carry his opinion at a council of war at Cáceres after the capture of Talavera. His plan was to continue the raid up the Tagus Valley: to take Aranjuez and Chinchon; and to make a junction on the Aragon (Madrid-Saragossa) road with the columns operating in the Upper Tagus and at Sigüenza. This would have cut from their bases the Government's strongest forces in Madrid, the Guadarrama and the Somosierra, and forced them to surrender. But

General Varela, then high in favour with Franco and a politician rather than a strategist, advocated and enforced the plan of gaining a moral victory at Toledo and then advancing on Madrid. The moral victory would vastly increase Franco's prestige inside Spain and permit him to take the supreme command over Mola, Cabanellas and Queipo de Llano, and also to enforce the supremacy of the Army upon the Falange and the Requetes, who had begun to question the necessity of a military dictatorship. The capture of Madrid, merely an incident in the whole operation, would allow Germany and Italy to recognise Franco as the supreme representative of the Burgos Junta. Strategy was subordinated to politics.

The plan saved Madrid. On October 1, while the Cortes passed the Basque Statute, the Burgos Junta solemnly proclaimed Franco Generalísimo of the Spanish National Armies and Leader of the Government of the Spanish State. There had been a proposal to name him simply Leader of the Spanish State, but the other formula was preferred in order to pacify the Monarchists; Franco was simply Leader of the Government, leaving, like Horthy in Hungary, the way open to an eventual Leader of the State itself, who might be either King or Dictator.

Yagüe's relieving column fought its way towards Toledo, and the Caballero Government was anxious to end the siege. Miners from Asturias had been digging under the building, cramming into the tunnels seven tons of dynamite. On September 17th, the trumpets and loud-speakers of the Toledo War Committee warned the remaining inhabitants to leave the town. All night, the besieged listened to the electric drills below them. At seven o'clock in the morning of the 18th a mine hurled the south-western tower bodily in the air. Vast fragments of stone and rock fell over the precipices into the Tagus. Not a window in the town was unbroken. But the Alcazar still stood, the second mine did not explode, and the Cadets, who, warned by the drills, had moved into another wing, easily repulsed a hesitating hand-grenade attack. After several hours of

desultory skirmishing in the great courtyard, it was decided to lay a third mine.

Madrid did not think highly of the mines and adopted the fantastic idea of trying to burn a building of solid rock. The following day, fire-engines full of petrol—which could have been better used for transport—began to unroll their hoses through the Hospital of the Holy Cross beyond the Zocodover. Suddenly there came another of the astounding incidents of this siege. A young Cadet leapt out of the Alcazar, seized the nozzle and directed the jet back upon the militias. The Cadet died, and the walls were again soaked in petrol. Hand granades set it alight, and all afternoon it burned with a foul stench while the fighting went on. “*Dinamiteros*” of the FAI and the Shock Police tore ragged gaps in the smoking walls; but in the evening nothing had been gained. The rain came down, and in the dark some daring militiaman managed to tie a red flag over the ruins.

At six o'clock that evening, Largo Caballero came to insist that the Alcazar must be reduced within twenty-four hours; he needed the ten thousand men blocked there to oppose Yagüe's furious advance. The battle intensified. Militia of the FAI succeeded in entering parts of the building and setting light to a great deal of petrol. Detachments of Shock Police poured into Toledo. The rebel advance-guard was only ten miles from the town on the 24th, and rebel planes flew over the city dropping messages of hope to the besieged.

On the 25th, the last and biggest mine blew up. But nothing could reach the deep rock cellars. The final attack had come too late, and it had failed. Next day, the sixty-eighth of the siege, Yagüe's first troops were half a mile from the entry to Toledo. On the 27th, communications with Madrid were cut.

The militia, fearing isolation, had retreated. The officers of the Shock Police were the first to go—by train. The militias, abandoned by their commanders, ran down the road to Bargas, arriving haggard and ragged-shoed. The

few soldiers of the International Column were the last to go, after a brief and impossible resistance. At 9.15 in the evening of September 27, the Alcazar was at last relieved, and the tragi-comedy of insufficient calculations was over.

But not quite. When Colonel Moscardó paraded his men to receive General Varela that evening, he strode towards his superior, saluted, and, standing rigidly to attention, stated: "Nothing to report, General!"

Somehow, somewhere, one seems to have heard the story before?

The most peculiar part of the whole Alcazar Legend was that, while the entire world was devouring sensational accounts of the first "story" in the Civil War since the earliest street-fighting, the Spanish censored press mentioned no definite word of it.

In Barcelona, the Ramblas "knew" by its strange "grape-vine", and the Saturday and Sunday were gloomy. As late as the following Wednesday, however, one Barcelona paper published the statements of a person who claimed to be on the staff of the *Heraldo de Madrid* and to have been lunching calmly in Toledo on the Monday, in complete ignorance, apparently, of the tremendous reception accorded to Franco himself the previous day.

IV. MAJORCA

Basque, Asturian, "Spanish". . . . The Catalans were to have their turn in the Majorcan Expedition, the political consequences of which are set out elsewhere.

The Balearic Expedition of the early autumn was a peculiar muddle of emotionalism, bravado, impatience and the results of acting on insufficient information and incorrect calculation. It was perfectly "spontaneous" and not a little stupid.

Minorca had remained loyal to the Government. The sailors had not risen with Franco. It was whispered in various places that this loyalty was due to the propaganda

of the Freemasons and the FAI. The former may or may not have been influential—it is an old legend; it is certain that sea-going men in Spain have always favourably regarded the C.N.T.

The Catalan columns stood in Aragon, and the Navy, reinforced by militias, waited in Port Mahon. A certain Sergeant Gonzalez made himself a petty dictator in the earliest days, but he was liquidated as soon as the columns from the mainland arrived; and Minorca recovered its usual tranquillity.

It was, however, a secret to no one that the Balearics were to play an essential part in the international game which had been opened by the insurrection. It was known that the islands had long been secretly fortified on a scale which no Spanish Government, unaided, could afford. The material, assembled piece by piece by workers who were not allowed to see the completed work, had come from both Vickers and Krupp. The Balearics were not only a part of the line of Mediterranean strongholds but interrupted French communications with the North African colonies.

During the Great War the French colonies in Africa had sent over 700,000 soldiers and about 240,000 workmen to the mainland. In 1936, colonial troops made up over a third of the French army's peace-time strength.

The fortified Balearics, Majorca and Minorca, could be a serious interruption in the British line of strongholds from Gibraltar to Malta, the Piraeus, Cyprus and Alexandria to the Suez Canal and India. The Catalan militias could not know, or at any rate could not believe, that the Imperial Defence Committee had already exchanged the Mediterranean as a first line of defence for the old Cape of Good Hope route.

It was firmly believed that the British, even more than the French, had a supreme interest in the Mediterranean and that the Foreign Office really feared Italian hegemony there. The Catalans, perhaps a little too ready to jump

to political conclusions and already impressed in the previous year by the sending of the British fleet into the Mediterranean during the Abyssinian crisis—a fact known to Spain forty-eight hours before it was revealed to the British public by the “uncensored” British press—believed that England would be grateful for the vicarious defence of her interests. It was believed that Franco had made a pact with Mussolini for the cession of the Balearics. It was calculated that the great British democracy would reward the baffling of this plot by a more benevolent attitude towards the Spanish Government. The Catalans were unable to take the long view and make allowances for immediate intrigue. The fact that the Spanish State naval war industry, the Constructora Naval, owed some two million pesetas to Vickers conveyed little to them.

Apart from these rather simple international calculations, the Catalans were victimised by an emotional impulse. For the first time in history Catalan forces had advanced into Spain. It had been the federalist FAI which had given that initiative. The FAI was reaping the glory in the domination of the “rearguard”. Already the petty-bourgeois, trained by Dencás, were complaining that the “specifically Catalan aspect” of the movement was being submerged. The Balearics had always been closely linked to Catalonia. The language of the Islands was a dialect of Catalan.

The Aragon Expedition against Saragossa and Huesca was, for the Catalan petty-bourgeoisie, tainted with the original sin of Anarchist initiative. The Esquerra, or, more precisely, the Estat Catalá, were determined to make “their” expedition. At that time it was still supposed that a party’s columns could win a “victory” and that this “victory” would immeasurably strengthen the party’s political position. Catalonia was still in the period of political proselytism, for the issues had not yet been clarified.

Captain Bayo, the “intrepid aeronaut” of the earliest

days, was in command at Port Mahon; and his men were bored. The Catalan Defence Council in Barcelona heard one day with stupefaction that Bayo's forces had sailed away to conquer the Balearics. There was nothing to be done but to withdraw men from Aragon, demand reinforcements from Valencia, support the adventure once it had been begun and feed the local press with glowing communiqués.

Messages sent back from Majorca, where the columns had landed at Puerto-Cristo after a sort of fantastic but fatal Gallipoli in the tourist-famed Grottos of the Dragon, stressed the demand for Catalan flags. Party flags were not wanted; this was a Catalan raid, worthy of the best Catalan traditions.

There is no doubt that the militias behaved splendidly under the worst possible conditions. They landed. The Navy did not appear in time to help them—Majorcan waters are tricky and the ships' committees knew more of politics than navigation. The Catalan Defence Committee could not refuse to send the columns of the various political organisations which refused to permit a specifically "Catalan" monopoly of the expedition. The columns were decimated as they struggled over the hostile countryside against vastly superior armament on land and in the air.

Astonishing exploits were not lacking. Sergeant Fabra, a pilot, having exhausted his ammunition in an air-battle against superior odds, simply rammed an enemy bomber and disappeared with it in flames.

It was quite impossible to hope to take Palma, defended by all the resources of modern military equipment. Forces whose presence in Aragon was essential were being wasted on a hopeless venture. After the Defence Council had sent mixed columns, even the Catalan aspect had lost its sense.

The first orders of the Caballero Cabinet were to liquidate this enterprise. Bayo received them direct. Alvarez del Vayo could not take so simple a view of international

politics. The thing was hopeless. The Great Catalan Expedition landed again at Barcelona, bearded and browned, and the Generalidad had had no official cognizance either of its beginning or of its ending.

From these four extraordinary "situations" some generalisation might be made about the characteristic of the first phase of the Spanish Civil War; precisely because none of these events had their origin in conditions created by the war, but were the continuation of tendencies which have already been analysed in the first part of this study.

Many foreign schematists tend to forget that the Civil War of Autumn, 1936, was still a *Spanish* Civil War. It has been pointed out already that, since circumstances alter characteristics, platitudes like: "The Spaniard is too individualistic to be a Communist, the British working man is too conservative to become a revolutionary," etc., can eventually lose their validity. It was this order of platitude that led to the exaggeration of the "heroism of the Alcazar" by Henri Massis, and to the failure of the Governmental Generals Riquelme and Asensio to take the fortress. It led the Basques to surrender San Sebastian and to suppose that nationalism in itself could cope with a civil war which would inevitably be another stage in a revolution. It led the Catalanists into a futile and wasteful adventure.

The perpetuation of this platitudinous legend diverted the course of the Civil War and wasted much time. But, as it was necessary in 1934 that Dencás' disgraceful failure—so neatly symbolised by his escape through a sewer—should finally explode Catalanism, so it was necessary that the phenomena exposed in this chapter should clarify the real issues of the war and revolution. The Revolution has always finally been forced to dispense with the picturesque, for it is a serious thing. The accumulation of the picturesque—what the Spaniards with sure instinct call the *típico*—is an element in the slow gathering of forces

which leads abruptly to the "leap" from "quantitative" to "qualitative" change. It cannot be deplored or approved: it happens.

This, with due allowance for "Spanishness", must be the sense of Irun, Bilbao, Simancas, Oviedo, the Alcazar, the Balearics.

The situation had to be concretised, clarified.

III

ORGANISING THE REVOLUTION

NEW DECISION HAD come into the faces on the Ramblas. They were still crowded, despite the mobilisation, and there were still hundreds of "rearguard militiamen". There was a babble and concert of loudspeakers day and night: speeches and more speeches, some news, and, perpetually, the songs of the Antifascists, the grave and moving Catalan *Segadors*, the nerve-racking, but jolly Republican *Riego's Anthem*, the anarchist *To the Barricades!* finely orchestrated, a very Spanish version of the *International*, which got so worn that it became torture, and *The Music Goes Round and Round*, and the *Sons of the People*, an old tune more or less annexed by the C.N.T., but, oddly enough, very popular with the Basque Nationalists.

Huge demonstrations jammed the streets, and sometimes funerals hushed the whole city. In these the POUM showed remarkable organising talents. There was the day, too, when all the taxis in Barcelona belonging to the C.N.T. Transport Union suddenly reappeared in splendid red-and-black, hooting steadily and simultaneously, while, amid perhaps the loudest noise ever heard in the noisy city of Barcelona, in each, a militiaman standing on the back seat triumphantly brandished his rifle.

Nevertheless, behind all these parades, a really serious effort was being made to reorganise the life of Catalonia. The great city was fed, lighted, watered and drained. The crops were gathered. The army was being gradually built. Despite the lack of efficient central organisation,

despite political and ideological disputes, despite a plethora of committees and sub-committees—or perhaps because of them—life went on in a rich and vital confusion which was not entirely chaos.

The war was distant and the social problem took first place. The front had come to a stand some twenty miles from Saragossa, and later converged northwards upon Huesca. It was a guerrilla war, the rebels using chiefly *requetes* and soldiers. Both sides lacked arms, especially planes and artillery. The front was a succession of outposts, often penetrating far into the enemy's lines. There was a certain amount of skirmishing, but there was no real battle until late in September, when the positions of Sietamo and Mount Aragon fell to the loyalists.

The Catalan army was not yet organised as a whole. Each party had its own columns which acted independently. The PSUC had a fairly efficient line at Tardienta, thanks chiefly to the first beginnings of the International Brigade, the Thaelmann Group, German refugees from Barcelona. At Bujalaroz, Durruti put into practice the "organisation of indiscipline" with excellent results, and his column was long the shock troop of the Catalan forces.

The C.N.T. had been able to put far the largest number of men in the field, and the anarchist conception presided over the structure of the first militias.

They were more or less spontaneous groupings, divided into "decuries", platoons of ten, with a leader of their own choosing. In theory, ten "decuries" made a "century", and any available number of "centuries" made up a "column". Each "century" had its Political Delegate or Commissioner, and many of them had also a Military Technician, a loyal officer from the Army or the Shock Police, to instruct them in the finer aspects of the art of war.

The Political Delegates were entrusted with almost everything, and the amount of work done by them was astounding. They were responsible for their men's moral and physical health. They had to see that food supplies,

communications, sanitation, etc., worked efficiently. They had to explain to their men the reason for all orders. Political agitation was the least of their tasks, for they were usually speaking to the convinced, and, at the front, strictly political questions were soon subordinated to the ordinary problems of billets, rations and fighting. There was no branch of activity in which the Political Delegate was not expected to intervene, save in the actual military command.

The system worked extraordinarily well. If the Political Delegate was sometimes the scapegoat, he was more often the leader, the guide, counsellor and friend. The vast majority of the Delegates took their responsibilities very seriously and on the whole carried them out efficiently.

The deficiencies were chiefly the fault of the chaotic conditions in Barcelona. It was said at the time that the political militia were too independent to accept a general command. This was not entirely true. Had there been a strong single command, there is no doubt that the militias would have obeyed it. The factional struggles, which were the sign at once of the weakness and of the vitality of the movement in Barcelona, had few direct repercussions at the front.

It was only too easy to exaggerate the lack of unity. The surprising thing was not how little unity there was, but how much. Remembering that the President of the U.G.T. Dockers' Union had been shot by C.N.T. men, or by *agents-provocateurs* disguised as such, on the Ramblas ten days after the rebellion broke out, that Anarchists and Socialists had been fighting each other desperately for half a century, that the Esquerra's police had been beating up workers at Police Headquarters only two years before, it was amazing that the unity endured after the first excitement of the street-fighting was over.

The chief reason was the tremendous urge towards the rebuilding of Catalan society. The Generalidad had decreed the forty-hour week; but the C.N.T. insisted that, so long

as the war lasted, it was essential to work a twenty-four-hour day if need be. The Barcelona Federation of Unions declared that it was treason to put forward any fresh demands about hours or wages until the war was won. The U.G.T. followed. The Unions rivalled each other in the ostentation of their sacrifices, and the large majority of their members willingly accepted their lead.

Naturally, there was war-profiteering on a large scale, especially among the petty-bourgeoisie and the peasant-farmers. Their position was curious and regrettably characteristic.

The working-class parties proclaimed again and again that small property was not to be molested in any way. This was not mere altruism, although a considerable factor in at least the C.N.T.'s moderation was the anarchist desire not to harm anyone if it were at all possible to avoid it. The Esquerra and the Rabassaires constituted a very large block, especially in the provinces, upon which Barcelona depended for supplies. It was essential that these should not be alienated.

This was not always understood. In several places, local Committees, self-appointed, "requisitioned" the crops. Sometimes, these were over-zealous members of the various organisations. More often, they were the gangsters and bandits who are bound to come to the fore in any social upheaval. Juan Peiró, later a C.N.T. Minister in the Caballero Cabinet, has described in his *Peril in the Rear-guard* some of the activities of these "uncontrolled Committees". In certain places, they instituted a real reign of terror.

These bandits were the exception, and the central organisations repeatedly repudiated them, often shot them out of hand. But the farmers could not know whether the central organisations were deceiving them, whether these bandits were "uncontrolled" or whether they were "uncontrollable". The farmers, organised by the Rabassaires, were restive.

They had their revenge by behaviour which was sometimes deliberately subversive, sometimes merely selfish. They hoarded and profiteered; and it must be realised that many who suffered for this, richly deserved to do so.

Against these persons must be placed the conduct of whole villages which banded together to send cartloads of provisions to the front. So enthusiastic were some that they almost bankrupted themselves by killing off their best cattle and poultry. In Aragon, surprisingly enough—for the Aragonese had little regional patriotism and might have been expected rather to resent their province becoming the cockpit of the Catalans and Navarrese—the peasants voluntarily provided the advancing columns with huge meals and apologised with melancholy courtesy to later comers that they could give them no more than wine and bread, but that must be accepted under pain of insult.

Part of the Aragonese enthusiasm may well have been due to the treatment they received from such leaders as Durruti.

It may be interesting to compare the two proclamations from Asturias in October 1934, already quoted (Grado and Mieres) with those issued by Durruti at Bujalaroz on August 11 and by the Socialist Trueba at Tardienta on August 1.

“The War Committee of the Durruti Column, attentive to the desires and needs of the people of Bujalaroz, proclaims:

- (1) Whereas the crops are sacrosanct to the interests of the labouring people and the antifascist cause, the harvest must be gathered without the least loss of time.
- (2) All goods, such as fruits, animals and means of transport, belonging to Fascists become property of the People under the control of its Committee.

- (3) On the date of issue of this proclamation, the private ownership of the lands of the large land-owners is abolished, they becoming the possession of the People in the form the Committee shall decide.
- (4) All tractors, reapers, ploughs, etc., belonging to Fascists are property of the People.
- (5) Since the armed struggle of the militias is the safeguard of the labouring people's life and interests, the citizens of Bujalaroz shall give them their unconditional and enthusiastic support, both material and moral."

Trueba's proclamation was as follows:

"The Military Committee of the First Column brings to the notice of the people of Tardienta and the militias quartered there the following orders:

- (1) Every person, militiaman-or civilian, who carries out requisitions, confiscations, etc., without authorisation or commits acts of looting will be severely punished by this committee.
- (2) Any person found guilty of signalling to the enemy or of sabotage will be shot.
- (3) All shopkeepers, owners of bars, barber-shops, factories, inns, etc., who have not begun work to normalise the town's life will be severely punished, even by shooting.
- (4) Any person useful for work or war trying to abandon the town will be punished in the same manner.
- (5) All goods, lands, factories, etc., belonging to persons who have made common cause with Fascism or are simply affiliated to Right organisations become the property of the people of Tardienta.
- (6) Whereas the crops are sacred to the interests of the working people, all agricultural labourers and small farmers are warned that work must be renewed to-day to make up for lost time.

- (7) The Covin flour-factory and the cement factory in Tardienta are to be the collective property of the town, administered by the Factory Committee formed by delegates from the Union.
- (8) All house rent is abolished.
- (9) All tenants and small producers are freed from paying any form of rent on their land.
- (10) Since it is the Antifascist Militia's task to defend the interests of the people against fascist barbarism, the people of Tardienta must give them every form of aid and solidarity in the prosecution of their work of liberation."

In practice, most villages near the front were submitted to a regime which might be called either Libertarian Communism or War Communism. In many places, money was abolished and supplies distributed by the Military Committee or the Village Committee against vouchers. In the early days, the system worked well enough, for the villages had always been more or less self-supporting, and they were able to exchange products with other villages. Manufactured or imported goods were sent up from the Supplies Committee in Barcelona. How far the Libertarian idea had penetrated Aragon was shown by the villagers' pride in the system, a pride quite certainly not inspired by increased well-being.

The same system was introduced in some places in Catalonia also, especially in the Pyrenees, where it had always been latent, and in some of the coast villages. Few, however, went to the lengths of the people of one small town near Tarragona, who, in the first flush of enthusiasm, piled up all their paper-money, burned it in the square, and were then alarmed to find, when they went marketing in Tarragona, that the materialists there wanted cash.

This peculiar mixture of high idealism, war-necessity and banditry was not calculated to attract the petty-bourgeois farmers, and throughout the war, the Catalan

Antifascists had to struggle against their stubborn opposition. The middle-classes were certainly not sympathetic to the rebels, for they were Catalans. But they were not enthusiastic Antifascists, and their attitude was to some extent reflected in the dilatoriness of their political organisations, the Esquerra and the Rabassaires' Union.

Although the Esquerra had a large number of men in the field and although its best men, such as Luis Companys, were eager to carry on the struggle with as much energy and efficiency as any Durruti, it was impossible, as *Solidaridad Obrera* continually pointed out, for a class to change its whole character overnight.

This social contradiction was continually present throughout the Catalan movement. Had the workers and peasants been united under a strong single party, the question of the bourgeoisie could have been subordinated. But there was no such party capable of governing without alienating the rest of the workers even more than the bourgeoisie itself. "Workers' and Peasants' Government" insistently demanded POUM. But the conditions for such a government not only did not exist but were not even in sight. Such a government would have had to be directed against the bourgeoisie and a wide section of the peasants, for the Rabassaires were incomparably the strongest force in the countryside. It was quite impossible for even an important workers' organisation such as the C.N.T. or the U.G.T. to govern against the Esquerra. It was certainly mere stupidity for a minute party like POUM to suggest such a thing. But to POUM's extraordinarily archaic conceptions these realities were foreign; and so it redoubled its energies in staging spectacular funerals—"specialising" in them, as *Sol* maliciously hinted.

The deficiencies of bureaucracy were amply supplied by what came to be called "individual initiatives". Not only in Catalonia but all over Spain, committees sprang up everywhere. Some of them had no reason for existence

save the ambitions of individuals. Some of them did extremely useful work.

Some of these committees were simply the continuation of the old anarchosyndicalist, socialist and communist organisations. Street-cells, factory-committees, neighbours' alliances and so on had existed for years. But, in general, they were the result of a few energetic persons uniting for a specific purpose, such as the rationing of a district, the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities, the stimulation of recruiting.

In the earliest days, there was extraordinarily little organisation; and the anarchist committees were opposed on principle to any form of centralisation. Each party had collaborated in the sweeping-away of the rebellion, and none would consent to any diminishing of its hard-won rights.

Each party had its own Defence Committees and Control Committees. Each jealously guarded "the conquests of the Revolution". The consequence was most noticeable in the important branch of police, "public safety". Each party and organisation had its own armed Patrols Committee, whose task was the repression of "Fascism". The disadvantage of this was that each party had its own idea of what "Fascism" really was, and that the safe-conducts issued by one party were often not recognised by another.

Chaos should have been complete. It was not. Common sense and the typical Spanish sense of honour and humanity saved many absurd and possibly fatal situations. What should have been chaos was in fact merely relative confusion; but, since no one cared much for the forms of bureaucratic legalism in those hot summer months, conflicts were solved in a rough-and-ready way which may have shocked the comfortable bourgeois and the schematic revolutionary, but actually was extremely reassuring to any sensible person.

Naturally, these committees were attacked from two sides and, later and more justifiably, from a third. The

bourgeois maintained that they were simply conducting a reign of unbridled licence. The ultra-revolutionaries were disappointed because the Spaniards did not at once set up Soviets. Later, when the Generalidad had evolved into a central organisation which really represented the forces behind it, President Companys, Dionisio Eroles, the Police Chief, and almost all parties united in considering that the committees had outlived their original usefulness and must be co-ordinated if not suppressed.

The chief disadvantage of the movement in Barcelona was that there was no reign of terror. Like Propaganda, Terror, which is indeed simply Propaganda's negative aspect, was for a long time neither centralised nor systematised. On July 19 and 20, the purely military rebellion had been smashed; but there remained the whole civilian apparatus upon which the military rebels had counted for support. Later investigations revealed the existence of a widespread and well-organised "Fifth Column". The Committee system prevented a general round-up in the first weeks.

Juan Peiró objected to the shooting of persons simply because they were rich or religious. If there had been so honest a man in the rebel ranks, he might have objected to the shooting of persons simply because they were poor or agnostic. The matter had no great importance, for it was on the movement's margin. What was more serious was that each party's patrols might well seize one member of a rebel organisation and omit to send in his dossier for co-ordination. It often happened that the man shot because he was rich or religious was guilty of far worse: conspiracy or concerted sabotage. His evidence, of supreme importance for the unravelling of the plot, had been eliminated.

The French Right-wing press abounded at one time in stories of the guillotine set up in the main squares of Barcelona. Naturally, this was quite untrue. Unfortunately: for an open Terror would have had a salutary effect. The Barcelonese, who were never very keen even on

bull-fights, would probably have been deeply shocked by public executions which took place in the more *aficionado* cities such as Seville and Valladolid; but the rebels appear in this to have adopted the more realistic policy. Particularly to profiteers, speculators and hoarders would public punishment have acted as a deterrent. The Basque Government very correctly posted up lists of such offenders outside the Town Halls. It is true that in Catalonia the sentences of the People's Courts were reported in the press every day, but so briefly that they aroused no attention. Public execution might have been rather too stern for profiteers, but some form of pillory would have seemed logical in a regime which depended entirely upon the approval of public opinion.

The public shooting of rich or religious persons, of course, would have been as absurd as their execution in any case: it was hardly possible to deter a man from the temptation of being born an aristocrat, a devotee or a millionaire. But the temptation to disloyalty, sabotage, treasonable activities, offences against the community such as hoarding and profiteering and plain gangsterism unfortunately existed. In time of civil war, the only feasible method of checking this was by a Terror such as ruled Paris in 1793.

As usual, a predominantly proletarian movement sinned by moderation. The Spanish workers in 1936, like the Paris Communards in 1871, could not be resolute in brutality, although they knew well enough how their enemies were treating their captured comrades. The real tragedy was that, since the world's opinion was formed mainly by a capitalist press, the Spanish workers were hysterically accused of setting up a "Red Terror" which should have existed but in fact did not.

The reason was the lack of a centralised revolutionary police. Each party had its own patrols, and the duality of powers remained. The Investigation Committee, central organisation of the Patrols, continued to exist side-by-side with the Commissariat of Public Order, which

controlled the Shock Police and National Republican Guard.

The Patrols, Control and Defence Committees assumed charge of every branch of activity. The Generalidad was so hastily improvised that it could not evolve the adequate administrative machinery in time. The duality which had existed in the days of the Antifascist Militias Committee was bound to continue until the central organisation could absorb the spontaneous creations of the people. This curious position was exemplified in the administration of law in the early days.

The first trials of the rebel officers had been by Court-Martial on board the prison-hulk *Uruguay*. Generals and officers, Goded, Lopez Varela, etc., had been guilty of mutiny. It was normal that they should be submitted to military law.

On August 5, the Attorney General of Catalonia was ordered to act as plaintiff in cases against those who had joined in the rebellion, "in order that difficulties of almost wholly monarchical procedure shall not hinder the exemplary application of the punishment deserved by those who have attacked the public peace and converted the Republic into the battle-field of civil war".

Two weeks later, the Generalidad set up Judicial Offices to give free legal advice about the new system of justice. On August 26 were created the Catalan People's Courts for the repression of Fascism. These were also set up in the provinces in place of the old municipal courts. On October 15, four People's Tribunals were set up in Barcelona, each with full powers.

The first Judicial Offices (dissolved on November 20) and the People's Courts grew up almost spontaneously and very typically. When the various public buildings were taken over by the workers' organisations after the rebellion, the Law Courts were somehow forgotten. C.N.T. patrols, indeed, who had suffered for years from legal repression, spent some time burning the records and were all for

burning the whole hated building—an æsthetic monstrosity anyway. The C.N.T. Control Committee, however, intervened and summoned from Madrid Eduardo Barriobero, a popular workmen's lawyer.

Barriobero has left an account of his activities at the head of the Judicial Offices in his amusing book, *A Revolutionary Tribunal*. During his time, the Law Courts were entirely run by the Control Committee of the C.N.T.

The Judicial Offices' chief work was to advise persons gratis on legal points, to repress usury, to facilitate marriages and divorce and, later, to try minor cases against persons accused of "Fascism". It dealt with 6,000 cases in the eighty days of its existence, working twelve hours a day and seven days a week.

A typical case was that of the man who declared that he had never belonged to a union or political party. "How old are you?" asked Barriobero. "Fifty." "Well, since every man's duty is to hold opinions and make some sacrifice for his opinions, you owe the parties and the unions thirty-five years' subscriptions. I shall fine you accordingly."

"Generally," Barriobero remarks, "the person in question must have owed revolutionary justice a good deal more than the subscriptions, to judge by his delight when he found he was going to get off with a handful of pesetas".

The People's Courts were more important. The Popular Juries set up on August 26 were concerned only with the persons who had been involved in the events of July 19. These Juries had worked within the framework of the old judicial system, with a president and twelve jurymen. The four People's Courts created by the Councillor of Justice, Andrès Nin, on October 15, were the basis of the new justice. The Generalidad had recovered the Law Courts from the Control Committee.

The new juridical system was to be based upon "the principle of public conscience and the necessity of a

revolutionary legality". The Courts were empowered to try and to punish all activities from espionage to "defeatist activities", terrorist actions, anonymous or unfounded denunciations, speculation, profiteering, hoarding, etc.

The People's Courts were composed of a president and eight members, one from each of the main political parties and organisations. These members were to be elected by the parties drawing up a list of sixteen adherents, the president choosing one man from each list by lot. The president had to be a Spaniard over thirty years of age, having resided in Catalonia for ten years and competent in Law. The members of the Court had to be over twenty-five, have resided in Catalonia for three years, be able to read and write and have belonged for two years to the party which elected them.

The accused could name a defender, who had free right of access and could accompany the authorities in any investigations made; he could defend himself; or any citizen could defend him if he refused to name a defence.

The Court would apply the existing legal system "in a form adapted to the exigencies of the present moment". The sentence would be final, but the president could call for a new hearing with another jury if he felt that the sentence was excessive. He could also ask the jury whether they were in favour of reprieve in the case of death-sentences, and if a majority were so, he could send the application to the Councillor for Justice.

A Generalidad document with an unmistakable Esquerra tinge states: "In the first twenty days of their existence, the People's Courts demonstrated such vigour and firmness that it was later (November 5) decreed that another organism be created (composed of the presidents of the four courts and two prosecutors) for the purpose of studying all death sentences imposed by said courts, making a report on each case to the Council of the Generalidad." The first reprieve was granted on November 10.

According to all objective observers, the People's Courts were extraordinarily fair. They certainly were very free with their prison sentences, but everyone knew that there would be an amnesty directly after the war. They did, however, tend to fine persons for the sin of being considered sufficiently suspect to be brought before the Court. They were really glad when they could acquit, and the acquitted always shook hands all round amid frantic cheers.

Justice was enormously speeded up and cheapened. Judicial staff in the civil courts were paid a fixed salary in place of the old commission on the sum involved. The date of coming of age in Catalonia was fixed at eighteen. Adoption was greatly simplified. Above all, marriage and divorce became easy and practically free.

After July 19, there was a tremendous rush to get married. No one could explain it. Partly it was due to militiamen who wanted to get married before going to the front. Partly it was persons who had been *novios* for years, without much chance of ever getting married under the old system where, in middle-class and peasant families at any rate, a wedding had always to be postponed if a distant cousin happened to die shortly before.

Marriages were blessed by the political organisations to which the couples belonged. "Colon marriages" were particularly popular, the Socialists and Communists with quarters in the Hotel Colon being more given to this formality than the Anarchists and Esquerra.

The Generalidad legalised these marriages on October 4, but stipulated that in future a legal representative should attend. Many couples preferred to marry in the Law Courts, since there they could be certain of valid registration.

The Generalidad's divorce legislation was extraordinarily simplified. The period of separation as grounds for divorce was reduced from three years to one. Immediate divorce by common consent was granted instead of, as hitherto, merely separation. The tremendous social, and indeed

common sense, importance of this second measure was thrown into relief by the cumbersome and illogical nature of English procedure as sharply demonstrated at the time by the debates on A. P. Herbert's Divorce Bill.

The new Divorce Tribunal, appointed by the Generalidad, began to function when the haphazard Judicial Offices were dissolved. It was composed of four professional lawyers, Eduard Ragasol (President), Luis Moles Marquina, Pelayo Sala Berenguer and Santiago Sentis Meléndo. Ragasol and Pelayo Sala were deputies, Catalan Action and socialist respectively, but the Tribunal was chosen rather for professional competence than political affiliation. This gave it the advantage that, almost alone among the new Catalan institutions, it could act with complete independence from political pressure. Its decisions were final, and it was responsible only to the Generalidad itself.

The Divorce Tribunal, although open freely to any person who wished to consult it, with or without legal representation, got through a great deal of work. Between October 1 and February 15, it dealt with some 3,100 cases, 1,800 of which, however, were simply those which had been brought before its activities began. The new procedure enormously simplified, speeded and cheapened divorce, for those by mutual consent were immediate and gratis.

While contested cases remained subject to the former republican legislation, interpreted, however, with greater elasticity and equity, the invariable criterion was the welfare of the children. In most cases, the parents settled this point before applying for divorce, but the Tribunal had the right to decide whether the children would fare best under the arrangement. If neither of the applicants appeared suitable parents, the Tribunal could hand the children over to the Children's Courts for care. This happened comparatively seldom. Alimony was calculated solely on the basis of the children's needs, the Tribunal considering that a woman should work if she were able

and, if unable, should enter one of the institutions provided by the State. The American system of making a fortune from alimony was impossible. Should any change in the circumstances of the parted couple take place, appeals could always be carried back to the Tribunal which had granted the divorce.

The majority of those who took advantage of the new system were poor persons, for whom divorce had formerly been too expensive. Some couples came to legalise a separation of over ten years. In the early days especially, several marriages in Barcelona high society were dissolved by mutual consent; for the marriage system in these circles was often still one of commercial or family convenience. There were certain wealthy families which had always intermarried without the slightest regard for the feelings of the interested parties. The removal of Church influence also stimulated the desire to dissolve unsatisfactory marriages.

This legislation, the most advanced in the world except in the U.S.S.R. which had a similar system, was confined to Catalonia. It was another result of the *de facto* autonomy which arose from war-time conditions, just as it was simply the regularisation of a spontaneous action during the first weeks of the upheaval. It was part of the whole process of regularising an existing state of affairs in the most liberal sense consistent with reasonable orderliness.

There was no "reign of unbridled licence" and there could be no chance of Barcelona becoming a kind of European Reno. Foreigners could be divorced only if their grounds were also valid in their own country—an English couple, for example, could not get divorce by mutual consent, unless they had been married in Spain after two years' residence. They could, however, and did, get married at once, especially those who joined the militias. All that was needed was a certificate of residence or the approval of some political organisation or trade union.

The rapidity of divorce was taken advantage of by a number of foreign women who had married Spaniards.

After divorce, they resumed their own nationality and were thus enabled to leave the country.

The Generalidad's social legislation was far in advance of that in any part of Europe save the U.S.S.R. That it coincided to some extent with that of the Soviets was due rather to the fact that both were based upon the people's elementary common-sense than upon any "Bolshevik influence" in Catalonia. The original Judicial Offices, indeed, were under the control of the Anarchists, and the new Divorce Tribunal was set up by José Quero, Esquerra Councillor for Justice in the Casanovas Cabinet. The Tribunal was composed of members of the most moderate parties and professional lawyers, so that there could be no possible suspicion of "Bolshevik influence" there.

The chief reason for this legal liberalism was simply the abolition of all the expensive, futile and anachronistic procedure which had been imposed by the vested interests of the Church and the bureaucracy. Although this social legislation was "superstructural" by definition, it was as important a demonstration of the new spirit as, on a trivial scale, the Barcelonese's ceasing to wear hats and ties on the Ramblas.

On December 25, it was decreed that qualified persons should "practise the artificial interruption of pregnancy" for any woman who demanded it, if the pregnancy were of not more than three months, if another abortion had not been carried out within twelve months and if there were no medical objection.

Sexual matters were dealt with chiefly by the C.N.T., especially by its young and active representative, Dr. Martí Ibañez.

This well-meaning young man was very much exercised by the question of prostitution, and, for a short period, the brothels and cabarets were closed. The natural result was the increase of street prostitution and of "massage saloons", advertised in the highly-respectable *Vanguardia*. The fight against prostitution was carried on by a female

anarchist group called, paradoxically enough, "Free Women", who brought out some really horrifying anti-venereal posters. At the same time, there was a vast increase in the sale of pamphlets such as *Sexual Communism*, *Love's Social Function*, etc., despite frequent police confiscations of "pornography".

The problem was almost always attacked from two directions: the reform of the Society which had produced prostitutes and made them pariahs, and the "psycho-therapeutic re-education" of the prostitutes themselves. The question of the desires of the militiaman on leave was hardly considered, but the streets of the Barrio Chino were always crowded; and it was an inexplicable fact that venereal disease was the commonest thing treated in base-line hospitals, despite a poster which proclaimed that "a casualty by venereal disease is as bad as a desertion".

The brothels were actually collectivised. Eduardo Barriobero has explained how this happened. One night the Generalidad sent him a commission of girls who wanted him to fix a proper tariff. "Love," he said, "cannot be an article subject to a tariff. Let us be more practical. Let us create the Love Union, and then you can expropriate the industry and throw the Madame out." "The odd thing," Barriobero notes, "was that these Unions were really seriously controlled—by the Caterers' Union!"

The cabarets, too, were re-opened and run by the C.N.T. Public Spectacles Union, which also controlled cinemas and theatres, and made a very good thing out of it.

Andrés Nin, the POUM Councillor for Justice, was insistent upon the need for proletarian revolutionary justice. The future Minister of Justice to the Republican Government, Garcia Oliver, an Anarchist, was far more concerned with humanising the existing conceptions. He begged the public, at a meeting held by him in Valencia, not to be too hard upon the Minister for Justice. Crime

was the product of social deficiencies, and, if he were really consistent, he would imprison everyone save the criminals. These should be treated as sick persons, and all sentences should be conditional upon the prisoner's improvement. If, sentenced to ten years, the prisoner seemed really cured in ten days, he should be released. Political prisoners, enemies of the regime but not actively traitorous—when they were so, they would be eliminated—should be put to useful work; and it would be very just and revolutionary to make the aristocrats work to support the workers.

One of the first things the FAI had done after July 19 had been to demolish the hideous Women's Jail. In this they were actually only following the authorities of New York and Paris, but the action had also a symbolic value.

Garcia Oliver's ideas were far more representative than Nin's, at any rate in Catalonia. Nin's Revolutionary Tribunals could only be composed of persons like Nin—Trotsky's ex-secretary.

Owing to special circumstances, Catalonia was compelled to take over many functions not assigned to it by the Statute. On August 20, a Generalidad Decree assigned to the Catalan Department of the Interior all functions of the Special Delegation of the Republic in Catalonia. That meant that such matters as passports and control of customs were in the hands of the Generalidad. The Official Bulletin became the Official Journal, and only decisions published there would be binding in Catalonia. An "Escort for the President of Catalonia" was created, and he was mentioned as "Excellency", whereas hitherto he had been "Honourable". A Secretariat of Foreign Relations was attached to the Presidency on December 27.

A Decree of July 25 provided that the "Rector of the Autonomous University of Catalonia" (hitherto Barcelona University) should have jurisdiction over the Secondary Schools previously in the hands of the Central Government. The University was placed directly under the Generalidad

Council of Culture, thus suppressing the representatives of the Spanish Government on the Board of Trustees.

A similar step was the dissolution of the Public Works Boards of the ports of Barcelona and Tarragona, on which the Central Government had been represented.

Very important was the granting of the power of reprieve to the President of Catalonia on October 15, a week before Azaña came to reside in the Barcelona Parliament House.

The financial and commercial steps were even more important. On December 11, the Catalan Government issued its own bank-notes to the value of twenty million pesetas. The notes were designed and printed in Catalonia on locally-manufactured paper, instead of by Messrs. Bradbury, Wilkinson. They were pleasing in design but rather fragile. A Foreign Trade Commissariat was created on October 21, and all merchandise destined for export had to be marked "Made in Catalonia". A month later, the Commissariat took over the full functions of the official Barcelona Chamber of Commerce and Navigation.

The limitations on social and educational reform laid down in the Statute were exceeded almost from the first, despite some opposition from Madrid. There could be no doubt that the movement in Catalonia was taking the form most suited to the Catalan character and to Catalan necessities. Juridically, it was shocking; but in practice, the "autonomist excesses" were not so very great. There was no question of actually proclaiming the "Catalan State in the Spanish Federal Republic," as Companys had done in 1934.

Companys was interviewed by *A.B.C.* "We are moving towards the Federal Republic," he said, "and thus to the conquest of the Spanish Tradition." The reporter was somewhat surprised, and pointed out that "they"—the rebels—were the people who were always talking of the Great Traditions of Spain, upon whose dominions the sun never set. "Nonsense!" replied Companys, "they are simply adapting historic legends to their own purposes.

The real Traditional Spain was Catalonia refusing to recognise Charles I, Castile rising against the Flemish nobles, Navarre recapturing its privileges and exemptions!"

Companys, however, emphasised that this attitude did not mean separatism, but just the reverse: the union of the federal Republics demanded by the peculiar character of each region.

This was an attitude very different from that adopted by POUM some months later, when, protesting against the formation of a Popular Army (in which it would have no influence) it attacked Valencia with the sudden accusation that the Central Government was attempting to "get possession of the army which guarantees Catalonia's national will". This attack coincided with reports in the German and Italian press hinting that the Caballero Government was about to fall and that Catalonia was negotiating for a separate peace.

Not separatism but federalism was Companys' desire, and this was shared by the immense majority of Catalans. Certain omissions from the Statute were seen to be quite arbitrary (restrictions on social and educational legislation): certain became impracticable owing to the abnormal circumstances. But pure separatism was as much an internal political racket as it had been in the time of Dencás.

There was, therefore, no real question of the setting up of a separate Catalan Soviet State, as Italy pretended to believe. Separatist it was not, and the C.N.T. was a strong guarantee against "Sovietisation" even had the U.S.S.R. wished it and even if there had been the institutions which could have made such a thing possible.

The Central Government, however, was suspicious. There existed a long-standing temperamental incompatibility between Spaniards and Catalans. The predominantly moderate-Socialist Central Government still distrusted the Anarchists and exaggerated the importance of the POUM, whose activities in Madrid had been considered little short of subversive. There was the old vicious

circle: the Central Government stinted its aid to Catalonia and then complained that Catalonia was not giving it sufficient support. The Catalans found that the Government was not supporting them sufficiently and were chary of their aid. Nevertheless, 25,000 Catalans took part in the Battle of Madrid and the Catalan hero, Durruti, died there.

Finance was the chief problem. Enthusiasm, political union, heroism in the field were necessarily subordinated to the question of hard cash; just as, with Franco, "nationalism", "patriotism", Fascism and Catholicism were subordinated to mercury, iron ores, copper pyrites.

The Generalidad Finance Council issued a report of its activities in a large book, a masterpiece of production. It is noteworthy that, despite temporary paper shortages, Catalan printing during the Civil War maintained its traditional high standard, especially in a whole series of new luxury magazines. *SIAS*, for instance, published by the Health and Public Assistance Council at 1 peseta, and admitting that it could only cover costs with the quite fantastic circulation of 100,000, was beautifully produced, on art paper, with a cover design of a lovely girl by Sim. It covered everything from a rather curious translation of Rudyard Kipling's "If", through Oscar Wilde's "The Nightingale and the Rose" to "The Abolition of Mercenary Love". Its frontispiece was a photo of Companys in evening dress. What exactly this had to do with effective propaganda amongst the workers and peasants it was difficult to see.

The Financial Department of the Generalidad explained that "Catalonia, merely obeying a stimulus as respectable as the instinct of self-preservation, could have reduced its activities to the solution of its internal problems and perfection of its defences. . . . This would not have embarrassed Catalan finances". Catalonia, however, joined in the general struggle, went out into Aragon and thus engaged itself in expenses vastly in excess of its resources. But as the war went on the Generalidad

"came to the conclusion that it must end the somewhat undignified system of running to State officials or the Bank of Spain for help. In reality, it was a problem of government".

Frequent interviews took place between representatives of the Generalidad and the Central Government.

In the four months between July 19 and November 19, foreign exchange to a total of 100 million francs was needed, as against usual average of 3-400 millions. Catalan imports, therefore, had dropped by nearly 75 per cent. Catalan industrialists, or, what amounted to the same thing, collectivised industries, became restless, unemployment increased, and the war was held up for lack of raw materials. Meanwhile, the Central Government appeared to be neglecting the Catalan financial problem entirely.

The Generalidad, therefore, felt bound to take matters into its own hands, and, at the end of August, sent Madrid a strong demand for a credit of 50 million pesetas to cover the expenses of the war in Aragon and Majorca, a credit of 30 million francs to be opened in Paris to acquire raw materials, and the Clearing House's authorisation to obtain 100 million pesetas' worth of foreign exchange. This note was not answered until Tarradellas himself put on sufficient pressure some time later; and the three demands, in very much modified form, were granted on September 8.

Meanwhile, the Generalidad was alarmed to receive, on August 22, a demand from the Treasury to pay within forty-eight hours 373,176,000 pesetas gold and 1,060,000,000 pesetas silver. The Treasury stated that this demand was no reflection upon the Generalidad's competence, but simply a desire to concentrate all gold and silver in Madrid to prevent hoarding and secret export. Nevertheless, it looked like suspicion of the Generalidad, and this was the general opinion of all the Catalan political organisations when consulted at a hurriedly-summoned conference.

It was quite impossible to satisfy the demand without bankrupting Catalonia, starving its inhabitants and causing serious internal disorders. In the four months studied, revenue had amounted to some 10 million pesetas, expenditure to some 200 millions. Contributions due to the Central Government amounted to about 80 millions.

The solution was the Decree of August 27, appointing a Generalidad Inspector in each of the branches of the Bank of Spain in Catalonia. The legal situation was complex; but in practice, Catalonia had the beginnings of a central banking system.

Madrid was naturally not pleased, but it had provoked the situation. Relations continued strained after the Caballero Cabinet was formed. The 1,400 million pesetas were at the base of all the apparently separatist and anti-separatist manœuvres which threatened good relations not only between the Catalan and Republican Governments but also between the organisations inside Catalonia, particularly between the native petty-bourgeoisie, the federalists and the centralists.

Eventually, thanks to Tarradelles' bargaining talents, the Central Government renounced its claim for the present. It would be simply another of those difficult points (like the similar advances made to the Basque Government) to be settled after the war; and might again be used as a political counter.

The interesting point, however, was that this dispute was the real starting-point for the creation of a Catalan financial system, with its successful Official Discount Bank (August 28) which was able to grant credits to a great many semi-bankrupt industries and even to show a small profit.

The middle-classes actually appeared to keep their confidence in the Generalidad's financial stability. This was shown by the Savings-Banks figures. The larger of the two Catalan institutions, with deposits of some 632 million pesetas and 563,505 depositors on July 19, had lost only about 15 per cent of its deposits by the end of December.

Most withdrawals were obviously made by would-be fugitives in the earliest days of the rebellion. In August, withdrawals were some 32,000 pesetas, deposits 10,500; but in December, even allowing for the normal Christmas and New Year drain, withdrawals had sunk to 23,000, deposits had risen to 14,000.

The new system, the work of José Tarradellas and his experts, was embodied in a series of fifty-eight decrees issued on January 8-12, in virtue of the Decree of November 20 conferring upon the Councillor for Finance full powers for the unification of Catalan finances. By this Decree Tarradellas received powers which can be paralleled only by those given to Dr. Schacht at the beginning of his activities as Reich Finance Minister.

The Tarradellas Plan, however, was nothing like the Schacht Plan. It differed, too, from the Rooseveltian, "a disinfected capitalism, but still capitalism, a position sincerely liberal but opposed to every kind of socialism". The Tarradellas Plan was "far from thinking that nineteenth century individualism is the summit of wisdom in every age".

The Tarradellas Plan, attempting to strike a balance between anarchist and communist ideals, was based upon a realistic concept making allowances for the individualist instinct of the Catalans. It aimed at limiting the ravages of the world crisis in Catalonia; that is to say, as José Quero, Councillor for Justice, pointed out, taxation was not to be a mere war-levy, like that of Queipo de Llano in Andalusia, but "a permanent source of revenue from the sources of wealth".

Banking in Catalonia—where branches of foreign or Spanish banks were to function without change—would approximate to that in the U.S.S.R., except that the Savings-Banks and the small investor would play a far larger role than hitherto in providing credit for national industries. Here the new Catalan system would resemble the ordinary, pre-war, system in the Basque Country.

Considerable credits were to be granted to the Councillor for Labour to finance public works and relieve unemployment. The actual scheme was left to the Councillor for Labour. One of the most important projects, suggested by the coal-shortage caused by the war, was widespread electrification.

Foreign trade was not to be nationalised immediately, but according to the necessities of the situation. It was simply to be regulated.

The question of rents and urban property was to be solved on a basis of liberty autonomy for the municipality, with especial collaboration with the Builders' Unions.

A Responsibilities Commission was to be set up, basing itself on the thesis that "it is logical that the damage caused by the fascist rising should be repaired by those who caused it or collaborated in causing it".

The actual working of the Tarradelles Plan necessarily depended upon general politics. It was uncertain whether an uncompromising regime would accept a realistic financial system. The crux lay in the co-ordination of the Finance Councillorship and the Economic Council. This problem could not be solved by the compromise Generalidad which had resulted from the crisis of December 19, three weeks before the Fifty-Eight Decrees were published.

The fact remained that Catalonia had evolved, by the force of circumstances, yet another system peculiar to itself. The Tarradelles Plan might or might not prove practical; it certainly could not have been conceived in Valencia or Madrid; and it certainly was not "imposed by Moscow". In its way, it was as much a manifestation of the peculiar circumstances in Catalonia as was the Collectivisations Decree.

The allied questions of the Committees, Catalan separatism and finance, arose from what has so often been called Spanish individualism. It would be more correct to call it mutualism, for the Catalan individual always

preferred to work in the group, the collectivity. To individualism was always allied a strong sense of solidarity. In the C.N.T., for instance, theoretically no member was *obliged* to obey strike orders. Nevertheless, a man was not deemed worthy to remain in the C.N.T. if he did not show sufficient solidarity to come off the job with the rest. It was not *binding* upon unions to follow the directions of the Regional Committees, nor upon the Regional Committees to carry out the instructions of the National Committee; but they were expected to demonstrate solidarity. Ramón Sender has a moving passage in his *Seven Red Sundays* where he describes some strikers' complete bewilderment at the sight of the lorries of blacklegs going by under police direction. "What awful necessity was driving them to break solidarity?"

A great deal of attention has been paid to the Barcelona church-burnings of July 19 and 20. Much has been written about the "incendiary instinct"; not nearly enough attention has been paid to a far more important "instinct": the urge to "collectivisation".

Even before July 19, the workers had taken over several bankrupt or abandoned enterprises, such as the Madrid Ciudad Lineal tramways, the "El Aguila" brewery, the Cadiz shipyards and some railways. The peasants in Extremadura and Andalusia had come together and had begun farming the fallow land of the big estates in common. Just as church-burning was nothing new, so collectivisation in its various forms had been seen before. For years, the workers had heard the slogan: "Neither God nor Master!": in other words, the abolition of the Church and the employer. They had formed their own organisations—C.N.T. and U.G.T.—on the basis of "the salvation of the workers must be achieved by the workers themselves".

The mechanism, still rude and untried, was therefore already in existence. The form was determined by political education, the collectivisations of Anarchists differing from those of Marxists. But a large proportion of the membership

of both U.G.T. and C.N.T. was as politically indifferent as a large proportion of any Trades-Union organisation, and there is no need to see in the collectivisations of 1936 any overwhelming influence of Anarchism, Syndicalism, Socialism or Communism. The workers were in fact acting as Socialist Syndicalists, the more politically-conscious among them regarding collectivisation as only a transitional stage on the way to socialisation. The form of eventual socialism would depend upon whether the Marxist or Anarchist conception prevailed after the original instinctive activities had been systematised.

It would be interesting to discover whether the workers' occupation of factories was due rather to Spanish psychology conditioned by Spain's specific economic characteristics or to seventy years of syndicalist education. During the Paris Commune, the first example of an attempt at proletarian dictatorship, the Communal Council decreed the taking-over of abandoned factories, but this was never done; while in Catalonia in 1936, the workers at once did so and their action was sanctioned by Government decree months later.

The real danger was precisely this more-or-less mutualist instinct which, uncanalised, could lead to chaos. It was a thing deep-rooted in the people, and any policy, however realist, which opposed it directly could only be disastrous. The instinct for mutual solidarity was confined to persons with similar interests—whether house-committees, district-committees, single workshops, factories, industries, municipalities, or even whole provinces. The centralised State ran just as much counter to this instinct as any form of fascist corporativism or totalitarianism. The fundamental problem of the Civil War was to find some institution which would permit the maximum autonomy and yet gather to it all the forces necessary for the successful waging of the war.

It would take a long time to find this combination, but upon the finding would depend the whole form of the

war and the revolution. In Catalonia, the Generalidad groped towards it, losing contact thereby with the Madrid Government which, supported by parties educated in centralism, could have little conception of federalist problems, and, unjustly, supposed that the concrete effects of this crux were merely the expression of Catalan ill-will.

Inside Catalonia, the Committees abounded and increased. There were District Defence Committees, Associations of Neighbours, Union Control Committees, Factory Control Committees, Union Defence Committees, Local Supplies Committees, Village Committees, Village Councils, Industry Committees, Co-ordinating Committees of all kinds, Military Committees: in fact, every branch of life was supposed to be controlled by some sort of Committee, and a safe-conduct looked like nothing so much as a stamp album. There were even Workers' and Soldiers' Committees, which sounded very Sovietic, but were in fact no more than the Committees inside the armed forces, such as the Shock Police and National Republican Guard, charged with the protection of their interests and the cleansing of their ranks from disloyal persons.

There was a vital ferment in Catalonia, and the very disputes showed that the body politic and economic was intensely alive. But a vital ferment alone would not win a war against troops submitted to a stringent and centralised discipline.

This "rearguard" and the conflict between the Central Government and Catalonia did much to paralyse action in Aragon. The early stages of the war, before the armament was completed in late October, were the traditional Spanish guerrilla. Partial actions were fought all along the front, and the rebel strongholds of Siétamo, Almudevar, Mount Aragon, Estrecho Quinto and Belchite were sufficiently strong to prevent a really serious threat to Huesca and Saragossa. After the rebel victories of Badajoz, Talavera and Toledo, this front lost much of its interest, for

it became obvious that only a very strong force could incommode Saragossa, and every available arm was needed in the Tagus Valley.

The chief casualties, indeed, appeared to be the requisitioned cars. "Speed on the roads is not limited, but drivers are expected to keep their cars well in hand," says the R.A.C. Handbook on Spain. The R.A.C.'s expectations were disappointed, and the ditches were crowded with wrecks. There was astounding wastage, for it was still believed that the war would soon be over.

There was also construction. Factories which had never made war material worked overtime with small resources to manufacture rifles, mortars and ingenious armoured cars which were often heroic death-traps. General Motors and Ford formed their own motorised centuries. By March 1937, Catalan factories were turning out three airplanes a day.

The transformed hotels, Colon, Falcon, Ritz, the Chamber of Commerce, the Naval School, the Güell mansion, the "ex-Capitania", the Jockey Club were loud with decrepit typewriters and the clatter of rifle-butts. In the first months, the amount of work—often misdirected, often futile but always enthusiastic—was astonishing. *Mañana* had always been a myth, especially in Catalonia (where one said *demá*, anyway); in July and August, before the Esquerra and some of the Trades-Unions had been able to reimpose the old *enchufista* bureaucracy, that spirit simply did not exist. There was, in fact, a superfluity of energies.

On the Ramblas, not a hat nor a tie to be seen, despite a demonstration by fifteen hundred hatted hatters complaining that they were faced with ruin. If the "rearguard militiamen" and the disguised bourgeois abounded, so did the real worker and employee trying, by their own efforts, to make sense of the confusion. The difficulty was not the lack, but the abundance, of solutions.

But there was no Smolny; and the beautiful Gothic Gallery and Orange Court of the Generalidad could not supply one. The tradition of Floral Games and Maciá's romantic eyes were too strong even for Luis Companys, and the Generalidad bureaucracy once more found itself at home. Only, in the Sessions Chamber, the Virgin of Montserrat had been substituted by the Venus of Ampurias.

It was obvious that such a situation could lead nowhere; and as early as September 9, the PSUC issued a long document demanding a "Government which governs". It stressed the necessity of organising the fighting forces, creating a "war economy", "centralised, mobilised or mobilisable for a concrete object: to win the war in the shortest possible time". "We demand an economy freed from ingenious experiments by persons who are operating on the bleeding body of Catalonia with the irresponsibility of a lunatic in a laboratory in flames." "We demand an economy liberated from the influence or pressure of so many new-born committees, manifestation of the pseudo-revolutionary pullulation which is strangling Catalonia's magnificent vitality. Catalonia is an economic unit, and only by accepting this can we organise a war economy."

The PSUC advocated a government of the Popular Front with the direct and active participation of the U.G.T. and C.N.T. The general lines of its programme would be: nationalisation of public services; municipalisation of local public services; nationalisation of private banking; nationalisation of mines; co-operative organisation of the industries abandoned by the bourgeoisie; direction of war industries; establishment of worker-control in what was left of big private industry; protection of the industrial and commercial petty-bourgeoisie and the Catalan artisans; rationalisation of production according to the needs of consumption and the war; collectivisation of the big industrialised agrarian estates; collectivisation of estates belonging to enemies of the regime; redistribution

of big estates in such a way that day-labourers would be abolished in Catalonia; imposition of compulsory unionisation on the land; co-operative organisation of production and consumption on the land; suppression of speculation and profiteering; creation of the People's Army in co-ordination with the Government of the Republic.

The PSUC was especially emphatic upon collaboration with the Government of the Republic and upon unity of action inside Catalonia. "Let us waive for the present whatever divides us, for it will be after the victory, *and only after the victory*, that the most intelligent, the best prepared, the best organised will direct and consolidate the Revolution."

Two days later took place the biggest demonstration seen in Barcelona since the march to Saragossa. This was the celebration of Catalan Independence. Every Catalan society, guild, party, group came out with banners, and the President appeared in state at the foot of the statue of Councillor Rafael Casanovas, "the martyr of Catalan liberty".

The C.N.T. did not attend. It took an attitude, partly political, partly puritanical. It disliked all this show in wartime. Next day, it complained bitterly of the number of rifles displayed, after all parties had initiated a big campaign to send them to the front as long ago as August 28.

The same abstention was planned when the PSUC hurriedly organised a mass reception for the Russian food ship *Zyrianin* on October 14. But the demonstration got completely out of hand. After waiting for two solid days in the rain on the docks, the whole of Barcelona turned out. Several enthusiastic groups had sat up all night painting banners of welcome in Russian with results linguistically disastrous. The reception was intended by the PSUC as a political demonstration of solidarity with the U.S.S.R. The Barcelonese turned it into a *fiesta*, and the boat's captain was paraded shoulder high right round

town. Frantic cheers greeted the Russian Consul, Antonov Ovseenko, to whom Miravittles said, tears in his fine eyes after a formal luncheon at Montserrat: "The Catalan people, having lost Francisco Macià, were like children grieving for their father, and they have found another in your grey hairs!"

The C.N.T. had not intended to join in the meeting, for they still secretly disapproved of the "Red Dictatorship" and suspected Ovseenko's influence. But their own supporters crowded the docks, and they had to submit. POUM, which later had to be publicly rebuked for its slanders on the U.S.S.R., was then engaged in its tactic of trying to monopolise all demonstrations, and carried most of the Russian banners.

The C.N.T. had its revenge at the demonstration in celebration of the Russian Revolution on November 8. For once it determined to show what it could do. For five and a half hours, it filed down the Ramblas, carrying its banners. The PSUC spent some four hours following. It is believed that POUM was seen to straggle past sometime in the twilight. The demonstration had begun at ten in the morning.

Much, however, had happened between September 11 and November 8. Something of unity had been apparently obtained.

Early in the movement, co-ordinating committees had been set up in many industries shared by the U.G.T. and the C.N.T. In various factories they had acted as bodies for regulating questions about unionism and collectivisation. They had not worked very well, save in the Railway, Tailors and Provisions Unions. They had, however, laid the basis for at least unity of action, one stage towards the possible fusion of the U.G.T. and the C.N.T. into one huge, irresistible union, in Catalonia if not nationally. The National Committees of both unions were for going more slowly, but Catalonia might well have disregarded this.

The desire for unity of action found political expression

first. The creation of the Caballero Cabinet had had no immediate repercussions in Catalonia. But the Generalidad Council presided by Casanovas could not make for good relations with Madrid, for Casanovas was an out-and-out separatist who considered that "Catalan heroism could only be properly shown when true Catalans held the official posts in the State". "Only the idea of patriotism can arouse true enthusiasm." "Doubtless," he told a reporter, "it is not easy to give the masses a sense of realities. We must fight against sterile illusions." This was hardly a point of view suitable to the leader of a Government which was supposed to represent these "masses" who were proletarian before they were Catalan.

The C.N.T. was still chary of entering a "Government" and becoming mixed up in the whole State-bureaucracy against which it had fought so long. It had been arguing for a National Defence Council in Madrid. This would allow it to participate without appearing false to its doctrines.

It was obvious that Casanovas' Generalidad represented no one and actually was doing its best to repress initiative without substituting any efficient organisation of its own. The withdrawal of the Balearics Expedition, ordered by Madrid without consulting Barcelona, showed that the Generalidad's separatist tendencies were causing a great deal of damage to national unity.

It was obvious from Casanovas' covertly contemptuous reference to "the masses" that his Catalanism, learned from Dencás, had become a mere bourgeois defence mechanism, directed far more against the Catalan workers than towards the benefit of Catalonia. The Majorca expedition had been a piece of irresponsible Catalanism; its withdrawal was a hint that this was no way to win the war.

On September 26, therefore, the Generalidad was reconstructed. All antifascist parties and organisations were represented. The U.G.T., unlike the C.N.T., was

not directly represented but publicly declared that Comorera, Valdès and Vidiella, the PSUC members, were authorised to speak for it.

The Councillor for Finance, José Tarradelles, was also "First Councillor" or Premier, Companys delegating to him his functions as Head of the Executive Council. This Executive Council was a kind of inner Cabinet, and was composed of Tarradelles (Esquerra; Finance), Juan Fabregas (C.N.T.; Economy), Comorera (PSUC; Public Works), Sandino (non-party; Defence) and Andrès Nin (POUM; Justice).

Thus, Catalonia now possessed a Government of the Popular Front with the addition of the C.N.T. and the FAI, who were not to enter the Caballero Cabinet for some weeks.

The basic programme of this new Council was: the collectivisation of big estates, respect for small landed property; collectivisation of big industry, public services and transports; "partial devaluation of urban property" by lowering rents; expropriation of abandoned industries and their collectivisation; respect for the artisan class. "The Council will indicate the best methods for the greatest efficiency in carrying on the war and reorganising the new economy. Invested with the unanimous representation of the antifascist people, it will impose its will on all those who, for whatever reason, try to act outside the discipline imposed by the present circumstances, without which we cannot win the war nor solve the grave economic problems raised by it."

"Soviet Government in Catalonia headed by Cambó," cried the London *Daily Mail*. Cambó had long ago departed on a yacht cruise in the Adriatic.

The Council's programme, fully approved by President Companys and suggested chiefly by the Anarchists, did not appear to be in any way Sovietic.

Nevertheless, unless Catalonia could be made by the *Daily Mail* to look like a "separate Soviet Republic", Count Ciano could not have told the *Daily Mail's*

correspondent, Mr. Ward Price, that Italy would never tolerate such a thing. After all, probably not more than ten of the *Daily Mail's* two million readers had the slightest idea who Cambó was; and everything which was not "insurgent patriot" might be assumed to be "Red", "Bolshevik" or "Sovietic", something somehow "menacing".

It was agreed that the new Generalidad should not be called "Government" but "Council". The censor hastily scratched the offending word out of next day's headlines; but *Solidaridad Obrera*, the organ of the "Government" hating organisation, going to press early, was the only paper to carry it.

On October 4, a Council of Public Safety was created to unify the various police services and fuse the Investigation and Patrols Committees with the ordinary police. The Councillor was Artemio Aiguadé, of the Esquerra; but Dionisio Eroles and Aurelio Fernandez, both of the FAI, remained in executive positions.

Relations with the Central Government were still not satisfactory, although Azaña, who had left Madrid on October 20 "on a tour of inspection of the fronts", came to live in Barcelona and inconspicuously did not visit Aragon.

On the other hand, a series of unpleasant incidents emphasised the need for proletarian unity in Catalonia, and the "Zyrianin" demonstration had clearly shown the desire. On October 26, the U.G.T., the PSUC, the C.N.T. and the FAI signed a pact. The POUM was asked not very warmly to join, and warmly refused.

The Pact was only the culmination of a very long process, dating from the foundation of the C.N.T. and reiterated by the Saragossa Congress the previous May. The importance was that the inclusion of the Iberian Anarchist Federation and the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia, member of the Third International, gave it a deep political significance at the time.

In some sort, it was to the 800,000 organised workers of Catalonia a charter similar to the Popular Front Pact of the previous winter.

The contracting parties agreed to mobilise the support of all their members to carry out the decisions of the Generalidad Council. The immediate programme was:

- (1) the collectivisation of the means of production; that meant the expropriation of capitalists without indemnity and the transfer of their property to a genuinely representative body, the Generalidad Council. Small industry was to be respected so far as possible, and where the necessities of war demanded the collectivisation of small industry, owners would be compensated by a sum adequate to their needs if they contributed their professional knowledge and labour to the collectivity. Foreign businesses collectivised for war purposes would receive compensation equivalent to the whole capital invested;
- (2) the municipalisation of housing property, except small urban property. Municipalities would control and fix rent;
- (3) conscription for the creation of a great People's Army;
- (4) production to be controlled in accordance with wartime consumption;
- (5) control of foreign trade;
- (6) the land to belong to the municipalities. Individual working of it to be guaranteed to those unwilling to work it collectively;
- (7) adaptation of co-operatives to the collectivist system, but special protection of small commerce;
- (8) nationalisation of banking and workers' control in banking transactions made by the Councillor for Finance in collaboration with the Employees' Committees;

- (9) Workers' control in private industry, but no compulsion on small industry;
- (10) Generalidad's financial policy to be directed solely towards winning the war;
- (11) popular education promoted by the New Unified School;
- (12) creation of a basis of political, economic and military collaboration with the Central Government once it was composed of all the organisations in the Generalidad Council (i.e., when the C.N.T. and the FAI participated);
- (13) liberty of union affiliation and checking of pressure to join one or other organisation;
- (14) joint action to eliminate irresponsible groups which might, through bad faith or misunderstanding, endanger the execution of this programme.

Quite obviously, the majority of the points were suggested by the C.N.T. On some all parties agreed. The emphasis on the People's Army and upon a basis of collaboration with the Central Government, were of Communist inspiration.

The Pact was the solemn confirmation of the new Generalidad Council's programme. More than that programme it represented the real state of affairs. The Pact was prodigal of guarantees for the petty-bourgeoisie and the small farmers, although the Esquerra had not been asked to sign. The Esquerra press greeted it with apparent enthusiasm, although it felt that it had been relegated to the margin. The Estat Catalá ventured to complain that "the specifically Catalan aspect of the Revolution had been ignored". It was perhaps annoyed that the document showed publicly that the real power in Catalonia was specifically proletarian, not specifically Catalan. Curiously enough, the C.N.T.—FAI radio-station, E.C.N. 1, began the following night to broadcast records of *sardanas*, the typical Catalan folk-dances. Catalanism was no longer the monopoly of the middle-class.

The U.G.T. and the C.N.T., the PSUC and the FAI had come together publicly at last, and a huge and enthusiastic joint meeting at the Monumental bull-ring sealed the union. It really appeared that the age-old cleavage in the Spanish working-class movement had been abolished in the region where it had traditionally been most dangerous. The minimum programme appeared reasonable, the regularisation of an existing state and a big step forward towards complete socialism. It seemed that the difference between the Catalan Marxists and Anarchists—not, of course, between Marxism and Anarchism—was largely a matter of words and associations. Finally, it might be possible to carry through this socialisation in the spirit of the Popular Front, without alienating the petty-bourgeoisie, small farmers and artisans.

Old Ossorio y Gallardo, that remarkable conservative Catholic who had defended Companys before the Courts after the October 6 failure, who now publicly deplored the irreligion and perjury of his fellow-Catholics in Spain from the broadcasting station of the Madrid Communist Party, made an interesting analysis of the situation in Catalonia at the end of 1936.

“It is extraordinarily interesting to read the Catalan papers, for one can see three important phenomena regarding the economic aspect:

“First, the cheerful matter-of-factness with which the workers take over factories and workshops with the idea of creating new economic forms;

“Second, the harsh recall to realities every hour;

“Third, the honesty with which the workers themselves recognise the distance between the ideal and the immediate possibilities.

“When the workers take possession of an industry, it is natural that they should see only the first aspect. Everything produced cannot be sold on the spot, and there are obligations which cannot be postponed to be met before the buyer appears. If the owner possessed a bank account,

the difficulty is solved by confiscating it; but after some time, it is found that the account is not elastic. Besides, the home and foreign markets have contracted as a result of the revolutionary upheaval.

"The collapse will not fall upon the capitalists but upon the workers themselves. All this must be borne in mind before advocating an economic revolution.

"There are only three ways out: first, the setting-up of a pure communist regime, with the abolition of money and the establishment of barter; second, State Capitalism, the State proper, single, the workers militarised; third, a mixed economy embracing several systems.

"All these solutions, as well as others, may co-exist in the near future. But the workers who look for unilateral, radical and intransigent solutions will be as wrong as the pusillanimous and short-sighted gentlemen whose Communism is limited to the itching of their fingers."

In Catalonia, the economic experiment took first place. Aragon was quiet, for there were few arms. But in the Tagus Valley, Mola's four columns were moving from abandoned Talavera and Toledo towards the great attack upon Madrid. The International Columns were still in Albacete, organising support for the counter-attack on Toledo which never materialised. In Oviedo, what was left of the rebel relief column from Galicia had dug itself obstinately in.

The foreign democracies sent aid to those women and children who were lucky enough to be merely widows and orphans, not corpses. Italy and Germany, while obstructing the Non-Intervention Committee, were gradually piling up reinforcements for Franco. The Italians under "Count Rossi" occupied Majorca.

The war was not, at the end of October, in a really acute stage, and it still appeared to be a Spanish Civil War, not a War of Spanish Independence against a foreign expeditionary force. An American paper could still write: "This fearless, heroic and cruel people continued the appalling exhibition which makes modern

historians write after each war in Spain that the country is 'still in some respects medieval'."

Soon the Italian and German bombers over Madrid were to show that to Fascists at least medievalism and extreme modernism could coincide, that the Cross of the Grand Inquisitors was merely a less crooked form of the Hitlerian swastika.

IV

MADRID DIGS IN

THE CABALLERO CABINET was a war Cabinet, but not the Government of the Revolution. The symbolic presence of Giral was a guarantee to the Spanish middle-classes and to international opinion. Both Caballero and Prieto agreed with Del Vayo and Araquistain that the war must be won as much in London, Paris and Geneva as in the Tagus Valley, Asturias and Aragon. Insufficiently informed of the true state of affairs in England when he attended the International Trade-Unions Federation meeting in London the previous spring, Caballero appears to have believed that the British working-class was not only willing, but also able, to force the National Government to maintain ordinary relations with the Spanish Government. Although one of Caballero's main activities at that time had been to expose the way in which the reformist wing of the Spanish Socialist Party had faked the elections for the Madrid Executive, he had failed to understand the power of similar figures in England to carry out precisely the same tactic.

Alvarez del Vayo made the same mistake about the Foreign Offices. It was a very Spanish mistake. Less cynical than Prieto and perhaps less aware of the pulling power of the world's "Two Hundred Families", he really believed that it was sufficient to be ostentatiously in the right to obtain justice at least from the big democracies. Even the Hoare-Laval Pact, which had so deeply shocked Spanish opinion, had not convinced him that justice and legality were no longer factors in practical politics. From the collection of Spanish Notes in the archives of

the League of Nations it will be possible for the future historian to compose a bitter and ugly "Don Quixote".

When the first "gentlemen's agreement" was signed, a French journalist commented: "Splendid—but who is the gentleman?" The generous illusions of the Wilson-Stresemann-Briand period had vanished from international diplomacy long before the equally generous illusion of the Spanish Republic had been broken by the Casas Viejas massacre.

The Anarchists, following their instincts, had grasped this new situation. On the evening of September 3, before Caballero had formed his Cabinet, the U.G.T., of which Caballero was General Secretary, proposed to the C.N.T. participation in the Government. A hasty meeting of the National Committee replied that the gravity of the situation was not yet sufficient for the C.N.T. to abandon its insurrectionary line. Two weeks later, the C.N.T. began a campaign for a Council of National Defence to take the place of a "Government which has not the courage to interpret the realities of the Spanish Revolution". The National Defence Council should be similar to the Generalidad Council in Catalonia, formed by the C.N.T., the U.G.T. and the fighting Republicans. The political parties as such should not be represented, but Caballero should remain. "Spain should not be called the Republic of Workers of All Classes, but the Republic of Honest Revolutionary Workers," said *Solidaridad Obrera*.

Negotiations went on throughout September, and this political tangle held up the general mobilisation and militarisation of the militias planned by Caballero from the start. It was curious that a federalist organisation like the C.N.T. should have failed to see the vast difference between conditions in Madrid and those in Catalonia, especially as the Catalan Regional Committee was taking many initiatives not dictated but afterwards approved by the National Committee.

There was a general impression that Catalonia was far more revolutionary than Madrid. This was based upon

superficial observation. In Barcelona, almost every building of importance carried a revolutionary flag or a huge banner proclaiming that the business had been collectivised, expropriated or occupied. Certainly, the capitalist had been more or less eliminated; but this did not by any means imply that capitalism had been abolished or that any other cohesive system constructed. The Catalan revolution was still in its "instinctive" stage, and, despite the fusion of the Antifascist Militias Committee with the Generalidad, it had not yet assumed any permanent political mould.

In Madrid, the process was far less obvious. Curiously Spanish was the way in which flags and banners diminished from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Barcelona was a riot of bunting; in Madrid, flags and posters were noticeably less; in Asturias at that time there were a few flags and no posters; in Bilbao no flags or posters at all.

In Madrid the revolutionary process was slower, deeper and better directed, in accordance with the characteristics of Madrid Socialism and Castilian psychology. Before the November Siege enforced a system resembling War Communism, the traditional Madrid bureaucracy muffled the revolutionary process. Just as in Barcelona they made new trams instead of tanks, so in Madrid they built new apartment-houses instead of fortifications. A building boom is a curious phenomenon common to all social upheavals; and it must be remembered that in Madrid the C.N.T. had succeeded in organising at least 60 per cent of the building trade; in fact, of its roughly 75,000 members in Madrid, some 40,000 were builders.

The "traditional frivolity of the *Madrileños*" was still a daily topic in the Barcelona papers; and it is quite possible that this campaign was an important factor in the defeat of the rebel assault on the city. The Barcelona press arrived daily at Perpignan, where it was eagerly read by Franco's agents. It was translated into Italian and German and sent to the Foreign Offices. According to rebel admissions, Franco believed that the people of Madrid could

not possibly put up any resistance or even support heavy bombardment. It may be that the Barcelona press campaigns were one of the most valuable services Catalonia gave to Spain.

The accusation appeared justified in September and October. A portion of the civil population was still secretly favourable to Franco, or at least hostile to Caballero. Madrid had been a bureaucrats' paradise and had a considerable population of absentee landlords, businessmen, and rentiers. From these Mola could draw his "Fifth Column", and García Atadell's Dawn Patrol had plenty of work. It caught Salazar Alonso, who was shot, after a remarkably fair and good-humoured trial, on September 22. Curiously enough, the chief evidence implicating him in the rebellion was not so much the reception at Molinero's on July 17 as papers found sewn into the boot-soles of Colonel Lopez Varela when he was shot in Barcelona.

A widespread espionage organisation was discovered, with centres in Madrid and Valencia. There was another plot to assault the Madrid radio-station and the Ministry of the Interior as soon as the enemy troops had surrounded the city. Black-lists of Left-wing leaders were found. There had been isolated attempts already. A C.N.T. leader was murdered on September 9, and a few days later the child of a socialist officer was kidnapped. So complex was the situation that no one could tell whether these plots and murders were gangster, inner-political, provocative or police jobs. García Atadell, like Rebertés in Barcelona, appeared to have a remarkably mixed idea of what constituted the "Fifth Column", and his own relation to this spy organisation—if definite organisation it was—is still completely uncertain.

In Valencia, too, the situation was peculiar. The orange capital had not experienced more of the Civil War than the drain on its produce for feeding the Army. The insurrection had never come to a head, and it was only afterwards, and outside the city, that the Civil Guard had

revolted. Disputes in the orange-fields had been frequent ever since the previous harvest, and were now translated into terms of union organisation. The day-labourers were organised by the C.N.T., who wished to set against the small producers' co-operative marketing system a form of collectivisation. The refusal to co-operate in the Majorcan expedition was one result of this tension; and it was an actual relief when, late in October, a serious shooting affray between Anarchists and Communists brought matters to a head and provided a concrete basis for unity.

There were strange movements in Portugal and Morocco. Behind the rebel lines there was a perpetual guerrilla, waged by badly-armed peasants and fragments of defeated columns. At the end of September, Prieto made a hurried and very secret visit to Tangiers.

The Cabinet made itself felt. The war communiqués began to approach accuracy and common sense. In place of the usual republican verbosity the radios began to speak curtly, seriously and soberly. A militiaman became a militiaman, no longer a "heroic warrior". This new, almost un-Spanish, sobriety became noticeable too in the conduct of affairs.

One disadvantage of this new policy was that no one had any idea about how the war was going, with the result that Madrid could pass without transition from wild optimism to the blackest panic. The fall of Badajoz had created no particular sensation in Madrid. Its full implications were not then understood, and the defeat had been compensated almost immediately by the victory at Medelín on August 17. But the effect of this victory had been over-estimated, and the rebel advance continued. By the middle of September, Madrid began to become alarmed.

The tragi-comedy of the Alcazar was studied in Chapter VI. It is only necessary here to place it in its perspective from Madrid.

The final bombardment, after Moscardó's refusal to treat with the Diplomatic Corps, began on September 14.

On September 18, the huge mine went up, and nothing more happened. The battle went on with varying intensity, until the rebel troops marched in on September 27.

Toledo had become the centre of the whole world's attention. Madrid eagerly read the accounts of dramatic interviews between the besieged and the besiegers, was assured every morning that the Alcazar could not hold out one day longer. Meanwhile, Yagüe's four columns were moving up the Tagus Valley, the loyalist counter-offensive did not begin, and Madrid became conscious of impending disaster.

El Socialista began the campaign in mid-September with a much-commented leading article, "Victory or Death!" The whole Madrid press took up the theme. Discipline was essential, and it must be strengthened. Desertion from the firing-line was not uncommon; for the opposing odds, especially the straight-shooting Moors, were too formidable for untrained troops. Mile after mile was lost, and the threat to Madrid became greater daily. "The moment has come for the heroism and self-sacrifice of the militias to be put to the test."

The press demanded the revival of the enthusiasm of the early days. "Rearguard heroes" were not wanted. Fighters were wanted, and any militia man who retreated should be expelled. The old rhetoric, not devoid of content, reappeared: "Those that fall, not those that live, will bring us victory!" "We need 5,000 desperate men," said *El Socialista*. "Five thousand determined men are worth more than 25,000 deserters."

"Madrid must and shall be the Grave of Fascism," declared the militia High Command. All Madrid took up the cry.

Trenches were dug on the Toledo front at last. "You cannot run away from trenches," said one officer, not cynically. Far more important was the great mobilisation of September 22 and 23.

For no apparent reason, Madrid had been plunged in the blackest pessimism, amounting almost to panic,

on the night of September 19. It was Sunday evening and there were no newspapers. Sunday evenings throughout the war were always emotionally critical, for the *paseo*, the evening stroll of the whole population, was a great breeder of rumours, not entirely unfomented by *agents-provocateurs*.

News from the front was rare, and, in those days, no news was bad news. Actually, the official communiqués' reserve was equal, whether there had been victory or defeat. There were the usual Sunday-evening fears of inner-political struggles. The C.N.T. was urging a governmental reorganisation in which it would hold very strong positions. The slogan, "Win the war first!" was perhaps partly a defensive manoeuvre against these demands. But the situation at the front was in truth critical.

Early in the morning of Wednesday, September 22, new reserves arrived from the provinces. Durruti's Catalan columns had come on the 9th, greeted rather sourly by the *Madrileños*, who knew nothing of their worth and temperamentally disliked Catalans and Anarchists. The new troops, with the Madrid reserves, were flung straight into the Tagus Valley. Hour after hour they went out, amid frantic cheers.

This had been made possible by the arrival of arms from Mexico. Ironically enough, they were of German manufacture, excellent rifles, lighter than the Spanish Mauser-type, carrying two magazines of five cartridges.

On the Thursday morning, Madrid resembled an armed camp. That day brought the first republican victory, at Alberche. The reservoir had been opened and the cataract had cut the main rebel concentration from the other sectors. Rumour spoke of thousands of dead. This was untrue, but the tactical success was enormous. The strongest part of the rebel army had been immobilised while a successful counter-attack had been made against the other sectors.

Although the victory at Alberche could not prevent the fall of Toledo, it did hold up the attack on Madrid until

the city had time to build its defences. The rebel columns needed time to rally and reorganise. Had they been able to concentrate sufficient effectives immediately after the fall of Toledo, they might well have marched straight into Madrid.

The official communiqué did not mention this important victory; but the news spread round all Madrid. *Politica* gave a broad hint to those who knew: "The irresistible onslaught of our troops is acting like a great flood to drown the enemy's attack."

The official reticence was justified, for the rumours, magnifying the victory, aroused such optimism that the press had to damp it down at once; for, despite simultaneous successes on the Asturian and Basque fronts, result too of the arrival of new arms shipments, the war was far from won.

It is interesting to note that in the Battle of Alberche, the Republicans had met Franco's revival of Ludendorff's massive-penetration plan used in France in 1918 with Ludendorff's plan used at Tannenberg in 1915, when he drove his opponents into the marshes.

The Alberche reservoir had for the first time been of use to the Spanish people. It had been started some time before the Primo de Rivera military dictatorship by a group of private capitalists whose funds proved insufficient to finish it. The works gradually rotted and the shares became valueless. As usual, Señor Ruiz Senén, the Jesuits' agent, turned up. On the day before Primo granted the bankrupt company State aid to the total of 90 million gold pesetas, Senén picked up the shares for practically nothing. The work was finished; but as a matter of fact it never did more than provide light and power for a few small villages in the provinces of Madrid and Toledo, and really only became useful when it drowned out the Jesuits' Moorish allies.

The optimism caused by the victory at Alberche appeared well-founded. It was overlooked that it was water, not men, which had gained that battle. But, in the third week

of September, the news from all fronts was at last favourable. Moreover, arms deliveries were satisfactory, and it appeared that that great problem had been settled.

The moral factor was exaggerated; and it was pointed out that on all fronts Franco was using little but Moorish and Foreign Legionary material. These had been in the line for over six weeks, and there appeared to be no reserves.

The rebel air force had at last been mastered by the loyalists. Despite the addition of forty new German and Italian planes, the human factor was decisive. The loyalist pilots were men who had come to Spain to fight for a home, to gain their revenge against Fascism. The rebel pilots were mercenaries. It was thought that relative equality of armament and the superior morale and reserves on the Governmental side would be decisive. Even well-informed foreign correspondents cabled that there could now be little doubt that the Spanish Government had won the war, and that the decisive victory was only a matter of time.

This was on September 23. On September 26, the rebels reached the outskirts of Toledo. Low-flying planes machine-gunned the militias as the infantry entered the town from an unexpected quarter. This was the first time in history that this tactic had been used, and it was a complete success. The militias, abandoned by their officers and entirely unprepared for the assault, ran for miles, throwing into confusion the second-line defences at Olia and Barga on the Madrid road. The defeat was as complete as it was sudden.

The Government had not wished to raise hopes by the news of Alberche. Equally, it was silent about the catastrophe at Toledo. A speech by Pasionaria might have changed the whole situation; but the radios were silent. Nothing was said, and Madrid lay despairing and helpless. If Alberche had not scattered the main rebel force, Madrid could have been taken by the beginning of October.

Luckily for the Republic, Yagüe stopped to consolidate his victory. There was a whole month's breathing-space.

The defence became organised, whole battalions of voluntary workers going every evening to dig trenches. The city was so efficiently barricaded that it would literally have to become Fascism's Grave before it could be taken, for every house was a fortress. Gradually, the Defence Committee co-ordinated the system, centralised the new initiatives which had arisen in the House and District Committees. The evacuation began, for Madrid was no place for children, and it could not feed them. Valencia and Barcelona received them. Madrid evolved, by force of circumstances, towards War Communism. The direction was taken over by those most competent and most energetic: in general, the Unified Socialist and Communist Youth, who had sent, far back in July, the first columns into the Sierra.

The Mexican arms had enabled Madrid to throw the reserves against the Tagus front and to hold the rebel advance for a month. Mexico had always stated quite openly that it saw no reason whatsoever not to supply a legitimate and friendly Government, and the Spanish Republic upheld its right and its intention of buying arms from anybody who would sell.

Antifascist volunteers were flocking in from all over the world, come to this war to fight for liberty as they had come to so many other civil wars in the past. Many of them were exiles from fascist countries and eagerly took the chance of revenge. Fascism had, by its own action and later, declaration, become an international force, and by fighting Fascism in Spain these volunteers were fighting it in their own countries also.

These few thousand men had travelled to Spain as best they could, some sent by their political organisations, some come on a sudden impulse, men with problems to solve, clear-headed antifascist fighters, romantics, a certain number of the idle and the desperate, men of every class, party, nationality and religion. For some Antifascism had hitherto been a vague feeling of dislike for castor-oil politics; for others it had been a burning desire to avenge

their comrades tortured in concentration camps or "shot while attempting escape". For most, it was a clear-cut ideal.

At Albacete there were Political Commissioners of the calibre of Fox, Nicoletti and Beimler. In a few weeks, this heterogeneous mass became the finest fighting force in Spain. The Political Commissioners gave the brigades a discipline and explained the meaning of the struggle. Any man who wished to return home could do so. There was no compulsion to go to the Madrid front; but once a man had taken the engagement to go, he went. Very few did not go.

The tragedy of it was that many of the men who had come as individuals belonged to those very parties whose acquiescence was the strongest guarantee of success to those who wished to sabotage all discussion of the raising of the embargo upon trade with the Spanish Republic. It was possible to find a man who had been an important member of a local Labour Party which had most strongly supported the refusal of aid to Spain, risking his life to reverse that policy.

The experience of individual members of such parties would be of historical importance when they returned to their own country—if they did.

The International Brigades were to act as shock-troops and their casualties were extraordinarily high. But they saved more than Madrid: they saved the honour of the international antifascist movement. As Dimitrov said, they were the true antifascist united fighting front.

THE WAR GOES ON

COLONEL YAGÜE'S COLUMN drove on up the Tagus Valley. The Asturians were pressing Oviedo, but relieving columns from Galicia were coming up in their rear. The Catalans were not progressing in Aragon. The rebels had the initiative.

Their second offensive was reaching its culmination: the assault on Madrid. Strategically, the capital was a liability to the Government, for supplies were a perpetual problem and a drain even upon the rich Valencia *huerta*. But the war was becoming increasingly a matter of international politics.

In Paris, they were discussing the report from underground sources in Rome that Catalonia was to be attacked on November 6. The plan, it was said, was for a landing-party to cut communications with France near Port-Bou while a string of German submarines would prevent any interference by the Governmental fleet. A fierce attack in Aragon would open the way for raiding parties to penetrate into the Catalan countryside.

The simple but rather impractical plan had in it a certain element of truth. The big clash was at hand. All the Governmental papers announced, as they had so often done before, that the coming week would be decisive.

In Madrid, Caballero called his men out to the big attack. "People of Madrid," he cried, "The decisive hour has come. . . . The Government, closely linked with the fighters at the front, appeals to them not to yield an inch of our soil, to fling themselves into the attack with

the violence which can assure victory. When the Government demands this, it also assures the fighting forces that it has now at its disposal all the means necessary for gaining the victory. . . . On to the attack for the final liberation of Madrid, supreme fortress of the world struggle against Fascism!"

Huge reserves of the most modern material had been accumulating at Albacete. The militias from inside the capital swept forward, clearing the road and line to Valencia. The Albacete columns moved northwards to take Yagüe in the rear. Prieto's air force, now equipped with planes at least as good as the rebels' Junkers, Fiats and Capronis, swung out to bomb the enemy bases and aerodromes.

The line swept on, so fast that for five hours the cars following it had no chance of stopping for one moment. The famous Fifth Regiment drove the rebels back and back. Pasionaria, Antonio Mije and other Communist leaders went into action with their men. "Now that we have tanks and planes," Caballero's voice came over the radio in the dawn, "Forward, comrades!"

For three days, the advance held, slowing after the first savage thrust, but moving steadily towards its objectives. Then it began to falter, hesitate. Positions had to be fortified, trenches dug. Offensive positions became defensive.

The word had been given too soon. Again and again it had been made clear that the citizen militia was dependent upon political conditions. A People's Army must necessarily be a political army; but as an army it must have, as all parties demanded, unity of command. However loyally the fractions worked in the Antifascist Front, military success was impossible until the militias had the full consciousness of unity behind them. The enemy, using non-political Moors, Legionaries and regular soldiers, organised by regular discipline, could make up for what they lacked in individual enthusiasm by organic cohesion. For weeks past, the C.N.T. had been demanding

the formation of a National Defence Council, somewhat on the lines of the Generalidad Council in Catalonia. Negotiations had been going on since early September; but the position was a deadlock. The Anarchists would not join a "Government", especially one in which bourgeois parties participated; but the legitimate Caballero Government could not turn itself into a "Council" which would appear to the world as a Committee of Public Safety, thus giving Germany and Italy an opportunity to recognise Burgos. Already, the Italian press spoke of the "vile Soviet Republic of Catalonia".

Amplifications of the plan for rebel attack upon Catalonia were known in Madrid and Barcelona. After Grandi had declared his refusal even to speak with any Power which did not consider itself bound any longer by the Non-intervention Pact, there seemed little doubt that recognition was merely a matter of choosing the appropriate moment. With the frontier cut at Irun and Port-Bou and the probable blockade of Barcelona, foreign aid to the Government would be impossible. The military peril, when the advance wavered and halted, suddenly redoubled. The need for unity was pressing.

The C.N.T.'s pact with the U.G.T. in Catalonia had expressly demanded "the creation of a basis of political, economic and military collaboration with the Government of Spain as soon as it is composed of all the organisations represented in the Generalidad Council". "All the organisations" could refer only to the inclusion of the C.N.T. and the FAI, or, since every member of the FAI was, by hypothesis, a member of the C.N.T. as well, of the C.N.T. alone. By this, the anti-political Anarchists could salve their more doctrinaire followers' consciences and simultaneously not alarm foreign and domestic bourgeois opinion. It was probably Juan Peiró, former leader of the "Thirty" schism, or Mariano Vasquez, the young and intelligent Secretary of the Catalan Regional Federation, who suggested this astonishing solution—astonishing in that the FAI still prided themselves on

their fundamental intransigence. But the new current in the C.N.T. had united both the older tacticians and the rising young men in the conviction that any concessions could be justified by the paramount necessity of winning the war. A few days later, Jacinto Torhyo, the young and indefatigable director of the C.N.T. propaganda, replaced Liberto Callejas in the editorship of *Solidaridad Obrera*, after Companys himself had complained of the papers' growing irresponsibility.

POUM, which had "refused" to participate in the Government simply because it had not been asked to do so, complained bitterly that the "Revolution" was being stultified by these concessions. It still held the curious idea that the issue was the seizure of power by the workers, the "Revolution". To talk of making the "Revolution" in the midst of the capitalist offensive, when its soldiers were at the very gates of Madrid, was little short of counter-revolutionary. "Some people may say that our attitude is due to the fact that we are not represented in the Government," said *La Batalla*. "But we attach no importance to what such people may say." Unfortunately, by far the majority of those who were interested in POUM's opinion at all did say precisely that, especially when this attitude was coupled with a strong protest against the new militarisation of the Catalan troops, decreed by the Generalidad Council on the day of the great Madrid offensive.

The militarisation was somewhat hurried, in that it had not yet worked out a new code of military law, submitting the citizen militias to the old discipline. It was to apply to all citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; those older or younger were allowed to leave the militias if they did not wish to accept this discipline.

The decree brought out the conflict between the civil and military predominance, said the POUM, whose small columns would lose their freedom of action, since the ultimate wielder of the code could be none but their political opponents. In point of fact, the question of a

conflict between the civil and military control was a mere schematisation, not in the slightest in accordance with the facts. The Catalan General Staff was either non-political or omni-political; its members were subject to the approval of the Generalidad, the new Commissioner for War, Alvarez del Vayo, and of Caballero himself. There could not be unity of command if POUM or any other organisation refused to obey military orders in the name of political supremacy.

Some weeks later, Angel Galarza, Minister of the Interior, said that the Civil War and the Revolution were two quite different things. "This," said *La Batalla*, "is essentially a reactionary formula. By separating the war from the revolution, he is going against not only the revolution but against the war itself." "It is obvious," replied *Solidaridad Obrera*, "that no one but *La Batalla* knows the true way. On which we congratulate it cordially and wish it a Happy New Year."

It was shown that the reactionary position was that of the POUM. All the disasters of the Civil War were due to the one factor which had allowed the war to break out: lack of unity. POUM, the Party for Marxist Unification, refused to adapt itself to reality. With only 8,000 men in the field, POUM remained nothing more than a useful example of how a movement may be sabotaged by those who cannot adapt themselves to reality.

Undoubtedly, as the C.N.T. repeatedly stated, the Caballero Government needed the injection of some invigorating force. How far it could absorb and use that force would be the measure of its strength. The problem was not so much that of the unity of the C.N.T. and the Popular Front in Madrid, although, by their own showing, the Anarchists there had 4,000 well-armed men in reserve; it was rather the problem of the unified command over the whole country. Some formula must be found which would allow a combined offensive and an interchange of command. Above all, a common ground must be found between the two most important centres

of the antifascist movement: Madrid and Barcelona. For there remained little doubt that Franco was planning a combined offensive; and, his communications clear, he could transfer shock troops from one front to another with disconcerting rapidity.

These considerations induced the C.N.T. to take a step of immense historical importance. The C.N.T.-U.G.T.-FAI-PSUC Pact had united the two great sections of the Catalan working-class on a common minimum basis, not, it is true, devoid of speculation, but at least ratified by common accord among the rank-and-file. The C.N.T. had given the U.G.T. parity on the old Militias' Committee in return for a tacit agreement that Caballero would do the same in Madrid. The U.G.T. had attracted sufficient new adherents to justify parity in Catalonia; the C.N.T. in Madrid had not been so successful. The entry of the C.N.T. into the Madrid Government therefore was nothing more than a step towards the unity of Catalonia and Madrid, with little reference to mere syndical unification, although holding out promise of it.

The C.N.T. members entered the Government on November 3. There were three from Catalonia and one from Valencia: Juan Peiró, the warning voice from Mataró, García Oliver, secretary of the Catalan Defence Council, Federica Montseny, Spain's first woman minister, one of the big driving forces behind the Catalan Regional Federation, and Juan Lopez head of the Valencian Regional Federation. The C.N.T. took the Ministries of Industry, Health, Commerce and Justice, but this had no particular significance; the attributions extended further, although the Ministers of Industry and Commerce, Lopez and Peiró, were to give to their ministries a new direction, more closely allied to those of Terradellas and Fábregas in the Generalidad. The Government was now composed of seven Socialists, two Communists, four members of the C.N.T., three of the Republican Left, one Basque Nationalist and one member of the Catalan Esquerra.

The C.N.T. explained its position. It had long demanded a National Defence Council and every antifascist force had agreed in principle, but it had been impossible to bring it into being. "The situation created by the incomprehension of certain sections and by our firm conviction decided us not to postpone our entry into the Government, although we, as the largest antifascist force, might have maintained an intransigent position. We desired equal representation of the Marxist parties and the C.N.T., but we were willing to reduce the number of our representatives to four. . . . The main reason why we made this sacrifice is the difficult situation on certain fronts, especially in the Centre, where the enemy is at the gates of Madrid." The C.N.T. maintained its view that it was necessary to reconstruct national economy no less than win the war. In this reorganisation consisted the revolution.

As ever, the C.N.T., directed here by the FAI, was the expression of the popular instinct. There was a tremendous desire for unity; but there were two ways of achieving it: by fusion or by elimination. The rearguard must be freed from individual indiscipline and, even more, from objectively hostile attitudes. If the war were to be won, it could be fought only by those whose prime interest was the winning of the war. The C.N.T.'s "organisation of the rearguard" contained advantages and dangers. Advantages, in that it made possible the creation of an efficient war-industry; dangers, when it led to untimely economic experiments, as when, for example, the worker-controlled machine-shops turned out two magnificent new trams before they started making armoured cars.

Parallel with the militarisation of the militias, a measure suggested chiefly by the Communists, whose Fifth Regiment in Madrid was already a model of what a People's Army division should be, went in Catalonia the decree for "municipalisation" of the land and the "collectivisation" of big industry and commerce. The land was to belong to the Municipalities, formed by representatives of all

the antifascist organisations. It would be worked for the profit of the whole village or town. At the same time, small property would be respected.

"Municipalisation" was a form of "collectivisation", since the Municipality was a representation of the "collectivity". But there were also "collectivised" areas in the Russian sense; and the whole problem remained confused. The peasants had lost a certain amount of their early enthusiasm, chiefly because the villages had been overrun by what could be described only as roving bandits. Juan Peiró had had the courage to describe them thus in his paper, *La Libertat* of Mataró in articles reprinted gladly by the Barcelona press. Requisitions, pure armed robbery, open mockery of the peasants' religious feelings, murder of rich men simply because they were rich men, seemed to point the way to a premature "liquidation of the *kulaks*". This was not the intention of any party. Even POUM was eager in its protestations that the small farmer should not be harmed. But the fact remained that the peasants were discontented and were abandoning, gradually, quietly, without open hostility, the antifascist front. In some places, they refused to work the fields, alleging that they were allowing them to lie fallow for maize.

The "collectivisation" of all industry employing more than a hundred workers had been the consistent aim of Juan Fábregas, the Councillor for Economy. This curious figure, quoting obscure Brahmin philosophers, Plato, Herodotus and Ricardo Mella, had certainly thought deeply about the reconstruction of Catalan economy. He was in no sense wild. He was, indeed, intensely serious, preoccupied not only in carrying out his plans but in explaining them. The Economic Council was a model of good administration, cutting all superfluous expenditure, permitting no *enchufistas*—relations, friends and friends of friends—that legacy from the Esquerra days which was the curse of the whole Catalan administration.

"Collectivisation" will be examined more fully in Appendix II, for it is the most important new form evolved

during the Spanish Civil War. The decree of October 28 legalised an existing state of affairs and extended it. Several trades had already been collectivised with extreme violence, by the process of eliminating all enterprises engaged in that trade except one, and thus combining them around the survivor. Not unnaturally, this quite unauthorised procedure caused considerable discontent among the middle-class.

There was thus a danger that both the peasants and the shopkeepers might prefer even Fascism to what appeared the unbridled excesses of the antifascist movement. More than ever was the repression of such abuses essential if the single command were to be effective. There was no use whatever in Catalonia offering the Government a support based on a rearguard rotten with dissensions. It would merely give the enemy a second and weaker front inviting the attack already planned in Rome.

The plan was being worked out. Dencás, ever restless, ever sure of himself as the providential saviour, was in Paris. In Paris, too, was Juan Casanovas, President of the Catalan Parliament, popular with the Estat Catalá. And the attack on Catalonia, said the Paris papers, was planned for November 6.

Waiting in the Balearics was the Italian Count di Rossi who was neither di Rossi nor Count, but an adventurer called Bonacorsi. With him were several thousand Italians and Falangists, whose "purification" of the town of Palma sent nearly 2,000 Majorcans, mostly middle-class Republicans, to the cemetery in six weeks. Cruising in Majorcan waters was the rebel cruiser *Canarias*.

The Rome plan was known to the crew of the *Canarias*, who were chiefly Falangists. Once again, their peculiar lack of a sense of timing destroyed a careful combination. The *Canarias* sailed up the Catalan coast and dropped a few shells on the peaceful village of Rosas.

The reaction in all Catalonia was spontaneous, even too spontaneous. One hundred and fifty thousand men poured up the coast to prevent or repel a landing. All the

province of Gerona came in arms. The *Canarias* had not landed any men.

The effect of this false alarm was crucial. Not only did it show that Catalonia was prepared to resist any attack—for rumour had increased the *Canarias* to a whole fleet—but it brought to a head all the latent antagonisms. All the arms kept for political intrigues were visible in the night, and with consternation the Generalidad and the parties discovered how many rifles had not been sent to the front and why they had not been sent.

There were two dangers which might be brought into the open by a rebel landing: a rising of the "Fifth Column" or the outbreak of bloody disputes between the various organisations. In Catalonia irresponsible groups who had been unable to see the necessity of forgetting old vendettas always profited by any general disturbance. The aggressors had more than an even chance of escaping, and the murders could always be attributed to Fascists or *agents-provocateurs*. It was indeed extremely difficult even for those most interested in knowing the truth to discover the exact significance and authorship of such incidents.

The patrols were out; and in the far streets, in the villages and in the fields rifles cracked, not only at shadows. Next morning, Companys, the one authorised figure who exercised in Catalonia a unifying and moderating influence, complained bitterly of the waste of energies and the complication of public life by commissions, committees, delegates and so forth. "We have got to end the irresponsible initiatives of these groups which seem to think the Generalidad is simply one group more. I tell you that either the Generalidad directs the life of Catalonia or it cannot accept any responsibility for what may happen. The sole Government, or Council, or directing instrument is the Council of the Generalidad of Catalonia, and if it is not, it has no reality."

The FAI had caught Ramón Salas, the famous—or infamous—secretary of the Free Syndicates which had

murdered so many working-class militants in the days of Anido and Arlegui. *Solidaridad Obrera* laconically reported that he had been shot by "those who had most suffered from his atrocious activities." Next day, the Generalidad asserted itself with even more vehemence. "I will say nothing," Companys said bitterly to the reporters. "If I said anything, I should say too much. We are holding a Council this afternoon, but it will not issue many decrees. It would be best to do no more legislation and turn our whole attention to seeing that those already passed are carried out. There are too many words here, too many committees, commissions, rifles, theatrical posturings, which are certainly not those of our old militants and the real people which fought on July 19. We have come to the time when the victory must be won by a joint effort in which everyone must have his say and his responsibility. I have been silent, I have suffered, but I am determined that this irresponsibility, this confusion shall not go on."

The Council was of the highest importance. The leaders of all the antifascist organisations attended, as well as all the Councillors. They decided to "ratify their full confidence and support of the Generalidad Council whose measures they promised to assist by every means at their disposal; and to appeal to the people of Catalonia to carry out all the decrees issued by the Generalidad, the only way of winning the war and continuing the social transformation already begun."

The first result of this Council was the creation of a new body to study the death-sentences dictated by the People's Courts. It was to be composed of the Presidents of the People's Courts and two Public Prosecutors alternately. They would study the cases, report to the Councillor for Justice who would in turn refer to the Generalidad. The decree had actually been drawn up as early as October 24, so that it was no improvisation due to the immediate circumstances; but these circumstances dictated its immediate publication. "The notion of acts juridically

anti-social," said Nin, "must be in intimate connection with the politico-social life of the people." Six death sentences were commuted that night and the others suspended until the new body had been definitely constituted. This put an end to the abuse of which the Anarchists continually complained: the non-execution of death-sentences passed long ago.

On November 1, Estat Catalá had held a big meeting, at which Juan Casanovas, recently returned from Paris, was asked to speak. His words were brief and ambiguous. His conclusion: that the sole guarantee of a free Spain was a free Catalonia.

The precise meaning of this was not explained; but many, especially the FAI, saw in it the expression of a desire to revive the Estat Catalá which Dencás and Badia had built up on a class, anti-anarchist, basis.

Estat Catalá was the only really militant section of the middle-class Esquerra, although many workers belonged to it. Estat Catalá was in a very curious position, a visible demonstration of the conflicts within the middle class. Some sections had actually joined the PSUC, others were able to march in line with the FAI, so that the Maciá-Companys columns could parade down the Ramblas with one red-and-black banner to every three of the silver star and the four bars. Another section, led by Torres Picart, the party's secretary, were hostile to both the FAI and the PSUC, because it thought that the "specifically Catalan" aspect of the movement was being submerged, submerging with it the Estat Catalá itself. Party ambition coincided with offended nationalism and class contradiction.

Durruti, back on one of his rare visits from the front in the most ramshackle car he could find, broadcast a speech on the 5th; and all Barcelona was out under the loudspeakers on the Ramblas. Already he had sent a message of greeting to Stalin with the Spanish delegation to the celebrations of the nineteenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. No one had realised better than

he the necessity for unity. Some of the more doctrinaire Anarchists considered that he, their most publicised, and most deservingly publicised, figure, was going too far in concessions to what POUM called the "Stalinist bureaucrats".

Durruti's voice was that of the front; he was authorised to speak in the name of all those in Aragon. "We ask the people of Catalonia to cease their intrigues, their internal quarrels. We shall have to mobilise everyone; and don't suppose that it will always be the same people who are mobilised. We at the front want to know what sort of men we can count upon in our rear." The militias blush, he said, when they see the subscriptions and rhetoric in the Barcelona papers because they see just the same in the papers dropped on their lines by the enemy planes. "Don't worry. There is no lack of discipline, no chaos at the front. We are all responsible men. Sleep quiet. But we left Catalonia relying on your economic reconstruction. Get a sense of responsibility, get disciplined. Don't let us provoke a new civil war between ourselves by our incompetence after we have won this war. If everyone thinks his party is the most capable of imposing its policy, he is wrong; we must oppose the enemy's tyranny with a single force, a single organisation, a single discipline. If we want to smash the fascist danger, we must form a granite block."

"Sleep quiet!": it was all very well for Durruti to say this in Barcelona, where "a civil war amongst ourselves" might be provoked by "incompetence"; but it seemed that Largo Caballero's Government in Madrid was also sleeping quiet although faced with far more imminent danger. As for the General Staff, it was either incapable or treacherous. Jesus Hernandez, Minister of Education, stated publicly later that one member actually told Caballero that all the militias were good for was to solve the unemployment problem and only fought for their 10 pesetas a day. This unworthy cynicism was soon to be contradicted in the most emphatic manner, but there

is no doubt that such defeatism was widespread among the regular officers and was at least not contradicted by the Minister of War, the secretary of the U.G.T.

In the ten weeks since the fall of Toledo nothing whatever had been done to fortify Madrid. The Communist Party and the Fifth Regiment had been insistent on the necessity of building an "iron belt" ten miles from the city so that it would at least not come under artillery fire. Caballero replied that "Madrid was being defended in the Tagus Valley", and refused to order the builders off their jobs to build fortifications. The Communist cells organised thousands of Madrileños to dig trenches, but it was an isolated effort, without co-ordinated plan and the Government looked askance at this encroachment upon its prerogatives. It was not until October 16, only three weeks before the Government quitted Madrid, that *Claridad*, Caballero's organ, said: "This is no time for generalised slogans, but for very concrete ones. It is no good anyone saying 'we ought to dig trenches,' until a co-ordinated plan has been drawn up by technicians in accordance with the rules of modern warfare."

The offensive in the third week of October had failed to check or divert the rebel offensive up the Tagus Valley and on, in a bold detour, to Seseña, north of Aranjuez, and into the very suburbs of Madrid. The great wedge, neglecting the Madrid-Valencia road where the attack had been expected, battered Madrid with its broad end, exposing its flanks and its base at Toledo to the planned counter-attack by the new International Brigade from Albacete. The tactic was more dangerous and luckier in its effects than Colonel Yagüe could have known, for the very name of Albacete had been silenced and hardly anyone knew of the great new base formed by Martínez Barrio, the Delegate to the Valencia Defence Committee, who had at last found an opportunity for exercising his undoubted talents.

The thrust, however, had been quicker and the Madrid

defence works more neglected than had been anticipated; and the projected flank counter-attack had to be transformed into a desperate and hasty defence of the Casa del Campo and the banks of the River Manzanares, that "rivulet with a river's repute", as Cervantes called it.

On November 7, the twentieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution, Madrid fought for its existence while Barcelona, ignorant of Madrid's danger, gave the biggest demonstration of antifascist solidarity yet seen. The International Columns paraded hurriedly through Madrid, greeted as saviours; but the rebel troops were in the outer suburbs and for seventy-two hours it seemed that all was lost.

It is still difficult to reconstruct the events of those three days, when, against all hope and all the probabilities of modern warfare, the rebels were held. It was a nightmare of a hastily-improvised defence, the whole population going out to make of Madrid "the grave of Fascism".

The Government, realising its impotence if shut up in a besieged city and fearing even the possibility of capture, moved to Valencia. At Tarancon, a committee using the name of the FAI stopped the Ministers, except Caballero, whom they did not recognise, and sent them back. Later, however, the Cabinet reached Valencia and the committee was liquidated.

There was no question of cowardice in this withdrawal. There were many precedents, the most obvious being the French Government's retreat to Bordeaux when the German armies threatened Paris during the Great War. It was essential to carry on the business of government and to organise the counter-offensive unhampered by local military inconveniences.

What was bad was the manner of Caballero's going. The parties and unions heard only indirectly of the proposal to evacuate, and at once went to protest against this slinking away. They realised the necessity for withdrawal

but demanded that the direction should be handed over officially and publicly to a Defence Junta and that a public proclamation of the reasons for the evacuation should be made to maintain the morale of the militias and civilian population. The Cabinet practically denied their intention and left only a brief note charging General Miaja with the defence of the capital. Alvarez del Vayo, General Commissar for War and delegate to Geneva, was an honourable exception.

Del Vayo now had an opportunity for diplomatic counter-attack on a big scale.

The rebels had not doubted that they could easily enter Madrid, and big celebrations of the victory were held in most of the large cities in their power on November 7. Germany and Italy had shared this impression—and London and Paris had not been unimpressed by the possibility—and hastened to exploit an accomplished fact by recognising officially the Burgos Junta in simultaneous notes with identical wording dictated in Berlin. But Madrid did not fall, and Germany and Italy were in an awkward and possibly humiliating position. They had now committed themselves.

Such had been the confusion in Madrid that this opportunity of exploiting an absurd situation and at least ensuring that the British Government's disapproval should harden and become transformed into active support of the Republic was lost. Protests were of course made, but nothing concrete was achieved. The Madrid Defence Junta was left to fight its own battle.

There was no question of the Defence Junta being a spontaneous Committee of Public Safety. Caballero and Alvarez del Vayo reiterated that the Junta had been formed with their entire approbation, while the Junta repeatedly assured Valencia that it considered itself merely the body delegated by the Government for the specific purpose of defending Madrid. The Supreme Court recognised the Junta, and messages of adhesion came in from all over the country. Companys broadcast

the entire solidarity of Catalonia with Madrid as well as Valencia.

The Junta, an even more remarkable body than the Generalidad Council, still preserved the representation of the Antifascist Front; it was the National Defence Council which the C.N.T. had so long demanded. Its President was General Miaja, commander of the First Division, replacing General Pozas, until then commander of the Centre front. Miaja was called specifically the "Governmental Delegate", the Secretary was a Socialist. The eight councils were directed by two members from the parties and organisations. War by the Communists; Police by the Unified Communist and Socialist Youth; Production by the C.N.T.; Supplies by the U.G.T.; Communications by the Republican Left; Finance by the Republican Union; Information by the Anarchist Libertarian Youth; Evacuation by Angel Pestaña's Syndicalist Party.

Miaja at once issued a proclamation of the Junta's policy: "There is only one order for all parties in the Junta and all our fighters: to resist without yielding an inch more ground. I am sure that all will carry this out. I also expect from the civil population effective, active and unselfish co-operation. All Madrid should feel the unanimous and firm desire to win at all costs, and I warn all those who show lukewarmness in the fulfilment of their duty or those who with bastard aims try to cause internal confusion to the enemy's profit or spread panic among the civil population by crimes and looting, that I will apply to them the harshest penalties. With the loyal co-operation of all Madrid, our victory is assured."

POUM's Executive Committee seemed hardly to have understood Miaja. "Almost all workers are represented in the Junta," it said. "When the FAI and the POUM also participate, it is quite certain that the workers' revolutionary enthusiasm will grow to such proportions that no one will be strong enough to resist it. No one is authorised to say that divergences exist among the workers.

Just because we are united we must be represented in the Junta. Whoever opposes that opposes the victory over Fascism and the victorious course of the Revolution."

✓ The FAI was not represented as such in exactly the same way as it was not represented in the Cabinet: it simply called itself the C.N.T. POUM was not represented because it represented nothing whatever in Madrid except a small body of persons whose chief activity appeared to be making unpleasant remarks about the Soviet Ambassador, hardly a helpful attitude. POUM's previous behaviour was anything but a guarantee of the necessary unanimity within the Junta, especially when the key-Councils, War and Police, were held by what POUM called "Stalinist bureaucrats" and "social-reformists". The Unified Youth actually had to dislodge the POUM Youth Movement, the Iberian Communist Youth, from its headquarters and suppress the POUM paper. POUM of course cried to the Barcelona heavens, but it was no time for even objective coincidence with the "Fifth Column", whose liquidation was the Junta's immediate task. No doubt innocent persons perished, as they did in every similar situation; but later discoveries of arms in the German Embassy, in houses under the protection of the Finnish Legation, the shooting of Durruti, the hand grenades thrown from windows into food-queues during air-raids fully excused undue severities.

The rebel armies drove on and on, right into the suburbs of Madrid. But the capital reacted against all expectation. Hitherto, the authorities and military circles in Valencia and Madrid had put up a brave show of believing that Madrid would not fall, but their lips quivered as they said it. Now, all Madrid went out to fortify the town. Every house became a fortress. The gay city, despised of Catalans, became sober, stubborn, of the Saragossa tradition. "Imperial and crowned, very noble, most loyal, most heroic and very excellent" is the style of Madrid's ancient arms.

Madrid was bombed. It was bombed as no other town had ever been bombed, for the material was more modern and heavier than anything used against a civil population during the Great War. Children, women waiting in food-queues, places of no military importance, were smashed and mangled. Three hundred and forty-three persons perished in a single house. And Madrid held on grimly.

While Madrid held, while the International Brigades intended for the flank counter-attack had to be hurled into the Casa del Campo against Franco's Moors, while German and Italian planes mercilessly bombed, the slow transformation towards unity went on amid all the appearances of diversity.

In Aragon, Joaquin Ascaso, the cousin of that Francisco Ascaso who had died on July 19, formed an autonomous Junta, militarily subordinate to the Generalidad Defence Council of Catalonia, but directed by vaguely libertarian communist principles; in fact, by a necessary form of war communism. Reyes, the commander of the Aragon Air Forces, dictated Draconian measures against rumour-spreaders and saboteurs. Aragon was free, but it assured both Catalonia and Valencia of its full support. The Federal Republic, the logical form of Spanish organisation, was being imposed by the sheer necessities of the Civil War.

Supplemented by the most modern arms, the governmental air-forces raided enemy aerodromes as far afield as Seville and Palma. Prieto began the reconstruction of the Navy, somewhat chaotically commanded by amateurs. Valencia began to look like a capital, crowded with refugees, darkened after ten at night, tense, but busy. The Moors failed to make their diversion in Aragon and were hurriedly brought back to the Madrid front. The *Canarias* raided and roved, striking Palamos, a harmless summer resort on the "Wild Coast" north of Barcelona. The rebel relieving columns from Galicia were caught and massacred by the formidable Asturian *dinamiteros*. Yagüe, making no progress against Madrid, was relieved

of his command. The Government sent their better men to direct the front. General Llano de la Encomienda to the Basques and Gomez Garcia, a police-commissioner, to relieve Colonel Villalba, whose tardiness in taking Huesca was by some attributed to the fact that his wife and children were held hostage there. Durruti's column swung from Bujalaroz in Aragon to the Casa del Campo in Madrid.

The international situation was growing tenser; so tense, indeed, that Spain was remembered only as a small potential issue. In the U.S.S.R. another plot had been discovered. A German engineer was involved. Hitler tore up the last shreds of the Treaty of Versailles by denouncing the Navigation Clauses, thereby seriously threatening the U.S.S.R.'s ally, Czechoslovakia. A new wave of internal repression, always the forerunner of some startling move in foreign policy, was begun. The Herrenklub and the General Staff began a new drive against Goebbels and the petty bourgeois wing of the National-Socialist Party. (In Rome, Mussolini spoke ambiguously to the hastily-summoned Fascist Grand Council. In Milan, recruiting offices were opened for "volunteers" for Spain, and those who had enlisted for Abyssinia but had not been sent were drafted into training camps before they were sent to Majorca or Cadiz. The German-Japanese "Anti-Communist" Pact was signed, and Japan, preparing new aggression in China, was able to employ some of Krupp's most recent patents.

A parachute floated over Madrid, a wooden box attached to it. Inside was the horribly quartered body of young José Antonio Galarza, a Government flier forced to land in the enemy's lines the previous day.

The same day, November 16, José Antonio Primo de Rivera with his brother, Miguel, and his sister-in-law, were tried in Alicante. They had been imprisoned before the outbreak, but it appeared extremely probable that José Antonio had been in communication with his Falan-

gists since then. At any rate, he was the leader of the party which was famous even among the rebels for its jackal work.

Such incidents, the whole vast atrocity of the war, persuaded the Ambassadors to suggest that Geneva should be asked to intervene to "humanise" the war. The lolling grins of the children killed at Getafe had shocked the whole of Europe. But "humanising" the war seemed to the Spanish Government a poor substitute for the possibility of importing the arms and planes it so badly needed; and Non-intervention was permitting Franco to make his biggest bluff, the threat to blockade the Spanish coast with three cruisers and a few miscellaneous smaller craft.

The weather broke suddenly in Barcelona, and the crowds standing beneath the loud-speakers on the Ramblas shivered as they heard nothing good. There seemed no one to talk to them, for Durruti was in Madrid and Companys was afraid to speak lest he say too much. Germany and Italy had recognised Burgos at last. The mangled children, the quartered airman, the heroism of Madrid should be having their effect upon English public opinion, which still could decide the issue. Franco's threat to blockade Barcelona, whispered along the Ramblas in the twilight of November 17, did not seem serious; the temperamental Mediterranean city was uneasy, vaguely apprehensive. The first air-raid practice had been announced for that evening "before midnight". Uncertainty, the reports of the wild shooting on the similar night in Madrid weeks before drove people to crowd the cafés, standing beside the tables to mutter. The French fleet, from Brest to Toulon, was mobilising. *Solidaridad Obrera* asserted that Radio Moscow had said that the U.S.S.R. was sending thirty-seven ships through the Dardanelles and "hoped that no one would put any obstacles in their way". Two thousand volunteers from France, fine material, marched up the Ramblas like a relieving army. It was muttered that the Anarchists were

not pleased with this Communist reinforcement and had placed difficulties in their way at Port-Bou.

There were more red flowers below the typescript epitaphs on the walls commemorating the dead of July 19. There was a feeling of isolation, of insecurity. All rifles should have been sent to the front, but there were still only too many in the city. Maciá's son, Juan, returned from Mexico, told reporters that "Spain aspires only to a federalist regime".

The German and Italian Consulates had gone. The German Anarchists of the DAS (*Deutsche Anarcho-Syndikalisten*) interrogated the few remaining Germans none too gently, working on the margin of the police and the Investigation Committee which had now become the Junta for Internal Safety. The British Government demanded zones of safety for its ships in Spanish harbours. In the House of Commons, Eden almost openly stated that the U.S.S.R. had been guiltier of violating the Non-intervention Pact than Germany and Italy, while there was no proof whatever against Portugal.

Still Madrid held, while Franco redoubled his attack, preparing the second great offensive for November 25. There was little news of the war. Madrid was holding, was not yet taken. That was the great thing. The International Brigade was doing wonders in the Casa del Campo. The militias, inspired perhaps by the Russian film, "The Kronstadt Sailors", performed fantastic feats, such as that of young Antonio Col, who single-handed destroyed four enemy tanks with hand-grenades.

On the afternoon of November 20, very bad news came to Barcelona. Buenaventura Durruti had been killed; shot in the back from a window, said *Solidaridad Obrera* next morning, hurriedly retracting the following day and declaring that anyone who did not believe as an article of faith that Durruti died in the field was a traitor and a Fascist.

Who killed Durruti was a mystery. Who was thought to have killed him was anything but a mystery. On the night

of the 22nd, the bodies of Martinez and Escobar, both high officials in the Catalan Defence Council, were found in a lonely field outside Barcelona. They had left a café on the Ramblas in a car, the number of which was not noticed.

The responsible leaders of the FAI made enormous efforts to restrain their followers, and probably succeeded. Worse than the death of Durruti would have been the breaking of the unity he had always demanded: "Only by union shall we win."

Remembering Tarancon, recalling the "Fifth Column", recalling, too, the lack of development of the Madrid branch of the FAI and its jealousy of Catalonia, the possibilities were numerous. The very fact that they were so numerous made for extreme danger.

Durruti's funeral on the 23rd was huge and strained. All Barcelona was out to pay their last homage to a man. The crowd filed past, without order, chattering, smoking; but, underneath, there was a feeling of real sorrow and of apprehension. No demonstration had been so perilous since the funeral of the Badia brothers in the spring; and for precisely the same reason.

The banners carried by the FAI and especially by the Libertarian Youth augured no good for anyone suspected of the shooting. *Treball*, the organ of the PSUC, demanded immediate vengeance for Escobar and Martinez. "We must show Fascism that we are not to be attacked with impunity!"

The day before Durruti's death, the FAI circularised all its Catalan sections denouncing the activities of various groups which usurped their name and committed "murders and robberies, with the sole aim of discrediting the FAI, which is one of the organisations which march at the head of the Catalan revolutionary movement". "We are decided partisans of justice," the circular stated, "but of justice in the strict sense of the word. If we must kill, we will kill, whenever the killing is justified. But to kill a man for the sole reason that he is a Catholic does not fit our

ideas in any way. It is completely repugnant to us to avenge ourselves on the defeated. We are determined to wipe out these groups, hurt whom it may."

Treball greeted these vigorous declarations with pleasure. It stressed too similar declarations by Peiró in *Solidaridad Obrera*. Terrorism, crime, personal vengeance and attacks upon small proprietors had "become the nerve-system of a vast conspiracy". Three unities were needed: unity of action, of command, of responsibility. The Collectivisation Decree was becoming an excuse for all sorts of individual actions by irresponsible committees. Both the big organisations, the Marxist and the Anarchosyndicalist, had the means at hand to enforce discipline and order: the Generalidad Council in which both were represented and the U.G.T.-C.N.T. Pact, with its minimum platform. A new pact, between the Unified Socialist and Communist Youth and the Libertarian Anarchist Youth was well on the way to completion, demanding chiefly the nationalisation of the metallurgical industry on a war basis and the regulation of other industries in accordance with war necessities. From this would result collectivisation only where it was essential—both organisations declared that this system was a means, not an end—under proper control.

There was, therefore, a wide basis upon which a really constructive reorganisation might be settled. It demanded really serious sacrifices of principle, but sacrifices which would prove that an unparalleled effort was being made to understand the true nature of this strange situation in Catalonia. That effort was being made just by those parties which were strong enough to have imposed their own line in full, at the cost of dangerously weakening the front, it is true, but with every chance of temporary success. It appeared, therefore, simply intolerable that small groups who had no means of imposing their criterion should remain intransigent, acting as *agents-provocateurs* for the "Fifth Column".

This was the reason, far more than old rancours, for the savage dispute carried on between the PSUC and the

POUM. POUM did its best to shelter behind the C.N.T., but *Solidaridad Obrera* rather avuncularly told them that this was no time for wrangling.

Here was the nerve-centre of this whole phase of the Spanish Civil War, the phase in which it was becoming what *Solidaridad Obrera* called a War of National Independence, a second Peninsular War. Catalonia became not only the centre of the Spanish antifascist movement but the real political centre of the non-intervention struggle. The question was therefore posed in two ways: the relations between Barcelona and Valencia and the relations between Catalonia and the U.S.S.R. Germany, more accustomed to diplomatic puzzles than Italy, stated the matter thus: Catalonia is separatist; Catalonia, therefore, can be accorded a treatment different from that given to the rest of Spain; because of this separatism, the U.S.S.R., the only antifascist Power likely to object effectively to German designs in Spain, is creating a separate Soviet State in Catalonia.

The data to support this accusation would be provided by proofs that the U.S.S.R. was tightening its hold on Catalonia either by direct intervention or by the intrigues of the PSUC, member of the Third International.

La Batalla, the organ of POUM, provided these data, said *Treball*, by "making common cause with the international fascist press in representing Catalonia as dominated by the U.S.S.R.; by making common cause with the anti-Communist Pact between Germany and Japan; by making common cause with the Fascist International against the U.S.S.R."

There was reasonable cause for this accusation. *La Batalla* published daily attacks on the U.S.S.R., which, even if they had been based on truth, would have been distinctly untimely. It was no moment to speak of the "Communist ex-International". It was no moment to talk of "the strange change in the revolutionary policy of Catalonia since the U.S.S.R. denounced the Non-intervention Pact".

This policy was carried so far that, finally, on November 27, the Russian Consul, Antonov Ovseenko, one of the most popular figures in Barcelona, had to send an open letter to the press: "One of the manoeuvres of the press sold to international Fascism consists in slandering the Soviet Union's accredited representatives with the Spanish Government, alleging that it is in fact they who are directing the domestic and foreign policy of the Spanish Republic. The reason is clear. In the first place, they desire to undermine the Spanish Government's prestige abroad; in the second, to weaken the fraternal solidarity between the Spanish people and the U.S.S.R.; thirdly, to strengthen the disorganising tendencies which might divide the United Republican Front. There is a sheet among the Barcelona press which has undertaken the task of aiding this campaign. *La Batalla* has tried to supply material for these fascist insinuations. The U.S.S.R. Consulate-General in Barcelona rebuts the lamentable insinuations of this sheet with contempt."

POUM complained bitterly of the "savage campaign against the only party which has understood the revolutionary significance of our civil war".

As early as November 19, the Radio News Agency had reported that "the Catalan Generalidad had agreed with the FAI to proclaim the Independent Catalan Republic". This remarkable statement was based on the fact that five Catalan Anarchists had repeatedly demanded the handing-over of the Spanish Consulate in Perpignan "in the name of the Catalan Generalidad", and that Barcelona was insisting on the dismissal of the Spanish Consuls at Sète, Toulouse and Port-Vendres and their replacement by Catalans. Then Catalonia would declare its independence and would be better placed to obtain French recognition since the Consuls would already be there.

There was a grain of truth in this. The Catalans were best qualified to know the lukewarm, if not positively disloyal, behaviour of certain Consulates, and *Solidaridad Obrera*

repeatedly denounced them. But there was no particular question of insisting upon Catalans to replace them, although Lluhi, ex-Minister of Labour, did go to Toulouse. In point of fact, the anarchist paper always demanded action by Alvarez del Vayo, the Madrid Foreign Minister. Catalonia might have taken action on its own responsibility, for the matter was urgent. The same apparently separatist steps had been taken by Tarradellas in creating a Catalan Foreign Trade Committee and ordering that all Catalan exports should be stamped "Made in Catalonia", simply because Madrid was extremely slow in granting credit from the reserves of gold and valuta owned by the Bank of Spain and later shipped in frail fishing craft to places of safety all over Europe.

Havas replied to the Radio note by stressing the fact that Azaña continued to live in Barcelona "because his presence constitutes in foreign eyes a formal contradiction of the false news that Catalonia is disposed to proclaim its independence". It is true that this was not precisely the reason for Azaña's closely guarded residence in the Catalan Parliament House and on lonely Montserrat; or, at least, not the whole reason. But it was a visible symbol of Catalonia's attachment to Madrid and Valencia.

The Unified Catalan Socialist Party, speaking Catalan, repeatedly declared Catalonia's obligation to Madrid. "From Catalonia has to come the army of victory, Catalonia must supply the towns which need food, everything rests on Catalonia. If Madrid fulfils its obligation by resisting, Catalonia will fulfil its duty by spending all its efforts to relieve Madrid." A proof that the PSUC was not trying to dominate Catalonia was the immediate sending of all the International Brigades to Madrid or Albacete. Certain persons looked sourly on these volunteers, who were mostly Socialists or Communists, simply because the other Spanish parties had almost no branches abroad. There were French and Italian Anarchists; and a very few Trotskyists, most of whom acquired administrative jobs in Barcelona. Since it was the International Column

which showed itself the really efficient fighting force on the Madrid front, the Catalan Communists were deliberately sending away the very elements which would have assured their victory in Catalonia had they been so wedded to the idea of a separate Soviet State that they had lost interest in the fate of Madrid.

The inner class conflicts were becoming acute. This was inevitable; but they were at least based upon a dialectical class process. The rebels were no less divided; but their divisions were less fundamental and therefore had less chance of finding a common basis. Lenin had stated that "unity must be conquered. Nothing more easy than to write the word 'unity' in huge letters, promise it and declare in favour of it. But in reality unity cannot be obtained save by the labour and organisation of the advanced workers, of all class-conscious workers. Unity cannot be 'created' by an 'agreement' of little groups of intellectuals. That is one of the stupidest, simplest, most ignorant of all errors."

An English journalist returned from Burgos—in Burgos a foreign correspondent could not write—said that Spain had never seen a union of more diverse elements: Basques and Navarrese, Carlists and Constitutional Monarchists, Falangists and Liberal Republicans, clericals and free-thinkers, all united by the cry of "Long live Spain! Up Spain!" "Amid this diversity of opinions, rivalries and quarrels increase daily."

The Antifascists had the great advantage, though an extremely perilous advantage, that their differences were based on perfectly definite and definable historical positions. Those between Carlists and Alfonsists were no more than a matter of preference, anachronistic and irrelevant. The elimination of a seditious section of the Carlists, for instance, would not have clarified the whole political structure in the same way as the failure of Dencás' final attempt at a *coup d'état*, an attempt which ended in the flight of Juan Casanovas, President of the Catalan Parliament, and the arrest of Juan Torres Picart, Secretary of

Estat Catalá, began to clarify the Catalan issue by openly demonstrating the pro-fascist nature of Dencás' separation. A certain amount of elimination was positively healthy, if Catalonia were not to be betrayed as Madrid was so nearly betrayed in the early autumn.

Little news of the Estat Catalá affair reached the outside world. It was a dilemma. To publish the plot would allow the rebels to exaggerate the lack of unity in Catalonia; not to publish would allow them to continue their insinuations about Catalonia's soviet separatism. The second was the lesser evil.

It was particularly necessary, however, not to allow an appearance of either separatism or sovietism, since, with the checking of the land offensive against Madrid, an offensive on the coast was to be feared.

It was not long in coming. Cartagena and Alicante were unmercifully bombarded and bombed. Barcelona remained unattacked, but Franco had sent the British Government a note on November 17, threatening to destroy the port of Barcelona; the excuse being that war material had been landed there by boats flying various flags, the majority Russian or Spanish. Franco strongly advised the evacuation of all foreign ships and subjects.

"Since this country has not recognised the Franco Government," asked Major Attlee in the House of Commons, "is not any action committed by him on the high seas an act of piracy?" Eden gave it to be understood that the British Government might be annoyed by any action taken outside the three-mile limit, and meanwhile demanded a safety-zone for British ships in the harbour. Britain would certainly not permit any British ships to be interfered with outside "Catalan territorial waters".

Not that Franco had the slightest chance of blockading Barcelona with his two cruisers, the *Canarias* and the *Almirante Cervera*. The bombardment of Cartagena, where Prieto was holding most of the loyal Navy for rapid reorganisation, succeeded in damaging three ships; but

even this could not redress the balance. Geneviève Tarbouis, *L'Oeuvre's* diplomatic correspondent, who appeared to know almost all the rebel calculations which never passed out of the realm of wish-thinking, decided that the Portuguese navy would be the most suitable to use, since Portugal had not recognised the "Valencia Government" and was taking no part in the work of the Non-Intervention Committee. She forgot, however, that the Portuguese Navy was not what might be called a fighting force and that it was the chief revolutionary nucleus in that country.

Much more serious was the statement by the Paris Communist daily, *L'Humanité*, that it knew for certain that thirty chaser-planes and twenty bombers were to leave Italy on November 28 for the Balearics, and that these planes would bomb Barcelona early on the morning of November 30. The planes went to Majorca, but they did not bomb Barcelona.

Barcelona's impunity was always puzzling. It was certainly not due to humanitarian scruples nor to any reasonable fear of the anti-aircraft defences, which were little better than those of Madrid. Two explanations were canvassed: that Germany, at any rate, really believed in the "Separate Soviet" legend and would use Catalonia as a bargaining counter with the U.S.S.R. against excessive Italian ambitions in the Balearics; or that the action against Barcelona was dependent upon success at Madrid. After the fall of Madrid, it was calculated, the rebels' first objective would be to liquidate the Bilbao, Santander and Asturias fronts; then, to make a strong offensive against Valencia and simultaneously blow up the Port-Bou tunnel, cutting Catalan communications by rail with France, while the Italian planes from Majorca prevented supplies arriving by road; finally, a general offensive along the Franco-Spanish frontier from Jaca and Canfranc towards the international station at Port-Bou.

Another pair of calculations may have been: first, that the natural dissensions between the parties, easily exploitable

by agents of the fascist Powers, as in the Picart affair, would greatly weaken the resistance, even persuading the numerically-large middle-class to accept Franco's Moors and Legionaries as a lesser evil; second, the proved fact that any aggression would inevitably lead to violent measures against the so-useful "Fifth Column".

On November 22, a very odd incident at Cartagena came to reinforce the impression that Germany was ready to give naval aid to the rebels besides smuggling men and war material. As Prieto pointed out, it was not the first time. He recalled the *Deutschland* incident at Ceuta on August 4, the German ships which kept their lights on at Malaga when the republican fleet was stationed there, espionage on the Atlantic coast in September, espionage of the *Mendez Nuñez* in Cartagena by a German destroyer, sinking of various food-ships off the east coast, all of which could not possibly have been done by the *Canarias*. On November 22, the *Cervantes* and the *Mendez Nuñez* were attacked at the mouth of Cartagena Harbour by submarines.

The rebels possessed no submarines, and fragments of the torpedo which damaged the *Cervantes* were found to be of a type used by the Italian navy. A German destroyer circled round the struck ships, examined them and vanished out to sea.

The rebels declared that the submarines were theirs, made in Vigo. But the Vigo yards were not capable of making submarines.

In Paris and London, Prieto's Note caused an immense sensation—for twenty-four hours.

The Spanish Government once again appeared to have on its side at least a modicum of human dignity, courage and decision. Luis Araquistain, Ambassador in Paris, published a note on the 17th explaining the Government's removal to Valencia. The Government had considered the possibility for some time and had decided upon it to "free itself from the psychological pressure exercised upon the Spanish capital by the proximity of the zone of

operations" and also to gain more complete control over all the fronts. "The Spanish Government will continue the war till victory because it has on its side right and the will of the immense majority of the country, because this right will end by opening its way into the universal liberal and democratic conscience; because the legitimate Government can count upon the great reserves of the national treasury, of which the rebels will not obtain a cent whatever happens; rather than hand over a grain of this gold to the rebels' creditors and backers, the Spanish Government will throw it into the sea. The Government has at its disposal the great industrial cities of the Basque country, Santander, Asturias, Valencia and Catalonia and the richest mines of coal, iron and mercury as well as the great agricultural wealth of the centre and east. With such resources and a people devoted to its Government there can be no doubt that the Government will fight on and win."

"We shall fight on," Largo Caballero said to the foreign press. "If there is foreign intervention, we shall fight on. If there is an international conflict, we shall fight on. We shall fight on so long as we have an inch of our soil under our feet. The war is only beginning. Now we have the necessary material."

An important note issued by the Government on November 23 carefully and with dignity defined the exact situation, in which Italy and Germany were using Franco as a "marionette", and stressed the fact of "the employment of colonial troops subject to the Sultan of Morocco amid the silence of those who share in Morocco the mission of a protectorate". This important point was closely linked to Caballero's enigmatic silence when one of the foreign correspondents asked him whether Spain would raise the question of the Algeciras Convention and the problem of joint French responsibility. It was the lamentable fact that Franco had promised a Moroccan Statute, probably as a method of more effectually placing Morocco under German control.

On August 26, General Sanchez Gonzalez had issued a Burgos decree ordering the Riff Mines Company to communicate with German mineral buyers. Mannesmann, whose activities had contributed to the Agadir incident in 1911, had returned to Morocco and secured a mining concession, and there were other German interests involved along with those of the Count de Romanones, and the English and French firms.

Franco at once set up a company in Seville called Hisma S.A. Carranza y Bernhardt to revise all current contracts and centralise them in a new Berlin firm called Rowak. Carranza y Bernhardt had long served as agents for mining firms in Spain.

A special clause had provided that the transport of minerals should be carried out at the risk of German consignees, who would put German ships at Hisma-Rowak's disposal under the protection of German warships. German payments would be made by offsetting the sums against Franco's armament debt to Germany, a typical piece of Ventosa Calvell finance. By December 22, the exchange of arms for ore was in full swing, and the 80,000 tons due to Germany by contract were pouring into the famous "Franco wharf" at Hamburg. This was providential for the German rearmament programme, for Britain had begun competing for the Swedish market and the French Socialists were talking of an embargo on Lorraine ores to Germany.

Algeciras and the Riff, therefore, were awkward problems. Equally so were the mercury mines of Almadén, north of Córdoba, still in Government hands. Italy and Spain together virtually control the world mercury market, so that the Italians were particularly anxious to get possession of Almadén, or, if Franco could not yet capture them militarily, at least reserve them until he could. Mercury is particularly important as a detonator.

In October, the Spanish Government broke up the mercury cartel with Italy and, according to the United

States Bureau of Commerce, gave the exclusive sales agency to a British firm, Alexander Pickering & Co. Italy complained that this was done "for political purposes".

Curiously enough, none of the British and French interests in the Riff mines filed protests, although they were not receiving a penny, all the proceeds going to offset Franco's debt (an estimated 320 million pesetas) to Germany. Possibly they considered protest was useless at the time; sentimentally—but not commercially—they favoured Franco. Rio Tinto, for example, was silent, though its hostility to the Azaña and Casares Quiroga Governments had been outspoken enough before the war. In February 1936, shares stood at a high of £22; in August they were £13; after the rebels took Rio Tinto in late August, they rose steeply to nearly £30. Yet it was complained that Franco was paying in pesetas at 42, when the current rate was about 85. The silence was politically disconcerting.

Since, unlike the Republic of 1873, the Republic of 1936 flatly refused to be economically colonised, the Caballero Cabinet was internationally in a weak but respectable position. It was rapidly becoming one of those troublesome minorities like Dantzic or the Polish Ukraine which, as Alvarez del Vayo was to put it, "regretfully disturbed the League of Nation's siesta". On November 28, the League Secretariat received a demand from the Spanish Government for the summoning of an extraordinary session.

British Governmental circles, already obsessed by the fear of the immediate outbreak of the Simpson affair which could be suppressed no longer, were very much disturbed. They felt that no good could come of this undoubtedly legitimate demand, that the League could only be discredited once more, while the eleven million men and women who had signed the Peace Plebiscite might well be roused again. Since Baldwin had unsealed his lips—the *Daily Express* had maliciously remarked that

one could almost see coils of sticking-plaster dropping to his desk—and frankly stated that the National Government's electoral promises of peace activity were simply electoral promises, and while the Baldwin Cabinet might at any moment be involved in a constitutional crisis which, whatever the ecclesiastical solemnity imposed upon it, would merely be a question of handing over the remains of British democracy either to a Royal camarilla or to a Cabinet oligarchy, the Spanish demand could only complicate Eden's and Plymouth's task of neutralising Maisky without actively opposing him. Should the Algeciras issue be raised, it could hardly fail to bring up the vexed question of the Statute of Tangiers, where Italian sailors, not so drunk as they appeared to be, were continually creating awkward incidents.

In France, too, the intransigent attitude of the employers refusing to carry out the Matignon Agreements was likely to cause serious difficulties to a Government which behaved almost exactly as if it had been an Azaña regime taking over after a bloodless revolution. The rank-and-file, not solidly behind the Communist Party but increasingly tending to approve its attitude, were more formidable than the employers themselves; and, as in 1848 on the Polish question, the internal issue might well be translated into terms of the two Communist slogans: "*Blum à l'action!*" and "*Des armes et des avions pour l'Espagne!*"

Thus Del Vayo's almost Cervantic irony fluttered the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay into strange projects of "safety-zones" and armistices. It was nobody's secret that these projects were not dictated by righteous humanitarian indignation but simply by domestic fears, however pathetically the British Parliamentary Commission might describe the horrors of the Madrid bombings. Humanitarianism had never yet been anything but a category of *Realpolitik* in precisely the same way as war, according to Klausewitz.

When the International Red Cross suggested the creation of a safety-zone in Madrid on the 23rd, Alvarez del Vayo

wired the President of the Madrid Defence Junta, General Miaja: "Government of Republic, which unlike Burgos rebels does not represent caste interests and feels responsible for lives of all Madrid citizens refuses idea of creation neutral zone signifying protection certain number of persons against air bombing carried out by foreign Fascists over open city. Creation of neutral zone would mean Government of the Republic would lend itself to legalisation of bombing of rest of Madrid outside said zone and expose popular and working class districts to rebels satiating their obvious impotence to take capital of Spain by breaches of international law which are scandalising all civilised humanity."

French military and political circles had already feared that Franco would try the utmost rigours of Nazi militarism, the complete smashing of a civilian population in order to destroy morale. Such, indeed, had been the orders circulated to the officers even at the beginning of the rebellion. He did not deign to answer an appeal signed by French intellectuals of all parties.

The Government's Note stressed two immediate needs: general mobilisation on all fronts and general rationing.

After the first big attack on Madrid on November 7 and the second on November 25, the situation had become more or less stationary in the centre. The International Column, hastily drawn into Madrid, was the backbone of the defence. Its commander, General Kleber, was an experienced revolutionary soldier, one of the leaders of the struggle against Koltchak in Russia, an organiser of the Chinese Red Army. Its Political Commissioner was Mario Nicoletti, member of the Executive Committee of the Italian Communist Party. Hans Beimler, the Communist deputy in the Reichstag, was leader of one section until his death. The members of the Column, however, were of all parties. Naturally, Socialists and Communists predominated since these parties were the leading antifascist organisations throughout Europe; but many men in leading posts were non-political. As Dimitrov

said, it was the true international antifascist fighting front.

The desperate and heroic defence of Madrid remains fresh in the memory of the whole world. The fierce bombardments, the epic of the Casa del Campo and the University City, the hunger, the women and children huddled shivering on mattresses in the Underground tunnels in the dangerous nights, the continual roar of the artillery smashing a quarter of the city, the bombing of the Prado Museum and the National Library; the caravans of refugees, two hundred thousand of them jamming Valencia and Barcelona, that "register of courtesy, asylum of strangers and hospital of the poor", as Cervantes called it; the crowds of cheerful *Madrileños* insisting upon watching the battle from the most exposed elevations, Miaja's "The people of Madrid will be worthy of its forbears of the Second of May who fought and beat Napoleon's armies"; the treachery of the "Fifth Column" and its liquidation in a night; the rebel Spanish airmen refusing to bomb their own mothers and sisters; the Italian bomb filled with sand and a note, "The Italian workers will not kill their Spanish brothers"; the whole able-bodied population digging trenches, making of each house and garden a fortress; the refusal to yield an inch, sometimes even holding up tactical operations; the bravery and the misery, the treachery and the sacrifices: a story to be registered not so much with the sieges of Numancia, Gerona or Saragossa as with the Commune of Paris, the defence of Petrograd, or, if with Saragossa, not with the siege but with the general strike that held through thirty-eight days.

Madrid's resistance gave a breathing-space for the reorganisation of the other fronts and the reversal of international policy. Germany and Italy had recognised Burgos too soon.

At a secret conference on November 19 at Berchtesgaden, Schacht's representative told Hitler that German finances could not possibly allow more adventures and the Generals

stated that they were not prepared for the war which intervention in Spain might well bring. The German working class would not support a foreign war as it had in 1914. Hitler's plea that the intervention policy could count on the support of the German Labour Front was treated with a certain brusqueness; and, although it was impossible to check the Leader's "somnambulistic" anti-Bolshevik crusade, the sending of German troops—"tourists", as Mr. Eden called them—seemed likely to excite the opposition not only of the German workers but also of the Herrenklub, the Civil Service, still wedded to the Meissner tradition, and of the General Staff itself. As Queipo de Llano remarked, rather sadly, "You can't take Madrid like a cup of chocolate".

While Catalonia still worked out its revolutionary salvation, while the U.G.T. and the C.N.T. fused in Malaga and issued joint proclamations in Valencia, while Vasquez, Secretary of the National Federation of the C.N.T. announced that Spain would not repudiate debts if given credits for raw materials and admitted that he did not know whether the C.N.T.'s present solutions "resembled Marxism or Anarchism", the Basques and Asturians advanced towards Leon, Burgos, Vitoria and Tolosa. General mobilisation, the single command, proletarian unity, the creation of militarised militia seemed in sight. Germany landed 6,500 regular soldiers at Cadiz and the recruiting offices in Milan and Turin were working overtime persuading the increasing Italian unemployed to join the Spanish Foreign Legion. And still Madrid held, broken, starving, insomniac; but it held.

Aragon built up a Defence Council, dominated by the C.N.T. but with participation of all other parties: the Basques were free: in Catalonia pseudo-separatism had received a death-blow: the Federal Spanish Republic was in the making.

The First Labour Day in Barcelona had determined the system of collectivisation as a transitional stage, and Luis

Companys had received a vote of confidence by acclamation.

To the League of Nations meeting called at the request of Spain the Powers sent their least important representatives. Their peoples shouted for "arms and planes for Spain!" but few went.

Snow drifted across the fronts under the bright sunshine which had succeeded the gloomy days dulling Durruti's funeral.

In Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Burgos, Salamanca, Pamplona the women stood in queues before the meagre markets. In the cold bright days the guns thundered the grim accompaniment of the Spanish Tragedy.

In Madrid, the Communists had gained control by the merit of the Fifth Regiment and the International Columns. In Catalonia, the Generalidad was an increasingly transitory organisation, and there were men in it and out of it sufficiently intelligent to recognise their errors and begin a constructive effort all over again. That was no small thing.

In Geneva, Alvarez del Vayo carried all liberal men with him but achieved only a euphemism on the mediation suggested by England and France and seconded by Roosevelt and the Pan-American Peace Congress in Buenos Aires.

In Valencia, Prieto slowly but efficiently reorganised the republican fleet to regain the command of the seas, as he had reorganised the Air Force and cleared the air over Madrid.

More and more Germans, Italians and Moors came to fight at Madrid. There could be no further doubt. The Civil War in Spain was not a "War of National Independence" or even a strictly civil war: it was the first battlefield of the world war which Marx had foreseen in 1870: that war which would override geographical frontiers and group the exploiters and the exploited against each other in the last struggle of an historical epoch. The new society, already on the way to achievement in the U.S.S.R. and

struggling frantically for birth in riven Spain, was coming into being, and, even though the savage Moor might squat on the ruins of Madrid and Barcelona, the world would not again be quiet until the next stage in its tragic but determined history had been achieved by indiscriminate bloodshed and the extremes of suffering which man is able to inflict and to bear.

VI

THE CIVIL WAR IN 1937

FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN Spain began on a large scale with the sending of the first Italian Expeditionary Force to Cadiz, where 15,000 landed in the first week of February. On January 11, Hitler had stated that there were no Germans in Spain, but the London *Times* became seriously alarmed by the fortification of Melilla, and a gentleman in close touch with the British colony in Barcelona privately boasted that he had been responsible for shipping Krupp "lorries" to Oviedo. On the other side, the Cortes at its meeting on December 2 addressed special thanks to Mexico and the U.S.S.R. for their aid and the U.S. Government licensed the export to Governmental Spain of £555,400 worth of planes and spare parts.

The full story of this shipment, on the *Mar Cantabrico*, cannot yet be told, but its complexities were both fantastic and typical. The *Mar Cantabrico*, making for Bilbao with what the American arms merchants supposed was a cargo of scrapped machines sold to poor ignorant Spaniards at an enormous price, was torpedoed after the last-minute passing of the Neutrality Act had given her departure unwanted publicity. Nevertheless, the cargo eventually helped the Basques to hold out for three months against the fiercest offensive of the war.

The Non-Intervention Committee continued its sessions, and agreement was finally achieved on the necessity of preventing "volunteers" reaching Spain. On January 15, France banned recruiting for Spain and Mr. Eden told the House of Commons, with doubtful legality, that

the Foreign Enlistment Act would apply to British subjects volunteering for either side in Spain.

Four days later, Goering, visiting Italy, stated: "Italy and Germany will oppose the Bolshevisation of Spain at all costs."

On February 17, after some sabotage by Portugal, the twenty-seven nations adhering to the Non-Intervention Pact agreed to ban the recruiting of volunteers for Spain. A system of control by neutral observers was set up. On the 20th, the Franco-Spanish frontier was closed to all except those who had legitimate business in Spain; the Portuguese following on the 23rd. On March 13, the control system came into operation.

The French, awaiting a lead from England, disliked the system, but carried it out on the whole efficiently and honourably. The effectiveness of the Portuguese co-operation was more dubious and the Commissioner's capacity open to question.

The naval patrol of the Spanish coast was to raise some crucial points. The British and French Navies patrolled the parts of the coast held by the insurgents, while the Germans and Italians covered the Governmental coast-line. The junction between the German and Italian spheres was almost precisely at the point where a rebel landing might be most expected, between Peñíscola and Oropesa, just south of the Catalan frontier at Vinaroz.

The ban on volunteers, even if it had been enforced, came too late to save Málaga from Franco's allies. The offensive opened from all sides on February 4, and on the 8th, after heavy bombardment from sea and air, the town fell. According to an English observer, the victorious army was composed of 15,000 Italians, 10,000 Germans, 5,000 Moors and 5,000 Foreign Legionaries, including about 1,000 Irishmen sent by General O'Duffy. These, however, were engaged in a small private civil war, the men from Kerry perpetually wrangling with the rest. Nearly 10,000 Government supporters were arrested, and the firing-squads began their work.

The fall of Málaga has been graphically described by Arthur Koestler, a foreign journalist captured and imprisoned for three months by the rebels. It was a disgraceful story, for which much of the blame was attributed to the Valencia General Staff. Not an attempt had been made to fortify the defiles which surround the town; not an attempt to organise even a last-minute defence of the town itself. There were no anti-tank guns, almost no machine-guns and the officers had quitted their posts the previous day. General Villalba, the failure of the Huesca front, had been unaccountably transferred to Málaga. He left for Valencia, saying that he was sure that everything would be all right. When the rebels swept on along the road to Motril, machine-gunning the fleeing civil population from the air and relieving Granada, General Cabrera remarked that this defeat was really an advantage since it shortened the front to be defended.

Simultaneously, another rebel attack was launched to cut the road between Madrid and Valencia. Vaciamadrid fell on February 9. The outlook was black for the loyalists.

The fall of Málaga had shown up the intolerable inefficiency of the Republican armies. All over republican Spain there were protests. In Valencia a huge demonstration on February 14 cheered the Government and reaffirmed the people's determination to win or die. The demonstrators demanded the immediate creation of the single command and the unified army. The party militias, the inept and often disobeyed officers sent by the General Staff and the lack of cohesion between the fronts had lost Málaga. The unified command, Franco's chief strength, was absolutely essential, and the demand, hitherto the slogan of the Communist Party and the Fifth Regiment in Madrid, now became general. Caballero, Premier and Minister of War, replied by taking the demonstration as an act of homage to himself and reiterating that he was the single commander. He interpreted the demand for the unification of the army as a mandate to expel the

Political Commissioners with the troops, the only reliable *cadre* then existing. Although Villalba was arrested and a full enquiry into the responsibilities for Málaga was promised, little was done to investigate the capacities and loyalty of the Generals with whom Caballero had surrounded himself. Caballero, well over sixty, practically dictator of a nation at war, tended to sacrifice everything to a vanity which had been flattered when some irresponsible journalist had dubbed him the "Spanish Lenin" some years before. His collaborator, the Minister of the Interior, Galarza, was no great help in sifting loyalties. He was perpetually engaged in discovering vast conspiracies by the Fifth Column, but, as someone remarked, "no one ever saw its tail".

Possibly with an eye to making future allies, neither Caballero nor Galarza were willing to take adequate measures against the subversive elements in the parties whose campaigns against the Government were as inopportune as they were misguided. It was not time to attack the democratic Government as such, but simply its inefficiency. Because incapable officers had betrayed Málaga, it could not mean that a regular army as such was undesirable. The correct demand, as it was proved, was for the improvement of the Army, not its abolition.

In Barcelona, the fall of Málaga had a tremendous effect. The cry for general mobilisation and the creation of the regular army was universal and spontaneous. Waiters, shoe-blacks, tradesmen, factory-workers left their jobs early and drilled up and down the Ramblas far into the night and from dawn to opening-time. Improvised instructors were elected by these groups of volunteers, and the drilling was enthusiastic, though hardly efficient.

This was a valuable movement, but it had to be properly directed. The Defence Councillor, Isgleas of the C.N.T. took no steps, so the PSUC organised a Committee for the Regular Army, placed under the presidency of Com-

panys himself, rather to his embarrassment. There were huge demonstrations, culminating in the unveiling of a hastily-constructed and hideous plaster statue of a vast militiaman in the Plaza Cataluña. Regular Army Weeks were organised, and there were monster manoeuvres several Sundays in succession. The "pre-military" instruction made great progress, and the Unified Socialist Youth promised to have 10,000 trained men ready in six weeks.

Each party now organised its own military training schools, but since all this was on the margin of the Defence Council, Isgleas threatened resignation. The PSUC was quite willing to have it accepted, for the Defence Council had proved unable or unwilling to canalise a most important movement. The crisis was averted by a compromise, but remained latent.

On February 28, General Miaja was at last given sole command of the whole Centre front, but neither the Catalan nor the Northern General Staffs were reorganised and unified. The Military Training Schools, hitherto functioning efficiently only at Albacete, were reorganised and began to turn out efficient Spanish officers, for the first time in centuries.

The rebel offensive against the Madrid-Valencia road had been halted on the day of the Valencia demonstration. By March 8, the road was again free. A governmental offensive between Toledo and Talavera, planned as a diversion, failed to achieve its objectives but gave the troops in the Jarama a breathing-space. Another fierce but unco-ordinated offensive against Oviedo between March 4 and March 10 pushed the miners' lines further into the city, but failed to cut the road westwards into Galicia, along which came the relieving forces.

On March 8 there began, down the Madrid-Saragossa road, near Guadalajara, the biggest offensive of the war. Four Italian divisions, of about 8,000 men each, under their own commanders. The attack was highly mechanised, and for four days the Italian tanks carried all

before them, the centre advancing twenty miles to a point between Trijueque and Torija.

Miaja brought up every available man, including the famous Garibaldi division of the International Brigade. These were to have the opportunity of fighting face to face the forces which had exiled them. On March 12, there was a violent storm of sleet. The loyalists launched the counter-attack, perfectly timed, just when the two Italian front-line divisions were being relieved by the two in reserve. The loyalist air force bombed effectively, and the Italian retreat became the biggest military rout of the war. The Italians lost four thousand men and a huge quantity of arms and stores.

The international effect of this victory was sensational. Mussolini, on a trip to inspect the Army in Libya, hastened back to Rome. The evidence of documents found on the dead, the evidence of prisoners confirmed Italian intervention beyond the shadow of doubt. A message from Mussolini himself, wired from his yacht on the way to Libya and wishing success to his brave Legionaries, was discovered and published. He had stated that he was watching the progress of the battle with intense interest.

Even more important than the definite proof that Italian regulars had been sent to Spain under their own officers, after Italy had adhered to the agreement banning volunteers, was the proof that the Spanish Loyalist Army was a really serious force. The battle of Brihuega had been fought against regular troops equipped with the most modern weapons. The fact that the Italian infantry had not proved such good material as had been supposed did nothing to diminish the effect of their defeat by troops which had been regarded as mere undisciplined guerrilla fighters. It was the first "modern" battle of the war, and the People's Army had shown a decisive superiority. The Cabinets and General Staffs all over the world began to revise their opinions about the Spanish Civil War and, even more importantly, about the strength of

the Italian menace. At Brihuega the Spanish People's Army had made the first move to call Mussolini's militarist bluff.

The effect was reinforced during the next few days by the very important action in Andalusia. The Guadalajara fighting had been purely military: that at Pozoblanco had also an economic objective.

On March 15, a mixed force of Moors and Italians, with some Spaniards and Germans, captured Alcaracejos and began to surround Pozoblanco. The objective was the mercury mines at Almadén, further to the north. With these mines in Italian hands, Italy could virtually corner the world market for this invaluable product. On March 25, the loyalists began a fierce counter-attack, Pozoblanco was relieved on the 27th, and, by the recapture of Villanueva del Duque and Alcaracejos, the rebels' coal, iron and lead mines at Peñarroya were seriously threatened.

The war for raw materials had begun in earnest. The capture of Málaga was intended as the preliminary to a drive up towards the rich iron, lead, copper and sulphur deposits near Cartagena. The Italians had entered the war later than the Germans, probably because Italian rearmament was farther advanced. The Germans had obtained tin and iron concessions in Galicia in December and had asked for vanadium and tungsten in Estremadura. When large Italian detachments landed at Cadiz, they went, not to the front, but to the vanadium and tungsten deposits to prevent German occupation. The defeats at Brihuega and Pozoblanco increased the Italian-German rivalry and perhaps tempted the British and French Foreign Offices to believe that the Rome-Berlin axis might thus be broken in Spain. This was particularly important in view of the situation brewing in the Far East, where Germany's "anti-Bolshevist" ally, Japan, was moving rapidly towards offensive action in China.

The war shifted northwards, and General Mola began his offensive against the Basque country on April 1. On the 9th, Franco declared the blockade of Bilbao,

sending his best warship, the *España*. The British Government, insufficiently informed of the situation at Bilbao, hesitated whether to recognise the blockade *de facto*. Doubts of everyone else were set at rest when "Potato" Jones and other skippers sailed into Bilbao with badly-needed food-supplies, unmolested.

The Basques were badly prepared for serious war. They had been resting on their laurels after Villareal. The Northern Command was divided into three, the Basque, Santander and Asturian; and General Llano de la Encomienda, transferred from Barcelona to Santander, could make little headway over local apathy. But Basque troops had been sent into Asturias for the March attack on Oviedo, and now Asturians, the finest fighters in Spain, came to help the Basques. But there was an appalling lack of material, and Valencia was quite unable to send any. Planes and anti-aircraft especially were inadequate.

No proper centralised command had been achieved, and Valencia was backward in intervening to create it. Santander, Castile's only port, was still apathetic. There were no political papers. Rationing was inefficient. A perpetual wrangle between the Delegation and the C.N.T. was not given much importance.

Although the blockade did not really exist, it was fairly hard to enter Bilbao harbour and useless to go to Santander, for all sorts of difficulties were placed in the way of releasing and transporting the cargoes. The Loyalist Navy was conspicuous by its absence.

This was due to several causes. Franco had established command of the Straits, and it would be fatal to risk losing ships even for a naval victory. They were needed too badly for convoying arms supplies, for the Government had not the rebels' advantage of being able to use the navies of two foreign Powers for this purpose.

All the officers had been killed in the early days, and navigation was not the Sailors' Committees' strong point. Prieto, Minister for Marine, was slowly rebuilding a force of seamen, but this took time. Here a political intrigue

came to slow the reorganisation. The C.N.T. offered technical experts, but Prieto refused. *Solidaridad Obrera* ran simultaneous campaigns, for C.N.T. inclusion in the Basque Government and against Prieto, the first authorised by the National Committee, the second repudiated by it. The Basques asked Prieto to send up a couple of cruisers with skeleton crews and promised to man them with their own skilled seamen. This too was refused.

The precise reason for the refusal was complex, partly political, partly financial. Centralising influences, such as that of Luis Araquistain, the C.N.T.'s *bête noire*, came into play. The cruisers would necessarily have come under C.N.T. control and it was also considered undesirable and probably uneconomic to authorise the creation of a Basque Navy. The whole question was involved in secrecy and silence.

On April 30, the loyalists scored an advantage when the best rebel cruiser, the *España*, was sunk in Santander waters, probably by a mine, although it was claimed at the time that loyalist planes had destroyed her. This would have been the first time for a warship ever to have been sunk by planes, and it caused a sensation in foreign naval circles. It is now fairly certain that the planes did not arrive until after the ship had struck the mine. The blockade was carried out by some smaller warships, against which the big Basque armed trawlers, called *bous*, waged a plucky but not very effective struggle.

For eighty days and eighty nights the Basques held out against superior forces and against the "totalitarian war" methods which Ludendorff, recently reinstated in Hitler's favour as a sop to the discontented Reichswehr and Herrenklub, had long advocated but never had the opportunity of trying out. On April 26, Guernica, the sacred city of the Basques, was bombed out of existence. Rebel propagandists immediately claimed that the destruction had been done by Basque Anarchists. The claim was absurd on the face of it, but the matter was proved by the direct evidence of the London *Times* correspondent,

who was himself machine-gunned from the air. Even in the unlikely case that the Bilbao Anarchists had wished to make such a gesture, they were certainly not strong enough to do so. The same destructive tactics had been used by the rebel air force at Durango and other places. The public opinion of the civilised world was outraged, but little concrete resulted save the evacuation of Basque children, 4,000 of whom were supported in England by the National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief.

After April 11, the same terrorist tactics were used in Madrid. The city was shelled continuously every day, the rebel artillery using shrapnel which did no military damage but merely killed civilians. Madrid's morale however, did not suffer, and the Junta had the greatest difficulty in persuading non-combatants to evacuate.

One reason for the absence of real central command and the possibility of an offensive on other fronts to relieve pressure on Bilbao was the acute political tension in Catalonia. Under the stress of wartime conditions, most concretely shown in a steep rise in food prices and a huge increase of profiteering and hoarding, the old party dissensions were sharpening. The FAI was beginning to lose its hold on the C.N.T., chiefly because the middle classes objected to its wholesale collectivisation policy, while the workers in collectivised industries found that they were no better off than before.

The Generalidad was not strong enough to cope with this situation. For weeks the PSUC had been demanding a "Government which Governs"; but while there was inter-party sabotage in all departments, this was impossible. The POUM, expelled from the Government in the crisis of December 19, had declared: "You cannot govern without POUM and you cannot govern against POUM." This party, therefore, settled down to systematic opposition, taking with it those Anarchists, especially in the Libertarian Youth, who had been trained in aimless violence and who were incapable of seeing the Civil War as a whole. Organisations grew up in this atmosphere of preached disobedience.

The chief was the small but influential Friends of Durruti, originally a cultural society loosely attached to the FAI and Libertarian Youth, but later penetrated and controlled by the Trotskyist Marxist-Leninist Group, the leaders of which were foreigners.

The old antagonism between the Catalan Nationalists of Estat Catalá and the Anarchists of the FAI broke out again in the countryside. The FAI was suspicious of a recurrence of the alleged Catalanist plot of November, while Estat Catalá was bitterly opposed to the forcible confiscation of small farms in the name of collectivisation, and the "lack of truly Catalanist principles".

Under promptings from POUM, certain sections of the C.N.T. included the PSUC in their general hostility to the Government. The PSUC, whose main slogans were all directed to war needs, was supporting the bourgeois elements in the Generalidad for the sake of creating an efficient army and war-industry. It took the view that the maximum resources must be mobilised in the fight against Fascism and that it was essential not to antagonise the small farmers who were the backbone of Catalan production. To divert attention from the war to a chimerical revolution which had not yet happened was worse than absurd.

The Madrid Junta was stronger than the Catalan Generalidad in that the war was closer. On March 12, it had demanded and obtained the surrender of all arms for military use. A month before, on February 6, it had closed down the POUM centres and paper in Madrid in reply to a campaign for open disloyalty. In Catalonia, the C.N.T., "for motives of justice and from traditional hatred of the dictatorship of any one party whatever it might be" tended to shelter the POUM, so that subversive influences found place in the Government itself.

The first signs of the coming struggle were found in the new activity of the Libertarian Youth, who were perhaps too young to take an intelligent part

in politics. Riots and killings took place in several parts of Catalonia.

It was well known that few of the arms manufactured in Catalonia went to the front. It was for this reason chiefly that the Valencia Government sent little of its foreign shipments to Catalonia, fearing with some justice that they would simply disappear into private arsenals. Usually a lorry arrived with an order signed by some committee and the arms vanished. The committees, some of which had existed underground long before July 19, became more and more obstructive. Parties maintained private armies and private prisons. The Coast Militias, a formation controlled by groups associated with the FAI, refused to be incorporated in the Regular Army.

The U.G.T. and the PSUC had long been demanding the fusion of the various police-corps into one Internal Security Corps. Against this stood out the Patrols Committees, descended from the Investigation Committee, a branch of the original Antifascist Militias Committee. The PSUC had withdrawn from the Patrols, which were now controlled by the C.N.T. and the FAI. A FAI member, Dionisio Eroles, commanded this formidable force armed with tanks and machine-guns.

The C.N.T. had abandoned the Supplies Council to the U.G.T., represented by Juan Comorera, "in order to assure itself of the Defence Council", hitherto held by the Esquerra. Comorera's work was perpetually sabotaged by local committees and by transport committees belonging to the C.N.T. union. His public protests were somewhat tactlessly phrased, and they were at once seized upon as a weapon with which to attack the PSUC.

These sources of contention were utilised by the POUM as a weapon against the PSUC, somewhat to the dismay of the C.N.T., which believed that this was merely "competitive rivalry between Marxist brothers". That it was something very much more fundamental was

soon proved by the glee with which rebel spies and *agents-provocateurs* seized their opportunity to creep into the POUM and the C.N.T. organisations. POUM deliberately created an atmosphere of tension in order to show that it was "impossible to govern without it".

A series of serious but isolated incidents, unfortunate in time-sequence, made open conflict inevitable. There was an odd case of the sequestration of some armoured cars by the PSUC on March 5. No one enquired very much why the cars had not already been sent to the front by the C.N.T., to whom they "belonged".

The unreliability of the police caused Tarradellas to issue a decree forbidding political affiliation in these armed forces. The object was in fact the dissolution of the Patrols Committees. There was an immediate crisis, on March 27, lasting so long that wits nicknamed the Plaza de la Republica outside the Generalidad building "the Plaza of the Permanent Catalan Crisis".

There could be no obvious solution. To patch up another Cabinet on the same basis as the last would not improve matters. The C.N.T. wished for this, but refused to enter into any signed agreement of policy. The U.G.T. demanded such an agreement in order to salve their responsibility when the threatened outbreak should come. It was by now essential to find out whether the sporadic riots and violence were the work of "uncontrolled" or "uncontrollable" elements; i.e., whether the C.N.T. and the FAI could control their own supporters and were willing to answer for their responsibility.

Public opinion was utterly sick of these crises; and Companys had the bulk of Catalans behind him when, somewhat arbitrarily, he formed a Provisional Council of four members, one each from the U.G.T., C.N.T., Esquerra and Rabassaires. On April 16, the crisis was finally solved on the same basis as the former Cabinet, but with the removal of persons particularly unpopular with the various organisations. Comorera, who was being attacked in Libertarian Youth leaflets in terms which

amounted to incitement to murder, quitted the Provisions Council, but was succeeded again by a U.G.T. representative.

On April 25, Roldan Cortada, secretary of Vidiella, the leader of the Unified Socialist Youth, was murdered by persons unknown near Molins de Llobregat, a suburb of Barcelona. The murder was followed by a police punitive expedition to Molins, ordered by Rodriguez Salas, a PSUC member who was Chief of Police in Barcelona. Tension grew with indignation all over Catalonia; the Anarchists were furious at the Molins expedition, the PSUC at the murder of Roldan Cortada, who had been universally respected. The PSUC and the Government made a demonstration of strength at the funeral on April 27, parading through Barcelona for three and a half hours.

On the same day, Antonio Martin, anarchist Mayor of Puigcerdá, was shot and killed at Bellver, a castellated town on the French frontier. The killings of Roldan Cortada and Antonio Martin had no actual connection, although the second was at once regarded as a reprisal for the first.

The anarchist committees of Puigcerdá and Seo de Urgel, further to the north in the Pyrenees on the Andorran border, had a system of barter. The road passed Bellver, where the Estat Catalá was in possession. There had been constant friction until Martin took advantage of the generally disturbed state of the country to head a column of 200 anarchists in an attempt to take Bellver. Another 200 converged from Seo. The second object was to obtain control of the whole frontier from Andorra to the sea, for it was known that Valencia was intending to send forces to regain free entry of imports, which had hitherto often been diverted to anarchist centres. Thirteen men in Bellver Castle, armed with fowling-pieces and one old machine-gun, held off the attack while the rest of the garrison lunched. Martin was killed in the first assault.

Such bandit warfare had been a feature of the whole northern province of Catalonia known as Cerdanya. The sham neo-Gothic residences of the Catalan bourgeoisie had been seized and held by a whole variety of free corps using the names of the various parties. Puigcerdá itself had been a sort of Icarian Anarchist Republic, a perfectly traditional and even admirable state of affairs, but dangerous to Valencia's sovereignty. If the Generalidad could not control the frontier, Valencia must.

During the nights of April 28 and 29 there were scuffles in Barcelona, darkened against air-raids. The party patrols attempted to disarm one another. Some barricades were raised. Armed men appeared on the streets, and the Generalidad suspended its sessions, Companys broadcasting that "the Catalan Government refuses to deliberate under the threat of armed forces".

Negotiations for a joint U.G.T.-C.N.T. demonstration on May 1 fell through. Valencia forbade public meetings throughout the country. As the C.N.T. account of the affair puts it, "bitterness increased and became hatred".

The details of the street-fighting, which lasted from May 3 to May 7 and cost some 950 dead, some 3,000 wounded and millions of pesetas' worth of ammunition in the worst street-fighting in Europe since the Paris Commune, are still open to dispute. The general line is not.

The amount of misrepresentation of its origins and aims is extraordinary. It was certainly difficult to get a clear view actually from the barricades. Most of the combatants themselves, whose youth was a striking feature, appeared to have little idea why they were on the barricades and against whom they were employing what the Japanese were later to call "self-defence in a wider sense". But some accounts which have appeared in England are based upon a fundamental misconception probably due to their inadequate sources of information already mentioned in this book.

A pamphlet by Mr. Fenner Brockway, entitled *The Truth About Barcelona* and alleged to be based upon the reports of two members of the I.L.P. in Barcelona, John McNair and Jon Kimche, is a remarkable instance of this misunderstanding. Mr. Brockway, or his informants, create a perfectly imaginary antithesis between the "Government Forces" and the "workers". The PSUC and U.G.T. were "on the side of" the Government forces; and one could hardly deny that a trade-union organisation with nearly half a million members must have necessarily contained a considerable number of workers.

The opening shots were fired from the Telephone Building at half-past three in the afternoon of Monday, May 3. The usual story is that Rodriguez Salas, acting on instructions from the Councillor for the Interior, Artemio Aiguadé, took three lorry-loads of police to the building and occupied it in a provocative manner. "Great sentimental value was attached to this building by the Anarchists," say Mr. Brockway's informants.

Rodriguez Salas' own account, which appears to fit the facts more closely, was as follows: The telephones had been controlled by a joint C.N.T.-U.G.T. committee, on which the C.N.T. had a majority, and by a Government Delegate. Since the heightening of tension in Catalonia, the Generalidad lines had been openly tapped and incoming calls from Valencia intercepted. The climax, it is said, was reached when Prieto asked to speak to the Catalan Government and was told that there was no such thing, only a Defence Committee. The employee who answered this call was almost certainly a member of the Friends of Durruti.

It had become known to the Generalidad that a subversive movement was being planned. Bellver was perhaps its beginning. On Sunday night, barricades had again been raised in the suburbs. It was essential to hold control of communications.

Rodriguez Salas and the Generalidad Delegate went into the telephone building. It was fairly empty, as public calls began only at four. The hall was guarded by some shock police.

Salas and the delegate went up to the offices on the first floor of the ten-storied building, to the censors' office. As they mounted, shots were fired from above, where the Workers' Control Committee was stationed. Salas returned to the lower floor and—a very Spanish touch—phoned police headquarters for reinforcements. While they were covering the five hundred yards from the Jefatura to the Telefónica, Dionisio Eroles appeared, persuaded the Control Committee not to fire, and all appeared to be over. The police arrived and the Committee was ordered to give up its arms. Its members did so, first firing off their spare ammunition through one of the upper windows as a form of protest. Immediately a cordon was formed round the building.

Thousands had gathered in the huge Plaza Cataluña outside the building. No one knew precisely what had happened. Most believed that the FAI had captured the building: it is an old Barcelona custom to attribute every disturbance to the FAI. Gradually, however, the ugly word "provocation" spread—or was spread—round the city, and barricades rose.

Quantities of arms appeared on the streets. The unions' headquarters and the political centres were sandbagged. Machine-guns were placed in strategic positions on the roofs. Firing began, chiefly between snipers.

On this first night, there was almost no regular fighting. The various forces fortified their positions, apparently fearing some such attack as they believed had taken place at the Telefónica. The party executives were taken completely by surprise. C.N.T. representatives saw Terradellas and Aiguadé and received assurances that the police would evacuate the Telephone Building. Then, however, under pressure from the local committees, they went on to demand the resignation of Rodriguez Salas

and Aiguadé. To this pressure the Generalidad could not yield, and negotiations went on all night. The workers left their jobs with the knowledge that next day they would be fighting. No orders were given for a general strike.

C.N.T. forces occupied all the outer suburbs, for in Barcelona itself it still had a big majority. In the countryside the division tended in favour of the U.G.T. In Barcelona, U.G.T. members did not come out on the streets, but they did not dare to go back to work for fear of sabotage. In some of the war industries, where the U.G.T. metallurgical Union had the majority, work was continued under armed protection.

There was little fighting in the suburbs, for the Civil Guard, mostly newly-recruited after July 19, were completely outnumbered, and surrendered. In a great ring all round the business and political centre of the city the Anarchists were masters. As on July 19, they had the city more or less at their mercy, but refused to follow up their advantage.

The fighting began in earnest on the morning of the 4th. It was chiefly composed of attacks upon police barracks and counter-attacks by the police. Owing to the occupation of residences for party and union headquarters in the early days of the war, the strategic position was incredibly complex. Rival organisations lived next door to each other, and no fighting was possible beyond a little roof sniping. In some places, a form of non-intervention pact operated.

The use of hand-grenades and dynamite made this one of the most interesting examples of modern street-fighting. After two or three police-cars had been destroyed by grenades dropped from roofs, not a car stirred. Save for the continuous rattle of rifles, pistols and machine-guns, the roar of explosives and the urgent bells of the ambulances, there was not a sound. Hardly a soul stirred on the streets. Nearly all the fighting took place on the roofs. At night, all lights were out, and the

darkness was so thick that it was difficult to see two yards ahead.

There were strange intervals when life suddenly became normal except that there were no trams and no shops or cafés open. These were during the truces, which were kept on the whole honourably. Curiously enough, phones functioned the whole time and lines were not tapped. Some of the Telephones Control Committee were driven up to the seventh floor, which rises above all the surrounding buildings. Here they remained, literally in mid-air, the Shock Police below occasionally sending them up sandwiches.

The C.N.T. and the FAI continually broadcast appeals to lay down arms and return to work. They stated that they were not the aggressors, that they did not wish the fighting, that they were not in any way responsible for it, but that their supporters should be careful not to be tricked again. This particularly mixed appeal naturally had no effect, especially as all Barcelona, on both sides of the barricades, believed that the FAI was really at the head of the movement. This was in fact untrue.

"The lead passed," says Mr. Brockway, "to the extreme Anarchists and the Anarchist Youth. The POUM leadership issued general slogans, such as 'The reawakening of the spirit of July 19', 'The Revolutionary Workers' Front', 'The Formation of Defence Committees'." "The workers were on the streets and our party had to be on the side of the workers," said the official POUM statement issued on May 11.

Negotiations were going on in the Generalidad all this time. Four of the Councillors were unable to reach the building. Companys and Tarradellas refused to be browbeaten into dropping Rodriguez Salas and Aiguadé.

Members of the C.N.T. and U.G.T. National Committees and C.N.T. Ministers rushed up from Valencia: Mariano Vazquez, Garcia Oliver, Federica Montseny, for the C.N.T., Hernandez Zancajo and Muñoz from the

Executive Committee of the U.G.T. All of them appealed over the radio for peace. Garcia Oliver's speech, especially, was an oratorical masterpiece, which drew tears but not obedience.

On Wednesday, May 5, the C.N.T. issued orders to return to work, but the firing went on. The Friends of Durruti, whose agents were everywhere except where there was fighting to be done, issued a leaflet, headed "C.N.T.-FAI" advocating the disarming of the police, the shooting of those responsible for the fighting, dissolution of all parties which "had fought against the workers"; "stay out on the streets," these leaflets advised. The C.N.T. immediately repudiated the Friends of Durruti, who were now being directed almost exclusively by German and Belgian members of the Fourth International.

A temporary solution had been reached in the Generalidad. The Government was to resign *en bloc*, to be replaced by a Provisional Council. Thus the question of the dismissal of Aiguadé was automatically solved. The confused but heavy firing continued, despite orders broadcast at five that evening for a truce, both sides remaining in their positions.

The Friends of Durruti published a proclamation: "A Revolutionary Junta has been formed in Barcelona. All the elements responsible for the subversive attempt working on the margin of the Government must be shot. The POUM must be admitted to the Revolutionary Junta because it has placed itself beside the workers." This appeared more like a broadcast by Queipo de Llano than anything else, and was received coldly. The Revolutionary Junta was never seen. Even the Libertarian Youth disowned all connexion with this manifesto. The POUM, however, published it in *La Batalla* without repudiating its slogans.

That night, the leading Italian Anarchist, Camillo Berneri, Malatesta's successor, was murdered. He had had sole access to complete documentation on the pre-war Italian espionage system in Spain. Thursday morning's

papers gave official figures: 500 dead and over 1,500 hurt.

The truce was observed all the Thursday morning, but firing broke out again after lunch. (There was never any fighting between 1.30 and 3 p.m.) All appeals to return to work were disregarded, and it was clear that the situation was definitely out of hand. The C.N.T. and FAI could not control their men, and the Government's action was hampered by sporadic attacks by police and Estat Catalá bands who could not resist this opportunity of trying to smash the Anarchists. The Patrols Committees appeared not to be participating actively, and Aurelio Fernandez, Eroles' confidant, had publicly appealed for peace; but the Libertarian Youth appeared to have taken over the Patrols' armoured-cars, and these became deadly weapons in their hands. The Coast Militias brought up some .75 guns with which they blew to pieces a number of Civil Guards quartered in the America Cinema. This was the only piece of large-scale damage done to property. It was believed that what was left of the Pino church was to be dynamited, but the local C.N.T. Committee intervened to save it.

The news of the alarming situation in Barcelona spread to the front and the C.N.T. troops at Barbastro and Bujalaroz made some move towards marching on the city. The C.N.T. Regional Committee dissuaded them from carrying out what was probably one of the chief intentions of Franco's *agents-provocateurs*, who, with the Friends of Durruti and elements in the POUM, were so active in spreading the most fantastic rumours.

The Generalidad could not cope with the situation without calling for civil war on a large scale and mobilising the man-power of the U.G.T., the PSUC and the Esquerra. So far, these parties had taken no part in the fighting except to defend their own buildings. Some PSUC members from the Military Schools acted as special constables in the centre of the city, where their smart khaki uniforms with red-and-white armlets made a good impression.

Unless the front was to be abandoned entirely or turned back on itself, Valencia must intervene.

For some weeks, Right-wing circles in the Esquerra and Catalan Action had been discussing the merits of asking for a General who would act as a Military Governor. General Pozas' name was most frequently mentioned. He had been an efficient Minister of the Interior, had achieved notable discipline in his divisions in the Centre and, though stern, was not unpopular. Valencia now sent him as General in Command of the Army of the East, and the Catalanists, though breathing relief, muttered at this infringement of Catalan autonomy. In fact, such a move was perfectly in accordance with the Constitution and the Catalan Statute.

Two warships loaded with armed police and soldiers withdrawn from the Jarama front arrived in the harbour, to be followed by the *Jaime I* shortly afterwards. News came that 4,000 police were coming from Valencia by road.

Fighting began again during the afternoon. Negotiations were held up by the shooting of Antonio Sesé, General Secretary of the Catalan U.G.T., on his way to take up his new position as Councillor. Although the shooting was probably accidental—all moving cars were still shot at regardless—it was generally believed that he had been murdered. Involved negotiations were still going on at the Telefónica, but the police now controlled the lines. It was impossible for the C.N.T. centre in the Via Durruti to communicate with its supporters except by its own broadcasting station, and its messages were easily intercepted.

The C.N.T. was alarmed to hear that the British warship *Despatch* was coming at full speed to Barcelona. At once they revived the old supposition of British intervention. They had believed the same on July 20, for experience in China as well as in Spain during the Republic of 1869 led them to be suspicious of "the protection of British interests". They pointed out that the democratic capitalist

powers would be even more hostile to any revolutionary government in Spain than even the fascist powers would be, and that the Spanish bourgeois parties, Socialists and Communists were depending upon British and French moral, if not material, aid. The usual—and perhaps justified—anarchist persecution complex reinforced the belief that the Barcelona events were a plot to crush them and lead to a compromise solution of the Civil War, a "Vergara embrace", they called it, referring to the Treaty which ended the First Carlist War in 1839. It was emphasised that this Treaty was largely due to the intervention of a British agent.

This fantasy increased the tension, especially as the Generalidad was playing for time until the Valencian forces should arrive. These had a fierce struggle at Tarragona and Reus, and in these places they crushed the revolt without mercy.

All night, the C.N.T. waited for the Generalidad's compromise solution. The fighters on the streets moved uneasily. There were isolated skirmishes. The news from Tarragona was disturbing. It was one thing to face and defeat the comparatively weak forces of the Generalidad, quite another to take on well-trained, experienced and well-armed soldiers furious at having been transferred from the front where they had been making special exertions to relieve the pressure on Bilbao. The easy-going slaughter of the three-day dogfight was over. The fighting had gone on too long, the fighters were tired and eagerly hoped for some solution which would allow them to retire from a pointless and dangerous enterprise with honour and safety. At 4.45 on the morning of Friday, May 7, the C.N.T. broadcast the order to "return to normality".

On Friday the tension relaxed notably. The whole population came out to stroll in the streets and discuss the fighting. Some cafés and bars opened, but there were no trams. There were general sight-seeing tours to admire the barricades, some of them constructed with a skill

worthy of a better cause. These days were an extraordinarily valuable lesson in the art of street-fighting, in which the Barcelonese had always been masters.

As twilight fell, the Valencian police entered the city. Lorry-loads drove down the Via Durruti, in which were situated both Police Headquarters and the C.N.T. Regional Committee. The people gathered outside Police Headquarters applauded the grim, smart-looking men, some of whom stood on the lorry roofs, picturesquely waving their rifles and cheering. There was a moment of tension as the cars passed the C.N.T. One man fired his rifle in the air—probably by accident; with great presence of mind his comrades shouted: "Long live the FAI!"

Next day, the city returned to normal. The C.N.T. broadcast the slogan: "Away with the barricades! Every citizen his paving-stone! Back to normality!" The Valencian Expeditionary Force strolled about the streets, fraternising with the Catalans. Strong detachments were sent up-country to complete the clean-up and assure the frontier. The PSUC and Esquerra town councillors who had been driven out of several towns were able to return.

The whole movement had been extraordinarily confused. Amid the broad masses of the combatants it was certainly instinctive, the traditional method of "manifesting a feeling of discontent". It was the same thing as the risings of 1932 and 1933, Casas Viejas, Arnedo, Bajo Llobregat. Always it had an anarchist content, and the FAI, although it had not participated, had received the unwanted paternity of the movement. The C.N.T., which always really believed its professions of its own nobility of intention—"the only way of defeating the C.N.T.", said one manifesto, "is by excelling it in honourableness, nobility and austerity"—had been placed in an impossible position. Disdaining to take a general view of a situation, which it despised as mere "politics", it lamented the rising but could not disown the actions

of its own "class-brothers". Hence, although its leaders begged for peace with the utmost eloquence and sincerity, even its own supporters could hardly credit its consistency. When the red-and-black flag waved from the barricades, it was hard to understand why Garcia Oliver was appealing with tears for the cease-fire. It was a lamentable misunderstanding, implicit in the whole modern history of Catalonia. The FAI had prepared the atmosphere and even made preparations for an eventual rising "against the counter-revolution", for it was well aware that Anarchism must lose, whoever won the Civil War. Its followers had proved "uncontrollable" because it was in the very nature of anarchist thought that no man should be "controlled" by another.

Anarchist responsibility was intelligible and even inevitable as the result of a long historical process. There were responsibilities more direct and less excusable. The anarchist participation was in its way honest and certainly very Spanish: the intervention of the POUM had not this excuse, and the leaders of the Friends of Durruti were not even Spaniards.

Documents found in two leading hotels proved conclusively that Franco's agents had been actively at work to foment the rising. The actual outbreak had, as usual in Spain, been badly mistimed. There had been a plan for a large-scale rebel landing on the Catalan coast in April, aided surreptitiously by German and Italian ships. Only the fact that these plans fell into the hands of a neutral power had prevented its execution. The Catalan rising had been planned to coincide with the landing.

It had been obvious that it would be easy to exploit a "manifestation of popular discontent" with anarchist tendencies. Another favourable factor was the atmosphere created by POUM's campaigns against the Popular Front and the Government.

The documents referred to "our business manager in the POUM, N.". In the heat of the moment, this was taken

to mean Andrès Nin, who was arrested, along with the other POUM leaders. In fact it almost certainly referred to a prominent German member of the Marxist-Leninist Group inside the POUM.

POUM had openly supported the movement, although it had not initiated it. It did not repudiate the Friends of Durruti's leaflets. It had a loose tactical alliance with the C.N.T., but the C.N.T. leadership refused to take its suggestions, and so POUM deliberately incited the extremer wing, the Libertarian Youth, to continued intransigence.

Sheer irresponsibility marked the conduct of some of the delegates from the International Bureau. Some of their militiamen were home on leave from the front. These were either instructed or allowed to stand guard on the roof of POUM headquarters, where an attack was feared. Luckily, no attack was made. These militiamen had come to Spain to fight the rebels, and it was no part of their business to get killed by the police of the Government for which they were fighting.

There were more sinister—or more irresponsible—matters. One alleged member of the British I.L.P. contingent made a point of impressing upon British journalists that volunteers had signed a paper before they came to Spain pledging themselves to fight for Workers' Control. Although this incredibly dangerous statement was at once denied by the local delegate of the I.L.P., it was only chance that there had been an opportunity to consult him before the story went out. It had always been understood that volunteers for Spain had been recruited simply and solely for the fight against Fascism and entirely without political aim. It was on this basis that the International Brigade was composed of men of every shade of progressive opinion, from Christian Pacifist to Communist.

These minor points are essential, because of the complete distortion of fact which spread in the foreign press both of the Right and of the Left. It was interesting that

Right-wing papers' accounts largely coincided with those of the Extreme Left, though both combined in the Anarchist alibi.

The Government took immediate action against POUM. The *Batalla* offices were occupied and the paper suspended; later, all POUM centres closed. The party itself was not dissolved partly owing to the demand of the C.N.T. that no persecution should result from a battle "in which there were to be neither victors nor vanquished", partly because there had always been a distinction made between POUM militants and POUM militias, and it was considered unfair to penalise relatively good troops for their leaders' political errors. The Sabadell POUM committee, one of the most important branches, had repudiated the Executive's approval of the rising immediately it received the news.

The U.G.T. expelled the POUM leaders and deprived POUM militants of their executive posts in the various Unions. In this it undoubtedly had the practically unanimous approval of the rank-and-file.

No direct measures were taken against the C.N.T. A gradual clean-up of the "uncontrollable" groups which had usurped the FAI's name was carried out in the provinces, and private prisons, such as the famous Convent of San Elias in Barcelona, were closed down. After a bewildering succession of new appointments to Chief of Police, Valencia definitely took over the administration of Public Order—"Public Disorder", the wits called it—in Catalonia. There were few further disturbances, save an occasional raid from air or sea, and the amazing city returned to such normality that it was impossible to notice that it had been through the severest street-fighting in its history.

The events in Catalonia had immediate repercussions in the general military and political situations. It was impossible to make a big diversion on the Aragon or Teruel front to relieve the increasing pressure upon the Basque Country. On the other hand, the appointment of General

Pozas to the command of the Army of the East meant that a big step forward towards the unification of the military direction had been made possible. No longer were the Catalan columns under the direction of an anarchist War Councillor, whose activities might be suspect of a political rather than military objective.

It was obvious that the Caballero Government was responsible for the Catalan disturbances. Galarza, Minister for the Interior, should never have allowed the situation to arise, and his first appointments of Police Chief in Barcelona had been an open gesture towards the C.N.T. One of his nominees had been an officer in the anarchist "Tierra y Libertad" Column.

Largo Caballero as Minister for War had been quite unable to create a regular People's Army and to unify the command. He had taken the "personalist" view that he was the unified command, but at the same time admitted that he knew nothing of military matters. His collaborators had been appointed for reasons of personal friendship, and when an incompetent General was forced out by popular clamour, he merely transferred but did not dismiss him. Both the military and the internal situations had been causing general dissatisfaction for some time and the Barcelona riots brought this to a head.

On May 15, the Communist Party opened the Government crisis, placing before Caballero and public opinion eight demands: (1) democratic direction of the whole life of the country by collective decision of the whole Cabinet; (2) normal functioning of the Supreme War Council, to occupy itself, together with the Minister of War, with all the problems of this Department; (3) immediate reorganisation of the General Staff, appointment of a Chief of General Staff responsible to the Minister of War and Council of War, but with full authority to plan and direct all military operations; (4) reorganisation of the War Commission and creation of a collective directorate

composed of all parties in the Government. The Commission to be responsible to the Minister of War and War Council, but autonomous in everything relating to the appointment and political direction of the Commissioners; (5) the Premier to occupy himself solely with affairs relating to the Premiership; separation of the portfolio of War from the Premiership; (6) elimination of Galarza; (7) the Ministers of War and the Interior to be men enjoying the support of all parties in the Government, and therefore their names to be known before they were definitely appointed; (8) a governmental programme to be drawn up and published on the same day that the new Government took office.

These demands were the purest common sense, and the really surprising thing, to the general public, was that they could give rise to a Government crisis. If these things were so lacking in the Caballero Government, which had held office for nine months, it appeared that only the capacity of the Spanish people for self-organisation could have enabled republican Spain to survive. The People's Army was coming into existence as one of the finest fighting forces in the world, despite lack of material, especially heavy artillery. It was admitted that the really efficient armies were those of the Centre and the South, the victors of Brihuega and Pozoblanco; it was no coincidence that it was precisely in these regions that the Communist Party predominated.

The Communists "considered indispensable the formation of a Government of the Popular Front in which all the political parties and unions were represented". Its press also demanded that the new Government should publicly disapprove of those who had participated in the events in Catalonia.

Caballero appeared to accept these demands, and everyone expected a speedy reorganisation of the Government, which would emerge with more or less the same composition as the last but greatly strengthened by having a reasonable and concrete programme. No

exception was taken to any of the Communists' eight points.

Caballero retired to think over the situation, and suddenly presented a completely new scheme, announcing his resignation if it were not accepted *in toto*. This scheme included a strong preponderance of the U.G.T and C.N.T., an elaborate War Council, of which he himself would be the head as well as Premier of the Government. In effect, it was a bid for a sort of syndicalist dictatorship headed by Largo Caballero.

The general impression was, quite literally, that Caballero had suddenly gone mad. The C.N.T., uneasy in Catalonia, where the Regional Federation had assumed a certain autonomy, swung its whole weight behind Caballero, declaring that it would support only a Government headed by him. But the whole weight of the C.N.T. was no longer what it had been. Its hawing during the Barcelona days had dislocated its striking force in exactly the same way as its similar stand had disrupted it temporarily during—by a subtle irony—the Telephone strike of 1932. The political parties refused to be terrorised, although they did not wish to alienate completely a still important, and certainly sincerely antifascist, force in the country. The U.G.T. Executive supported its General Secretary, but the Executive had lingered far behind the rank-and-file. When the Asturian miners, long the backbone of the U.G.T.'s moderate but militant wing, had followed Javier Bueno in his reasoning that, willy-nilly, the Third International could be the Spanish working-class's only salvation, the purely syndicalist tendency in the U.G.T. was broken. The Asturian U.G.T. and C.N.T. had made effective union on March 5 on what can only be described as a common-sense basis; and, although Asturias was entirely isolated from the rest of Spain, its prestige was such that "what Asturias thought to-day Spain thought to-morrow". The common-sense basis was a tendency to follow the line, though not necessarily the resolutions, of the VIIth Plenum of the Communist International, that

is to say, to coincide with the new orientation of Popular Front policy already adopted by Prieto. In Spain first of all this historic Congress was showing the correctness of its analysis, the practical effect of the understanding of "the dialectic of the dialectic", a process which neither POUM nor Caballero could be capable of appreciating. The Government crisis of May 15, 1937, at Valencia may well have begun an entirely new phase in world history.

To none of the parties save to the C.N.T. and to the U.G.T. Executive did the Caballero proposal recommend itself. The C.N.T. membership was puzzled and divided by the sudden adulation of a man whom it had been taught to regard with the deepest suspicion. Caballero resigned, and, despite gloomy forecasts, there was no battle, murder and sudden death. The war could go on.

The C.N.T., which had declared that it would support no Government not headed by Caballero, withdrew its four Ministers. Juan Peiró went straight back to his trade as glazier in Mataró. Probably no other Minister in history had ever gone straight back to the humble trade from which he had come.

The idea of a purely syndicalist Government, without political parties, had failed, although Caballero and a small group round him were to intrigue for its revival. It had been a very interesting conception, although hardly a practical one. Its chief fault lay in the fact that it would have had to introduce forcible and universal union membership in order to remain democratic; and, as in Catalonia, the entry of vast numbers of unorganised persons would have diluted the strength of the unions, creating an unmanageable hotchpotch. It would have meant union collectivisation when, in time of war, nationalisation could be the only efficient system. Even warring capitalist countries discovered this. The syndicalist entry into politics had always been a failure—hence the creation of the British Labour Party—and this historical experience received its most striking confirmation in Spain. Since the

basis of Syndicalism was non-political, it necessarily stultified itself by entering politics. The withdrawal of the C.N.T. from the Negrin Government was the logical result of the fine but false position in which it had placed itself by taking political action on July 19.

The new Government was incomparably the strongest since the foundation of the Second Republic. Dr. Juan Negrin took the Premiership, Economy and Finance, on which he was an expert. José Giral, Azaña's confidant, took Foreign Affairs, still working closely with Alvarez del Vayo, delegate to Geneva and Chief War Commissioner. Prieto's Ministry of Defence now included all the land, sea and air forces. The Basque Nationalist, Manuel Irujo, was Minister for Justice. The Communists, Jesus Hernandez and Vicente Uribe were Ministers for Education and Agriculture. A Catalan Esquerra member, Jaime Aiguadé, brother of Artemio, was Minister of Labour. The Protestant Giner de los Rios, of the Republican Union Party, became Minister of Public Works and Communications. The Interior was held by Julian Zugazagoitia, editor of *El Socialista* in its most brilliant period. There were thus three Socialists, all of the Prietist tendency, two Communists, one Azañist Left, one Republican Union of the Martinez Barrio tendency, one Catalan and one Basque Nationalist. Curiously enough, since the operations in the Basque Country were then in the forefront of the war, Basques predominated, with Irujo, Zugazagoitia, Uribe and Prieto, who, although an Asturian, was deputy for Bilbao.

An important point of strength was that Negrin, Giral, Prieto, Zugazagoitia, de los Rios and Irujo were all experts on international affairs, and that Alvarez del Vayo had not followed the other two of the Triumvirate, Caballero and Araquistain, into the wilderness. This was to be the more necessary very soon, for the Spanish Civil War was becoming increasingly an international problem. There were not only the questions of the naval patrol by the Non-Intervention powers but also the obvious objective

in the northern campaign, the mines and foundries of the Basque country. Here British, French and German capital and rearmament interests interlocked. It was impossible to prevent the rebels' military victory at Bilbao, but it might be possible to set the victors squabbling for the loot.

Negrin, intimate friend of Prieto, with whom he had conducted a long guerrilla against Juan March, was particularly well placed to cope with this situation.

Two days previous to the crisis, the British warship *Hunter* had struck a mine, losing eight killed and fourteen wounded. A fortnight later, the German pocket-battleship *Deutschland* was bombed by loyal planes at Ibiza, with twenty dead and seventy-three wounded.

There could be no certainty as to what happened. Whether the planes or the battleship began hostilities was open to any interpretation. The *Deutschland* had no business at Ibiza, in any case.

On May 31, the German fleet in the Mediterranean bombarded Almeria. Almeria was not a naval base, and there was not the slightest attempt to treat it as such. The barrage began at the top of the town and moved steadily downwards to the harbour. This was sheer cold-blooded massacre as "reprisal".

Despite international protests, which talked of "medieval methods", the fascist powers continued their policy. International law had long ago become an outworn conception, and there were plenty of precedents. Signor Gayada, rather cruelly, continued his comments on the way in which the British Empire had been acquired.

On June 19, the German Government announced that the cruiser *Leipsic* had been attacked twice by "Red" submarines, luckily without damage. The attack had been perceived only by sound-detection apparatus. This, however, was sufficient for Germany, followed by Italy, to withdraw from the naval Non-Intervention patrol, crying aloud about "Red piracy and barbarism".

This move was nicely timed to coincide with the fall of the Blum Government and of Bilbao. On June 13, the "Iron Ring" of defences had been penetrated owing to the treachery of an officer who had long benefited by the famous Basque "exquisite tolerance". For the next week, there was the utmost confusion in Bilbao. The Basque militias turned upon the Asturians, the best fighting force on that front. The Government deserted its President, José Antonio Aguirre, who had taken over the supreme command on May 12 in a vain hope of repairing the past errors. All the barely-concealed Monarchists came into the open, penetrating the nationalist militias and raising barricades against both the Asturians and the Basque working-class militias. The struggle against centralism and militarism had been heroic, but the petty-bourgeois Basque Nationalists could not face the necessity of taking extreme measures in self-defence. Italian mechanised divisions prepared the way against their almost unarmed opponents, and the Requetes of Navarre and Guipúzcoa were given the jackal-work of cleaning up their fellow-Basques and fellow-Catholics of Vizcaya. The remains of the army withdrew to Santander, an untenable position. The mines were not flooded nor the foundries dynamited. Franco's first move was to encourage the return of British engineers. Iron exports, however, began to flow into Hamburg. It had been a costly offensive.

Franco concluded a commercial treaty with Germany on July 19, extending, by a series of individual agreements, the German Commercial Treaty of May 1926 and granting most-favoured-nation treatment. The position after the fall of Bilbao was summed up by the *Boersenzeitung*: "It was to be expected that the Spanish National Government would see to it that the German iron industry was compensated for the loss it had suffered from the illegal intervention of the Red Government in Bilbao in favour of the iron industries of other countries which would be unable to dispute the justice of such a proceeding."

The usual blackmail was applied to England, for whose armament programme Bilbao supplied at least 7 per cent of the necessary ore. Dr. Schacht's organ, *Deutsche Wirtschaft*, pointed out that "just at the moment when an increased supply is so very urgent, a continued shortage of Bilbao ores would cause serious embarrassment to the British rearmament programme".

Both the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Daily Mail*, which had special facilities for reporting Franco's views, announced that British citizens would not be welcomed back to rebel territory until Franco had been officially recognised by Britain. The *Metal Bulletin* hinted that serious representations might be made to the Board of Trade in view of the report that the bulk of Bilbao ores would now be directed to Germany. The British Government was placed in a dilemma between governmental mercury and rebel iron and pyrites.

Bilbao had fallen, "admired and abandoned by the whole world". The lack of communications between Valencia and the Basque Country as well as the internal situation in Catalonia had made any diversion impossible. Davila pressed on with his Italian allies towards Santander.

The taking of Bilbao, by Italian troops, brought into the open the internal dissensions among the rebels. Local interests came into play, for the Carlists were also Basques and disliked the introduction of foreign allies. The Falange, on the other hand, were favourable to the idea and action of a Fascist International.

The Basque campaign had been directed by General Mola, by far the most competent of the rebel officers. His connexions with the Carlists when Military Governor of Navarre had led them to look upon him as the probable leader of the whole movement, especially in the early days when Franco, Cabanellas, Quiapo de Llano and Mola held independent commands.

The Left wing of the Falange led by Manuel Hedilla in the absence of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, were in favour of carrying out their Twenty-six Points, while

Franco's chief supporters, the Falange Right Wing, issued the slogan: "Win the war first."

Franco was thus attacked from the Left by Hedilla and from the right by Mola's supporters, who had been particularly outraged by a big massacre of hostages in Vitoria on the night of the reported shooting of Primo de Rivera. Troops had to be called out to suppress the Falangist rioters.

On June 3, Mola, in a plane piloted by an "ex"-Anarchist, Chamorro, crashed to his death on the Basque front, as his leader Sanjurjo had crashed in Portugal. On June 16, as the attack closed on Bilbao, Hedilla, twice condemned to death, along with other Falangist leaders, was reported to have been shot. At once, there were bloody riots in various places.

Franco became leader of a new unified party, the FET (Falange Española Tradicionalista de las JONS). The name really implied the "co-ordination", in the German manner, of the Traditionalist Carlists and the Monarchists of Renovación Española with what was left of the Falange. The Leader assumed absolute authority, with the right to nominate his successor, and was to be responsible "only to God and History". The organisation's National Council, appointed by the leader, had a "Catholic and Imperial mission"; it would "establish an economic regime transcending individual group and class interests with a view to the multiplication of riches in the service of the people, State, social justice and Christian liberty of the individual".

This was sufficiently vague, contrasting strongly with the almost too-vocal programmes of the various antifascist parties. Nationalisation, collectivisation and so on were concrete matters which could be discussed freely and sensibly. What an "economic regime transcending group and class interests" might mean was not clear, and no discussion was permitted in the rebel press. The lack of definition increased the bitterness of the struggle between the "co-ordinated" parties; and their quarrels reinforced

those between Spaniards, Germans and Italians. In July and August there were large-scale disturbances behind the rebel lines, suppressed by the dependable non-political Moors, who were given a wide margin of tolerance for wholesale looting, since they were paid in deflated German and Austrian currency or with cheques upon the banks of the cities they had not yet captured, and very often were not paid at all.

While the disturbances on the rebel side and the murders of the few surviving rebels with any claim to governing capacity were necessarily sterile, the struggles between the Antifascists were, although terribly wasteful, a sign of vitality. Unity, Lenin repeatedly declared, must be fought for: unity could not be made by a stroke of the pen, as in the creation of the FET; it could emerge only from fusion, elimination or absorption on the basis of a concrete issue. This had been the basis and the strength of the Popular Front.

The Government was reorganising. The Northern front after the fall of Irun had been more of a liability than an asset. It had been impossible to send supplies, and its chief importance had been to prevent Franco's allies from laying their hands on its rich mining districts and important factories. It was now important to make a diversion from the Santander advance chiefly to prevent a large number of men being transferred to the Madrid front and also to try out the newly-organised People's Army. Before this could be successful, it was essential to clarify the political situation.

The C.N.T. had withdrawn from the Valencia Government, but, after a few days of loud remonstrances, had promised to support it in the industrial field. The local branches of the U.G.T. had sent in promises of support, and the Executive was isolated. Caballero and some of his friends, together with a small group of Socialists of the Extreme Left, coquetted with the C.N.T. to form an opposition alliance, but could not carry the bulk of the U.G.T. with him. The C.N.T. considered that Caballero

had been hardly used, but was unwilling to come out into open opposition again after its recent defeat. It was engaged in proclaiming its undying hostility to any form of armistice.

The idea of an armistice had been mooted abroad, especially when the Non-Intervention Committee had proved its uselessness after Germany and Italy had been allowed to withdraw from the Naval Patrol following the hypothetical *Leipsic* incident. The bombardment of Almeria by the German fleet had made a deplorable impression among Conservatives as well as among Liberals. The withdrawal of "volunteers" was raised, but no formula could be found. The British Government, forced by its own behind-the-scenes pressure to submit a plan, made a proposal that Franco's belligerent rights should be recognised "as soon as the Committee is satisfied that a substantial evacuation of volunteers" had taken place. Maisky, for the U.S.S.R., pointed out the difficulties and inconsistencies of this scheme and asked what was a "substantial evacuation" and how could it be proved. The British Government declared that it could accept only the approval of the whole scheme or none of it. Shortly afterwards, the whole idea was literally torpedoed by an outbreak of piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean, far from Spanish waters, English ships not being spared. There was evidence that the responsible planes and submarines were not under the control of Salamanca.

This piratical activity killed all hope of the utility of Non-Intervention and most prospects of immediate mediation. Mussolini had stated that there were no Italian volunteers in Spain and that, anyway, the Italian volunteers were not defeated at Brihuega, but had avenged their defeat there by the capture of Bilbao. This Mussolinian logic was completed by a declaration on July 1 that he would not withdraw volunteers from Spain; and on the 8th, Franco stated that the withdrawal of volunteers was impossible.

The capture of Bilbao was balanced in August by the first really big battle waged by the People's Army. It was

entirely successful. Planned as a military "show-down", the armies fought for two weeks over a fourteen-mile stretch centring on Brunete, west of Madrid. Both sides used all their available resources. Despite a huge concentration of arms, men and over 300 planes, the rebel counter-offensive petered out. The Italian infantry had again proved a failure, and, despite terrible losses, the Government had won one of the few pitched battles of the war. The rebels had captured important towns, but they had not won any major battle save the unequal struggle in the Basque Country. There had been nothing like a real fight at Badajoz, Talavera, Toledo and Malaga. Peguerinos, Medelin, Villareal, Brihuega, Pozoblanco, Brunete showed a steady improvement in the Republican Army's fighting capacity; and by the time of Brunete reserves were being trained and equipped faster than Italians could be landed.

The Negrin Cabinet at once set about restoring order in the rear. "That side will win", said Prieto with his usual sceptical caution which many called pessimism, "which has the healthiest rearguard."

Despite the colossal wastage of life and munitions, the May riots in Catalonia had at least precipitated a solution of immediate political problems. The POUM had been eliminated. The FAI had lost prestige. The C.N.T. was faced with the necessity of employing a little common sense in time of war and was responding with honourable intentions if with some difficulty.

Gradually, the wilder economic experiments were liquidated in view of war needs. Certain industries were decollectivised. It was proposed to dissolve the Patrols Committees, from which all parties save the FAI and POUM had withdrawn. A Popular Army of the East was rapidly trained, and, in late August, was able to support a big offensive towards Saragossa and take Belchite. The public transport services were to be taken out of the hands of the C.N.T. Transport Syndicate, which had made of them a lucrative but somewhat

irregular business, and transferred to the Municipality. Shock brigades and Stakhanovism began to be the rule in the war industries, which were now turning out three fighting planes a day.

The Generalidad crisis, which had been in effect permanent for the past five months, was solved by an impatient, somewhat high-handed, but popular gesture by Companys. As usual, a solution had been reached and published when last minute difficulties arose. Companys wished to include a notable Catalan scholar, Dr. Bosch Gimpera, of the Rightist Catalan Action, as Minister without Portfolio. This was a gesture towards the broadening of the Popular Front to include those who were discontented by Valencia's assumption of the military and police services in Catalonia. The C.N.T., justly complaining that Bosch Gimpera did not represent any one in particular and that a Minister without Portfolio was so much dead-weight in a Cabinet, went on to assume that his inclusion was a gesture towards a pact with the rebels. The C.N.T. representatives refused to attend the first Cabinet session. Companys broadcast the challenge: if they did not appear within two hours, he would reconstruct the Government without them. They did not appear; and with an expressive Catalan "*prou!*"—which might be translated "no more shilly-shallying!"—the President formed a Cabinet composed of the Esquerra, PSUC, Rabassaires and Catalan Action, Bosch Gimpera becoming Councillor for Justice.

Next day, the C.N.T. stated that it would henceforth confine itself to the industrial field, work for unity with the U.G.T. and not place obstacles in the way of the Generalidad. "Government", it stated rather ruefully, "was never the C.N.T.'s strong suit."

Companys' solution smacked of the "personalist" policy which had made Caballero objectionable; but in his case there was every excuse. Someone had to say "*prou!*"; and there was no one so authorised as the

President who was, after all, the successor of Macià' the Liberator. Companys' weavings in and out of the complexities of Catalan politics had not always met with universal approval. In Catalan intrigue, a man was too often judged by his unwanted friends; and, at various times, every party, from Estat Catala to the FAI, had praised "our revered President" and denounced any detractor as traitor. The consequence was that every time some new party broke the monopoly of adulation, Companys became anathema to his late friends. Just before the fall of Bilbao, Companys himself, a sick man with his physical exhaustion increased by his inability to deal with the "uncontrollables" and by a widespread campaign respectfully suggesting that he had served his purpose and had become an obstacle, was thinking of resigning. The fall of Bilbao, he said, would make resignation appear desertion, and he stayed. But he had become an obstacle by his own political cleverness; he complicated things. His "personalist" policy had been forced upon him, but it was no longer time for "personalist" policies. He stayed on sufferance. The man who had had the acumen to offer complete political power to the C.N.T. after July 19, when he knew it would be refused, was no longer needed to control it. Companys could retire with all honours whenever necessary, for even the FAI had radically changed.

On July 4, the Peninsular Plenum of the FAI decided to alter the whole character of an organisation which in just ten years had made an indelible mark on Spanish history. The FAI, the conspirators *par excellence*, were to become members of a legally registered organisation. Dogmatic foreign Anarchists, who had stuck steadily to their principles and held nudist picnics while their Spanish mates died for an ideal respectable at least if misguided, were furious. This Plenum, confirmed by a Conference of Regional Committees in Valencia on July 11, marked a turning-point in the history of the anarchist movement, and possibly of Spain.

“Although affirming our libertarian principles more strongly than ever, we must become more efficient in action and in the application of revolutionary methods. . . . The FAI will not be able to fulfil its mission completely if the war is lost.” The original system of small groups was suitable to the old conspiratorial conditions, but lacked flexibility under the present circumstances. “We ourselves do not know the faculties and attributions which correspond to us.”

Permission was now given to Anarchists to accept posts in all “public institutions”. The FAI was no longer to be a co-optive body, but was opened to “every manual or intellectual worker who accepted the general line and was willing to co-operate in realising it”. He was bound to carry out all missions entrusted to him by the appropriate Committee, provided such missions had been previously approved by the Assemblies and Congresses. An important provision was that any member of the FAI appointed to public office could be disauthorised or forced to resign if the organisation disapproved of his activities.

The Secretary of the FAI Peninsular Committee stated three weeks later that the organisation had over 160,000 members throughout Spain.

Meanwhile, the Communist Party had been agitating for the fusion of the Communist and Socialist Parties into the “Single Party of the Proletariat”. The Youth Movements had long been so fused, and fusion had been achieved, on a smaller scale, in the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia. The summer of 1937 was a period in which issues in Spain were becoming increasingly clarified by contact with the catalytic of civil war. Party lines, political divergences, personal ambitions and capacities could be judged by one supreme test: their efficiency for war purposes.

POUM had held that the war could only be won by making a social and economic revolution at once. Bitter experience had shown that revolutionary experiments, made by the C.N.T., not the POUM, which had made

nothing but an insurrection, had created merely chaos. Certainly, the Spanish Revolution had been carried forward a long way since Azaña had announced his intention of making it, six years before. Things could never be the same again. But the war had to be won by the arms-factories' capacity for production, by the harvests, by the mobilisation of capital and above all by the creation of an efficient People's Army. In January, the fate of the Spanish Civil War seemed to depend on manoeuvres in the foreign capitals and at Geneva. In August, it again depended upon Spain itself. The Spanish Republic had failed to command success; it now had to do more, and deserve it. It had to provide factors which would upset the calculations of National Governments and spur the hesitations of wavering labour movements. The battle of Brunete, even more than the constitution of the Negrin Government, was to be the beginning of a fourth phase in the Spanish Civil War.

The first phase had been that of the Giral Government, between July 19 and September 4, 1936; the second that between the fall of Irun and the Catalan crisis of December; the third that of antithesis resolved into synthesis, the liquidation of chaos and the emergence of a real Civil War Government, the unification of the regions, the military command, the Army, the administration.

The Spanish Republic, attacked by military rebellion seconded by foreign military, economic and political intervention, had started from far behind scratch on July 19, 1936: after a year of war, in which its survival, not its lack of resounding victories, was surprising, it had become a power to be reckoned with, not only nationally but internationally. It had had to face overwhelmingly superior forces, the sabotage of international capital, the disorganisation and half-heartedness of international Labour. Its representatives had to hear Mr. Ernest Bevin, leader of the biggest surviving Labour movement, esteemed member of an International to which their organisation belonged, state at a meeting of the L.S.I. and I.F.T.U.

in London in March that he was "speaking in the name of the whole British labour movement" when he refused their appeal for aid. The Spanish delegation withdrew from the Conference. The *Daily Herald* made no reference to Mr. Bevin's remark. Aged Emile Vandervelde, chairman of the Second International, said that the organisation which had somehow survived 1914 was now dead.

After the bombardment of Almeria, Dimitrov, for the Third International, sent a telegram to the L.S.I. and I.F.T.U. proposing a Joint Contact Committee of all three Internationals. De Brouckère, Chairman of the L.S.I. Executive, agreed, but was unable to overcome the opposition of the British delegation. At last, however, on June 21, the three Internationals decided on a common policy at Annemasse, after the resignations of De Brouckère, Adler and Roosbrock (Treasurer of the L.S.I.) had been refused. The two general demands, also accepted previously by the Joint Council of the T.U.C. and the Executives of the Labour and Parliamentary Labour Parties, were: immediate action by the League of Nations to end acts of aggression against the Spanish Government; restoration without delay of the right of the Spanish Government to buy arms. It was not much, but it was something.

While international Labour fumbled in a well-meaning effort to help Spain by reliance upon a body controlled by their own hostile Governments, Santander fell. On August 27, all Italian newspapers emphasised that this was an Italian victory. Lists of casualties and the names of the ten Italian generals who directed the fighting were given. Mussolini replied to a telegram of thanks from Franco: "I am particularly proud that the Italian Legionaries have, during ten days of hard fighting, contributed mightily to the splendid victory of Santander, and that their contribution receives coveted recognition in your telegram. This brotherhood of arms, already close, guarantees the final victory which will liberate Spain in the Mediterranean from any menace to our common civilisation."

The truth was out. Issues were clear. Republican Spain was fighting a war of national independence. The existence of the People's Army and the possibility of the creation of the Single Proletarian Party could still bring victory even if the legitimately-elected Spanish Republican Government found itself "admired but abandoned by the whole world".

VII

SOCIAL CHANGE

THE SITUATION WAS not much clearer than it had been at the beginning of the war. Militarily, it was a dead-lock. Politically, the situation had resolved itself into a matter of the external and internal politics of Italy, Germany, England, France and the U.S.S.R. Economically, it was still almost entirely dictated by the necessity of creating a war industry and caring for war supplies and by the problem of the acquisition and disposal of foreign currency in relation to the apprehensions and intrigues of foreign holders of raw materials.

Because of this complex situation, the levers of which were outside the control of the antifascist Spaniards, it was very difficult to see the extent of the social change that had been effected. Several parties proclaimed loudly that the war and the revolution were inseparable; even the petty-bourgeoisie expressed through its most intelligent representatives such as Companys and Prieto the feeling that "things could never be the same again and the workers had won a very much larger share in the direction of the country".

Indubitably, the movement of July 19 had begun as the mere continuation of April 1931 and October 1934, sharing the characteristics of both. This was shown, in July, by the fact that the military rebellion was simply the continuation of Sanjurjo's *putsch* of 1932. The Spanish military rebellion relied upon the semi-aristocratic officer caste, the younger sons of the upper classes, enrolled in the Falange Española, and upon the Navarrese peasants of the Requetes, entirely controlled by the clergy. In

Robles' Acción Popular was the nucleus of a mass fascist movement, but Robles was never popular with his allies and his followers were soon relegated to much the same position as that held by some of the bourgeois fractions of the antifascist front. Simplifying, Franco possessed an S.S. (the Falange), but never an S.A.

The petty bourgeoisie, strong only in the autonomous regions, unhesitatingly opposed the movement, after Martínez Barrio's short-lived attempt at conciliation by the "Maura plan". The Catalan Esquerra and the Basque Nationalists, despite their class limitations as fighters, put all their force into opposing reactionary centralism.

The logic of the Spanish Civil War was determined by the circumstance that the Spanish Antifascists were fighting against an *offensive* movement of the reactionary classes, a movement opened at a time when those classes were, dialectically, on the defensive against the latent revolutionary movement of 1934. It was easy for many observers to mistake the symptoms of revolution for the fact. Obviously, the symptoms could not have existed if the fact had not been latent; but it was an error, at the close of 1936, to mistake the promise for the present reality. There were many contradictions yet to be solved.

In Catalonia, the casual visitor might well have supposed that the revolution had already been accomplished. The Generalidad Council was composed of more or less equal representation of the two Unions, the Marxist and the Anarchist, and the petty-bourgeoisie, with a petty-bourgeois President who was publicly moving further every day towards at least acquiescence in the Unions' demands.

In everyday life there was a form of proletarian rule, amounting almost to dictatorship, said the socialist organ, *Treball*. A rich man could not direct his business without at least consulting a Workers' Committee; he could not withdraw more than a certain amount of money from the bank or keep it in his house; he could neither buy nor drive a car without the workers' permission; the police protecting his person and property were workers; he could

not buy more than a certain amount of most commodities, nor could his provisions-dealer deliver goods at his house. If he wished to go into the country, he had to ask the workers for a pass. He had to provide a certain amount of household linen for worker refugees. He could not dismiss his employees or servants. He was liable for military service to fight with the workers against his fellow rich men. He could no longer live in luxury on his director's fees. He did not like to wear a hat on the streets.

Many factories and firms had been expropriated by the workers and run on a co-operative basis. Enterprises employing more than 100 workers were collectivised by Government decree. Only very small businesses could function without workers' control. The framers of the Collectivisation Decree, to do them justice, always declared that this was simply a transitional measure tending towards socialisation later. It was a weapon, a means, not an end.

Striking in such declarations, publicly and frequently made by such prominent Anarchists as Juan Fábregas, Councillor for Economy, was that they showed the immense difference between Spanish Anarchism and the conventional conception still obtaining in other countries. It was always the objection to historical Anarchism that by shooting a King or a capitalist nothing whatever was achieved: it was well nigh impossible to liquidate a whole royal family or an entire board of directors. This was, in actual fact, an unfair accusation, since these tactics were not employed even by the Russian Nihilists, and political assassination was always more of a wild emotional protest than a tactic. But the fact that the Spanish Anarchists could think in terms of organisations and systems rather than of individuals was a big step towards an intelligent revolution.

In the Resolution of December 28, 1936, the Communist International Executive Committee not only fully approved the action of the Spanish Communist Party but added:

"The strengthening of fraternal relations with the Anarchists . . . has been extraordinarily facilitated by the fact that the C.N.T. has proved in practice its ability to draw correct tactical conclusions from the circumstances." This statement is as important as the entry of the C.N.T. into a Socialist-Communist-Republican Government.

Great changes had come about even in six months in the structure and administration of the three fundamentals of government: legislature, executive and judiciary. All the new apparatus was, however, by the nature of things, transitional.

Legislation was carried out by decree. The Cabinet which issued the decrees was quite unlike any other Cabinet in the world. An important section, the four Anarchists, were not even members of the Cortes. The Cortes still existed, and met periodically to hear the Ministers account for their legislation and to ratify the Basque Statute. The Cortes Standing Committee met monthly to assure an astonished world that a "state of alarm" was necessary in Spain. The Catalan Parliament existed in theory, despite the C.N.T.'s protests; but this odd body continued its tradition of being perfectly useless when it existed and an excellent grievance when suppressed.

While the Spanish and the Catalan Governments stood firmly on the basis of the Constitution, this strange state of affairs had to continue, a polite fiction but possibly a future weapon: the Cortes might, under certain circumstances, become a Convention.

The executive was naturally subordinated to military needs. At the end of the year, the Valencia Government took steps to fuse all the various police corps and the political patrols into a single Junta of Internal Security, under the orders of the Minister of the Interior. The U.G.T., the PSUC and the Esquerra suggested the same in Catalonia, but here local political issues came into play.

The judicial system had been profoundly modified by the creation of the People's Courts formed by representatives of all the antifascist parties. Their action was

not more unjust and a great deal more human than that of the old professional courts. Justice was made vastly speedier and cheaper. A kind of Appeals Court had been set up in Catalonia to examine the People's Courts' sentences, so that the Councillor for Justice, who reported on the cases to the whole Generalidad Council, had a very large measure of power. While the Courts dealt only with proved rebels of July 19, the matter was not of great importance, except in so far as many of the accused were related to more or less influential persons in the Esquerra, who, thinking perhaps of their own position, did not like the idea that a man was suspect because he was rich. In justice it must be said that the Barcelona People's Courts rarely sentenced a man for his ideas or social position but simply for his proved activities, that acquittals were frequent and popular. In the provinces, however, there were certain cases against which the extremist parties were the first to protest.

The political importance of the Appeals Court would appear when the trials dealt with presumed traitors, persons who had insinuated themselves into the various antifascist organisations. In the early days, the organisations had dealt with their own traitors severely and expeditiously. But all parties recognised that this system opened the way to all kinds of abuses and that the People's Court could be the only judge of the matter.

The Valencia Government created labour camps, an economic and a humaner method of treating the hundreds of persons who were in prison not for any actual seditious behaviour but because they had belonged to Right-wing organisations, were obviously disaffected to the Popular Front, and, if released, might well join the famous "Fifth Column". Many were set to work on a new Valencia-Madrid road.

Diego Abad de Santillan, declaring that he had always been a heretic, told a meeting of C.N.T. militants: "Instead of condemning an enemy to thirty years' jail, I would sentence him to build five miles of road or plant

a hundred thousand trees." He had always been hostile to the idea of prisons, but thought it was far humaner in the early days of the rebellion to preserve them instead of executing the people's enemies right and left. Daily executions, he added, had no effect and merely served to satisfy certain "repugnant morbidities".

The U.G.T. representative who took Nin's place abolished the Appeals Court, restoring liberty of judgment to the People's Courts.

There were several other very important changes in legal ideas and procedure. As has already been related, both marriage and divorce were immensely cheapened and speeded up. Coming of age was lowered to eighteen. Women obtained more liberty in many directions. The brothels were collectivised and a vigorous campaign was carried on for the abolition of prostitution. Many of the sexual inhibitions imposed by the Church gradually disappeared. Curiously enough, after the first outburst, there was almost no anti-religious propaganda. The Church, as Church, had simply vanished and, just as by June 1931 no one mentioned Alfonso XIII, so now few people mentioned the clergy. Mariano Vasquez, Secretary of the National Committee of the C.N.T., actually told the foreign press that it was quite possible that a form of private Catholicism would be tolerated in Spain after the Revolution, much in the same way as in the U.S.S.R. Churches might be rebuilt by private subscription, but the convents and monasteries would never again be tolerated.

One of the most interesting creations in Catalonia was the New Unified School, decided upon by a two-days conference of the C.N.T. unions in the early autumn and ratified in a special article of the famous Pact with the U.G.T. and PSUC on October 22. Education had always been one of the fundamental Spanish problems, and although illiteracy was not very extensive in Catalonia, the mere ability to read and write was hardly a satisfactory criterion when the chief reading-matter in the schools

was the Catechism. Even upper-class education in the private schools was not much better, as it was usually controlled by the head master's confessor.

The new education, as one speaker put it, was to be "neither communist, socialist nor anarchist, but rationalist". It was to be based on the teachings of Ferrer Guardia, shot in 1909.

The Council of the New Unified School was created by Generalidad decree on July 27, only a week after the outbreak; in itself an impressive fact.

The Committee was to be presided over by the Councillor for Education, at that time the poet Ventura Gassol. It consisted of four representatives from the U.G.T. (Spanish Federation of Educational Workers), four from the C.N.T. (Liberal Professions Union), and one each from the Council for Education, the Autonomous University of Barcelona, the Committee of the Industrial University and the Fine Arts School.

The New Unified School was based on the Spanish Constitution and the Catalan Statute, which defined its four ideals: "Labour, Freedom, Social Justice and Human Solidarity."

The School was to cover the whole of the child's life from its birth until its education was finished. Teaching was to be in Catalan up to the age of six, then strictly bi-lingual.

The curriculum was to be decided by consultations between the Unified School Committee, the teachers, and a Parents' Committee, which was to control the school under supervision by the Generalidad. In the High Schools, there would be formed joint councils of teachers and pupils.

Important school building activity took place, especially in the provinces. The Workers' University was created. The Generalidad obtained from the Government the educational rights not originally included in the Statute. The Basques also obtained their long-desired national University.

Parallel with these legislative, executive, judicial and cultural developments went a fundamental economic change: the Collectivisation Decree. What precisely happened is extremely hard to assess, chiefly because the same word had different meanings in different places. Property and enterprises were "collectivised", "socialised" "nationalised", "municipalised", "controlled", "appropriated", "occupied", "taken over" (*incautado*), "supervised" (*intervenido*). All these terms covered the legalisation, to a greater or less degree, of an action taken by the workers themselves, when they simply occupied first the factories and businesses whose owners had fled or been liquidated, then those essential for war purposes.

The eventual regularisation of this state of affairs was aimed at by the creation of the Economic Council of Catalonia, the programme of which was:

- (1) Regulation of production in accordance with the necessities of consumption.
- (2) Control of foreign trade.
- (3) Collectivisation of big estates, respecting small property.
- (4) Reduction of urban rents.
- (5) Collectivisation of big industry, public services and transport.
- (6) Confiscation and collectivisation of all enterprises abandoned by their owners.
- (7) Encouragement of co-operatives for distribution and collectivisation of the big distributive enterprises.
- (8) Workers' control of banking leading to complete nationalisation.
- (9) Workers' control in private firms.
- (10) Placing of unemployed workers on the land and in industry, encouragement of agricultural production, resettlement of city workers on the land, creation of new industries, electrification of Catalonia, etc.
- (11) Abolition of all indirect taxation in favour of the single tax.

In point of fact, about a dozen different systems prevailed. There were branches such as banking which were "*intervenido*", controlled by a Workers' Council, sometimes including the former director, who might stay on at his work at a salary equal to that of a highly-skilled worker, 1,500 pesetas a month, and by a delegate from the Generalidad. Other industries were "*intervenido*" by the Workers' Council and a delegate from the Union. The taxis were about 80 per cent in the hands of the C.N.T. Transport Union, and were run by it as a commercial undertaking, the drivers receiving a fixed wage. Many cafés were collectivised, being run by the waiters on a co-operative basis. Tips had already been abolished. Some enterprises, such as the smaller hotels, ruined by lack of visitors and the imposition of non-paying refugees (who were later moved to converted convents, the Hotels Pasionaria and Federica Montseny) applied for collectivisation so that the unions would pay wages and provide cash for food, etc.

Other enterprises, abandoned by their owners, were "*incautado*" and run by Workers' Councils for their own profit. The real disadvantage of this was that it merely intensified the faults of capitalist competition and created a "new form of bourgeoisie", as many papers complained, while most of them refused to pay the bills outstanding on July 19, thus creating even more confusion and placing other "*incautado*" enterprises in a very difficult position.

The same confusion was apparent in the countryside. In theory, the big estates, rare in Catalonia, were to be collectivised. In Andalusia the peasants had already done this and were farming in the manner of the Russian *kolkhozes*. The Catalan peasants, with their smallholder mentality, more French than Spanish, did not want this. Their ideal was the one-family farm. It was also hard to persuade them not to kill their cows and chickens for meat, for the Barcelona market was voracious and profitable, even with the huge speculation carried on by the middlemen.

A transitory measure was the "municipalisation" of the land. This responded to the anarchist idea of autonomous municipalities organised federally, but in practice it was uneconomic. There was also a project to municipalise all urban property.

The municipalities had gone through much the same stages as the Generalidad. The Azaña and Casares Quiroga Governments had been unable to hold municipal elections, and although the Generalidad had decreed the return of the former corporations displaced after October 6, 1934, by Government Commissioners, there was still considerable confusion on July 19. The old municipalities were more or less forced out by Village Committees or Defence Committees, composed of representatives of all parties, many of which had never been represented there before. Later, the Committees were changed back to Municipalities, and later still, the Municipalities were called Councils.

One of the political consequences of the municipalisation of the land was the rapid growth of the U.G.T.'s Land Federation, which had hardly existed previously in Catalonia, and counted some 20,000 members by the end of the year. This was, however, partly due to the decree making it compulsory for the peasants to join a union. The Rabassaires tended to support the U.G.T. both in the Councils and in the Generalidad.

Despite two important agrarian congresses held by the C.N.T. and others by the PSUC, the POUM and the Rabassaires, no definite decision was reached. This was inevitable; for land-tenure conditions in Catalonia differed widely from those in the rest of Spain, so that it was impossible to apply to the Catalan farmers and peasants alone general measures, of which the application would have averaged out over the whole country. While the war lasted, no radical solution for the land problem could be found. The Generalidad simply suspended temporarily all the contracts of tenure in existence before July 19, whether they conformed to the famous Land Tenure Law or not.

The original Supplies Committee, at first merely a subsidiary of the Antifascist Militias Committee, came to assume increasing importance and increasing autonomy owing to the magnitude of its task. When the Militias Committee fused with the Generalidad, Supplies, Finance and Economy became separate Councillorships, but the Economic Council was for long so much the most important that there was at one time a project to reform the Generalidad into three supreme Councils: Defence, Internal Security and Economy. The C.N.T., before it entered the Caballero Cabinet, advocated the formation of a National Economic Council.

The Catalan Economic Council kept its importance, and increased it by the Collectivisation Decree. The Decree created—or rather perpetuated—the Works Council and the General Industrial Council.

The Works Council, composed of from five to fifteen members, with proportionate representation of the unions organising the workers in each enterprise, was to be elected by the workers in general assembly. The General Industrial Councils were to be formed by four representatives from the Works Councils, eight representatives from the various unions, proportionate to the number of their members in the factory, four technicians appointed by the Economic Council, and be presided over by a representative of the Economic Council.

The General Industrial Councils were to have a very large measure of liberty and authority, but were to remain in constant contact with the Economic Council and, ultimately, take their orders from it.

Since the Councillor for Economy could take important measures only after consultation with the Generalidad Council, this was still a strictly centralised organisation. It was, however, not impossible that the Councillor for Economy might obtain, like the Councillor for Finance, full powers to act without consulting the Generalidad Council, although the Presidents' signature would be necessary to give the decrees the force of law.

Even before July 19, the country had been breaking up: Catalonia had recovered its Statute, Casares Quiroga had bestowed autonomy on the somewhat astonished Galicians, Prieto was lobbying through the Basque *fueros*, Gil Robles was half-seriously trying for a Statute for Old Castile and Leon, in order to provide a stronghold for the reaction, and Navarre was in frank opposition to Madrid.

By the end of the year, Catalonia and the Basque Country were autonomous, the Valencians had been offered autonomy, but had not pressed the point, owing to the hostility of Castellon and Alicante, Aragon had a Defence Council, presided over by the C.N.T., Asturias and Leon were acting almost independently, cut off as they were from the rest of the loyalist districts. On the rebel side, it appeared that Queipo de Llano in Andalusia and Mola in Navarre had a certain autonomy, despite the proclamation of Franco as Generalissimo of Spain, the Moroccans had been promised their Statute and the Balearics were more or less an Italian colony.

It was important, however, that even the Basques and Catalans consulted Valencia in matters of foreign policy and reiterated their adhesion to the Central Government. The break-up showed no likelihood of going so far as it had in 1869-73, when the whole of Spain had been a tangle of warring provinces. It had had increasing independence thrust upon it by the force of circumstances, and neither seized nor demanded it; Catalan separatism, indeed, on the only occasion on which it became at all militant, was shown to be definitely disloyal, not only to the Republic but to Catalonia.

The federal structure could admit local varieties of organisation. Collectivisation could mean one thing in the Andalusian countryside, another in the Catalan factories. The course of the war, objective conditions rather than will, would determine whether the process would be centripetal or centrifugal.

In Part I of this book, the five fundamental problems of Spain were discussed: the land, the Church, capitalism,

the Army, the national question. Of these, the Church and national problems had solved themselves by disappearing. The creation of a new Popular Army was the biggest of all the problems the Revolution was facing. The problem of capitalism was being attacked through collectivisation, but still remained acute, and could not possibly be solved until the end of the Civil War. The problem of the land remained, as ever, the fundamental problem of Spanish society.

On January 4, 1837, the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent wrote from Bilbao: "We are extremely glad to announce that on Christmas Day, the Spanish general Espartero, powerfully aided by the crews of the British ships on the station, and by detachments of the royal and marine artillery, succeeded in raising the siege of Bilbao, completely routing the Carlists, and capturing the whole of their artillery and a considerable number of prisoners. . . . We expect that the moral advantage of this signal victory will be of peculiar advantage to the liberal cause."

A hundred years later, the German fleet was off Bilbao, capturing and handing over to the Carlists ships of the "liberal cause". Sheltered by the Non-Intervention Committee, the British Government was even able to promise to make it an offence for Englishmen to join the ranks of the "liberal cause" as volunteers, at a time when some thousands of German and Italian regulars were landing at Cadiz.

There was no free field for the development of Spanish internal processes. It was impossible either to neglect or to count upon the chance of an international war which would divert attention from Spanish affairs. "Is there not," Engels asked in 1891, "perpetually hanging over our heads the Damocles' sword of another war, on the first day of which all the chartered covenants of princes will be scattered like chaff; a war of which nothing is certain but the absolute uncertainty of what will be its outcome, a race-war which will subject the whole of

Europe to devastation by fifteen or twenty million armed men, and is not only already raging because even the strongest of the great military states shrinks before the absolute incalculability of its final outcome?"

In the welter of blood and treachery, of intrigues and heroism, of injustice, idealism, error and initiative which filled the first half-year of the Spanish Civil War, three tremendous facts stood out: Madrid did not fall, the International Columns, voluntarily enlisted, fought for antifascist Spain, and the Catalan workers of the General Motors factory in Barcelona produced, in four months, a completely national-made lorry.

Madrid held. Despite the crucial aid of the International Columns, it could not have held had not the militias and the civil population, so frivolous hitherto that it was hard to distinguish their "*no pasaran*" from their traditional "*no pasa nada*", simply refused to be impressed by the most terrible bombardment to which a city had ever been subjected. It could not have held had not the Fifth Regiment and the Defence Junta organised the war, the civil life of the city and the evacuation of the civil population on correct revolutionary lines.

The International Columns came to fight for Madrid. Many of the leaders had been through almost all the civil wars of the last twenty years; but this was the first time in history that a voluntary political army had gathered from the ends of the earth. They were not the scum of the capitalists lands, cannon-fodder from the slums. Their dead included men like Hans Beimler and Ralph Fox, men whose fame extended beyond the circle of their revolutionary activities. By far the majority had no pressing reason to come to Spain save their burning desire to fight that Fascism which had murdered so many of their friends and class-comrades in almost every country in Europe and the Americas. It was jokingly said that the Spanish Civil War had been almost transformed into a German Civil War on Spanish soil. The German exiles, many of whom fought in a compact body on July 19,

formed the first Thaelmann Century, but later they were in a minority. The Soviet battalions were a myth.

The International Columns were an extraordinary thing in the Europe of 1936. In so many countries the antifascist front had appeared to be merely platonic, but now men actually came to die under unfamiliar bombardment. Unlike the civil wars of 1919-23, this was no last flicker of a world war, though it might well be the first flicker of one. Antifascism had joined hands often with integral pacifism: the example of the International Columns might go far to remove that dangerous illusion.

In Madrid, the Communist Party had gained predominance not by cunning political manœuvres, but by its "seriousness": by the speeches of Pasionaria, the organisation of the Fifth Regiment, the efficiency of its food-distribution, the responsibility for evacuation, the military success of Miaja and Antonio Mije; in a word, by the proved correctness of its general line. In Asturias, it was well on the way to the same results, simply because the reformism of the Miners' Union and the predominant Anarchism of the Regional C.N.T. were, practically and dialectically, incapable of solving the immediate problems. In Catalonia, the C.N.T. had shown remarkable adaptiveness, but its whole tendency was precisely to adapt itself to the general line of the Communist Party. In the Basque Country, the Communist Party alone realised the correct way of reconciling the Nationalist petty-bourgeois reformism with the necessities of civil war and revolution.

Franco's victory would serve only to stress the tragic wastage, the ubiquity of death, the often pointless slaughter, the horrors of lolling child corpses and the huger horrors of the treacheries of intention, of deviation, of stupidity and of weariness; the ruin of a fine land and a fine race of men. To do Franco the utmost justice he may have believed that he was emulating the Cid Campeador, who also fell into strange company; and, charging the windmills of history, have wished to destroy the only progressive force in Spain.

Ultimately, the struggle was between progress and "order". Undoubtedly, progress would be accompanied by upheavals, wild experiments, murders, transitional changes which could bring only suffering until they had found their correct direction. But "order" could only be the order of those Spanish graveyards where, facing the finest landscape in the world, the dead are inserted into a thick wall in square boxes.

The proletariat, the people, has been defeated time after time. It has been victorious only in the U.S.S.R. and, partially, in South China and Mexico. It can afford to be defeated again and again. Military defeat is only the intensification of its normal position. It cannot afford to throw away the chance of victory, for too much is then at stake. The chance of victory lies in unity; not only in one country but over the whole world. The Civil War in Spain is only an incident in the whole world struggle of the working-class for liberation and progress. Not the defeat would be shameful but the betrayal of this historic solidarity. And the result of that betrayal would be simply annihilation: a war of which the workers and progressive classes would inevitably be the first to pay the very personal and painful price of death.

August 1937.

APPENDICES

I. English Penny

II. The Collectivisation Decree in Catalonia

III. Spanish Parties

APPENDIX I

ENGLISH PENNY

BEING THE EXPERIENCES OF PENELOPE
PHELPS, AN ENGLISH NURSE IN SPAIN, AS
TOLD BY HERSELF IN A SPEECH AT WELWYN
GARDEN CITY

I WENT OUT TO Spain in January with a unit from the British Spanish Medical Aid Committee, along with two other nurses. I was interviewed at Albacete, and told I was going to help the International Column. My destination, however, was kept secret from me, since I was, by then, under military discipline.

My first night was horrible, and the guns were going all the time.

Next day I had to go to a small school, about five kilometres outside Madrid, taking mobile theatre equipment with me, and getting it ready inside the school. Cases began to roll in and the work went on until about 5.30 the next morning.

It was a terrible time; the wounded arrived in ambulances, on the sides of lorries and stretchers, anyhow, and they must have had a terrible time, because the roads in this region are very rough and it is very mountainous. It was only at this time that I discovered I was quite near to the actual front.

I slept then until 9 a.m., and then we had to begin again, doing the same job until 6 o'clock the next morning. I kept thinking we were finished, but more and more cases kept coming in, and the "hospital" got very crowded. Some of the patients had to be left out in the yard, there was so little space, which must have been very terrible,

because until about three weeks ago it was very cold out there and there was often snow on the ground.

Machine-gunning and aerial bombardment went on continuously all this time. At first it was only in the day, but now it is at night as well. We had no electric light, and had to use torches instead of it; also there was no heating except a small gasoline stove, and sometimes it was so cold you would be glad to be in a room full of people to get the heat from their stuffiness. We kept the water in jars.

Sometimes I was so tired I felt I couldn't go on any longer; then you would have a Spanish cigarette (there were no English ones) and some black coffee, and then begin again.

There were times when I had to stumble out for air, and as you tried to get out, you would keep falling over bodies, some dead and some wounded. And that and the cries of the wounded for "agua" (water) always made us go on. I don't know where our energy came from; often I would be so tired I would think: "I can't stick it. I suppose I shall have to give it up." But I used to get fresh strength and go on again.

At the next place, Chinchon, we had to treat an English brigade. And how grateful they were to hear an English-woman's voice!

The conditions here were terrible and we were very short of material. Also our instruments were blunt. We had not enough anæsthetics and we had to give local ones in operations which ought to have had ether or chloroform, which is a horrible experience for the patients.

I was the only English nurse there and I was called English Penny by the Spaniards. I had a Spanish boy and girl to help, and I had to get all the instruments ready and do lots of other work besides. (For example, we had to dispose of the amputated limbs ourselves somehow.)

The anæsthetic was usually given by someone quite unskilled, sometimes from outside.

At Tarancon another incident occurred which I must tell you about. We were at a little hospital on the Madrid-Valencia road, and opposite there was a little petrol station where the food lorries refuelled.

Lower down there was a little coffee shop, and as I passed along the road the guard in front signalled to me, and as he could speak a little English I went and sat down with him. I noticed some children playing near the petrol station and I thought how beautiful they were with their dark eyes.

Suddenly, and without warning, I heard terrible crashes (so loud my hand automatically flew up to my ear) and my chair went from underneath me on to the floor. At first I didn't realise what it was, but then I saw it was a bombardment, and I dashed across the road, through a bloody mess of mules, bricks, etc., to get to the children.

The petrol station was by this time a sheet of flame. This was my first experience of picking up a child; it was awful. I shall never forget it. As I took it up it regained consciousness and struggled in my arms, and I had to hold it, which was difficult because one leg was hanging on by a sinew. I dashed across to the hospital and the child was operated upon.

In the middle of the operation one of the doctors came in with another child, burnt almost to an unrecognisable cinder; we gave it morphine, which was all we could do, so it shouldn't wake up to its agony.

I have got used to picking up children now, but I shall never forget that first horrible experience. The house and the petrol station and all the people in them were nothing but ashes.

We are very short of anæsthetics now, and we cannot give them to many who really need them. Injuries from dum-dum bullets, which are used in spite of any denials, and hand-grenade injuries, have to be called "not serious", and treated without anæsthetics.

Then we are so under-staffed. A London hospital has

a doctor, four nurses, an anæsthetist and an assistant, where we have one doctor, one nurse and one assistant.

Also our instruments get worn out and blunt. There is no Lysol or other sterilising fluid, and boiling merely blunts them. I used alcohol, until one day I found out that they had started to water it to make it go further.

I don't know what will happen when the typhoid epidemic comes, and it is almost bound to. I saw a child with it. Its mouth was literally black inside with flies, and it was in a pitiable state. We had to risk its going to Valencia to hospital. It might have died on the way, but there was one chance in ten it might get through, and it would die for certain if it stayed.

Once I had to go to see Lady Hastings about what we needed for the isolation hospital. I had to go to Madrid to see about it, and I took some patients with me in a small ambulance.

Just as we were going over the Arganda Bridge they began machine-gunning us (though we were clearly marked with the Red Cross). I had to duck my head, and we escaped by going at terrific speed, round hairpin bends, etc. I could never be frightened by road-hogging again! The despatch rider in front was killed, and it was dreadful to have to leave him, but to stay would have been suicide. We got through all right ourselves in the end.

We had no milk but tinned, and very few eggs. All these were for the patients only. Butter we got three times a week, and then it was rancid; but we ate it, it made the bread go down. These are just incidents. You can't realise what's going on out there. War is the great atrocity. The guilt lies with those who started this war.

But "Spain is Red", said a friend to me. "Yes," I said, "it is: red with blood." The blood is splashed over the streets, and the gutters often run with it. For weeks my finger-nails were blocked up with clotted blood, and my arms were splashed up to the elbows with it.

It makes my blood boil to see the people of England arranging all these festivities so thoughtlessly. Why don't they spare a thought for Spain?

I don't know what this Government is doing. They don't seem to want the Spanish people to win. We must help them to change the awful conditions of the life out there.

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APPENDIX II

THE COLLECTIVISATION DECREE IN CATALONIA

THE "DECREE ON Collectivisations and Worker Control" was published on October 24, 1936, and completed by a supplementary Order on November 28. The Workers' Control Committees had already been legalised on August 28, although the Order was published in the Official Gazette only on September 23. Since there had been a great deal of difficulty in understanding the original Decree, a new body, the Junta of Economic Syndical Control, was formed on October 31. The Councillor for Economy, to whom is due the credit for the Collectivisation Decree, was Juan P. Fábregas, of the C.N.T.

The Decree is a very long document, comprising a theoretic Introduction and thirty-nine articles.

It starts from the thesis that the accumulation of riches in the hands of an ever-decreasing minority has led to the ever-increasing misery of the working class. This minority had provoked a civil war to preserve its privileges, and therefore the victory of the people would mean the death of capitalism.

Therefore, it was essential to organise production in such a way that the "only beneficent of the new social structure should be the collectivity, the worker who would have the direction of the new social order; income not proceeding from labour would be suppressed."

On July 19, the bourgeoisie had deserted; the industries affected could not be left without direction, so the workers decided to intervene and created Workers' Control Committees. The Generalidad had to legalise this and try to

canalise the workers' spontaneous action. In some cases, the workers had to confiscate industries to safeguard their own interests, thus creating the necessity of collectivising these industries.

"But the collectivisation of industries would mean little if no aid were given to their development. Therefore the Economic Council has been asked to study the constitution of an Industrial and Commercial Credit Bank to help collectivised industries financially and to group industry in wide concentrations."

These considerations were the basis of the Collectivisation Decree.

Catalan industry was divided into two categories:

- (1) *Collectivised enterprises*, in which the responsibility for the direction lay with the workers, represented by an Enterprise Council;
- (2) *Private enterprises*, in which the direction was entrusted to the owner or manager, with the collaboration and approval of the Workers' Control Committee.

All enterprises employing more than 100 employees on June 30, 1936, all those whose owners had been declared rebels by the People's Courts or had abandoned their business, even if they employed less than 100 workers, were collectivised. Enterprises employing between 50 and 100 workers could be collectivised if three-fourths of the workers so desired. Other enterprises could be collectivised if the owner and the majority of the workers so desired. "Worker" meant any person on the pay-roll.

Enterprises which no longer employed 100 workers, but had done so on June 30, 1936, could be collectivised. In cases where work was given to piece-workers outside the actual enterprise (in the dress and carpentry trades, for example), the piece-workers could be made full-time workers and the enterprise collectivised if the total number then exceeded 100. Branches of firms situated outside

Catalonia could be collectivised if the branch employed more than 100 workers (several shipping firms).

Both the assets and the liabilities of the former enterprise passed to the collectivised enterprise.

The collectivisation had to be carried out in unities; that is to say, a firm comprising both a factory and a distributing organisation had to be collectivised as a single unit.

Former owners and managers could continue to work in their enterprises in the position for which they were most suited; but their maximum wage was to be 1,000 pesetas a month (foreign "technical experts" received 1,500—an average skilled worker's salary was about 5-600).

Foreign-owned enterprises or enterprises in which foreign capital was involved were to be the object of special study. Compensation was to be paid. Branches of foreign firms, if they employed more than 100 workers, could be collectivised if the workers so desired. In this case, the Generalidad would decide the amount and method of compensation.

No worker could be dismissed once an enterprise was collectivised; and no foreign firm could be closed down without the special authorisation of the Councillor for Labour.

THE WORKS COUNCILS

The management of collectivised enterprises was entrusted to a Works Council elected by the workers themselves in general assembly. The Council was composed of from five to fifteen members, who included a representative for production, administration, technical services and commercial exchange. The U.G.T. and C.N.T. were represented proportionately to the number of workers belonging to each union employed in the enterprise. The Councillors were elected for two years, but half the Council was renewable annually; Councillors were re-eligible. Former owners or managers could not serve on the Council.

The Council was responsible to the workers and to the General Industrial Councils (see later). They assumed the functions and responsibilities of the former Directors' Boards in limited companies.

The Works Councils had to adapt themselves to the general plan drawn up by the General Industrial Councils, each separate firm acting in co-ordination with the other firms in the same branch of industry. They had to take into account the general regulations laid down by the General Industrial Councils dealing with margin of profit, general conditions of sale, acquisition of raw materials, reserve funds, distribution of profits, building up of stocks, etc.

They were also responsible for conditions of work, hygiene, safety; they were to encourage the creation of clubs, sports centres, recreation, reading-rooms, etc.

The Council elected a Director, delegating to him its functions. In the case of big firms employing more than 500 workers, with capital of over one million pesetas or connected with national defence, the Director would have to be approved by the Generalidad. The Director need not necessarily be a member of the Council.

Every Council had to include a Government Inspector appointed by the Generalidad. His task was to see that the Collectivisation Decree was strictly carried out and to act as link between the enterprise and the authorities. He could suspend any measure taken by the Works Council not in accordance with the spirit of the Decree.

The Council was obliged to take note of the complaints and suggestions made by the workers and pass them on to the General Industrial Council. In many cases, these complaints and suggestions could be made through delegates from the Factory Committees already in existence but not yet legally recognised. These delegates were chosen from U.G.T. and C.N.T. affiliates proportionately to the number of each employed.

Members of the Council could be dismissed for notorious incompetence either by the general assembly of the workers

or by the General Industrial Council. In the latter case, the workers, if they did not approve, could appeal to the Generalidad Councillor for Economy whose decision would be final.

WORKERS' CONTROL COMMITTEES IN PRIVATE ENTERPRISES

The creation of Workers' Control Committees in non-collectivised enterprises was obligatory. The workers themselves could decide its composition. Their work was to see that all labour legislation was strictly carried out and that the conditions of work were satisfactory. All payments and revenues had to be approved by the Committees, and they had to work in close collaboration with the owner to improve the processes of production.

All instructions given by the owner or manager to the workers had to pass through the Committees, and the annual balance-sheets had to be submitted to them, to be passed on to the General Industrial Councils.

THE GENERAL INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS

The General Industrial Councils were formed by four representatives of the Works Councils, eight representatives of the Unions, proportionately to the number of members employed, and four technicians appointed by the Generalidad Economic Council.

The General Industrial Councils drew up the general plans for each industry, with especial attention to the regulation of the industry's total production, the unification of prices, so far as possible, to avoid competition, the study of markets, the rationalisation of the industry, the application for tariffs, the study of all problems affecting production and marketing in that particular industry.

The decisions of the General Industrial Councils were absolutely binding upon the Works Councils, who could appeal only to the final decision of the Generalidad.

The Generalidad Economic Council embarked upon an important plan for concentrating various industries, by a

kind of rationalisation. Groups of small enterprises could be fused, bringing the number of their combined workers over the hundred limit, so that they could be collectivised. This was amplified in the Order of November 28. This form of rationalisation, however, could be carried out only on the proposal of the workers, the General Industrial Councils or the Generalidad.

The Unions could not make collectivisations. They could only advise their members, but could not exploit for their own profit public services, industries, workshops, businesses, land. This could be done only by the workers themselves employed in the various enterprises.

Every enterprise affected by the Decree had to draw up a balance-sheet, checked by a commission appointed by the Generalidad. Any favourable surplus was registered at the Generalidad. The Council for Economy was to decide what compensation could be paid to bond-holders. Dividends would be paid in Spanish or Catalan currency.

The Collectivisation Decree was distinctly anarcho-syndicalist in inspiration. It legalised an existing state of affairs created by the Catalan workers' "instinct" rather than invented a new form of economic organisation. It had to build upon accomplished facts. Hence its confusion and inconclusiveness. Fábregas himself always stressed that the Decree was merely a means to the end, Socialism. But what precisely he meant by Socialism no one could understand.

"Collectivisation" itself was a difficult word, though it recurred time after time in the speeches of C.N.T. militants. The "collectivity" appeared to be the sum total of the workers in any one enterprise; and "collectivisation" to be a kind of co-operativism. In theory, it had nothing to do with the Soviet system of "collective" farming, for example; although this was in practice employed in some villages after the "municipalisation" of the land.

On December 6, the Regional Federation of the FAI, assembled in Barcelona, resolved that "economy must be

constructed on the basis of solidarity and equality. Social wealth must be used in the general interest. The organisation of work must be carried out by the Unions. Partial collectivisations must be avoided. To complete Socialisation, the distribution of products must be socialised, in order to prevent the continuance of social injustice”.

Three weeks later, *Solidaridad Obrera* stated: “The time for Socialisation has come. In the first phase of the Revolution, the Workers’ Control Committees were its practical expression. But the Revolution must be completed by a decisive step: entire Socialisation. This can be done only if the Unions take over complete control of the administration of production. The Unions must control the factories. Only thus can the possibility of exploitation be destroyed. The slogan of all workers of all parties must be: ‘Production directed by the workers through their class organisations’.”

Implicit in the Collectivisation Decree was the creation of a “new bourgeoisie”. Unless the General Industrial Councils and the Junta of Syndical Economic Control could impose themselves within a month of their creation, there was nothing to prevent a Works’ Council, “assuming the functions of the Directors’ Board of a limited company”, from engaging in cut-throat competition with other Works’ Councils in the same branch of industry. The Unions, too, could run certain industries purely for their own profit. The taxis, for instance, were a pure commercial enterprise of the C.N.T. Transport Union, which assured its monopoly by simply liquidating the small U.G.T. competitors.

Interesting is the emphasis upon the safeguarding of small industry and commerce. It was certainly unpleasant and even intolerable to the older generation of Barcelona artisans not to have complete control over their workers, but to have to consult the Workers’ Control Committees. On the other hand, several industries, like the smaller hotels, actually applied for collectivisation as a method of

raising from the Industrial Council sufficient funds to pay wages and buy provisions.

The FAI resolutions were taken on the same day as the first Celebration of the New Economy, a mass meeting at which Fábregas explained his Decree and Estanislau Ruiz Ponsetí, the U.G.T. representative in the Generalidad Economic Council, criticised it.

The chief defect of the Decree, he said, lay in its extreme vagueness about the financing of the project. This was not entirely the fault of the Economic Council. In the original draft far more emphasis had been laid upon compensation to the petty-bourgeoisie and especially upon the creation of the Industrial and Commercial Credit Bank. This Bank would have collected the profits made by collectivised industries, granted credits to those in need of capital and aided those industries, such as the luxury trades, which inevitably worked at a loss in war-time. Otherwise, since certain enterprises worked with huge profits and others could only just keep alive, there would still be two classes of workers: the favoured employees of the big profitable industries and the poorer workers employed in the small semi-bankrupt businesses.

This inequality would exist not only between the enterprises engaged in one branch of industry but also between the various industries. Only the most idealistic contributors to *Solidaridad Obrera* and the very young members of the Libertarian Youth demanded the immediate institution of the equal and family wage; but, while it was obvious that a street-cleaner was not so skilled a worker as a mining-engineer, it appeared unfair that a skilled metallurgical operative working overtime to fill military contracts should be able to earn more than an equally skilled operative in a textile factory bankrupt for lack of raw materials. This was the great danger of collectivisation.

Another danger, recognised by Ruiz Ponsetí, was that of the Works' Councils' inefficiency. Obviously the members elected by the workers would generally be those best known to them, the political militants, leaders of strikes, factory

committee delegates, and so on. But there was no reason to suppose that an excellent agitator was necessarily an efficient businessman; and all too often this was true.

This led to a shortage of credit, Works' Councils often refusing to pay debts, especially those incurred before July 19, although the Decree expressly stated that both assets and liabilities were to be taken over.

Undoubtedly there were many objections to the Decree, and the petty-bourgeoisie did its best to sabotage the "New Economy" in many cases, because impetuous "irresponsible committees" at once began to collectivise right and left. One of the methods, happily rare, was simply to liquidate all owners engaged in one branch of a small local industry, such as village bakers, except one, unite all the ovens and collectivise the industry. The bakers could not, of course, protest; but their widows could and did.

Nevertheless, with all its defects, freely recognised, the Collectivisation Decree represented a really serious effort to restore order and to reorganise an economy which had been chaotic even before July 19.

It could not help leaving its traces upon the new structure of economy in Catalonia, for it had arisen from the Catalan workers' "instinctive" action. Bakunin, speaking of the Paris Commune, had said that the masses even then had the "instinct for Socialism". "Instinct" alone was hardly likely to be able to organise a revolution scientifically, but it was the indispensable base for it. The Catalan Collectivisation Decree was the most notable codification of this "instinct", and an indispensable base for the socialist structure of the new society.

APPENDIX III

SPANISH PARTIES

RIGHT.

Popular Action (Acción Popular). Clerical, Austrofascist.

Leader, José Maria Gil Robles Quiñones.

Youth organisation; JAP (Juventudes de Acción Popular).

Various Regional Right parties, most important being *Valencian Regional Right* (Derechas Regionales Valencianas—D.R.V.).

Leaders, Bosch Marín, Lucía.

These were united by Gil Robles into the CEDA (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas—Spanish Federation of Independent Right Parties).

Agrarians. Clerical and big landowning interests.

Leader, Martínez de Velasco.

Spanish Regeneration (Renovación Española). Alfonsist Monarchist, inclining in 1936 towards the Corporative State.

Leader, Calvo Sotelo (dead).

Traditionalists (Carlists). Nominally supporting the Carlist line of the Spanish Royal family. More clerical than Renovación, not so centralist.

Leader, Fal Conde.

Militia, Requetes.

Spanish Phalanx (Falange Española). Fascist, chiefly on German lines.

Leader, José Antonio Primo de Rivera (reported dead).

Militia, JONS (Juntas Ofensivas Nacional-Sindicalistas—National-Syndicalist Offensive Committees).

Catalan League. Catalan big business interests.

Leader, Francisco de Asís Cambó.

Us

CENTRE.

Basque Nationalist Party. Clerical, but strongly autonomist.

Leader, José Antonio de Aguirre.

Radical Party. Petty-bourgeois "defence of order".

Leader, Alejandro Lerroux.

Conservative Party. Bourgeois, "moderate".

Leader, Miguel Maura.

Liberal Democrats. Northern big business (mostly Asturias).

Leader, Melquíades Álvarez.

LEFT.

Republican Left (Izquierda Republicana). Liberal, anti-clerical.

Leader, Manuel Azaña.

Republican Union (Union Republicana). Slightly Right of I.R.

Leader, Diego Martinez Barrio.

National Republican Party (Republicano Nacional). Madrid

Commerce and banking. Right of U.R.

Leader, Sanchez Román.

Catalan Left (Esquerra). Catalan petty-bourgeois, autonomist.

Leader, Luis Companys.

Affiliated until spring 1936 was *Estat Catalá* (Catalan State), frankly separatist.

Leader, Juan Casanovas.

Basque Action (Acción Vasca). Basque autonomist, but not clerical.

WORKERS' PARTIES.

Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero—PSO). Second International.

Leaders, Largo Caballero (Left), Indalecio Prieto (Centre), Julian Besteiro (reformist).

Communist Party (P.C.E.). Third International.

Leader, José Diaz.

Catalan Unified Socialist Party (Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya—PSUC). Combination of former socialist and communist groups. Third International.

Leader, Juan Comorera.

Workers' Party for Marxist Unification (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista—POUM). Merger of Nin's Communist Left and Maurin's Workers' and Peasants' Block. Anti-Third International.

Leader, Andrés Nin.

Iberian Anarchist Federation (Federación Anarquista Ibérica—FAI). Anarchist.

Secretary, Germinal de Souza.

Rabassaires. League of Catalan small tenants, under Esquerra influence.

Leader, José Calvet.

YOUTH MOVEMENTS.

Unified Socialist Youth (JSU). Merger of Socialist and Communist Youth.

Libertarian Youth (JJLL). Anarchist youth movement.

Iberian Youth (JCI). POUM youth movement.

TRADE UNIONS.

General Workers' Union (Unión General de Trabajadores—U.G.T.). Marxist, chiefly Left socialist.

Secretary, Largo Caballero.

National Labour Federation (Confederación Nacional de Trabajo—C.N.T.). Chiefly under influence of the FAI. International (A.I.T.).

Secretary, Mariano Vasquez.

DISSOLVED OR ABSORBED UNIONS.

General Labour Federation (Confederación General de Trabajadores—C.G.T.). Communist-controlled unions, mostly joined U.G.T.

Workers' Federation for Syndical Union (Federación Obrera de Unificación Sindicalista—FOUS). Run by POUM, now in U.G.T.

Free Syndicates (Sindicatos Libres). "Yellow" clerical unions, chiefly in Barcelona. In fact, murder gangs for strike-breaking.

Leader, Ramón Salas (dead).

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